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INTRODUCTION 
 
  
It is commonly known that the question: Is it possible to infer an “ought” from 
an “is”? which means: Is it possible to make the transition from descriptive phrases to 
prescriptive ones or from fact to value? is nowhere to be found in St. Thomas’s 
writings. Neither do we find the question: Is it possible to base ethics upon a non-value 
science or upon some definition of goodness? It seems to some that Aquinas, as a pre-
Enlightenment author, did not see these philosophical traps, which were “discovered” 
more than five centuries after his death, and thus he unwittingly committed a massive 
initial error which led to the elaboration of a complex, blundering moral theory. For 
indeed, if we were simply to ask whether Aquinas inferred moral rules from factual 
statements or moved from fact to value, many scholars would reply affirmatively, 
despite much recent interpretative acrobatics undertaken to deny this. For a fair number 
of people this is unfortunately a sufficient reason to cast such an author aside in order to 
prevent the loss of precious time in the study of theories which do not respect the basic 
rules of contemporary philosophy and theology. For them, to acknowledge this 
movement from fact to value is like acknowledging a pupil’s mistake. It completely 
disqualifies the author in question. He is banished from the contemporary world of 
serious thinking because the thesis “no ‘ought’ from ‘is’” is one of the dogmas of 
modern thinking and the “naturalistic fallacy” remains a serious objection in the 
evaluations of meta-ethical theories. 
This disqualification and banishment may, however, be precipitate. One can 
rightly ask, for example, what it means for Aquinas to “infer.” In particular, one can ask 
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what the character of “inference” is on the logical level and in what its relation or 
relations to things, signified by the words of descriptive and prescriptive phrases, 
consists. What is it we describe with our words and phrases? What makes an inference 
illicit? Whence do we obtain the principles that allow us to say that an inference is 
improper? Have we only one logic? What kind of logic makes untenable any derivation 
of practical judgments from theoretical ones? More profoundly, is there really an 
insurmountable chasm between fact and value, between “is” and “ought,” between 
factual and moral statements? Is “fact” really value-free? What kind of description 
devoids “facts” from their value-content and makes “is” a stranger to “ought”? These 
questions are asked because it is very probable that these modern problems do not apply 
to Aquinas’s worldview at all.  
The interpretative acrobatics mentioned above, which aim to deny that Aquinas 
infers “ought” from “is,” are the work of certain Thomists who seem convinced that 
these problems are applicable to St. Thomas’s moral teaching on both the philosophical 
and theological level.1 For example, the best known proponent of this interpretation of 
Aquinas insists: 
Aquinas’s repeated affirmation that practical reason’s first principles are undeduced 
refutes the common accusation or assumption that his ethics invalidly attempts to 
deduce or infer ought from is, for his affirmation entails that the sources of all 
relevant oughts cannot be deduced from any is. There remain, however, a number of 
                                                 
1 The expression “some Thomists” conceals especially such names as Germain Grisez, John Finnis, 
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., who initiated the controversy around the “New Natural Law Theory” (the 
controversy began in 1965 with Grisez’s article “The First Principle of Practical Reason: 
A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2” atural Law Forum 10 [1965]: 
168-201, but an extensive discussion followed the publication of Finnis’s book atural Law and 
atural Rights [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980]). Later, the same or a slightly modified thesis was 
repeated in many publications by these authors and other followers. From among those later defenders 
of this interpretation we can enumerate most notably Robert P. George and to some extent also Martin 
Rhonheimer (although Rhonheimer is influenced by it, he does not adopt fully Grisez-Finnis-Boyle’s 
approach). Each of these authors deserves a high esteem for his impressive work in the field of moral 
philosophy and theology. Many other Thomist scholars nonetheless have been struck by the affinity of 
arguments advanced by the proponents of the “New Natural Law Theory” with these of David Hume 
and G. E. Moore. This was one of the reasons why this innovation in reading Aquinas was criticized. 
Among early critics of this approach were such authors as Henry B. Veatch and Ralph McInerny. Later 
many others also objected against such interpretation, including Russel Hittinger, Lloyd Weinreb, 
Janice L. Smith, Brian V. Johnstone, Benedict M. Ashley, Alasdair MacIntyre, Fulvio Di Blasi, 
Anthony Lisska, Steven A. Long, John Rist, and Jean Porter. For a long list of publications on both 
sides of this controversy and an interesting discussion of the issue, see e.g. Fulvio Di Blasi, God and 
the atural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas, transl. by D. Thunder (South Bend, Ind.: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 2006). For an earlier account see e.g. Janice L. Schultz, “Is-Ought: Prescribing and 
a Present Controversy,” The Thomist 49 (1985): 1-23; and a continuation article: idem, “Thomistic 
Metaethics and a Present Controversy,” The Thomist 52 (1988): 40-62; Russell Hittinger, A Critique of 
the ew atural Law Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987). While 
I acknowledge that some presentations of their interpretation might be oversimplified and not entirely 
just, I do not intend to present the whole controversy once again.  
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contemporary Thomists who deny that such a deduction or inference need be 
fallacious, and regard Aquinas as postulating some such deduction or inference.2 
 
A common feature of this type of interpretation is a quest for the experimental source of 
the moral “ought” based on the argument that we need not learn metaphysics in order to 
know what we ought to do. As an almost obvious conclusion we find that our “ethical 
knowledge” precedes our speculative knowledge of human nature,3 “ethical knowledge” 
being distinguished from “ethical reflection.”4 The latter may take advantage of 
speculative knowledge but not the former because this would destroy moral autonomy. 
Ethics or moral theology reposes on the first principle of moral knowledge and is 
subsequently developed through moral reflection. This is so because “there can be no 
valid deduction of a normative conclusion without a normative principle, and thus … 
[the] first practical principles cannot be derived from metaphysical speculations.”5  
It is argued that Aquinas is in agreement with these claims: he escapes this 
“logically illicit” transition from “is” to “ought” by an appeal to the principles of 
practical reason, which are autonomous regarding theoretical principles. What is often 
brought forth is a concern to guarantee the practical character of ethics. Morality seen as 
a theory of action in conformity with human nature would reduce ethics to a theoretical 
science. Ethics, in fact, is irreducibly practical. Hence, the Aristotelian attempt (present 
in Aquinas’s writings) to identify a “distinctive” or “peculiarly human function” is at 
least unnecessary for the whole of ethics.6 In the same vein, St. Thomas’s identification 
                                                 
2 John Finnis, “Aquinas’ Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/aquinas-moral-political/). Elsewhere Finnis argues 
that Aquinas would allow no deduction of “ought” from “is,” nor would he sanction attempts to derive 
basic practical principles or practical (evaluative) judgments from facts. 
3 Cf. John Finnis, “Natural Inclinations and Natural Rights: Deriving ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’ According to 
Aquinas,” in Lex et Libertas: Freedom and Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas, edited by Leo 
Elders and Klaus Hedwig, p. 43-55, Studi Tomistici 30 (Rome, 1987). 
4 Martin Rhonheimer, “The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity,” The 
Thomist 67 (2003), p. 23. In the words of another defender, it is the distinction between epistemology 
and ontology that plays the main role and critics of the New Natural Law Theory do not see it clearly; 
cf. Robert P. George, “Natural Law and Human Nature,” in atural Law Theory: Contemporary 
Essays, edited by Robert P. George, p. 31-41 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
5 John Finnis and Germain Grisez, “The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph McInerny,” 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 (1981), p. 24. “According to Grisez and others, natural law 
theory need not – and a credible natural law theory cannot – rely on this logically illicit inference from 
facts to norms” (George, “Natural Law and Human Nature,” p. 33). 
6 “The ‘function’ argument is not the deep structure of Aristotle’s ethical method; it is an erratic boulder” 
(John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983], p. 17). 
Cf. seven arguments for this stance in Finnis, “Aquinas’ Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy.” 
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of “man’s last end” is said not to be foundational for his ethics, “despite surface 
appearances.”7 It is thus possible, for example, to make an elaborate sketch of 
Aquinas’s theory of natural law “without needing to advert to the question of God’s 
existence or nature or will.”8 We are reminded as well by another author that the time of 
“naturalism” (equated often with “physicalism”) in ethics or moral theology is over: 
“To be sure, no moral theologian today would still derive moral normativity 
immediately from ‘nature’ as such (understood as the naturally ‘given’ and 
‘presented’).”9  
I will argue that Aquinas in a sense justified the transition from “is” to “ought” 
and I will attempt to exhibit some reasons why his ethics and moral theology are and 
should be naturalistic. The meta-ethical problems identified with David Hume and 
George Edward Moore, when compared with Aquinas’s teaching, will appear only as 
the consequences of mistakes made (or arbitrary decisions taken) on a more basic level, 
namely, the epistemological, semantic, and logical. These mistakes result as well in the 
elimination of the philosophy of nature and in the debilitation of metaphysics. I will 
argue that St. Thomas’s approach to human cognition, semantics and logic is to some 
degree immune to such perturbations.10 Thus, a defense of his ethics or moral theology 
against the accusation that he invalidly infers an “ought” from an “is” should not deny 
that he infers an “ought” from an “is,” but rather should explain in what sense he validly 
infers an “ought” from an “is.” I will clearly distinguish in the “Is/Ought Thesis” 
between the logical sub-thesis, the semantic sub-thesis, and the internalist assumption, 
which are distinct layers of the question. It is probable that the Thomistic is/ought 
controversy consists precisely in the blurring of these distinctions. A strong emphasis on 
the motivational character of moral discourse or necessarily practical character of ethics 
                                                                                                                                               
Rhonheimer does not think “function” argument is an erratic boulder and criticizes Finnis on this point, 
see “The Cognitive Structure,” p. 24. 
7 Finnis, “Aquinas’ Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy.” 
8 John Finnis, atural Law and atural Rights (Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 1982), p. 49.  
9 Martin Rhonheimer, atural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy, 
translated by G. Malsbary (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), p. xvii. “Knowledge of 
human nature is not the point of departure for ethics, and even less for the practical reason of each 
acting subject: it is, rather, its result. We must already know the human good to interpret ‘nature’ 
rightly and thereby reach the concept of human nature, which is full of normative meaning. This 
human good we know, indeed, through the natural law, which therefore must be understood as a 
cognitive principle – as a form, that is to say, of moral knowledge” (Rhonheimer, “The Cognitive 
Structure,” p. 6). 
10 Hence I inscribe myself into the Veatch-McInerny line of interpretation and develop more positively 
some of their brief remarks written in a polemical spirit.   
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seems to introduce the hegemony of the question: “how is it that we know we ought to 
do something?” (a kind of phenomenology of action) over the question: “why ought we 
do something?” (a causal explanation). I will however not verify this possibility here. In 
this dissertation I intend only to show, distinguishing these three layers of the question, 
in what way Aquinas justifies the transition from “is” to “ought.” 
 
*   *   * 
 
We could say, without exaggeration, that every reasonable philosophical and 
theological question of his time was of interest to Aquinas. Nearly all philosophical and 
theological teaching was the subject of his study. In this it is clearly demonstrated that 
he desired to gain an adequate and integral view of all things insofar as it was possible. 
This desire seems to follow upon plain experience: the understanding of one thing can 
illuminate the understanding of another thing or reveal an aspect of it yet unseen. We 
can perceive in St. Thomas’s writings that this experience is inscribed into a broader 
observation that there are different planes, aspects and orders in the world and that this 
significantly influences his methods for freeing himself from confusion or ignorance.  
It is important for us to look at the topic of this dissertation from Aquinas’s 
perspective, taking into consideration his universality of interest and his methods of 
thinking. It is particularly important because we live today in a different world and in 
a different philosophical and theological spirit. Universality of interest is often 
perceived (sometimes correctly) as a sign of little scholarly skill. Moreover, the haste of 
our academic formation, and the pressure for publications (“publish or perish”) serve to 
deepen further the compartmentalization of our philosophy and theology. This fact 
contributes to the common notion that one can dispense oneself from studying issues 
which do not belong to one’s own field.11  
Such a dispensation is perhaps valid when studying modern or contemporary 
authors who write with the same “dismembered” spirit and from within the same (often 
unconsciously accepted) set of intuitively evident presuppositions. This does not apply, 
                                                 
11 As Gyula Klima says: “For nowadays, I think, no serious scholar could deny that the scientist of our 
age would deserve for at least equal reasons Avicenna’s reprimand addressed to Galen, who, says 
Avicenna, ‘knows many branches of science, but does not know its roots’” (Ars Artium. Essays in 
Philosophical Semantics, Mediaeval and Modern, “Doxa Library” [Budapest: Institute of Philosophy, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1988], p. 2). Cf. also Benedict M. Ashley’s first two chapters of the 
book The Way towards Wisdom. An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to Metaphysics 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), p. 3-60. 
Introduction 
 6
however, when studying the major ancient and medieval authors. Reading their writings 
in this way is likely to lead to anachronism.12 While the particular writings of these 
authors maintained methodological order and focus regarding their subjects, they 
nevertheless allude to other fields of philosophy and theology. Thus the ancients and 
medievals bear witness to the one integral teaching and learning they have experienced, 
wherein many parts, aspects and methods illuminate each other.  
In the case of Aquinas, it is especially difficult to meet the demand of following 
his genius in its entirety, for he left a corpus of about nine to eleven million words (as a 
comparison, the Bible contains less than one million words). However, it seems 
necessary to study at least his general method of thinking and the scientific status of his 
moral theory with its implications for our topic in order to avoid the anachronistic error. 
For St. Thomas the very basic aim of the noblest kind of reasoning is to discover the 
due place of everything in the universe: sapientis est ordinare. If we take seriously into 
account his own indications concerning the proper order of learning and his teaching 
about the virtue of science, we cannot begin our study of Aquinas’s moral theory with 
the texts where he treats issues that we recognize today as moral theory. We cannot do 
this unless we want to prove what we wanted to prove before committing ourselves to 
such study. This being the case it would be easier to claim that for Aquinas the thesis 
“no ‘ought’ from is’” is true. Yet, it would force him to accept as a problem something 
that appeared as a philosophical problem for the first time only with Hume, who lived 
five centuries after Aquinas and had very different approach to logic, epistemology, 
metaphysics, and, finally, to theology.  
                                                 
12 See for example how Klima distinguishes between something which is “intuitively clear” for us and 
something that used to be self-evident to our predecessors but is definitely no longer self-evident to us, 
when he denounces several anachronistic approaches to Aquinas even in the work of such a serious 
scholar as Anthony Kenny: Gyula Klima, “Review of A. Kenny: Aquinas on Mind, New York: 
Routledge, 1995,” Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998): 113-117. Referring to another book by Kenny, 
Klima says that “in these criticisms [i.e. that Aquinas is ‘thoroughly confused’ on the notion of being 
and that his doctrine is ‘one of the least admirable of his contributions to philosophy’] Kenny 
sometimes behaves like someone who, having less than perfect command of English, would express 
shock at the barbarity of British mores when he is asked by native speakers ‘to keep his eyes peeled’ or 
to allow them ‘to pick his brain’. But in such a situation we should certainly not blame the native 
speakers for the misunderstanding. Rather, we should blame the foreigner for delivering judgment 
before understanding the native speakers’ point, simply for failing to master their idiom. Likewise, if 
we can show that it is simply Kenny’s failure to master Aquinas’s conceptual idiom that accounts for 
the absurdities he claims to derive from Aquinas’s theses, then we should immediately see where the 
blame lies” (a quotation from his paper “Ens multipliciter dicitur: The Semantics and Metaphysics of 
Being in St. Thomas Aquinas” delivered at the 4th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Arts 
and Humanities, Honolulu, HI, January 15, 2006, http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/FILES/Ens
-multipliciter-dicitur.doc). (Cf. Klima, “On Kenny on Aquinas on Being: A critical review of Aquinas 
on Being by Anthony Kenny, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002,” International Philosophical 
Quarterly 44 [2004]: 567-580.) 
Introduction 
 7
This does not mean that we should not ask how St. Thomas would have 
answered a question that he had not directly considered. Just the opposite is true. We 
can and should ask such questions because they reveal even more clearly the correctness 
of many of his basic solutions (solutions which may not be obvious or may seem 
inessential or even superfluous in themselves). What is not recommended is an attempt 
to save St. Thomas’s claims from the threats of modern and contemporary theories 
without taking into consideration his worldview. After entering into his general 
worldview and with a proper understanding of the meaning of his statements, one can 
perhaps call into question some modern and contemporary theories. 
 
*   *   * 
 
Moral discourse of our times has been characterized by Alasdair MacIntyre as 
“fideistic.”13 According to his intepretation of recent history of philosophy, an 
overwhelming majority of philosophers no longer believe that moral claims can be 
rationally justified. MacIntyre complains also that this fideist spirit has shaped our 
cultures as well.14 For some Thomist scholars the acceptance of Hume’s Law as true 
and the claim that Aquinas did not infer an “ought” from an “is,” is a sort of consent to 
this “fideistic” character of moral domain.15 One may wonder whether such a consent is 
not also concealed behind the claim that we can only find theology in Aquinas, not 
moral philosophy, and that his teaching on moral matters has little value for non-
                                                 
13 This fideism takes the form of emotivism which is “the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and 
more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of 
attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character” (MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 11-
12).  
14 In MacIntyre’s opinion there is “a general cynicism in our culture about the power or even the 
relevance of rational argument to matters sufficiently fundamental. Fideism has a large, not always 
articulate, body of adherents, and not only among the members of those Protestant churches and 
movements which openly proclaim it; there are plenty of secular fideists” (Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? [London: Duckworth, 1988], p. 5). 
15 Cf. e.g. Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of atural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 157-165. Yet I disagree with Lisska when he tries to avoid mentioning God 
in the reconstruction of Aquinas’s theory of natual law. He claims that “the existence of God is, in 
a structural sense, neither a relevant concept nor a necessary condition for Aquinas’s account of natural 
law … Natural law depends upon natural kinds, which is a metaphysical issue resolved in terms of 
Aquinas’s ontology, not his theology. Therefore, a consistent account of Aquinas’s theory of natural 
law is independent conceptually of the proposition that God exists” (Lisska, p. 120-121). 
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believers.16 Perhaps the intention behind such an argument is to protect St. Thomas’s 
thought from the attacks of “enlightened” thinking. If so, this defense seems to be 
misplaced and is harmful for the presentation of his moral theology itself.  
The question may be asked: why is this dissertation, presented in order to obtain 
the degree of doctor in theology, so philosophical? There are no Biblical quotations to 
be found in it, nor are there any Catholic Councils, Fathers of the Church, popes, or 
documents of the Church cited. It may be easily conceded that this text is in some way 
the work of a historian. The thought of a theological giant of the thirteenth century is 
explored in these pages, and this may explain why certain references are not found here. 
Yet, even in this perspective it must be remarked that the Summa theologiae is not the 
principal source of this work and St. Thomas’s commentaries to the Bible are not 
mentioned at all. Did the candidate for the degree of doctor in theology forget that 
Aquinas was above all a theologian? No, he did not forget. Moreover, he considers this 
work to be primarily the work of or for a theologian living today. The fideistic threat 
applies perhaps even more to moral theologians than to philosophers. Admittedly, a 
secondary intention of this work is that it be useful as well for the philosopher in search 
for an alternative solution for the “Is/Ought Thesis.” Such an openness to dialogue on 
the philosophical level is dictated by a desire to know the truth (which is, in a way, 
“revealed” in Creation) as well as to protect the work of a theologian from being 
fideistic or sectarian. In banishing fideism, however, there is a danger of exaggeration 
and a fall into a sort of rationalism. Following St. Thomas, I hope to avoid this.  
One of the great strengths of Aquinas’s theology is the reconciliation brought 
about in it between theology and philosophy: he expresses the harmony of reason and 
faith. This harmony has been and is praised by papal encyclicals to our day. Aquinas’s 
attention to the mystery of Creation did not allow him to discredit the power of human 
reason in an effort to exalt the mystery of Redemption; that is, to exalt the work of 
faith.17 Hence, for him, the defects of our cognition remain defects and are not 
                                                 
16 Ralph McInerny is afraid that some affinity with fideism can be found in the thought of such great 
Christian philosophers as Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain; see Ralph McInerny, The Question of 
Christian Ethics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993). 
17 This is contrary to what happened in the Reformation. As one commentator remarks, “Aquinas offers 
us a theory of nature, including human nature, as founded and ordered by God. The universe, including 
man, is purposive, and human reason (aided by revelation) can determine God’s purposes for man in 
that providential universe, which can be rationally approached through (Aristotelian and Platonic) 
metaphysics. One of the effects of the Reformation was to dethrone metaphysics, in the hope of 
replacing it by Biblical exegesis, Jerome being scheduled to replace Augustine as patron-saint-in-chief. 
Hence especially in lands where the effects of Protestantism were strong, we shall not be surprised to 
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constituents of our nature in the strict sense. When human defects are considered as 
human nature, “Hume’s Law” may stand firm.18  
We can learn much from St. Thomas today regarding the role of philosophy in 
theology. It would take more pages than it is possible to allow here to explain the 
presence of philosophy in Aquinas’s theology.19 Let it suffice to say that for him one of 
the tasks of theology is to reflect on what is accessible to human reason in order better 
to understand the content of Revelation. Errors in our knowledge of creatures may 
directly result in errors in our knowledge of the Creator.20 Since the problem with the 
transition from “is” to “ought” appeared in philosophy, it is appropriate to respond to it 
on this level. One of main interpretative keys I suggest for reading Aquinas’s writings 
against the threat of anachronism is to consider seriously his remarks about the order of 
learning. Hence, I present some elements of the background St. Thomas’s students are 
likely to have had when they began to learn ethics. These elements are philosophical 
and not theological because for Aquinas the study of theology is the last stage in 
a theological formation. Theology was to be approached only after instruction in several 
philosophical disciplines. From these philosophical lessons our reasons for stating that 
St. Thomas justified the transition from “is” to “ought” will be clear. This conclusion 
will be valid for both philosophy and theology. From the theological point of view this 
topic might be developed much further but since it deserves special attention, it would 
constitute a project for at least a comparable work. 
                                                                                                                                               
find an attempt to restate human nature in non-metaphysical terms: if God is to be introduced, he is to 
be the God of the voluntarists and his nature beyond the reasoning of metaphysics. From an 
unknowable God we move fast to an irrelevant God, and eventually to his elimination as superfluous” 
(John Rist, Real Ethics: Reconsidering the Foundations of Morality [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002], p. 156-157).  
18 See MacIntyre’s reconstruction of the religious (Calvinist) and philosophical background of “Hume’s 
Anglicizing Subversion”: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? p. 209-326. He notes, for example, that 
“in Calvinist versions of Augustine’s theology human beings are characterized in two ways. They are 
on the one hand viewed as having in some sense totally lost both their freedom to respond to God, to 
His commands, and to the offer of His grace, and any rational ability to discern the true nature of God 
and His law, so that all good is lost to them except by the operation of divine grace acting upon human 
beings, independently of their will. But on the other hand they are held to be guilty before God and 
accountable to Him in a way that presupposes both a knowledge of God’s law and responsibility for 
disobedience to it. And both of these stances are affirmed in the Westminster Confession and in the 
Catechisms” (ibid, p. 231).  
19 I briefly did it elsewhere; see “Metafizyka i teologia u św. Tomasza z Akwinu,” forthcoming in 
Metafizyka i teologia. Debata u podstaw, edited by Robert J. Woźniak (Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
Apostolstwa Modlitwy, 2008). 
20 “Sic ergo patet falsam esse quorundam sententiam qui dicebant nihil interesse ad fidei veritatem quid 
de creaturis quisque sentiret, dummodo circa Deum recte sentiatur … nam error circa creaturas 
redundat in falsam de Deo sententiam, et hominum mentes a Deo abducit” (CG, II, 3, n. 869). 
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In this study I would like to express opposition to an exaggerated emphasis on 
the autonomy of particular disciplines. Such emphasis shows concern for respecting 
scientific rules of thought. Yet an exaggeration begins when a sort of scientific 
puritanism developes against the influence of other sciences, and when a sapiential, 
uniting dimension vanishes. This fate may meet not only theology in relation to 
philosophical sciences but also practical sciences in relation to theoretical ones. 
Nonetheless, even when renouncing such influences in theology, one necessarily 
accepts some kind of philosophy, and the same necessary mechanism occurs also in 
practical sciences. As we shall see, an imbalance appears when the notion of discipline 
is not correlated with the notion of epistemic virtue.  
 
*   *   * 
 
I do not enter into open discussion with or critique of the Thomist scholars who 
accept “Hume’s Law” as true, nor do I want to explain why Hume preached no “ought” 
from “is.” Likewise, I do not want to explain why Moore, although criticizing Hume for 
his “naturalism,” confessed another version of “no ‘ought’ from ‘is.’” The opinions of 
experts on these two authors and my own reading of their texts suffice to construct 
a presentation of Aquinas’s position, a presentation that, I hope, will answer – at least 
partly – the main concerns of those for whom “Hume’s Law” holds and for whom the 
“Naturalistic Fallacy” is not a fallacy. Hence, my principal goal is to present only some 
elements of Aquinas’s thought which clarify and explain the topic of this dissertation. 
Therefore, in the body of the text of this work I limit myself to the treatment of St. 
Thomas’s teaching with some small exceptions. Other authors and problems are 
referred to in footnotes.  
This dissertation is preceded by a short history of the problem to which Aquinas 
is, as it were, asked to respond. From these historical notes it will be clearer how to 
proceed in order to find solutions to subsequent difficulties. Further, this work is 
divided into two parts. Each part contains four chapters. Because I ask St. Thomas for 
an answer to the problem which originated in a later philosophical epoch, and because 
the representatives of this later philosophical epoch usually charged Aquinas’s epoch 
with an ossified dogmatism, baneful essentialism, sterile deductivism, passion for 
systems, etc., we shall briefly sketch in Chapter 1 Aquinas’s general approach to 
cognition, suggesting that either these accusations refer to other authors than Aquinas or 
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they simply commit the straw man fallacy. Today, these accusations are often an 
obstacle to reading or taking authors such as Aquinas seriously.  
Given that there are disparate interpretations of Aquinas’s texts, an appropriate 
interpretative key will also be sought, in order to protect our reading from at least some 
errors. Taking into account the historical context of Aquinas’s writings and their 
character, as well as Aquinas’s repeated statements, we will look to the order of 
learning to guide our research.  
Since it is claimed that the transition from “is” to “ought” is “logically illicit” (or 
that the “Is/Ought Thesis” contains a logical sub-thesis), I will present in Chapter 2 
some elements of the logic used by Aquinas, as well as examining the place of logic in 
the order of learning. This will reveal his specific understanding of logic and its role in 
the whole philosophical-scientific enterprise. 
In Chapter 3, I will proceed in exploring some fundamental topics of Aquinas’s 
logic, especially his semantics and the inherence theory of predication. This will enable 
us to see the direction of St. Thomas’s possible answer to the semantic sub-thesis of the 
“Is/Ought Thesis” in Moore’s reformulation.  
Without drawing hasty conclusions, we will continue in Chapter 4 to manifest 
still another part of Aquinas’s logic that is essential to our purposes. This part of his 
logic is a general methodology for every science, including moral science and theology. 
It consists in an extensive theory of demonstration and exhibits the rules for causal 
explanation. We will see how causal explanation, and especially the use of final cause 
in demonstrating purposeful facts or events, is made possible thanks to semantic 
presuppositions presented in Chapter 3. The question of first indemonstrable principles 
will also be briefly discussed.  
Building upon what is addressed in the first part, on logic, the second part begins 
with Chapter 5 with the investigation of possibilities of constructing an “is.” 
Specifically, I seek a science that constructs such a human “is” which might provide 
a basis for infering an “ought.” I point at natural science as this science in which we 
might, in the most proper and comprehensive way, present what the human being is.  
Next, in Chapter 6, I delve into the question of the specificity of method in 
natural science conditioned by its object and principles. Principles of natural things are 
shown in terms of basic hylomorphism, the notion of nature itself is briefly explained, 
as also the principles of natural science are revealed in the analysis of formal, material, 
efficient and final causes. Already here the topic of goodness appears and is 
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provisionally analyzed so as to be seen as a rudimentary background for moral 
philosophy. In Aquinas’s approach, this set of issues, dealt with from the scope of 
natural science, belonged to the ordinary formation that followed the course of liberal 
arts and were presupposed in the study of moral philosophy. When Aquinas was writing 
about ethics or theology, he could rightly expect his readers to have this background; he 
himself clearly states that earlier things are presupposed, treated as manifest, and not 
repeated. 
In Chapter 7, I emphasize three topics from the vast domain of natural science. 
The first consists in pointing at some lines along with which the notion of nature could 
be analyzed in order to recover the richness of its signification in the teaching of St. 
Thomas. The second theme, the source of nature, is brought up in the prolongation, as it 
were, of the recovery of the notion of nature. I insist that for Aquinas’s ethics as 
a discipline, a necessary context is theistic, and that it is not a postulate of practical 
reason but a consequence of the order of learning. The third topic, cogitative power, 
addresses mainly the third layer of the “Is/Ought Thesis,” the internalist assumption. 
Further, in Chapter 8, I evoke St. Thomas’s teaching on goodness: how 
goodness is analyzable and how this analysis closes the “Open Question” in Moore’s 
argument. It will be accompanied by some notes on the character of moral goodness and 
ethics as practical science. 
 These elements, I hope will sufficiently show in what sense Aquinas justified the 
transition from “is” to “ought,” in what sense his ethics or moral theology should be 
naturalistic, and in what consists the practical character of practical disciplines.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0. A Short History of the Problem 
 
 
The title of this dissertation refers to the problem formulated by David Hume. In 
order to identify the task I undertake in this study, as well as its importance, and in order 
to explain better why my presentation assumes this specific form, I will present the 
roots of this problem in Hume’s philosophy, and G. E. Moore’s contribution to the 
problem. This dissertation is not a comparative study of Hume (or other authors) and St. 
Thomas Aquinas. I shall merely introduce Hume’s statement of the “Is/Ought Thesis” 
and its famous modification made by Moore, so as to trace back the origin of the 
problem constituting the topic of this dissertation and to insert my exposition of 
Aquinas in the context of contemporary discussion.  
 
 
0.1. David Hume 
 
David Hume (1711-1776) was a prominent figure of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
He is regarded even today as the most important philosopher ever to write in English1 and 
is numbered as the third most influential “British empiricist” after John Locke and George 
Berkeley. Hume’s best known works, including A Treatise of Human ature (1739-
1740), Essays, Moral and Political (1741-1742), An Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding (1748), An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), and 
                                                 
1 Cf. e.g. William Edward Morris, “David Hume”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/hume/. 
0. A Short History of the Problem 
 14 
Dialogues concerning atural Religion (1779), influenced many generations of 
philosophers2 and have a significant influence today, especially in the English-speaking 
world.3  
According to a common interpretation, Hume’s philosophical project aimed at 
the total reform of philosophy, and in this vein a central part of his program was – for 
the sake of modesty – profoundly anti-metaphysical.4 More specifically, in his Enquiry 
concerning the Principles of Morals,5 Hume intends to bring about “a reformation in 
moral disquisitions” resembling what had recently been achieved in natural philosophy 
(on several occasions he reveals his admiration of these discoveries).6 Natural 
philosophy had been cured of “a common source of illusion and mistake” as well as 
from “passion for hypotheses and systems.” Hence, he would like to advance a similar 
progress in moral science. In order to do so he urges that we should “reject every system 
… however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation,” and 
                                                 
2 Morris notes that “his influence is evident in the moral philosophy and economic writings of his close 
friend Adam Smith. Hume also awakened Immanuel Kant from his ‘dogmatic slumbers’ and ‘caused 
the scales to fall’ from Jeremy Bentham’s eyes. Charles Darwin counted Hume as a central influence, 
as did ‘Darwin’s bulldog,’ Thomas Henry Huxley. The diverse directions in which these writers took 
what they gleaned from reading Hume reflect not only the richness of their sources but also the wide 
range of his empiricism. Today, philosophers recognize Hume as a precursor of contemporary 
cognitive science, as well as one of the most thoroughgoing exponents of philosophical naturalism” 
(ibid.). 
3 Cf. e.g. James Fieser, “David Hume: Life and Writings,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humelife.htm (accessed August 2007); and Don Garrett, “Hume, David,” in 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig, London: Routledge, 2005, 
http://www.rep.routledge.com.proxycu.wrlc.org/article/DB040SECT13 (accessed November 2006).  
4 Cf. EHU, 26. A not yet thirty-year-old Hume in the Introduction to his Treatise declares that “any 
hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be 
rejected as presumptuous and chimerical” (A Treatise of Human ature, David Fate Norton and Mary 
J. Norton [eds.] [Oxford University Press, 2007], p. 5 [further quoted as T]). Against too high 
expectations in philosophical research, Hume suggests an academic scepticism which “consists in 
a certain diffidence, modesty and lack of dogmatism in all one’s judgments plus a determination to 
refrain from all ‘high and distant enquiries’ beyond our faculties – such as cosmological speculation 
concerning ‘the origins of worlds’ – that have no connection to ‘common life.’ Hume in the Enquiry 
recommends and endorses this mitigated scepticism, which he judges to be socially useful, … [and] 
call[s] for the elimination of scholastic metaphysics and theology not based on mathematical or 
experimental reasoning: ‘Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and 
illusion’” (Garrett, SECT9). 
5 Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) (quoted further as EPM). 
6 “It is not for nothing that his work is entitled A Treatise of Human ature, and subtitled, An attempt to 
introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects; it is an attempt to study and 
explain moral phenomena (as well as human knowledge and emotions) in the same sort of way in 
which Newton and his followers studied and explained the physical world” (John L. Mackie, Hume’s 
Moral Theory [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1980], p. 6). 
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“hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from experience” (EPM, 7).7 In 
this climate Hume dispels any religious influence on ethics, denouncing religion as one 
of the sources of illusion and mistake and, as such, pernicious for humanity.8  
Since, as he indicates, “the chief obstacle … to our improvement in the moral or 
metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms,”9 Hume 
intends to cure moral sciences through the most distinctive and innovative element of 
his system: his account of definition. He believes that this philosophical device will 
bring about an authentic renewal, and even calls his theory “a new microscope or 
species of optics” (EHU, 49) which will dramatically reshape moral sciences.10 Thus, he 
proposes to undertake a simple series of tests in order to determine precisely the 
cognitive content of words and ideas. Ideas, for Hume, “are naturally faint and 
obscure,” whereas “all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are 
strong and vivid.” Ideas are complex and simple. Complex ideas are composed of 
simple and simple ideas are fainter copies of the simple impressions from which they 
are ultimately derived, to which they correspond and exactly resemble.11 This is his 
                                                 
7 From his fascination with the new natural philosophy and his remarks that in metaphysics we consider 
things that are not founded on experience and use unintelligible terms and principles, we may suspect 
that Hume was acquainted with metaphysicians who pounced on metaphysics without going through 
the course of natural philosophy. Such people are like boys, in Aquinas’s description, who repeat some 
formulas without knowing what they are talking about (“non attingunt mente, licet ea [i.e. 
metaphysicalia] dicunt ore” – In Eth., VI, 7 [Leon. 47/2, p. 358, lin. 189-192). Another suspicion is 
that Hume himself, fascinated with the new natural philosophy, did not bother to follow through the 
course of the old natural philosophy where one finds the experimental foundation of metaphysical 
terms and principles. These are only suppositions that I do not intend to verify here. 
8 Hume is known for constructing a perfectly irreligious (atheistic) ethics, “the first in modern 
philosophy to be completely secular, without reference to God’s will, a divine creative plan, or an 
afterlife” (James Fieser, “David Hume: Moral Theory,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humemora.htm (accessed June 2007). He did not see any difference between 
religion and superstition. He claims that “religion began in the postulation, by primitive peoples, of 
‘invisible intelligences’ to account for frightening, uncontrollable natural phenomena, such as disease 
and earthquakes. In its original forms, it was polytheistic, which Hume regards as relatively harmless 
because of its tolerance of diversity. But polytheism eventually gives way to monotheism, when the 
followers of one deity hold sway over the others. Monotheism is dogmatic and intolerant; worse, it 
gives rise to theological systems which spread absurdity and intolerance, but which use reason to 
corrupt philosophical thought. But since religion is not universal in the way that our nonrational beliefs 
in causation or physical objects are, perhaps it can eventually be dislodged from human thinking 
altogether” (Morris, ibid.). On Hume’s enterprise to free humanity from the yoke of religion, cf. Paul 
Russell, “Hume on Religion”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/hume-religion/. 
9 Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and 
concerning the Principles of Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 3rd edition revised by P. H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 61 (further quoted as EHU). 
10 Cf. Morris, ibid. 
11 Since impressions are not, strictly speaking, capable of truth and falsity, Hume suggests coherence as 
a means of accepting or rejecting impressions: “We may draw inferences from the coherence of our 
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“general position” presented as the “first principle … in the science of human nature” 
(T, 10), and often referred to as the “Copy Principle.” According to Hume, we must 
always inquire “from what impression is that supposed idea derived?” The suspicion 
that a term is being employed without any meaning or idea justifies the performance of 
such a trial before the tribunal of reason. When we can associate no idea to a given 
term, this means that the term has no cognitive content, even in spite of its honorable 
presence in philosophy or theology.12 Using this device “we may reasonably hope to 
remove all dispute” concerning ideas (EHU, 17).  
The account of definition has its consequences in Hume’s manner of escaping 
from the “eidetic atomism” that results from our sense cognition. The aforementioned 
theory of the origin of ideas does not lead him to accept a set of disconnected, 
independent ideas, unified only in that they are the contents of a particular mind. He 
claims that “there is a secret tie or union among particular ideas, which causes the mind 
to conjoin them more frequently together, and makes the one, upon its appearance, 
introduce the other” (T, 416).13 This “secret tie or union” that is required for connecting 
our ideas is threefold: “resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect” 
(T, 13). He calls them “principles of connexion or association.”14 It is important to note 
that they are not theoretical or rational. The principles accounting for the connection of 
our ideas are rather natural operations of the mind that we experience in “internal 
                                                                                                                                               
perceptions, whether they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of 
the senses” (T, 59). Elisabeth Anscombe says that “Hume defines ‘truth’ in such a way as to exlude 
ethical judgments from it, and professes that he has proved that they are so excluded” (“Modern Moral 
Philosophy” in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, vol. III: Ethics, Religion 
and Politics [Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1981], p. 27). 
12 It seems improbable that so great philosopher as Hume was would claim that the only tribunal is my 
own reason – as if it were impossible to learn from others what they mean by a term or by an idea. If I 
or even a group of people cannot assign an idea or impression to a term, it does not mean that this term 
has no meaning at all. It may have no meaning for me if I do not understand it, but from my lack of 
understanding, and without any stronger warrant, I cannot make a universal extrapolation. In some 
cases in his practice as philosopher, however, such an improbable interpretation imposes itself. 
13 Hume confesses that he “does not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the 
principles of association” (EHU, 19), so advertises it as his most original contribution: “If any thing 
can intitle the author to so glorious a name as that of an inventor, ‘tis the use he makes of the principle 
of the association of ideas” (T, 416). He also compares this discovery for the science of human nature 
to Newton’s discovery of the Law of Gravitation for the physical world (cf. T, 14). 
14 In the Appendix to the second edition of the Treatise Hume expresses his dissatisfaction with what he 
wrote about the principle of connexion: “I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that 
nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou’d have induc’d me to receive it. If 
perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no 
connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel 
a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. … I cannot discover 
any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head” (T, 635-636). 
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sensation.”15 This statement directly opposes any attempt to explain how ideas “bound 
together” by postulation of theoretical notions (as, in Hume’s opinion, Lock intended to 
do). Among the theoretical notions hitherto postulated, the most stigmatized are those of 
power and substance. In this way the need of substance, as traditionally conceived in 
philosophy, is obviated.16 On this point, experts in Hume’s philosophy say it is good to 
take into account his opposition against such rationalists who did not acknowledge the 
dependence of intellectual representations on sensory experience. Since he was writing 
in reaction against this kind of philosophy, we may have some serious difficulties in 
distinguishing in his writings the faculty of the intellect from the interior sense of 
imagination.17  
                                                 
15 I follow Morris in this interpretation of the “principles of association.” If this interpretation is right, it 
confines causation only to the sensory realm. For him, then, cause is necessarily something sensorily 
experienced.  
16 “I wou’d fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of 
substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be 
deriv’d from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be convey’d to us by our senses, I ask, 
which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceiv’d by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, 
a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that 
substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be deriv’d from 
an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into 
our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no 
idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other 
meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it. The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, 
is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular 
name assign’d them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection” 
(T, 16). 
17 “In the course of analyzing the operations of the human mind, Hume discusses a number of cognitive 
faculties. In addition to sensation and reflection, which are faculties for having impressions, Hume 
distinguishes two faculties for having ideas. Memory is a faculty for having ideas that retain not only 
the character but also the order and a large share of the original force and vivacity of the impressions 
from which they are copied. The imagination, in contrast, does not retain this large share of the force 
and vivacity of the original impressions and is not constrained to preserve their order; instead, the 
imagination can separate and recombine ideas freely. Because it is a faculty for having ideas, the 
imagination is, like memory, fundamentally a representational faculty. Such additional cognitive 
faculties as judgment and reason are nevertheless functions of the imagination in Hume’s view because 
they ultimately constitute particular ways of having ideas. This, in turn, is because belief, in which 
judgment consists and which constitutes the characteristic outcome of reasoning, is itself a lower 
degree of force and vivacity, or ‘liveliness’, below that of impressions and memory. Notably absent 
from Hume’s account of cognitive faculties is any further representational faculty of intellect … 
Hume’s adoption of the Copy Principle constitutes a rejection of such a faculty, for it commits him to 
accounting for all human cognition exclusively in terms of representations that are images of sensory 
and inner impressions” (Garrett, SECT2). Aquinas notes that “Stoici moti sunt ad ponendum 
intellectum esse fantasiam” (In De An., I, 2 [Leon. 45/1, p. 9, lin. 37-38]) and “Antiqui enim 
philosophi naturales … posuerunt quod intellectus non differt a sensu … Hinc etiam processit 
Stoicorum opinio, qui dicebant cognitionem intellectus causari ex hoc quod imagines corporum nostris 
mentibus imprimuntur, sicut speculum quoddam, vel sicut pagina recipit litteras impressas, absque hoc 
quod aliquid agat” (CG, III, 84, n. 2591-2592). He remarks also that “non esset necesse ponere 
intellectum agentem si uniuersalia, quae sunt intelligibilia actu, per se subsistunt extra animam, sicut 
posuit Plato” (De spir. creat., 9 c.). 
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In accordance with Hume’s forecast, this innovative account of definition, and 
the theory of association ensuing from it, did revolutionize metaphysical and moral 
inquiry. According to his classification of sciences, in the four categories of “Logic, 
Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost everything, which it can any 
way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or 
ornament of the human mind” (T, 4). As we can see, metaphysics, along with natural 
philosophy, disappears from the horizon of human interest or even capabilities, 
seemingly replaced by “criticism”, the then-emerging discipline we now call 
“aesthetics.” At the outset Hume also claims that morals regard (along with criticism) 
our tastes and sentiments. It is often indicated that this radical shift is a consequence of 
Hume’s specific understanding of the intellect and its capabilities. His analysis of the 
human mind immediately affected his understanding of causality, going so far as to 
exclude the possibility of traditional causal explanation in sciences.18  
One of the main innovations in moral inquiry, as Hume himself remarks, is the 
opposition against a longstanding position of philosophers from Plato to Spinoza 
recommending that actions should be motivated by reason rather than passion.  
Every rational creature, ‘tis said, is oblig’d to regulate his actions by reason; and if 
any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to 
oppose it, till it be entirely subdu’d, or at least brought to a conformity with that 
superior principle. On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, 
ancient and modern, seems to be founded … In order to shew the fallacy of all this 
philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive 
to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the 
direction of the will (T, 265). 
 
According to Hume’s classification, all reasoning is either demonstrative or probable. 
We can learn from him that “abstract or demonstrative reasoning never influences any 
of our actions” (T, 266) because it concerns only relations of ideas and does not 
discover the actual existence or non-existence of things, “as its proper province is the 
world of ideas, and as the will always places us in that of realities” (T, 265). (This 
clearly Platonic opposition between the world of ideas as proper to reason and the world 
of reality, is worth noting.) Thus, Hume observes, “demonstration and volition seem, 
upon that account, to be totally remov’d, from each other” (ibid.). Yet, more precisely, 
                                                 
18 On Hume’s account of causality see Helen Beebee, Hume on Causation (London-New York: 
Routledge, 2006) and William A. Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation, vol. 2: Classical and 
Contemporary Science (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1974). For a contemporary 
critique of Humean concept of causality as deeply ingrained in today’s philosophy, see John 
C. Cahalan, Causal Realism: An Essay on Philosophical Method & the Foundations of Knowledge 
(Lanham-New York-London: University Press of America, 1985). 
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we learn that demonstrative reasoning alone is never the cause of any action. It can, 
however, affect action, but only by helping to formulate the process of reasoning 
scientifically (in his mind this means mathematically) and by helping to judge causes 
and effects. Nor can probable reasoning motivate action, because if there were no 
objects affecting our emotion of aversion or propensity (these emotions arise from the 
prospect of pain and pleasure), reasoning would affect no action. Probable reasoning, to 
which it is proper to discover the relation of cause and effect, can nonetheless serve to 
direct action by showing the means to a desired end. Yet we are reminded that “the 
impulse arises not from reason.” If the prospect of pain and pleasure alone is capable of 
motivating our actions, then in the presence of an object which is indifferent to us, no 
discovery of the cause-effect connection is able to motivate us. It follows for Hume that 
“reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition” (T, 266). 
From this conclusion Hume infers also that reason is “incapable of preventing 
volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion” (ibid.). We are 
informed that “this consequence is necessary.” Why? Because “nothing can oppose or 
retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse.” It was established that reason has 
no original influence; therefore, it cannot exert an opposite influence either. This 
suffices for Hume to conclude that “we speak not strictly and philosophically when we 
talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of 
the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” 
(ibid.).19 Only when a false judgment accompanies a passion, can we speak about 
unreasonable passions, yet even then it is not passion but judgment that is unreasonable. 
The consequence is simple: “it is impossible, that reason and passion can ever oppose 
each other” (T, 267).  
To this it should be added that for Hume reason alone cannot even discern 
between moral good and evil (cf. T, 294).20 It follows for Hume from the simple fact 
that morals do influence human actions whereas, as established, reason alone “can never 
have any such influence.” Since “reason of itself is utterly impotent” in exciting 
passions or actions, it is impossible that the rules of morality be its conclusions. He 
believes that reason is inactive in itself and “it must remain so in all its shapes and 
appearences, whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers 
                                                 
19 Cf. Garrett, SECT10. Note how smoothly “is” is transformed into “ought” despite the prohibition. 
20 For a more ample account see e.g. Garrett, SECT11. 
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the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings” (ibid.). We should note 
here a blunt negation of the existence of the active function of the intellect. Hume 
started by claiming that reason alone cannot incite an action and ends astonishingly with 
generalizing his conclusion, stating that reason in all its operations may have only 
a passive function. He now claims to have proven that “reason is perfectly inert” and 
that “reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as 
conscience, or a sense of morals” (T, 295).21  
Hume exposes the traditional claim that morality consists in relations in a very 
particular way. In his former treatment of relations he had established that there are only 
four kinds of relations susceptible of certainty and demonstration: resemblance, 
contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number. Although he 
notes the suspicion that he might have omitted something important, he maintains that 
no other relations can enter into scientific discourse. Until “some one be so good as to 
point out to me this new relation,” says Hume, he refuses to carry his suspicion any 
further for “‘tis impossible to refute a system, which has never yet been explain’d” 
(T, 299).22 Since we find these four relations not only in human beings but also in 
irrational or inanimate objects, Hume’s surprising conclusion is that such objects must 
also bear moral characteristics. This is plainly absurd; therefore, morality cannot consist 
in relations, moral rules cannot be demonstrated, and reason cannot discover virtue and 
vice.23 Later Hume also “proves” that morality does not consist “in any matter of fact, 
which can be discover’d by the understanding” (T, 298).  
Finally, as if sealing his explanation why moral distinctions are not derived from 
reason, Hume states his famous “Is/Ought Thesis”: 
                                                 
21 On Hutcheson’s influence on Hume, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
(London: Duckworth, 1988), p. 260-290 (especially on this point that reason is practically inert, see 
p. 285). 
22 Here, again, are we facing a similar policy as in his dealing with definitions? Who can claim: what I do 
not understand, nobody ever understood or explained? Even in writings of a great philosopher this 
seems to go too far. 
23 In footnote 69 Hume reveals his understanding of relations as something in sharp opposition to 
“matters of fact,” and that may help to explain why he infers otherwise unjustified conclusions. In 
EHU Hume formulates clearly this distinction (now called “Hume’s folk” or “Hume’s dictum”): “All 
the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of 
Ideas, and Matters of fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic … 
[which are] discoverable by the mere operation of thought … Matters of fact, which are the second 
object of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, 
however great, of a like nature with the foregoing” (EHU, 20). Note also, that Hume’s rejection of the 
meaning of the distinction between substance and accident, leads him here to see no differences 
between human relations and relations of irrational or inanimate beings.  
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In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, 
that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and 
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; 
when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last 
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or 
affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same 
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this 
new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But 
as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to 
the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar 
systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not 
founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason (T, 302). 
 
This argument caused a furore in philosophy and is known to this day as “Hume’s 
Law.” It is still regarded as controversial and is usually understood as follows: it is 
impossible to infer an “ought” directly from an “is.” This is to say, that between “ought” 
and “is” there is so considerable a dichotomy that it is impossible to deduce imperative 
phrases from descriptive ones. There is thus an inferential gap between moral and 
nonmoral claims (the “Is/Ought Gap”) or between fact and value.24 No moral 
conclusion can be derived from exclusively nonmoral premises. Hence, a moral 
conclusion can be derived only from premises containing at least one moral statement. 
Although Hume himself did not do so, we may specify the following on the basis of his 
writings: the inferential gap is accompanied by a logically independent belief about the 
inherently motivational character of moral considerations. This latter belief is called an 
“internalist assumption.” The “internalist assumption” is based on a commonsense view 
that “normal” people will not be indifferent to moral considerations. Within Hume’s 
system, this assumption is developed into the suggestion that we should derive moral 
rules from the “moral sense.” Moral sense for Hume is the natural capacity to feel a 
distinctive kind of approbation and disapprobation when considering features of 
character from “the general point of view” (that is, independently of one’s own self-
interest). This feeling is activated primarily by natural sympathy with those who are 
affected by the character traits in question. He argues, therefore, that values are the 
projections of natural human desires or sentiments. Moral values are one kind of value 
and their main characteristic is that they are the projections of desires that aim at the 
common good of society. Through the observation and analysis of these desires or 
                                                 
24 For an example of the diverse interpretations of this thesis see W. D. Hudson (ed.), The Is/Ought 
Thesis, (New York: Macmillan, 1969). 
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sentiments, we may, Hume holds, construct a true moral philosophy. Since feeling and 
sympathy are natural phenomena, they belong to the scope of that science which 
considers man. They are the object of this science even so far as to efface the difference 
between moral philosophy and the science of human nature (cf. EHU, 1). If we have 
“moral sense,” the analysis proper to the science of human nature is said to improve our 
moral evaluations. Such a science can, for example, enable one to perceive that 
“monkish virtues” (like fasting, celibacy or self-denial) are not truly virtues, or it may 
help to establish a new set of virtues that will persuade others. This manner of treating 
moral questions in the same way as natural phenomena was dubbed by posteriority as 
“naturalism in ethics.”25  
In the Appendix to the second edition of the Treatise, Hume includes an 
important note about some errors that touch upon the very foundations of his 
philosophical project. He admits with disarming candor that “there are two principles, 
which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. 
That all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never 
perceives any real connexion among distinct existences” (T, 636). Hume himself does 
not seem to be conscious whence these principles come or how to justify them.26 
There is no need to discuss here the historical content of Hume’s argument and 
its diverse interpretations. What is important to the purpose of this dissertation is that 
the origin of the problem as it is commonly understood become apparent. Although this 
dissertation is concerned with Aquinas’s thought and not with that of Hume, an outline 
of Hume’s thought has nonetheless been presented herein in consideration of an 
influential contemporary interpretation of St. Thomas’s moral philosophy and theology. 
This contemporary view seems to presuppose the legacy of “Hume’s Law” as it is 
                                                 
25 Cf. Garrett, SECT11 and H. O. Mounce, Hume’s aturalism (London-New York: Routledge, 1999), 
p. 77-98. 
26 “A central tenet of Hume’s nominalism is that whatever is distinguishable is separable. As far as I have 
been able to discover, Hume never supports this by any argument or evidence, and it is therefore 
a sheer dogma in his philosophy. On the other hand, the most effective representative of medieval 
nominalism, Ockham, has an elaborate argument to support this proposition” (Julius R. Weinberg, 
Ockham, Descartes, and Hume: Self-Knowledge, Substance and Causality [The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1977], p. 129). Cf. similarly Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction. Three 
Essays in the History of Thought (Madison and Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965). He 
says also that: “The nominalism of Berkeley and Hume and their critiques of abstraction are not only 
central features of British Empiricism but also pave the way for many contemporary philosophical 
issues” (p. 3). Berkeley fought against abstract general ideas; Hume followed Berkeley and “used his 
nominalistic views of language in his theories of space and time; his contention that repetition adds no 
new idea depends upon his nominalism; and his critiques of cause, body, and personal identity all 
presuppose his nominalism to some extent or other” (ibid.). See especially the chapter “Hume’s 
Nominalism,” p. 32-41.  
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commonly interpreted. Before we start exploring Aquinas’s thought, however, we must 
briefly mention yet another author who, while criticizing Humean “naturalism,” 
suggests a more refined version of the “Is/Ought Thesis.” We are referring, of course, to 
George Edward Moore. 
 
 
0.2. G. E. Moore 
 
G. E. Moore (1873-1958) is another great figure in the philosophy of the 
English-speaking world.27 He is regarded as the third of the trinity of philosophers from 
Trinity College Cambridge (after Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein28) and 
thereby as one of the fathers of “analytical philosophy.” After his youthful and brief 
fondness for British idealism (especially that of F. H. Bradley), he became its vigorous 
opponent. Another significant characteristic of his thought, which lasted throughout the 
span of his philosophical activity, consists in his opposition to empiricism. Already in 
his idealist dissertation on “The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics” (1897) he writes about 
“the fallacy involved in all empirical definitions of the good.” This claim is identified as 
a precursor of his famous statement in Principia Ethica (1903)29 on the “naturalistic 
fallacy” in all naturalistic definitions of goodness. Principia Ethica “is often considered 
a revolutionary work that set a new agenda for 20th-century ethics” and it “remains the 
best-known expression of a general approach to ethics.”30  
                                                 
27 See e.g. Thomas Baldwin, G. E. Moore (London: Routledge, 1990). 
28 Russell was a great friend of Moore’s, whereas Wittgenstein seemed to disrespect his colleague as he 
is related to have remarked of Moore that he showed how far one could get in philosophy without a 
great intellect (cf. Tom Regan, Bloomsbury’s Prophet (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 
p. 187]. Brian Hutchinson suggests that “Moore can be seen to anticipate Wittgenstein’s diagnosis that 
the philosophical intellect suffers a kind of bewitchment that creates a deep and abiding sense of 
alienation. Like Wittgenstein, Moore suggests a program of therapy whose aim is to restore 
philosophers their sense of being at home in the world” (Brian Hutchinson, G. E. Moore’s Ethical 
Theory: Resistance and Reconciliation, [Cambridge University Press, 2001], p. 6).  
29 Principia Ethica, Revised edition with ‘Preface to the second edition’ and other papers, T. Baldwin 
(ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) [further quoted as PE]. 
30 Thomas Hurka, “Moore’s Moral Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/moore-moral/. “The 
influence of Principia Ethica is an extraordinary phenomenon in the history of English philosophy. 
Cambridge men of that generation really thought (I can remember my father continuing to think) that 
now for the first time in the history of philosophy ethics had been given a really rigorous foundation. 
This was Moore’s own claim; the wonder is that men like Russell, McTaggart, and Maynard Keynes, 
accepted it” (Peter Geach, Truth, Love, and Immortality [London: Hutchinson, 1979], p. 174-175). 
“Twentieth-century British ethical theory is unintelligible without reference to PE” (Baldwin, p. 46). 
See also Alasdair MacIntyre’s interpretation of this period and its lasting consequences for today’s 
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Moore intended to bring about a revolution in ethics.31 According to him, the 
“Naturalistic Fallacy” is an error of those who either deny or neglect the fact that the 
property of goodness is simple, indefinable, and non-natural.32 It is simple in the basic 
sense that it has no parts. Yet to define a thing, in his philosophy, is to list its parts and 
their arrangements.33 Thus, if good is simple, it is indefinable. He does not mean here a 
verbal definition, but a real one or, as he calls it, a definition which is “analytic.” To be 
analytically indefinable is for a thing to be an ultimate constituent of reality (cf. PE, 9-
10). By non-natural property he means a property that cannot exist in time by itself. 
Natural properties exist in time: “they are in themselves substantial and give to the 
object all the substance that it has.”34 Any confusion of good with some temporal, that 
is, natural property, results in fallacy (cf. PE, 13). If we want to avoid the fallacy, we 
cannot identify or confuse good with anything else.35 Good is a sui generis property, 
something we are unable to pick up and move about with even “the most delicate 
scientific instruments” (PE, 124).  
Moore introduced controversy by accusing previous moral philosophy of 
committing this fallacy: every author who had defined goodness in either naturalistic or 
metaphysical terms (hence every author until Sidgwick, cf. PE, 14), had constructed an 
erroneous ethics.36 Against them Moore devised an argument known as “Open Question 
                                                                                                                                               
moral reflection and the life of societies: After Virtue. A study in moral theory (Duckworth: London, 
1981), p. 11-21 and 60-75. MacIntyre develops certain insights that G. E. M. Anscombe presented in 
her brilliant and very influential article “Modern Moral Philosophy.” 
31 “It is an often-noted irony that much of Moore’s revolutionary impact was quite other than what he 
envisioned or hoped for. Besides the contribution his work has made to objectivist ethical theory, it has 
also given great sustenance to emotivists, prescriptivists, and other noncognitivists” (Hutchinson, 
p. 88). Hutchinson claims that emotivism is Moore’s bastard, not his rightful heir (ibid., p. 90). 
32 Cf. Panayot Butchvarov, “That Simple, Indefinable, Non-Natural Property Good,” Review of 
Metaphysics 36 (1982): 51-75. 
33 Hutchinson remarks that Moore’s insistence on this understanding of definitions comes from his fear 
of “the monistic strain in the thought of the British Hegelians. If the requirement that definitions be in 
terms of other things is taken to the farthest reaches, we will not be able to understand anything until 
we understand everything. Appearance and reality will then collide; instead of there being many 
discrete things, there will be only one thing. Although this is not the only place where we find Moore’s 
thought to be marred by a fear of views, which could, in certain hands, have such unpalatable 
ramifications, this might be the place where it is the most marred” (Hutchinson, p. 24). 
34 Cf. PE, 41. “Take the natural properties away and not even a bare substance remains” (Hutchinson, 
p. 23). 
35 Cf. G. E. Moore, Preface to Principia Ethica, Revised Edition, p. 17. Cf. Hutchinson, p. 39-60. 
36 Proximate targets of Moore were hedonists such as Jeremy Bentham, evolutionary ethicists such as 
Herbert Spencer, and metaphysical ethicists such as T. H. Green, but he also criticises Aristotle, the 
Stoics, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, and Mill. Moore criticizes Aristotle’s treatment of ethics for being 
“highly unsystematic and confused” in the most important points, “owing to his attempt to base it on 
the naturalistic fallacy” (PE, 106). 
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Argument.” In order to show that good is indefinable, Moore uses as an example “one 
of the more plausible definitions of good,” namely that, 
to be good may mean to be what we desire to desire. Thus if we apply this definition 
to a particular instance and say ‘When we think that A is good, we are thinking that 
A is one of the things we desire to desire,’ our proposition may seem quite plausible. 
But if we carry the investigation further, and ask ourselves, ‘Is it good to desire to 
desire A?’ it is apparent, on a little reflection, that this question is itself as intelligible, 
as the original question, ‘Is A good?” – that we are, in fact, now asking for exactly the 
same information about the desire to desire A, for which we formerly asked with 
regard to A itself. But it is also apparent that the meaning of this second question 
cannot be correctly analyzed into ‘Is the desire to desire A one of the things which we 
desire to desire?’: we have not before our minds anything so complicated as the 
question ‘Do we desire to desire to desire to desire A?’ Moreover any one can easily 
convince himself by inspection that the predicate of this proposition – ‘good’ – is 
positively different from the notion of ‘desiring to desire’ which enters into its 
subject: ‘That we should desire to desire A is good’ is not merely equivalent to ‘That 
A should be good is good.’ It may indeed be true that what we desire to desire is 
always also good; perhaps, even the converse may be true: but it is very doubtful 
whether this is the case, and the mere fact that we understand very well what is meant 
by doubting it, shews clearly that we have two different notions before our minds 
(PE, 13).37 
 
According to Moore, the same argument works against every other naturalist 
foundational proposal. Another example he gives is the identification of good with 
pleasure. If we accepted that “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasure,” we would be 
forced to accept a tautology, because saying “pleasure is good” we would say no more 
than “pleasure is pleasure.” Such a definition, says Moore, does not inform us whether 
this something that we desire to desire, is good, because we can still ask whether what 
we desire to desire is good. Thus, the question whether it is good remains “open.” 
Moore also considers definitions of goodness that hinge upon the notions of more 
evolved and more unified, and make the same conclusion: the question remains open.38 
If the question remains open no ethics can be constructed on this foundation.  
                                                 
37 Hutchinson comments: “It is breaking no new ground to point out that Moore’s presentation of the 
OQA is quite muddled. In fact, it is shocking how slapdash he is with something he considers so 
important” (Hutchinson, p. 29). “Actually, no version of the OQA can establish the indefinability of 
good as something certain” (ibid., p. 33, note 41). “Because of all it requires, the OQA is hardly 
something we have a right to accept at the beginning of philosophical investigation. … He seems to be 
saying that he proved to us that good is indefinable simply by getting us to see that it is!” (ibid., p. 34). 
“Finally then, Moore’s ‘argument’ is not an argument, but a means for the attainment of an epiphany. 
… The recognition of a question’s significance sets the stage for the epiphany that finally comes 
without the obfuscating mediation of reflection. … So Moore’s project becomes one more in a very 
long line of attempts to return us to, and keep us in, a state of innocence” (p. 35). See also Alexander 
Miller’s analysis of this argument and its relevance today: An Introduction to Contemporary 
Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 10-25. 
38 In an article which intends to sum up 20th century ethics, we can read that “it has been known for the 
last fifty years that Moore discovered no fallacy at all. Moreover, Moore’s accident-prone deployment 
of his famous ‘open question argument’ in defending his claims made appeal to a now defunct 
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One of the main concerns behind this argument is Moore’s belief that if good 
were definable in either naturalistic or metaphysical terms, it would rob the science of 
morals of its right to exist: it would be completely taken over by experts in the defining 
science. His efforts, therefore, aim to save ethics from possessive aspirations of the 
“non-value sciences,” that is, natural sciences.39 Moore even denies that health be 
subject to a natural definition, that nature has fixed what health should be: “we have 
only to go to her and ask her what health is, and we shall know what is good: we shall 
have based an ethics upon science” (PE, 27). Such an enquiry is impossible, he says, 
because such an appeal to nature, according to him, annuls the logical autonomy of 
ethics. He confesses:  
I myself am not prepared to dispute that health is good. What I contend is that this 
must not be taken to be obvious; that it must be regarded as an open question. To 
declare it to be obvious is to suggest the naturalistic fallacy (ibid.).  
 
The “Open Question Argument” draws a clear line of demarcation between sciences 
that consider natural properties and ethics which considers non-natural properties. Later 
on, refining the claims he had made in Principia, Moore holds that only value properties 
are non-natural and it is precisely non-naturalness that is responsible for value’s being 
an intrinsic feature of the world.40 According to Moore, it is important to banish the 
“naturalistic fallacy” from ethics because such an error can be dangerous to society. 
Namely, “naturalistic fallacy” leads to the denial of a plurality of goods (cf. PE, 15). 
Here we have only to think of those who, too narrow in their perception, might perceive 
only one natural property as goodness. Moore ends his lectures on ethics as follows:  
The pity is that some of the best minds are the most likely to be influenced by theories 
– to think a thing is right, because they can give reasons for it. It is something 
important to recognise that the best reasons can be given for anything whatever, if 
only we are clever enough: sophistry is easy, wisdom is impossible, the best that we 
can do is to trust to COMMON SENSE.41  
 
                                                                                                                                               
intuitionistic Platonism, and involved assumptions about the transparency of concepts and obviousness 
of analytic truth that were seen (eventually, by Moore himself) to lead inescapably to the ‘paradox of 
analysis.’ … However readily we now reject as antiquated his views in semantics and epistemology, it 
seems impossible to deny that Moore was on to something” (Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, Peter 
Railton, “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends,” Philosophical Review 101 [1992]: 115-116).  
39 He even defines “natural” by natural sciences: “By ‘nature’, then, I do mean and have meant that 
which is the subject matter of the natural sciences and also of psychology. It may be said to include all 
that has existed, does exist, or will exist in time” (PE, 92). 
40 Cf. G. E. Moore, “Conception of Intrinsic Value” in Philosophical Studies, (Totowa, New Jersey: 
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1956), p. 253-76. 
41 The Elements of Ethics, Tom Regan, ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).  
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Moore believed that the “Open Question Argument” undermines ethical 
naturalism as well as ethical supernaturalism. We encounter this belief in his insistence 
that moral facts and properties are sui generis, that is, are neither reducible to nor 
derivable from non-moral (scientific or metaphysical) judgments. This is why, he 
claims, ethics should be autonomous. Moore denies that ethical issues could be a matter 
of empirical enquiry. He also denies that fundamental ethical truths are truths of reason. 
His solution consists in discerning a human capacity to grasp fundamental ethical truths 
intuitively. We cannot assign any reason that would justify these truths because they are 
fundamental and we grasp them intuitively; thus our knowledge of moral truths is not 
arrived at by inference from non-moral truths but is founded on the recognition of 
certain moral propositions as self-evident.42 Nonetheless, he holds that normative 
judgments are objectively true or false and that fundamental moral judgments ascribe 
the property of goodness to states of affairs (placing him in the camp of moral realists). 
Moore bases his argument primarily on the semantic assumption that moral and 
nonmoral terms are not interdefinable. In this way “naturalistic fallacy” becomes 
a reformulation of the “Is/Ought Thesis.”43 We spoke above about a hidden distinction 
in Hume’s formulation of the thesis into the “internalist assumption” and the inferential 
gap. Moore seems to offer an equivalent of the second part of the original formulation 
(the inferential gap). In David Brink’s analysis, this version of the “Is/Ought Thesis” 
might be presented as follows: 
Because nonmoral statements consist of (i) synthetic statements expressed by 
sentences using no term in its moral sense, and (ii) analytic statements, the is/ought 
thesis claims that no moral statement can be deduced from a consistent set of 
premises made up entirely of statements of types (i) and (ii). This formulation alows 
us to distinguish two subtheses in the is/ought thesis. The logical thesis claims that no 
moral statement can be deduced from statements exclusively of type (i). The semantic 
thesis claims that there are no type (ii) statements which by themselves, or in 
conjunction with type (i) statements, would entail a moral statement. In particular, the 
semantic thesis claims that there are no statements asserting relations of implication 
between the possession of moral properties and the possession of nonmoral properties 
– moral bridge premises – that are analytic. (If we were to deny the existence of 
analytic statements, we could construe the is/ought thesis as the claim that no moral 
statement can be deduced from a consistent set of premises consisting entirely of 
                                                 
42 Naturalism is characterized by the claim that moral facts are nothing more than familiar facts about the 
natural, including social, world. Whereas the proper claim of supernaturalism is that moral facts and 
properties are supernatural facts and properties. Some of his philosophical posterity accepted rejection 
of ethical naturalism and supernaturalism but did not enter into nonnaturalism. Instead, they claim that 
there are no moral facts or properties and have therefore adopted some form of noncognitivism. Cf. 
David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 
156. 
43 Cf. ibid., p. 146-147. 
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statements of type (i), and the is/ought thesis would depend only on the truth of the 
logical thesis.)44 
 
This analysis is exceptionally helpful for us because it shows clearly that the “Is/Ought 
Thesis,” despite the fact that it concerns moral considerations, has its main roots in logic 
and semantics. 
 
*   *   * 
 
For a Thomist scholar who wants to remain faithful to the teaching of the 
Church on moral issues, to accept the thesis “no ‘ought’ from ‘is’,” or to take the 
“naturalistic fallacy” seriously, may be a means to avoid some contemporary dangers. If 
one is convinced that Aquinas’s metaphysics and natural science are compromised, one 
will certainly avoid references to nature, natural function and natural development in 
discussion with today’s academia. To do otherwise could mean running the risk of 
having to face some contemporary scientific data which are irreconciliable with 
Aquinas’s thought. Nobody can deny that there are, indeed, some serious challenges. 
Thomistic teaching might appear as being in a hopeless position and it might be safer to 
not enter into such a discussion. It might seem more reasonable to look for another way 
of defending certain truths concerning morality as objective, universal, and 
unchangeable.  
To be sure, it is a good idea to present moral truths, not in a parochial manner, 
but rather in a manner acceptable to as many as possible. Aquinas’s teaching on natural 
law, as an integral part of his moral thought, is indeed a teaching worthy of wise 
popularization. If we today are in possession of philosophical devices enabling us to 
understand better what, perhaps, St. Thomas did not understand himself or what, 
perhaps, he did not emphasize enough because there was no need to do so, we certainly 
should take advantage of this. Some of these philosophical achievements, however, may 
be so incompatible with St. Thomas’s thought that, when incorporated into his teaching, 
they significantly modify it, even to the point of making it difficult to identify this 
thought with Aquinas. Moreover, some of these philosophical achievements may prove 
to be no achievements at all, but plain errors. Thus, our understanding, armed with these 
modern or contemporary theories may turn out to be, not a better understanding, but 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 149.  
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a deficient one. If this is so, then there is a possibility that, in studying Aquinas’s 
thought, we may learn something.  
I hope it will be evident from this dissertation that the “Is/Ought Thesis” and 
“Naturalistic Fallacy,” as meta-ethical claims, are incompatible with St. Thomas’s 
thought because of different epistemological, semantical, logical and metaphysical 
presuppositions. It is also advisable to take into account that some renowned authors 
have recently attempted to show that these two philosophical devices are doubtful 
achievements.45 We should be all the more cautioned not to defend important moral 
truths with faulty premises and not to interpret Aquinas by use of such distorting lenses. 
 
                                                 
45 See for example G. E. M. Anscombe, “On Brute Facts,” originally published in 1958, reprinted in 
Ethics, Religion and Politics, 22-25; idem, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 26-42; Philippa Foot, atural 
Goodness (Oxford University Press, 2001) as well as her many essays reprinted in collections Virtues 
and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy and Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral 
Philosophy (both published in Oxford University Press, 2002); John R. Searle, “How to Derive 
‘Ought’ From ‘Is’,” The Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 43-58 (reprinted in Speech Acts: An Essay in 
the Philosophy of Language, [Cambridge University Press, 1970], as Section 6.1: “The Naturalistic 
Fallacy Fallacy”); Julius Kovesi, Moral otions, first published in 1967 and re-edited by R. E. Ewin 
and Alan Tapper in Moral otions (with Three Papers on Plato) (Christchurch, New Zealand: 
Cybereditions, 2004); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A study in moral theory (London: Duckworth 
1981), especially 6-83; Jean-Louis Gardies, L'erreur de Hume (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1987); Candace Vogler, Reasonably Vicious (Harvard University Press, 2002); Hilary Putnam, The 
Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other essays (Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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Aquinas’s Logic and Scientific Methodology 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Aquinas’s General Approach to Cognition 
 
 
The claim that St. Thomas did not infer moral rules from metaphysics or natural 
science seems to be motivated by a desire to exculpate him from the charge of being an 
essentialist or deductivist. Indeed, in his most mature work, the Summa theologiae 
(further quoted as STh), one may be struck easily by the fact that everything seems to 
follow from the established truth of God’s existence and other truths established in the 
first questions of this grand work. When read in this spirit, an impression may impose 
itself on the reader: that of an arbitrary juggling with abstract ideas that have no 
reference to reality. Moreover, this juggling may appear to be trickery, aimed to conceal 
the fact that arguments are proposed in order to increase the plausibility of accepted 
dogmatic claims.  
This is perhaps why some interpretations emphasize that the second part of 
STh might be detached from the first without detriment to the whole of St. Thomas’s 
moral project. Some authors are content to find, in this second part of STh, some first 
principles that have, at last, a relationship to human experience and hence, it is thought, 
one can begin to build an ethics which is both autonomous and plausible. This may 
especially appear to be the case because Aquinas refers to first, indemonstrable 
principles. If they are indemonstrable, no previous science is needed. This is in 
accordance with the merciless alternative that ethics should be autonomous or it will not 
be ethics at all.  
It is apposite, in light of the above, that our presentation of Aquinas’s logic be 
preceded with some general remarks about his approach to cognition and about his way 
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of thinking. These remarks will caution us to take into consideration the fact that, in 
order to understand STh properly, we should learn a great deal about something else 
before we begin to read it.  
 
 
1.1. World, wonder, predecessors, and questions 
 
Aquinas follows Aristotle in many respects (or follows what he understands to 
be Aristotle’s thought),1 especially in his methodology and general approach to human 
                                                 
1 In this text I am not concerned with the historic Aristotle but rather with St. Thomas’s Aristotle. The 
view that Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle are a kind of pia fraus supporting the truth of 
Christianity has little textual foundation. St. Thomas’s attitude toward Aristotle’s writings, as 
epitomized for instance in his De unitate intellectus, is grounded in the conviction that Aristotle in 
many philosophical questions was basically right, but we should either bring out his true meaning 
contaminated by his commentators or help him to express what he wanted but for which he lacked the 
intellectual instruments. I agree with Ralph McInerny who says: “It is libelous to suggest that Thomas 
simply took words and phrases from Aristotle and turned them to purposes he knew they could not 
truly serve” (Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1992], p. 177 [see Chapter 7: “Aristotle and Thomas: Père Gauthier”]). 
I follow also the opinion of Louis Marie Régis when he says “the philosophic method of St. Thomas is 
entirely borrowed from Aristotelianism … It would be easy to give historical proof that St. Thomas 
completely accepted the Aristotelian philosophic method, simply by considering his continual 
quotations of the Stagiryte’s methodological texts. An even more direct argument is to be found in his 
interest in Aristotle’s purely logical works and in the precision of his commentaries upon those parts of 
logic that deal explicitly with scientific or philosophic knowledge. … although Aquinas rejected some 
of Aristotle’s doctrines, he never criticized his method but, rather, defended it on every occasion and 
brought it to its highest possible fruition by transporting it to regions that the Stagiryte would never 
have dreamed could be studied by means of the methodological instruments that he himself had 
perfected” (Epistemology, translated by I. C. Byrne [New York: Macmillan Co., 1959], p. 122 and 
123). Along the same lines James A. Weisheipl says: “In my opinion Thomas commented on Aristotle 
because he felt an apostolic need to help young masters in arts to understand Aristotelian philosophy 
correctly in harmony with the actual text and the guideline of faith, where necessary. Similarly 
I consider these commentaries to have a great philosophical value, as well as great significance, in the 
development of Thomas’s theology. The least one can say is that Thomas must have considered the 
valuable time and energy expended on their composition, at the very height of his maturity, worthy and 
necessary” (Friar Thomas d’Aquino. His Life, Thought, and Works [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975], 
p. 281). James Doig in his two authoritative and exemplary studies: Aquinas on Metaphysics. 
A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1972) and Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics (The New Synthese Historical Library, 
Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy, vol. 50 [Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001]), reaches similar conclusions. Besides, searching “intenti* aristotelis” in Index 
Thomisticus (http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age) results in a list of 50 very interesting 
cases where St. Thomas is at pains to discern Aristotle’s true intention. Some of them were recently 
analyzed by John Jenkins in his article “Expositions of the Text: Aquinas’s Aristotelian 
Commentaries” (Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 [1996]: 39-62) where he discusses different 
approaches to the question and concludes: “Aquinas’s dialectical approach to authorities and his 
externalism led him to hermeneutical principles which required that in order to elucidate Aristotle’s 
texts, he must both make clear Aristotle’s individualistic understanding and construct, or at least 
suggest, the best account of the matter under discussion. … in the commentaries Aquinas often sought 
to be true to Aristotle’s text by presenting not only what Aristotle understood but also what his intellect 
‘tended toward,’ as Aquinas understood this by his own best lights. And Aquinas’s best lights included 
both what he took as the insights of his own metaphysics as well as what he knew by the light of 
Christian faith” (p. 61). Finally, Marie-Dominique Chenu in this way captures the difference between 
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knowledge. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas perceive the world in which we live as 
a complex multi-faceted reality that excites our wonder in such a way that we seek to 
know it better, to explain it or at least something of it. To wonder is to admit some 
ignorance and to desire to know the unknown, because wonder expresses itself in 
a question.2 Today it is often repeated that philosophy in the ancient world began with 
wonder, whereas in the modern world it began with doubt. This, however, does not 
seem to hold for either Aristotle or Aquinas. Both doubt and wonder are for them signs 
of some ignorance that can produce philosophical questions. St. Thomas, commenting 
on Aristotle’s text, writes: 
for those who wish to investigate the truth it is fitting … before the work “to doubt 
well,” i.e. properly arrive at that which is doubtful. This is so because the 
subsequent investigation of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier doubts. 
… just as one who wishes to loosen a physical knot must first inspect the knot and 
the way in which it is tied, similarly one who wants to solve a doubt must first 
survey all the difficulties and their causes. … those who wish to investigate the 
truth without first considering the doubt are like those who do not know where they 
are going. … one who does not know where he is going cannot go there directly, 
except perhaps by chance. Therefore, neither can one seek the truth directly unless 
he first sees what is doubtful.3 
 
Apart from obvious biblical inspiration, Aquinas learned also from Aristotle to 
revere his great predecessors and to remain in constant dialogue with them in his 
personal commitment to know the world or something of it.4 This reverence originates 
                                                                                                                                               
modern and medieval commentators: “Thus, counter to the practice of the modern exegete who 
abstains from taking as his own the thought of his author and who does not have to say so if he does 
not accept it, the medieval commentator implicitly makes the contents of the text his own, and if he 
does not accept it, he says so explicitly whereas he is presumed to make it his own, if he says nothing” 
(Towards Understanding St. Thomas, translated by A. M. Laundry and D. Hughes [Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1964], 207-8). 
2 “Dubitatio et admiratio ex ignorantia provenit … Et quia admiratio ex ignorantia provenit, patet quod 
ad hoc moti sunt ad philosophandum ut ignorantiam effugarent” (In Meta., I, 3, n. 55). See Aquinas’s 
analysis of wonder: Super II Sent., 18, 1, 3 sol.; De pot., 6, 2 c.; CG, III, 101; STh, I, 105, 7. 
3 “Volentibus investigare veritatem contingit … ante opus ‘bene dubitare’, idest bene attingere ad ea 
quae sunt dubitabilia. Et hoc ideo quia posterior investigatio veritatis, nihil aliud est quam solutio prius 
dubitatorum. … sicut ille qui vult solvere vinculum corporale, oportet quod prius inspiciat vinculum et 
modum ligationis, ita ille qui vult solvere dubitationem, oportet quod prius speculetur omnes 
difficultates et earum causas” (In Meta., III, 1, n. 339). English translations of St. Thomas’s texts in 
this study are mine, although I always consulted existing standard translations. Aquinas continues: “Illi 
qui volunt inquirere veritatem non considerando prius dubitationem, assimilantur illis qui nesciunt quo 
vadant. … ille qui nescit quo vadat, non potest directe ire, nisi forte a casu: ergo nec aliquis potest 
directe inquirere veritatem, nisi prius videat dubitationem” (ibid., n. 340).  
4 Aquinas recognizes that Aristotle learned this from his own teacher, Plato: “Post omnes praedictos 
philosophos supervenit negocium Platonis, qui immediate Aristotelem praecessit. Nam Aristoteles eius 
discipulus fuisse perhibetur. Plato siquidem in multis secutus est praedictos philosophos Naturales, 
scilicet Empedoclem, Anaxagoram et alios huiusmodi, sed alia quaedam habuit propria praeter illos 
praedictos philosophos, propter philosophiam Italicorum Pythagoricorum. Nam ipse ut studiosus erat 
ad veritatis inquisitionem, ubique terrarum philosophos quaesivit, ut eorum dogmata sciret. Unde in 
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from a profound consciousness that any serious search for truth has a social dimension.5 
This social character of searching for the truth already begins in the process of learning 
a language or languages.6 Then it grows and develops with the aid of direct or indirect 
communication. The communication is direct when the truth discovered by our 
predecessors is transmitted as historical knowledge or as immediate instruction by 
a teacher. Indirect communication occurs when the errors of our predecessors provide 
opportunities for dialectical discussions that manifest the truth more clearly.7 Those 
engaged in the pursuit of truth, therefore, owe a debt of gratitude to these predecessors: 
It pertains to justice to be grateful to those who have helped us attain so great a good 
as knowledge of the truth … not merely to those whom one thinks have found the 
truth and with whose views one agrees by following them, but also to those who, in 
the search for truth, have made only superficial statements, even though we do not 
follow their views; for these men too have given us something because they have 
shown us instances of actual attempts to discover the truth. … we accept from certain 
of our predecessors whatever views about the truth of things we think are true and 
disregard the rest. Again, those from whom we accept certain views had predecessors 
from whom they in turn accepted certain views and who were the source of their 
information.8  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Italiam Tarentum venit, et ab Archita Tarentino Pythagorae discipulo de opinionibus Pythagoricis est 
instructus” (In Meta., I, 10, n. 152). 
5 “Licet id quod unus homo potest immittere vel apponere ad cognitionem veritatis suo studio et ingenio, 
sit aliquid parvum per comparationem ad totam considerationem veritatis, tamen illud, quod aggregatur 
ex omnibus ‘coarticulatis’, idest exquisitis et collectis, fit aliquid magnum, ut potest apparere in 
singulis artibus, quae per diversorum studia et ingenia ad mirabile incrementum pervenerunt” (In 
Meta., II, 1, n. 276). Cf. also In Eth., I, 11 (Leon. 47/1, p. 39, lin. 36-61). 
6 Cf. In Peryerm., I, 2, (Leon. 1*/1, p. 22, lin. 167-184); In Eth., I, 1 (Leon. 47/1, p. 4, lin. 55-78). See 
also John O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of 
Existence (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), p. 275-298. 
7 “Adiuvatur enim unus ab altero ad considerationem veritatis dupliciter. Uno modo directe. Alio modo 
indirecte. Directe quidem iuvatur ab his qui veritatem invenerunt: quia … dum unusquisque 
praecedentium aliquid de veritate invenit, simul in unum collectum, posteriores introducit ad magnam 
veritatis cognitionem. Indirecte vero, inquantum priores errantes circa veritatem, posterioribus exercitii 
occasionem dederunt, ut diligenti discussione habita, veritas limpidius appareret.” (In Meta., II, 1, 
n. 287). 
8 “Est autem iustum ut his, quibus adiuti sumus in tanto bono, scilicet cognitione veritatis, gratias agamus 
… non solum his, quos quis existimat veritatem invenisse, quorum opinionibus aliquis communicat 
sequendo eas; sed etiam illis, qui superficialiter locuti sunt ad veritatem investigandam, licet eorum 
opiniones non sequamur; quia isti etiam aliquid conferunt nobis. Praestiterunt enim nobis quoddam 
exercitium circa inquisitionem veritatis. … A quibusdam enim praedecessorum nostrorum accepimus 
aliquas opiniones de veritate rerum, in quibus credimus eos bene dixisse, alias opiniones 
praetermittentes. Et iterum illi, a quibus nos accepimus, invenerunt aliquos praedecessores, a quibus 
acceperunt, quique fuerunt eis causa instructionis” (In Meta., II, 1, n. 288). 
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This is why St. Thomas read so carefully, frequently, and reverently the writings of his 
great predecessors, and urged others to do so as well. For him it was a sign of laziness 
to neglect this reading, and a sign of arrogance to hold one’s predecessors in contempt.9  
From Aristotle, Aquinas also learned that the immediate motive to study the 
thought of others is the hope of finding knowledge about the truth of things (not the 
truth that somebody thought in this or that way) or of finding at least some useful hints 
to discover the truth about things that really exist.10 To arrive at certainty, a kind of 
radical openness that one might find in a court hearing is required. Otherwise, an 
important aspect or point of view may be missed, notwithstanding the fact that the same 
can cause some confusion and even add more doubts. In the end, however, this 
openness is worthwhile because it can reveal more of the truth we want to discover.11 
Therefore, such a reverential study is not guided by a mere fancy, but by a sincere 
desire for solid explanations, sound reasoning, and, finally, for the truth: 
Since in choosing or rejecting opinions a person should not be influenced either by 
a liking or dislike for the one introducing the opinion, but rather by the certainty of 
truth, he therefore says that we must love both parties, namely, those whose opinion 
we follow, and those whose opinion we reject. For both have diligently sought the 
truth and have aided us in this matter. Yet we must “be persuaded by the more 
certain,” i.e., we must follow the opinion of those who have attained the truth with 
greater certitude.12 
 
The reverence shown to our predecessors does not mean an uncritical acceptance 
of their positions, but the whole idea of apprenticeship, so present in Aristotle and 
emphasized by Aquinas as an acknowledgment of dependence on others,13 as also 
                                                 
9 “Docilitas, sicut et alia quae ad prudentiam pertinent, secundum aptitudinem quidem est a natura: sed 
ad eius consummationem plurimum valet humanum studium, dum scilicet homo sollicite, frequenter et 
reverenter applicat animum suum documentis maiorum, non negligens ea propter ignaviam, nec 
contemnens propter superbiam.” (STh, II-II, 49, 3 ad 2). 
10 “Studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat 
veritas rerum” (In De caelo, I, 22, n. 8). 
11 “Sicut autem in iudiciis nullus potest iudicare nisi audiat rationes utriusque partis, ita necesse est eum, 
qui debet audire philosophiam, melius se habere in iudicando si audierit omnes rationes quasi 
adversariorum dubitantium” (In Meta., III, 1, n. 342). 
12 “Quia in eligendis opinionibus vel repudiandis, non debet duci homo amore vel odio introducentis 
opinionem, sed magis ex certitudine veritatis, ideo [Aristoteles] dicit quod oportet amare utrosque, 
scilicet eos quorum opinionem sequimur, et eos quorum opinionem repudiamus. Utrique enim 
studuerunt ad inquirendam veritatem, et nos in hoc adiuverunt. Sed tamen oportet nos ‘persuaderi 
a certioribus’, idest sequi opinionem eorum, qui certius ad veritatem pervenerunt” (In Meta., XII, 9, n. 
2566). 
13 According to MacIntyre, this, among other things, distinguishes sharply Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas’s 
approach from the Enlightenment model of “plain person” anthropology and morality, which regarded 
a human being as knowing by himself and at once what the world is and what he is supposed to do, as 
stripped of any tradition, independent from any influence of others, and establishing his own world for 
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a spontaneous aversion from the arrogance, demands that serious reasons be present for 
not accepting them:  
doubtful issues arise for two reasons, either because the ancient philosophers 
entertained a different opinion about these things than is the truth of reality, or 
because they completely omitted to consider them.14 
 
St. Thomas approvingly remarks that it was Aristotle’s custom in most of his works to 
preface his own solutions and synthesis with a historical survey and a serious discussion 
of the opinions of his predecessors.15 On the other hand, to avoid the charge of being 
naïve or credulous, Aquinas also stresses the importance of evidence to accept 
a proposition as true.16 Again, according to him there are degrees in our knowledge. 
There is a hierarchy of truths and there are different kinds of truths (e.g. necessary and 
contingent truths). These factors should also be taken into consideration while assenting 
to or dissenting from what is proposed to us.  
                                                                                                                                               
himself: cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, 
and Tradition, Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1988 (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), especially chapter VI, “Aquinas and the Rationality of 
Tradition” (p. 127-148), and chapter VIII, “Tradition against Encyclopaedia: Enlightened Morality as 
the Superstition of Modernity” (p. 170-195). See also his Dependent Rational Animals. Why Human 
Beings eed the Virtues, “The Paul Carus Lecture Series 20,” (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open 
Court, 1999). Régis also contrasts Aristotle and Aquinas on this score with Descartes and Kant, 
cf. Epistemology, p. 126-127. John Deely also writes that Descartes engendered the general prejudice 
against the importance of history for the philosopher, the prejudice that justifies the dismissal of 
predecessors: cf. John Deely, “What Happened to Philosophy Between Aquinas and Descartes?” 
The Thomist 58 (1994), p. 557-558. Descartes says for example: “when I cast a philosophical eye upon 
the various activities and undertakings of mankind, there are almost none which I do not consider vain 
and useless” (Descartes, Discourse on Method, translated by John Cottingham in The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes, edited by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch [Cambridge 
University Press, 1985], Vol. II, p. 112). Such a statement may be well taken as a summary of the 
history of ethics that G. E. Moore presented in his Principia Ethica. Deely complains that: “so 
ahistorical had philosophy become by the modern twilight that it was possible in the twentieth century 
for Bertrand Russell to market a best-selling history of philosophy in which the portraits even of such 
major figures as Aristotle and Aquinas bear almost no relation to historical actuality. In such a climate 
of historical obfuscation, his student Ludwig Wittgenstein succeeded in presenting the wholesale 
implementation of late Latin nominalism under the guise of a method without precedent for handling 
philosophical problems” (Deely, Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of 
Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-first Century [Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001], p. 581). Deely notes as well that Wittgenstein “took pride in having studied 
almost nothing of other philosophers” (ibid., p. 583). 
14 “Sunt autem huiusmodi dubitabilia propter duas rationes. Vel quia antiqui philosophi aliter susceperunt 
opinionem de eis quam rei veritas habeat, vel quia omnino praetermiserunt de his considerare” 
(In Meta., III, 1, n. 338). 
15 “Est autem attendendum, quod propter has rationes consuetudo Aristotelis fuit fere in omnibus libris 
suis, ut inquisitioni veritatis vel determinationi praemitteret dubitationes emergentes. Sed in aliis libris 
singillatim ad singulas determinationes praemittit dubitationes: hic vero simul premittit omnes 
dubitationes, et postea secundum ordinem debitum determinat veritatem” (In Meta., III, 1, n. 343). 
Cf. In Meta., I, 11, n. 180. 
16 “Esse credulum in vitium sonat quia designat superfluitatem in credendo, sicut esse bibulum 
superfluitatem in bibendo” (De ver., 14, 10 ad 6). Cf. In Meta., I, 1, n. 29. 
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Yet, over all accounts that we learn from our predecessors, the primacy in our 
cognition has the reality of things which we want to know, things which are the measure 
of our knowing, measure of truth that we discover or learn. The only immediate 
cognitive access to the reality of things is that through our senses. It is therefore the 
reality of material and changing being. A special attention paid to this fact is one of the 
most crucial characteristics of St. Thomas’s thought. We should also have this 
awareness when we read his texts. It helps in avoiding two modern philosophical 
tendencies: an absolutization of a mathematical way of thinking on the one hand, and 
a whimsical poeticization on the other. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the gate to any 
human cognition is our sensory experience, which remains always the essential feature 
of every cognitive operation.  
What Aquinas learned from Aristotle above all was his genuine technique of 
investigation and explanation. Aristotle identified and described patterns of question-
asking and answer-giving, and then proposed a method of research, as well as a method 
of reliable philosophical explanation. Taken together, these two methods correspond to 
human cognitive capacities and the structure of the world, and lead one to true 
knowledge insofar as they help to search truth and avoid errors in reasoning. Aquinas 
adopted these methods from Aristotle and applied them to philosophical and theological 
issues in his work. The method of research has several names: “method of discovery” 
(via inventionis), “method of inquiring” (via inquisitionis) or “dialectical method” 
(dialectica). The second method, the general method of reliable philosophical 
explanation, is understood to be identical to scientific explanation and is called 
a “method of judgment” (via iudicii) or “method of instruction” (via doctrinae). 
Sometimes Aquinas also refers to these two methods more narrowly, referring to logical 
presentation (ostendere logice) or analytical presentation (ostendere analytice).17 These 
methods constitute two parts of logic: the first is presented mainly in Aristotelian Topics 
and the second in Posterior Analytics. The purpose of both methods is to provide 
reliable means of acquiring true knowledge about the world.  
The use of the method of research develops one’s capacity to challenge 
uncritically accepted principles and opinions. This method helps to identify the topic of 
research, classify what is known already, develop the argument, defend one’s ideas 
                                                 
17 Cf. In Poster., I, 33 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 122, lin. 3-8); 43 (p. 161, lin. 5-7); 44 (p. 168, lin. 101-102).  
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against opponents, and discover new truths.18 Using this method we may proceed from 
merely probable premises, such as commonly received opinions or some analogies 
(as in arguments ex convenientiae), or from general, that is, only logical considerations. 
Conclusions of such arguments are only more or less probable. This distinguishes 
dialectics from scientific method, to which it is proper to attain a certain knowledge 
through proper causes. Dialectical discourse may also concern things about which we 
cannot have strictly scientific knowledge, supplying tentative conclusions where 
certitude is impossible. It can play a preparatory function in gaining first indemonstrable 
principles or an exact scientific knowledge of something. Thanks to its discursive mode, 
a problem may be stated properly and unconvincing arguments may be undermined in 
order to find proper causes and make room for a strict demonstration. So, in Aristotle’s 
and Aquinas’s account, dialectics, understood as an inquiry led by the method of 
research, is significantly present along with demonstrations in scientific disciplines.19 
St. Thomas indicates that dialectical discourse is to scientific discourse what an 
unterminated process is to a terminated one.20 
                                                 
18 Cf. Louis-Marie Régis, L’Opinion selon Aristote (Paris-Ottawa: Vrin-Institute d’Etudes Médiévales, 
1935), an authoritative study where the author with a great clarity utterly dispels absurd accusations 
against Aristotle’s alleged dogmatism in philosophy: “Aristote n’est ni dogmatique, ni aprioriste, come 
on le lui a si souvent reproché, c’est nous qui le faison dogmatique et aprioriste par nos interprétations 
textuelles et doctrinales” (p. 267-268). Although Aristotle is the main figure of this book, the author 
refers from time to time to Aquinas showing several serious errors and inaccuracies in some 
interpretations of Aquinas’s writings. These spurious interpretations seem to result from ignorance or 
underestimation of Aristotle’s logical books and Aquinas’s commentaries upon them. See also his 
Epistemology, p. 127. By the end of the book Régis writes: “Everyone knows the profound contempt in 
which Descartes and modern thinkers hold Scholastic logic; to them, it is formal, vicious, and does 
violence to the mind without giving it evidence. And what is worse, it is absolutely sterile as an 
instrument for discovering truth. According to Descartes, the source of these capital sins of the 
Scholastic method is in its essentially synthetic character, which completely excludes analysis, by 
which fact the only method of discovering truth is excluded. These statements made by the putative 
father of philosophic method are owing to his total ignorance of the texts of ancient philosophers as 
well as to his identification of the method of discovery proper to mathematical truth with that of 
philosophical truth” (p. 442). Cf. following pages of this book for a plain justification of these claims.  
19 Alasdair MacIntyre underlines the role of dialectics in the process of gaining first principles of 
demonstration in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s theory of science, and notes that such science “had thus 
been an inseparable blend of demonstration and dialectic. But from late medieval Aristotelianism 
onward they were split apart in a way that first diminished the importance of Aristotle’s discussions of 
the Topics, either by downgrading the importance of dialectical argument or else by assimilating the 
study of dialectic to the study of consequentiae (see Eleonore Stump ‘Topics: their Development and 
Absorption into Consequences’ chapter 14 The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 
edited by N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, and E. Stump, Cambridge, 1982), and then during the 
Renaissance permitted the presentation of dialectic, or rather what then became represented as 
dialectic, as a rhetorical rival alternative to the Aristotelian logic of demonstration” (Whose Justice? 
p. 224). 
20 Cf. STh, I, 79, 8 c.; In Boet. De Trin., 6, 1 ad 1am and ad 3am. 
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It is not enough simply to reject objections in answer to our wonder, problems or 
doubts, because after doing this another doubt can still arise. A doubt arises when the 
resolution of contradictory wonder-provoking accounts becomes too difficult. Doubt is, 
therefore, a state of mind avoiding decision through fear of error or falsity. Error or 
falsity, according to Aquinas, is feared more than ignorance itself; it is avoided naturally 
because it constitutes a “great part of misery.”21 Threatened with a failure to grasp what 
something really is and the prospect of remaining in doubt, the investigation should not 
halt before any artificial barrier; it should go as far as the nature of the thing to be 
known requires.22 We should not even refrain from doubting the truth universally in the 
domain that studies universal truth.23 Asking questions open to both sides of the 
contradiction is the fundamental feature of the method of research in Aristotelian 
philosophy. It is not doubt that is problematic in modern philosophy but the way of 
coping with it. Especially the most problematic seems to be the identification of doubt, 
which is a fear of error, with error itself, and considering what is doubtful to me as what 
is doubtful in itself.24 Whereas for Aquinas one of the most important and yet simple 
distinctions is that between what is more knowable to me and what is more knowable in 
itself. To attain a satisfying depth of knowledge, we should know thoroughly and 
perfectly the nature or essence of the thing that happens to be the object of our 
                                                 
21 “Deceptio autem et error magna pars miseriae est: hoc est enim quod omnes naturaliter fugiunt” 
(CG, III, 39, n. 2170). See also Aquinas’s sobering remark: “Videmus enim quod homines ex se ipsis 
decipi et errare possunt … et iterum pluri tempore anima est in deceptione quam in cognitione 
ueritatis” (In De An., II, 28 [Leon. 45/1, p. 189, lin. 141-146]). 
22 “[Aristoteles] dicit hoc accidisse, quod [quidam] tam defectivas solutiones assignaverunt, quia 
videntur quaerere circa dubitationes usque ad aliquem terminum, et non quousque possibile sit 
dubitari. Oportet autem eum qui vult recte solvere, ut perducat solutionem usque ad id ubi non sit 
amplius dubitatio; quod isti non faciunt. Cuius rationem assignat, connumerans se aliis, causa vitandae 
iactantiae; dicens quod omnibus nobis dubitationes solventibus hoc videtur esse consuetum, ut 
inquisitio fiat non ad rem, sed ad contraria dicentem, idest non quousque natura rei requirit, sed 
quousque adversarius non habeat ulterius contradictionem: quia etiam hoc quilibet observat ad 
seipsum, ut cum ipse dubitat de aliquo, quaerat in seipso quousque ipse non habeat in promptu unde 
sibi contradicat. Sed illud non sufficit: quia cum aliquis vult veram solutionem invenire, oportet quod 
non sit contentus obiectionibus quas habet in promptu, sed diligenter inquirat eas. Et propter hoc, sicut 
ipse subdit, oportet eum qui vult bene inquirere veritatem, esse promptum ad hoc quod instet et sibi 
ipsi et aliis; non per instantias sophisticas, sed per instantias reales et rationabiles, proprias, idest 
convenientes, generi de quo inquiritur. Et hoc quidem contingit ex hoc quod homo considerat omnes 
differentias rerum, ex quarum similitudine quaestio solvitur” (In De caelo, II, 22, n. 10). 
23 “Sed ista scientia [i.e. philosophia prima] sicut habet universalem considerationem de veritate, ita 
etiam ad eam pertinet universalis dubitatio de veritate” (In Meta., III, 1, n. 343).  
24 Cf. Régis, Epistemology, p. 110. 
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knowledge.25 The scientific method directs us to this perfect kind of knowledge attained 
from the nature or essence of the thing that is the object of science.  
Following Aristotle, Aquinas says that in order to explain something accurately 
we should know how to ask questions. There are four kinds of philosophical or 
scientific questions that we ask about what we do not know: 1. does the subject of 
inquiry exist? (si est or an sit); 2. what is it? (quid est or how can it be defined?); 3. is it 
a fact? (quia or what are its properties?); 4. for what reason? (propter quid or why does 
it have these properties?). “To these four can be reduced whatever is inquirable or 
knowable.”26 St. Thomas remarks that this array of scientific or philosophical questions 
is broader than in the method of research – in the latter all questions can be reduced and 
contained only in the range of the question quia.27  
These four questions have an order determined by what is to be known and by 
our cognitive capacities.28 We do not ask questions about something that is obvious to 
us but about something unknown.29 For example, Aristotle says that we would not ask 
the question why the moon is eclipsed if we could be elevated above the moon high 
enough so as to see that the moon entering into the shade of the earth loses the light that 
it used to reflect. This evidence would be enough. It would provide sufficient 
intellectual knowledge to appease the wonder that was the source of our question.30 
                                                 
25 John Deely reminds that Jacques Maritain called the distinction between objects and things “the crux 
of the problem of realism.” Deely briefly characterizes this distinction as follows: “Things are 
whatever exists in the physical surroundings independently of being detected or known by the 
cognitive channels of some organism. Objects, by contrast, exist in relation to an organism and as the 
terminus of an awareness or cognition. Nothing prevents an object from also being, in this or that 
respect, a thing, but nothing requires an object to be also a thing, except in the limit case of sensation 
analytically distinguished and precised within the whole of experience as consisting normally, in the 
case of human animals, of perceptions and understandings as well as (and as englobing and 
structuring) the sensations forming a limit case which demands examination in its own right” (John 
Deely, “Philosophy and Experience,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 66 [1992], p. 306). 
26 “De hiis questiones facimus que ignoramus; unde sequitur quod ea que queruntur sint equalia numero 
hiis que sciuntur. Quatuor autem sunt que queruntur, scilicet ‘quia’, ‘propter quid’, ‘si est’ et ‘quid 
est’, ad que quatuor reduci potest quicquid est queribile uel scibile” (In Poster., II, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, 
p. 174, lin. 40-45]).  
27 “Diuidit autem in I Topicorum questiones siue problemata aliter in quatuor, que omnia 
comprehenduntur sub una harum questionum, que dicitur questio ‘quia’: non enim ibi intendit nisi de 
questionibus ad quas dyaletice disputatur” (ibid., lin. 45-50]). 
28 As Aquinas speaks about an ordinata interrogatio (STh, I, 84, 3 ad 3). 
29 “Non enim fit questio de inmediatis, que, etsi uera sunt, non tamen habent medium, quia huiusmodi, 
cum sint manifesta, sub questione non cadunt” (In Poster., II, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 175, lin. 134-137]). 
30 “Quando medium per sensum innotescit, nullus relinquitur questioni locus: tunc enim querimus in 
rebus sensibilibus secundum aliquam predictarum questionum, quando medium non sentimus, sicut 
querimus si est defectus lunae uel non, quia non sentimus medium quod est causa faciens deficere 
lunam. Sed si essemus in loco qui est super lunam, uideremus quomodo luna subintrando umbram terre 
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Sometimes it happens that we do not know or are not certain whether something exists, 
when for example we have an idea of something but its existence is not obvious to our 
senses. In this case, we first ask if what we know confusedly (at least only by name)31 
exists at all (an sit).32 For example: “does the Minotaur exist?” or “does God exist?” At 
first, a nominal definition suffices, i.e. what a given word signifies (ratio nominis or 
quid nominis).33 Thus a question like “does biltrix exist?” does not make sense if we 
have no idea whether the word “biltrix” has any signification (to my knowledge, it has 
not, at least in English). To state a philosophical or scientific problem we should first 
know a language and the significations of words. Yet if anything is to be discovered, 
this nominal definition should only be a starting point toward the knowledge of real 
things, and to pass from what is known superficially to a deeper and better knowledge. 
To know the significations of words is a kind of pre-scientific knowledge. Knowledge 
of things as they really are is the main purpose of cognitive project for Aristotle and 
Aquinas. It is important to note here that the answer to this first question (as to every 
philosophical question) concerns our intellectual judgment and not sensation,34 although 
according to Aristotle and Aquinas no intellectual judgment is possible without some 
reference to the sensory existential data.  
Knowing that something exists (because it is obvious or because we answered 
the first question), we can pursue our questioning to know better what this something is 
                                                                                                                                               
deficeret, et ideo circa hoc nichil quereremus, nec si est nec propter quid est, set simul utrumque nobis 
fieret manifestum” (ibid., p. 177, lin. 296-307]). 
31 “Ante quam sciatur de aliquo an sit, non potest proprie sciri de eo quid est (non entium enim non sunt 
diffinitiones), unde questio ‘an est’ precedit questionem ‘quid est’; set non potest ostendi de aliquo an 
sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen” (In Poster., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 11, lin. 63-69]). 
Cf. STh, I, 2, 2; 1, 7 ad 1; In Boet. De Trin., 6, 4 ad 2. 
32 “An res sit, tripliciter cognoscit. Uno modo quia cadit sub sensu. Alio modo ex causis et effectibus 
rerum cadentibus sub sensu, sicut ignem ex fumo perpendimus. Tertio modo cognoscit aliquid in 
seipso esse ex inclinatione quam habet ad aliquos actus: quam quidem inclinationem cognoscit ex hoc 
quod super actus suos reflectitur, dum cognoscit se operari” (Super III Sent., 23, 1, 2 sol.).  
33 “De eo enim quod est nobis penitus ignotum, non possumus scire si est aut non. Inuenitur autem aliqua 
alia ratio rei preter diffinitionem, que quidem uel est ratio expositiua significationis nominis, uel est 
ratio ipsius rei nominatae, altera tamen a diffinitione, quia non significat ‘quid est’ sicut diffinitio, set 
forte aliquod accidens” (In Poster., I, 8 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 203, lin. 97-104]). 
34 “Sciencia non consistit in cognitione quae est per sensum. Et hoc probat sic. Manifestum est enim 
quod sensus cognoscit aliquid tale, et non hoc: non enim obiectum per se sensus est substancia et quod 
quid est, set aliqua sensibilis qualitas, puta calidum frigidum album nigrum, et alia huiusmodi; 
huiusmodi autem qualitates afficiunt singulares quasdam substancias in determinato loco et tempore 
existentes; unde necesse est quod id quod sentitur, sit hoc aliquid, scilicet singularis substancia, et sit 
alicubi et nunc, idest in determinato loco et tempore. Ex quo patet quod id quod est uniuersale, non 
potest cadere sub sensu: non enim quod est uniuersale determinatur ad hic et nunc, quia iam non esset 
uniuersale. Illud enim uniuersale dicimus quod est semper et ubique” (In Poster., I 42 [Leon. 1*/2, 
p. 158-159, lin. 83-99). Cf. ibid., lin. 121-215. 
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(quid sit), in order to attain a clearer and more distinct knowledge, knowledge of the 
nature or essence of this thing. For Aristotle and Aquinas there is no sense in asking the 
question quid sit without having the answer to the question an sit, because if something 
does not exist, it does not have any nature or essence, and thus it is unintelligible in 
itself.35 We cannot know the essence of what is not first known to exist. If we use the 
nominal definition in the question an sit, we should be aware that the nominal definition 
has nothing to do with the nature of the thing, but only specifies in what sense the term 
is used, i.e. what it signifies or to what it actually refers.36 In the Aristotelian approach 
we know something philosophically or scientifically only if it exists or in relation to 
existence.37 Science and philosophy are about actual reality, not about fiction or merely 
possible being.  
To answer the question quid sit means to construct a real or essential definition. 
This can be a laborious task because in our intellectual cognition, taken from sense 
experience,38 in the beginning we know only generally, in an undifferentiated way, and 
gradually we are able to de-fine, de-termine, de-limit this particular species of things to 
                                                 
35 That the substances properly have essences and accidents only in a derivative and relative sense see 
In Meta., VII, 1-11. 
36 “Oratio significat secundum placitum, idest secundum institutionem humane rationis et uoluntatis” 
(In Peryerm., I, 6 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 35, lin. 191-193]). “Nulla sciencia demonstrat quod tale nomen 
significet talem rem: nomina enim significant ad placitum, unde oportet hoc supponere secundum 
uoluntatem instituentis” (In Poster., II, 6 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 195-196, lin. 160-163). 
37 Therefore charges of so-called “essentialism” (in its pejorative meaning) against Aristotelian 
philosophy seem to come from a simple misunderstanding of Aristotelian epistemology and 
philosophical method. Cf. critical review of Etienne Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers by Louis 
Marie Régis, The Modern Schoolman 28 (1951): 111-125; as well as idem, Epistemology, p. 315-327; 
Ralph McInerny, “A Note on Thomistic Existentialism” in: Being and Predication. Thomistic 
Interpretations (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), p. 165-172; 
Benedict Ashley, The Way toward Wisdom, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2006), p. 146-163. “The pretension that St Thomas discovered the difference between essence and 
existence is no older than the twentieth century, but over the course of the decades of that century it led 
to some pretty strange posturing. Aristotle made it the condition of a science which wanted to 
understand reality that it answer first respecting an object it sought to investigate the question whether 
that object exists apart from the mind’s consideration. Yet Phelan would have us believe that ‘in the 
world of Aristotle there was no esse.’ The effort to maintain that Aquinas was the first to discover the 
difference between essence and existence leads those engaged in it to remarkable conclusions more 
reminiscent of the modern idealism they oppose than of the way Aquinas presents the distinction 
between essence and existence as an ancient heritage of philosophy and a common heritage of anyone 
who begins to think on the matter of the contrast between physical being objectified and purely 
objective being the point of origin of distinctively human awareness” (John Deely, Four Ages, p. 294-
295). On a very positive meaning of Aristotelian essentialism as epitomized in Aquinas and its logical 
“incommensurability” with problematic contemporary versions of “essentialism” (as exemplified in 
Kripke), see Gyula Klima, “Contemporary ‘Essentialism’ vs. Aristotelian Essentialism” in: J. Haldane, 
(ed.), Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytic Traditions (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), p. 175-194. 
38 Régis notes that Aquinas affirms the dependance of the intellect on the sensory phantasm in more than 
fifteen hundred places – Epistemology, p. 513.  
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which this singular object belongs. For example, when we see two birds, it can happen 
that we are unable to distinguish them from other kinds of birds or say whether the 
differences they have between them constitute two species (perhaps their differences are 
only as those between male and female). Obviously, we can describe sensory data that 
this bird is bigger, and has such and such colours, but to tell the exact nature of it, 
provided we do not learn it from somebody else, consists in a long process of defining. 
We know the nature of any material being only by means of its sensorily experienced 
accidents.39  
Another question that deals with the problem of existence (as in the first 
question) is the question quia, but in this case we ask about the existence of a feature 
belonging to something, or about a form or an accident inhering in a subject. Put 
differently, in this question we ask whether something is such and such (an sit talis).40 
Here we also ask about something that eludes our perception. This question is closely 
related to the second, because in establishing the answer to the question quid sit in via 
inventionis we must first do a survey of thing’s properties in order to discern among 
them which ones are essential and which are only accidental. Indeed, if we do not know 
the answer to the question an sit and to the question quia, we cannot even ask the 
question quid sit. 
When we know that something is such and such, i.e. knowing an accident as 
inhering in something, we can ask another question: “why something is such”, that is: 
“why the accident inheres” (propter quid). This question arises when we know the 
existence of a subject and at least one of its properties.41 Basically, to know quid sit and 
                                                 
39 “Set, quia forme essentiales non sunt nobis per se note, oportet quod manifestentur per aliqua 
accidencia, que sunt signa illius forme” (In Poster., II, 13 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 222, lin. 118-121]). “In 
naturalibus, in quibus essencie et uirtutes rerum propter hoc quod in materia sunt, sunt occulte, set 
innotescunt nobis per ea, que exterius de ipsis apparent” (In Poster., I, 4 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 22, lin. 305-
308]). “Formae substantiales, quae secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia” (STh, 
I, 77, 1 ad 7). Cf. STh, I, 29, 1 ad 3; I-II, 49, 2 ad 3. 
40 “Tunc dicimur querere ‘quia’, non ita quod hoc quod dico ‘quia’ sit nota uel signum interrogationis, set 
quia ad hoc quaerimus ut sciamus ‘quia’ ita est. Cuius signum est quia, cum inuenerimus per 
demonstrationem, quiescimus a querendo; et si in principio hoc sciuissemus, non quaereremus utrum 
ita sit” (In Poster., II, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 175, lin. 77-84). 
41 “Cum quaeritur propter quid, oportet existere manifesta entia ista duo: scilicet ipsum quia et ipsum 
esse, quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est. Sicut cum quaeritur propter quid luna eclipsatur? Oportet 
esse manifestum quod luna patitur eclipsim: si enim non sit manifestum hoc, frustra quaeritur propter 
quid hoc sit” (In Meta., VII, 17, n. 1651). “Quoniam vero in hac quaestione, qua quaeritur quid est 
homo, oportet habere notum existere verum hoc ipsum quod est esse hominem (aliter nihil 
quaereretur): … palam est, quod ille qui quaerit quid est homo quaerit propter quid est. Nam esse est 
praesuppositum ad hoc quod quaeritur quid est, quia est praesuppositum ad propter quid” (In Meta., 
VII, 17, n. 1666). 
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propter quid is the same thing: to know quid est refers to a knowledge through which 
we know about something what it simply is and not that something inheres in it, but 
propter quid refers to a knowledge of what inheres.42 Sometimes it is impossible to 
know exactly what something is and in those cases, having the quia, we can inquire 
propter quid, and in this way accept quid est.43  
Various findings that occur in philosophical or scientific investigation need to be 
verified. Without this we are left only with an opinion or belief, which perhaps is 
somehow justified, but there will be no scientific certainty in the Aristotelian sense. The 
via inventionis furnishes us more or less probable theories, which we can judge as true, 
but not with an absolute certitude. The inventive process, i.e. the realm of opinions, 
occupies a vast sphere of human experience, and both Aristotle and Aquinas give it an 
adequate place in philosophy. A great part of our actual knowledge is only provisional 
and in constant need of improvement. Especially in the realm of nature, we can know 
things only partially, because much always remains to be known.44 The process of 
discovery is the first stage of knowing something; afterwards the stage of scientific 
judgment is needed. The fourth question (propter quid) provides the means through 
which this judgment is carried out.45 In this question we ask: what are the explanatory 
                                                 
42 “Idem est scire quod quid est et propter quid. … quid est refertur ad scienciam qua scimus de aliquo 
quod simpliciter sit, non autem quod aliquid insit alicui; set ‘propter quid’ refertur ad cognitionem 
eorum quae insunt” (In Poster., II, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 178, lin. 323-331]). 
43 Cf. ibid., 8 (p. 203, lin. 91-114). 
44 John A. Oesterle in his article “The Significance of the Universal ut nunc” (in: James A. Weisheipl, 
(ed.), The Dignity of Science: Studies in the Philosophy of Science presented to William Humbert 
Kane, O.P. [The Thomist Press, 1961], p. 27-38) notes that a defect of much scholastic philosophy, 
especially in the manual form, consisted in treating too many things as subjects to rigorous 
demonstration. He adds: “The great scholastics, however, were never under such illusion” (p. 33). On 
the universal ut nunc in Aquinas, see e.g. In Poster., I, 9, (Leon. 1*/2, p. 37, lin. 75-85). Oesterle gives 
the definition of ‘man’ as ‘rational animal’ as an example of a universal which is true but remains a 
universal ut nunc. He comments: “The definition of ‘man’ as ‘rational animal’ has often been criticized 
as inadequate and even ridiculed as being incomplete. But this definition, though an essential one and a 
good one in precisely this sense, was never intended to be a complete definition. From the standpoint 
of completion, much remains to be said about what man is, and much of what we know in seeking to 
determine more fully what man is will remain provisional” (p. 36-37). Today’s repeatedly raised 
charges that Aquinas was a “deductivist” usually simply misconceive his methods of thinking. 
45 See for example how St. Thomas applies this to different ways of theological discussions: “Dicendum 
quod quilibet actus exequendus est secundum quod conuenit ad suum finem. Disputatio autem ad 
duplicem finem potest ordinari. Quedam enim disputatio ordinatur ad remouendum dubitationem an ita 
sit, et in tali disputatione theologica maxime utendum est auctoritatibus quas recipiant illi cum quibus 
disputatur … Quedam uero disputatio est magistralis in scolis, non ad remouendum errorem, set ad 
instruendum auditores ut inducantur ad intellectum veritatis quam credunt, et tunc oportet rationibus 
inniti inuestigantibus ueritatis radicem, et facientibus scire quomodo sit uerum quod dicitur. Alioquin, 
si nudis auctoritatibus magister questionem determinet, certificabitur quidem auditor quod ita est, set 
nichil scientie uel intellectus acquiret et uacuus abscedet” (Quodl., IV, 9, 3 c.). 
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reasons, why different kinds of properties necessarily follow such and such substance?46 
The failure to distinguish clearly between the method of discovery and the method of 
scientific explanation may lead to erroneous interpretations of Aquinas’s texts.47 It may 
also be a reason why some interpretations of the status of St. Thomas’s ethics as 
a discipline seem to be confused in seeking what is first in human experience when we 
engage in moral action, in order to prove that ethics is autonomous. I will say more 
about scientific explanation in Chapter 4. 
Since we are concerned here with a general approach to cognition, it should be 
noted that on this topic St. Thomas also follows this fundamental method of 
questioning. The first question this method has us pose is whether knowledge as such 
exists at all. For Aristotle and Aquinas, philosophy begins with a question that aims to 
acquire knowledge about what is still unknown through or from what is already 
known.48 If nothing were already known, even tentatively, of what we want to know, it 
would be impossible to ask a question. Hence, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, the 
first problem about human cognition is settled between knowledge and ignorance: 
whether there is some knowledge or there is no knowledge at all. Our ability to pose 
questions about something – and it cannot be denied that we have this ability49 – 
assumes that there is also some kind of knowledge before the question is posed.  
We acquire a kind of confused and undifferentiated knowledge already in the 
early period of our life. This occurs because we are human beings, living bodies that are 
born from other living bodies, growing among and depending upon other living bodies, 
communicating with others through a language or languages, sensing, experiencing this 
world. Our cognitive capacities, faculties for exercising cognitive acts, are our abilities 
                                                 
46 “Ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter 
intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad 
quae inventa examinat” (STh, I, 79, 8 c.). Cf. De ver., 15, 1. 
47 Anthony Kenny remarks that “Bertrand Russell was one of those who accused Aquinas of not being a 
real philosopher because he was looking for reasons for what he already believed. It is extraordinary 
that that accusation should be made by Russell, who in the book Principia Mathematica takes 
hundreds of pages to prove that two and two make four, which is something he had believed all his 
life” (Aquinas on Mind [New York: Routledge, 1994], p. 10). Clearly, Bertrand Russell did not realize 
that there existed these two methods of questioning. Dialectical method aims in discovering or 
establishing the knowledge of a fact (when the fact is itself not evident). Then, the process of looking 
for reasons for this fact, which aims in attaining the knowledge of reasoned fact, pertains to the 
proprium of philosophical or scientific method in Aristotelian philosophy.  
48 Cf. In Meta., I, 3, n. 55; In Meta., VII, 17, n. 1669. 
49 “Nichil est adeo uerum quin uoce negari possit … quedam autem adeo uera sunt quod eorum opposita 
intellectu capi non possunt” (In Poster., I, 19 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 71, lin. 45-46. 48-50]). 
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and as such are experienced. Since they are abilities of a human being, the unity of 
a person, existing as a living body, guarantees the unity of experience and cognition 
through the senses and the intellect of the individual. On this basis very early in life we 
form worldviews which are, in fact, narrow, limited, confused, opaque, vague, and 
incoherent. Nevertheless, they are already worldviews which somehow allow us to live 
in the world, to react in a human way to what we experience, and to form some concepts 
or opinions. Based on the combination of our experience and our intellectual capacities, 
we can ask questions about perceived facts in order to know them better. Furthermore, 
we can ask what kind or, better yet, kinds of knowledge are obtained about these facts 
or things – such as their veracity or falsehood – and whether and how this knowledge is 
infallible.50 This respectful attitude toward our experience led Aristotle and Aquinas to 
regard knowledge as something multiform and diversified, yet at the same time 
analogous, i.e. united under the same generic understanding of the reality named 
“knowledge.” To be sure, they are careful to distinguish and describe these many types 
of knowledge exactly, yet without separating one type from another altogether. It is 
worth stressing in our day that for them there is no a priori cognition independent of our 
senses.51 We are not so rational as to have our cognition without our animality. For 
Aristotle and Aquinas, logic also has its remote roots in sensory experience. 
                                                 
50 Régis says that the sequence of questions about human cognition, to which I referred above, is 
a genuine request stemming from the very notion of cognition: “Evey epistemological problem stated 
in terms of the opposition between truth and error is badly stated and therefore insoluble. Every 
epistemological problem must first be stated in terms of knowledge and ignorance; this is its first 
instance or moment. Once this question has been answered, we can ask what truth our knowledge gives 
us. With this question answered, we can go on to a third: Is this truth infallible? Because Descartes and 
Kant started with the third question before asking the second and first, whose solutions are 
presupposed, they were never able satisfactorily and objectively to solve their own problem. … They 
asked: ‘Why is our reason the source of infallible truth and error?’ To state the problem in this way is 
to identify the nature of knowledge with the nature of truth, and the nature of truth with that of 
certitude or infallibility. But this identification is impossible, for knowledge is to truth as cause is to 
effect, truth is to certitude as cause is to effect, and a cause cannot be identified with its effect since, by 
definition, they are opposites. … the inventors of the critique identified knowledge with one of its 
properties, infallibility, and were thus obliged to refuse the name of knowledge to everything that did 
not present this identification card to the intellect” (Epistemology, p. 60 and 139).  
51 Benedict Ashley writes about “the radical semantic shift” in the meaning of “a priori knowledge”: “In 
Aristotelian and Thomistic thought … knowledge always begins from the senses and proceeds to the 
intellect: hence a science proceeds from effect to cause (a posteriori). Once, however, the causes of the 
sensible effects have been demonstrated a posteriori, the science then proceeds to demonstrate the 
effects from the causes (a priori). By contrast, in the seventeenth-century origins of modern 
philosophy, with the turn to the subject, it comes generally to be supposed that we have a priori 
knowledge independent of and logically prior to sense experience” (The Way toward Wisdom, p. 33). 
Thus for Kant a priori meant not only a truth known prior to sense experience, but also a necessary 
condition for sense experience. “For Aristotle and Aquinas, the whole content of intellectual 
knowledge is derived from sense experience, and the a priori element reflects only the critically 
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1.2. The order of learning, intellectual skills, and liberal arts 
 
Aquinas did not preface his theological analysis with elaborate logical or 
methodological treatises, taking for granted the material that his students had learned 
during their trivium studies.52 We can, nonetheless, glean from several places in his 
texts what kind of preparation he assumed his students of theology would have.53 The 
trivium was the first stage of any university education of the era.54 It consisted of 
grammar, logic and rhetoric. The second stage was called quadrivium and was 
comprised of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. These seven domains, called 
“liberal arts,” were for St. Thomas the ordinary introduction to further studies in 
philosophy or theology.55 
                                                                                                                                               
organized deductive phase that knowledge sometimes achieves in philosophical and scientific 
reflection” (ibid., p. 472).  
52 Recently John I. Jenkins took this observation as one of the fundamental interpretative keys for the 
Summa Theologiae (cf. his Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas [Cambridge University Press, 
1997], especially p. 79-98). In fact, the correctness of this assertion imposes itself after a careful 
reading of Aquinas’s commentary upon the Posterior Analytics when we take the commentary as a 
sign of St. Thomas’s personal approach to science.  
53 Especially the whole of In Peryerm. and In Poster. as commentaries to logical texts which concern 
what is to be learned first. Further we can find more helpful general remarks in: In Boet. De Trin., 5-6; 
in many places of In Meta.; In Eth., I, 3 (Leon. 47/1, p. 12, lin. 94-165); VI (p. 332-377); In De causis, 
prooem. 
54 Chenu notes that “St. Thomas himself, then the young regent of Saint James College, together with St. 
Albert, regent at Cologne … , was a member of the commision of studies that in 1259 at the General 
Chapter of Valenciennes made up a vigorous code of the Order’s academic regime and decreed that 
each province would henceforth have a school of liberal arts, with philosophy heading the list of 
subjects to be taught” (Toward Understanding, p. 205). Let us remark that Aquinas started to write his 
Summa in 1266, seven years after this chapter. See also a very interesting article “El estudio de las 
artes liberales en la primitiva legislación dominicana. Antecedentes históricos” by Laureano Robles, 
(in: Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Age, Actes du IVe Congrès International de Philosophie 
Médiévale [Montréal, Canada, 27.08–2.09.1967], edited by Henri Irénée Marrou et al. [Montréal-Paris: 
Institut d’Etudes Médiévales-Vrin, 1969], p. 599-616), where the author analyses the transition of the 
Order of Preachers from a negative stance about the learning of liberal arts by clerics (very common 
stance of Church’s institutions at the time of the beginning of the Order) to a very affirmative one by 
the time of St. Thomas and later. See also a more recent and general approach “The Trivium and the 
Three Philosophies” by Gordon Leff (in: A History of the Univesity in Europe, edited by W. Rüegg, 
vol. I, Universities in the Middle Ages, edited by H. de Ridder-Syoens, p. 307-336 [Cambridge 
University Press, 1992]).  
55 The tradition of education through liberal arts has its partial roots prior to Aristotle and Plato. But this 
exact list of arts probably originated in the schools of Athens and Alexandria under mixed Platonic and 
Aristotelian influences which reigned throughout the Hellenistic period. By the time of St. Thomas the 
canon of liberal arts was nearly sacrosanct. See Pierre Conway and Benedict Ashley, “The Liberal Arts 
in St. Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 22 (1959): 460-532. The authors trace briefly the origin of the 
general tradition of liberal arts, then the immediate roots of Thomistic theory of the liberal arts, and 
discuss at length the character of these arts in the relation to other arts and sciences. One of the theses 
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Aquinas identifies the trivium and quadrivium with logic and mathematics 
respectively in the Aristotelian scheme of a man’s progressive learning.56 In this 
scheme, often referred to by St. Thomas,57 the first thing to be learned is the general 
method of thinking properly, that is logic, which he also called “a rational science” or 
“rational philosophy.”58 After this, mathematics is to be learned (divided into arithmetic 
and geometry), even more fittingly numbered among speculative sciences. The trivium 
and quadrivium form a sufficient introduction to the study of natural philosophy, which 
treats changing natural beings. Only after these three stages (logic, mathematics, and 
natural philosophy) could one properly begin the study of the threefold moral science: 
monastica, oeconomica, and politica. Finally, after these one could embark on the study 
of first philosophy, also called metaphysics or theology.59  
                                                                                                                                               
of this article is that Aquinas presented the Aristotelian sequence of education as adequate to the very 
nature of reason and so as a natural procedure, which would impose itself upon those who were 
studying Aristotle, even if there were not such a well established canon of liberal arts in times of 
Aquinas. Cf. also Eugenio T. Toccafondi, “Il pensiero di San Thomaso sulle arti liberali,” in Arts 
libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Age, p. 639-651; Gérard Verbeke, “Arts libéraux et morale d’après 
Saint Thomas,” ibid., 653-661; and especially an outstanding article “Divine Art in Saint Thomas 
Aquinas” by Francis J. Kovach, ibid., p. 663-671. Kovach refers to many ancient and medieval authors 
and states that Aquinas treats some traditional questions concerning liberal arts but in his answer to the 
question of the essence of the liberal arts “he ceases to be traditional; instead, he creates a Platonic and 
Aristotelian synthesis of unprecedented simplicity and lucidity” (p. 665). For a more recent and general 
view, see Ralph McInerny, “Beyond the Liberal Arts,” in The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages, 
ed. David. L. Wagner (Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 248-72.  
56 It is “Aristotelian” and not exactly “of Aristotle” because some elements are rather infered than found 
in his texts. See Conway and Ashley, “The Liberal Arts,” p. 467. 
57 For example: “Septem connumerantur quia hiis primum erudiebantur qui philosophiam discere 
uolebant; et ideo distinguuntur in triuium et quadriuium, ‘eo quod his quasi quibusdam uiis uiuax 
animus ad secreta philosophie introeat’. Et hoc etiam consonat uerbis Philosophi, qui dicit in II 
Metaphisice quod modus scientie debet queri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod 
logicam, que docet modum omnium scientiarum, debet quis addiscere ante omnes alias scientias, ad 
quam pertinet triuium; dicit etiam in VI Ethicorum quod mathematica potest sciri a pueris, non autem 
phisica, que experimentum requirit; et sic datur intelligi quod post logicam consequenter debet 
mathematica addisci, ad quam pertinet quadriuium. Et ita his quasi quibusdam uiis preparatur animus 
ad alias philosophicas disciplinas” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 ad 3).  
58 Cf. In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 4, lin. 25]; In Peryerm., I, 1 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 5, lin. 15); In Eth., I, 1 
(Leon. 47/1, p. 4, lin. 25-54). See also a very helpful and comprehensive study The Domain of Logic 
According to Saint Thomas Aquinas by Robert W. Schmidt (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 
especially p. 10 and 16-31. 
59 “Erit ergo hic congruus ordo addiscendi, ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica 
docet modum totius philosophiae; secundo autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis, quae nec experientia 
indigent nec imaginationem transcendunt; tertio autem in naturalibus, quae, etsi non excedant sensum 
et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam; quarto autem in moralibus, quae requirunt et 
experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum, ut in I habitum est; quinto autem in sapientialibus et 
divinis, quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intellectum” (In Eth., VI, 7 [Leon. 47/2, 
p. 358-359, lin. 202-213]). “Primo quidem incipientes a logica quae modum scientiarum tradit, 
secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse capaces, tertio ad naturalem 
philosophiam quae propter experientiam tempore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam 
cuius iuvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest, ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant quae 
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Theology is twofold, encompassing both a discipline based on natural capacities 
of human reason (theologia philosophica) and a discipline based on supernatural light 
given to believers through revelation (theologia sacrae Scripturae or sacra doctrina).60 
The teaching of theology in the second sense goes at the end of theological formation 
because sacra doctrina uses many premises from other disciplines. Revelation comes to 
man through material signs. To understand signs in a proper way and to construct 
a discipline of sacra doctrina, a solid knowledge of the natural world is required. You 
can receive grace without philosophy, even without understanding a word (as in the 
case of infants during baptism), but you cannot have theology as a discipline without 
philosophy. Philosophy is as omnipresent in theology as water in wine. This is why 
learning many things should precede our learning of theology. This whole order of 
learning is dictated by the nature of human cognitive capacities and the nature of the 
things to be known in specific sciences.61  
We should note here that since the Summa theologiae is a theological work in 
the sense of sacra doctrina, in order that it be properly understood, it must be read in 
the light of what was taught before learning theology. This directly concerns the 
character of the work: it is not a diary of an inventor, where he sets forth the steps of his 
inquiry beginning with things that are better known to us and finishing with things that 
are invented. This is a work of a teacher who presents the whole body of theology in an 
organized way for those who learned enough already to understand why this material is 
put in such an order and not in another.62 When Aquinas only mentions some difficult 
arguments and goes further without discussion, it is not because he dogmatically 
imposes something on the reader, but he hints at something that he may rightly expect 
his readers to know from their previous studies.  
                                                                                                                                               
considerat primas entium causas” (In De causis, prooem.). “Ad cognitionem enim eorum quae de Deo 
ratio investigare potest, multa praecognoscere oportet: cum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad Dei 
cognitionem ordinetur; propter quod metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes 
ultima remanet addiscenda” (CG, I, 4, n. 23). 
60 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 4 c. 
61 James A. Weisheipl notes that the same order we find in writings of Albert the Great, and he also 
considered this to be the natural order of learning. The same conviction about “naturalness” of this 
order of learning was shared by Robert Kilwardby, although he, interestingly, places moral philosophy 
after metaphysics (as does also Roger Bacon). Cf. idem, “Classification of the Sciences in Medieval 
Thought,” in idem, ature and Motion in the Middle Ages, ed. by William E. Carroll, (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985), p. 203-237. 
62 I follow here Jenkins’s interpretation of the general character of the STh, and on its intended audience; 
cf. his Knowledge and Faith, p. 78-98.  
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It is widely known that Aquinas’s attitude toward philosophy distinguished him 
from many of his great contemporaries. By employing Aristotelian tools for thinking, he 
was able to distinguish levels and methods of reflection and to give to specific sciences 
their due autonomy. He taught constantly that the confusion of methods or the use of 
arguments which are not proper to a particular science result in erroneous reasoning.63 
This is why he would never permit the reduction of all sciences to theology64 although 
he sought to unify all human knowledge under one general science that explains 
everything through ultimate causes. The explanation through the highest causes was for 
him the highest human activity called “wisdom.” This sapiential character of all 
intellectual activity is one of the salient features of his approach to philosophy.  
As we have seen, St. Thomas teaches that the “liberal arts” can introduce us to 
the science called wisdom. The notion of art is somewhat different from our common 
contemporary use of this term and it is worthwhile to elucidate it briefly in the context 
of other intellectual skills. In the first words of the commentary upon the Posterior 
Analytics, Aquinas refers the reader to the beginning of the Metaphysics, where 
Aristotle claims that “the human race lives by art and reasoning (hominum genus arte et 
rationibus uiuit).” St. Thomas adds that the faculty of directing one’s actions by 
a judgment of reason is regarded by Aristotle as that which differentiates humans from 
other animals.65 In the introductory remarks to his commentary on the Ethics, Aquinas 
expresses more clearly the difference between humans and other animals when he says 
                                                 
63 Notice how St. Thomas defends the right of philosophical research to keep a due autonomy from 
theology: “Nec uideo quid pertinent ad doctrinam fidei qualiter Philosophi uerba exponantur” (De 43 
articulis, 34 ad arg.). Before answering all the questions in this letter he directly warns the Master of 
his Order against confusing these two disciplines because it harms theology itself: “plures illorum 
articulorum ad fidei doctrinam non pertinent sed magis ad philosophorum dogmata. Multum autem 
nocet talia quae ad pietatis doctrinam non pertinent vel asserere vel negare quasi pertinentia ad sacram 
doctrinam. … Vnde mihi uidetur tutius esse ut huiusmodi que philosophi communiter senserunt et 
nostre fidei non repugnant neque sic esse asserenda ut dogmata fidei, etsi aliquando sub nomine 
philosophorum introducantur, neque sic esse neganda tamquam fidei contraria; ne sapientibus huius 
mundi contempnendi doctrinam fidei occasio prebeatur” (ibid., prooem). 
64 “But the ancillary character of philosophy differs very greatly in Thomism and Augustinianism. 
Within the framework of Augustinian thought, which Bonaventure most faithfully and perfectly 
represents, philosophy is a servant-slave and theology a matriarch and despot; philosophy is allowed 
neither liberty nor autonomy; philosophy must believe in order truly to be philosophy, that is in order 
to be true knowledge. In Thomism, philosophy is queen in the realm of natural truth; it dons 
a servant’s uniform only when undertaking a task beyond its capacities, when it attempts to study the 
intimate mysteries of God and of deified man, for then it is blinded by that surpassing light and must 
be guided by faith” (Régis, Epistemology, p. 125). 
65 “Alia enim animalia quodam naturali instinctu ad suos actus aguntur, homo autem rationis iudicio in 
suis actionibus dirigitur” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 4, lin. 4-7]).  
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that only the former can recognize different orders of things.66 Possessing such rational 
judgment allows one to acquire certain abilities which help one to accomplish acts more 
easily and in an orderly fashion. These abilities, called “arts,” are fixed procedures 
established by reason whereby human acts reach their due end through appropriate 
means.67 In other words, this is a habitual (i.e., well assimilated, and ready to be applied 
to operation) intellectual knowledge of how to do or make something. Thanks to reason, 
humans use the experience they acquire through the senses and preserve in the memory 
to create effective and reasonable methods for acting, and to maintain these methods 
according to a fixed, steady disposition. Thus, art constitutes for Aquinas a kind of 
practical intellectual virtue.  
There is another practical intellectual virtue apart from art: prudence. Both these 
virtues are intellectual and concern such contingent things as our actions (‘contingent’ 
means here: such that happens, but can be otherwise). In both there is a judgment of 
reason, concerning something which has some kind of universality first found in 
particulars and is ultimately ordered to particulars. Again, both art and prudence as 
intellectual virtues are always concerned with the truth because they imply the rectitude 
of reason.68 They are distinguished by their subjects. Prudence refers to immanent 
human acts (acts that remain in the human being, as for example to love, hate, choose). 
Art, however, refers to transitive human acts (acts like building, cutting, and sculpting 
that have an external material effect). Aquinas sometimes distinguishes under the 
common heading of ‘operations’ between ‘action’ (actio) and ‘making’ (factio).69 This 
                                                 
66 Cf. In Eth., I, 1 (Leon. 47/1, p. 3-4, lin. 1-14). 
67 “Nichil enim aliud ars esse uidetur quam certa ordinatio rationis, quomodo per determinata media ad 
debitum finem actus humani perueniant” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 4, lin. 9-12]). In fact, art refers 
to many things: “Omnis ars est circa generationem, id est circa constitutionem et complementum 
operis, quod primo ponit tamquam finem artis, et est etiam circa artificiare, id est circa operationem 
artis qua disponit materiam, et est etiam circa speculari qualiter aliquid fiat per artem” (In Eth., VI, 3 
[Leon. 47/2, p. 342, lin. 185-191]). 
68 Cf., In Poster., I, 44 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 170, lin. 283-286, 295-304). 
69 “Differunt enim agere et facere: nam agere est secundum operationem manentem in ipso agente, sicut 
est eligere, intelligere et huiusmodi … Facere autem est secundum operationem, quae transit exterius 
ad materiae transmutationem, sicut secare, urere et huiusmodi” (In Meta., VI, 1, n. 1152). Cf. In Meta., 
VII, 7, n. 2253. “Nam actio manens in ipso agente operatio dicitur, ut videre, intelligere et velle. Sed 
factio est operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam ad aliquid formandum ex ea, sicut aedificare et 
secare” (In Eth., VI, 3, [Leon. 47/2, p. 342, lin. 133-136]). Cf. De ver., 5, 1 c. But the terms can be 
taken not so strictly, cf. e.g.: “Facere autem dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo proprie; alio modo 
communiter. Proprie autem facere dicitur operari aliquid in exteriori materia, sicut facere domum vel 
aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Communiter autem dicitur facere pro quacumque actione, sive transeat in 
exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et secare; sive maneat in ipso agente, sicut intelligere et velle” (STh, 
II-II, 134, 2 c.). 
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allows him to use in Latin two short and neat definitions: prudence is recta ratio 
agibilium, the rectitude of reason in things to be done (that is, in regard to acts which 
remain within the one acting),70 and art is recta ratio factibilium, the rectitude of reason 
in things to be made (that is, things that are done to external matter).71 Thus something 
external, some useful product of human operation, is the essential feature of art.72 The 
manner according to which the products of the arts are used also distinguishes them into 
two groups: those that provide the necessaries of life, and those giving pleasure.73 
There are also some speculative intellectual virtues that deserve mention here for 
two reasons: they serve to accent further the status of the liberal arts, and they draw 
attention by their contrast to the future consideration of the status of ethics. The 
speculative intellectual virtues, we are told, are distinguished from the practical virtues 
in that the latter are ordered to some extrinsic operation, product or work, while the 
former are concerned simply with the truth and without regard for anything extrinsic.74 
Science is one of the speculative intellectual virtues, along with understanding and 
wisdom.75  
                                                 
70 “Prudentia vero et ars est circa animae partem practicam, quae est ratiocinativa de contingentibus 
operabilibus a nobis. Et differunt: Nam prudentia dirigit in actionibus quae non transeunt ad exteriorem 
materiam, sed sunt perfectiones agentis: unde dicitur quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Ars vero 
dirigit in factionibus, quae in materiam exteriorem transeunt, sicut aedificare et secare: unde dicitur 
quod ars est recta ratio factibilium” (In Meta., I, 1, n. 34). 
71 St. Thomas defines art diversely: “habitus ad faciendum aliquid cum ratione” (In Eth., VI, 3 [Leon. 
47/2, p. 342, lin. 167-168]); “habitus factivus cum vera ratione” (ibid. [lin. 172]); “ratio recta 
aliquorum operum faciendorum” (STh, I-II, 57, 3 c); “recta ratio factibilium” (In Meta., I, 1, n. 34). 
72 “Omnis faciens, puta faber aut aedificator, facit suum opus gratia huius, idest propter finem, et non 
propter finem universalem; sed ad aliquod particulare quod est factum, id est constitutum in exteriori 
materia, puta cultellus aut domus; et non est finis aliquid actum, idest aliquid agibile in agente existens, 
puta recte concupiscere aut irasci; facit enim omnis faciens propter aliquid, quod est alicuius, idest 
quod habet aliquem usum, sicut usus domus est habitatio; et talis quidem est finis facientis, scillicet 
factum et non actum” (In Eth., VI, 2 [Leon. 47/2, p. 338, lin. 187-197]). 
73 “Artes repertae [sunt] quantum and utilitatem, quarum quaedam sunt ad vitae necessitatem, sicut 
mechanicae, … vel ad voluptatem, sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae ad hominum delectationem” 
(In Meta., I, 1, n. 32-33). 
74 “Illi artifices dicendi sunt sapientiores quorum scientiae non sunt ad utilitatem inventae, sed propter 
ipsum scire, cuiusmodi sunt scientiae speculativae” (In Meta., I, 1, n. 32). “Theoricus siue speculatiuus 
intellectus in hoc proprie ab operatiuo siue practico distinguitur, quod speculatiuus habet pro fine 
ueritatem quam considerat, practicus autem ueritatem consideratam ordinat in operationem tamquam in 
finem” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 c.). Cf. De ver., 3, 3; CG, III, 75, n. 2511; In Poster., I, 41 (Leon. 1*/2, 
p. 153, lin. 135-145). In the In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 ad 4 Aquinas says that there are speculative and 
practical arts: “dicuntur artium quedam esse speculatiue, quedam practice”, but this is a broad use of 
the term; “speculative” strictly speaking refers to science not to art. About the special position of logic 
see below. 
75 Recently some philosophers have discovered anew the role of virtues in the process of cognition, and 
much attention is payed to increasingly popular “virtue epistemologies” which more or less avowedly 
acknowledge their debts to Aquinas. Whether he is properly understood in particular authors is another 
1. Aquinas’s General Approach to Cognition 
 53 
There are thus, according to Aquinas, five virtues of cognition: art, prudence, 
science, understanding and wisdom. Acts that come from any of these are necessarily 
true. If some act is not true, it is not strictly an act of any of these virtues. Science, as far 
as it is a speculative intellectual virtue, does not concern contingent things in 
themselves, but only necessary things or that which is of necessity in contingent things 
(‘necessary’ means here: such that cannot be otherwise). The application of science to 
practical things belongs to prudence or art.76 Practical or operative sciences are about 
acts of arts (factive sciences) and prudence (moral science).77 These actions are 
considered on a general level as some natures, forms, types, orders or relations, and in 
such a way that practical science concerns necessary things.78 It considers what is of 
necessity in contingent practical things. In both speculative and practical sciences we 
seek scientific knowledge. The subject matter of the practical sciences is what we can 
make by ourselves. For the speculative sciences it is not what we make but what we 
discover.79 And so there are three speculative sciences: natural science (called also 
natural philosophy or physics), mathematics, and metaphysics (with its philosophical 
and theological parts).80  
Liberal arts differ from the other arts. Aquinas says that some arts are ordered to 
an external utility, a useful exterior product to be had through a bodily action. These are 
the arts in the strict sense and are called “mechanical” or “servile.”81 Others are ordered 
                                                                                                                                               
question. For a good discussion see for example Thomas Hibbs, “Aquinas, Virtue, and Recent 
Epistemology,” The Review of Metaphysics 52 (1999): 573-594. 
76 “Scientia uero moralis quamuis sit propter operationem, tamen illa operatio non est actus scientie set 
magis uirtutis, ut patet in libro Ethicorum, unde non potest dici ars, set magis in illis operationibus se 
habet uirtus loco artis” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 ad 3). 
77 “Est ergo scientia activa, ex qua instruimur ad recte exercendum operationes, quae actiones dicuntur; 
sicut est scientia moralis. Factiva autem scientia est, per quam recte aliquid facimus; sicut ars fabrilis, 
et alia huiusmodi” (In Meta., XI, 7, n. 2253). “Scientiae activae dicuntur scientae morales … scientiae 
factivae dicuntur artes mechanicae” (In Meta., VI, 1, n. 1152). 
78 We shall discuss later (in Chapter 4) how to understand ‘necessity’ in this context. 
79 “Oportet practicarum scientiarum materiam esse res illas que a nostro opere fieri possunt, ut sic earum 
cognitio in operationem quasi in finem ordinari possit; speculatiuarum uero scientiarum materiam 
oportet esse res que a nostro opere non fiunt, unde earum consideratio in operationem ordinari non 
potest sicut in finem. Et secundum harum rerum distinctionem oportet scientias speculatiuas distingui” 
(Super Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 c.). Cf. In Meta., XI, 7, n. 2253. 
80 For the fullest discussion of this classification see: In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1-4. Cf. also In Meta., VI, 1, n. 
1166; ibid., XI, 7, n. 2264 and 2267. 
81 Cf. e.g. In Meta., I, 1, n. 34; ibid., 3, n. 59; In Eth., I, 1 (Leon. 47/1, p. 4, lin. 39); STh, I-II, 57, 3 ad 3; 
II-II, 104, 5.  
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to science – these arts are called “liberal arts.”82 Liberal arts are not ordered to an 
external product, but nonetheless they are ordered to some internal “product” or “work” 
of reason (opus rationis). We notice in them a kind of “useful product”: a “product” that 
is only internal in regard to the intellect. Some examples are the construction of 
a syllogism or a fitting sermon, or the work of counting or measuring. We refer to these 
things sufficiently by the name of “art” according to a certain likeness.83 They are, 
therefore, arts by extension of the meaning of the word “art,” and they are liberal, as 
Aquinas explains briefly, distinguishing them from arts ordered to works executed by 
our body in servile subjection to the soul. Liberal arts pertain to acts that are in the soul 
and remain in it. And a human being is free (liber) thanks to his soul.84  
We do not acquire knowledge in liberal arts for their own sake but for the sake 
of something else: they are related to other speculative sciences and insofar as they 
serve the latter as an introductory stage. Therefore, to the extent that they are learned as 
arts and used in life, liberal arts are not speculative sciences. Yet this does not mean that 
these arts cannot be speculative sciences. As liberal arts, logic and mathematics belong 
to the speculative sciences because they can be known and presented in a scientific way. 
But they are speculative sciences only reductively because of the mentioned “product” 
or “work” and because of their subjection. There is a difference between logic and 
mathematics in their status as arts subordinated to speculative sciences. Logic remains 
always subordinated, even if it can be known and presented in a way of speculative 
science.85 After the introductory stage, however, mathematics can become a fully-
fledged speculative science without this “artisan” subordination.  
                                                 
82 “Illae solae artes liberales dicuntur, quae ad sciendum ordinantur: illae vero quae ordinantur ad 
aliquam utilitatem per actionem habendam, dicuntur mechanicae sive serviles” (In Meta., I, 3, n. 59). 
Cf. ibid., I, 1, n. 32-34. A slightly different explanation of the name ‘liberal arts’ is found in In Polit., I, 
5 (Leon. 48 A, p. 95, lin. 69-96) and yet another in STh, I-II, 57, 3 ad 3. 
83 “Per quamdam similitudinem” (STh, I-II, 57, 3 ad 3). 
84 “Etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cuiusdam operis, puta constructio syllogismi aut 
orationis congruae aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi opera rationis 
habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam similitudinem artes, sed liberales; ad differentiam 
illarum artium quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo serviles, 
inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo secundum animam est liber. Illae vero scientiae 
quae ad nullum huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non autem artes. Nec 
oportet, si liberales artes sunt nobiliores, quod magis eis conveniat ratio artis” (STh, I-II, 57, 3 ad 3). 
“Hee [i.e. logica et mathematica] inter ceteras scientias artes dicuntur, quia non solum habent 
cognitionem, set opus aliquod, quod est immediate ipsius rationis, ut constructionem sillogismi uel 
orationem formare, numerare, mensurare, melodias formare et cursus siderum computare” (In Boet. De 
Trin., 5, 1 ad 3). Cf. also STh, I-II, 90, 1 ad 2; II-II, 47, 2 ad 3; De ver., 3, 2 c. 
85 “Omnis applicatio rationis rectae ad aliquid factibile pertinet ad artem. … Quia igitur ratio speculativa 
quaedam facit, puta syllogismum, propositionem et alia huiusmodi, in quibus proceditur secundum 
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*   *   * 
 
It should be apparent now that the charge of dogmatism or deductivism raised 
against the philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas is probably founded on lack of 
familiarity with the basic methodological presuppositions of these thinkers. From this 
basic methodology we learned about the importance and role of dialectics as the way of 
research in philosophical sciences as well as about the relevance of the sequence of 
questions asked in philosophy. This methodological element also indicates that in 
Aquinas’s interpretation it would be impossible to dismiss Aristotle’s philosophy under 
the pretext of baneful essentialism. In addition, already on the level of their 
methodology or logic we are able to perceive a conscious acknowledgement of the 
multiform dependence of human being, cognition, and language – a component which 
has recently been more often emphasized in philosophy, in opposition to a modern 
forgetfulness of this aspect of our existence.  
One of the main forms of this acknowledgement is the conception of learning as 
an acquisition of theoretical and practical virtues. In our reading of St. Thomas’s texts 
on this topic we picked out one of the interpretative keys to his teaching, namely, that 
we should respect the order of learning when we study his writings, taking into 
consideration what is rightly presupposed as already known. Taking seriously what has 
been brought to light by former examination, that is, what was treated in perhaps other 
disciplines than the field of our interest, protects us, on one hand, from anachronistic 
interpretations (for example we see the explanation why some statements are taken for 
granted in later disciplines and not dogmatically postulated), and, on the other hand, we 
have an opportunity to free ourselves from some of the presuppositions that are 
seemingly evident to the contemporary mind, and which may turn out to be at least 
unnecessary or even misleading. For ethicists or moral theologians, in particular, this 
exercise may prove to be highly beneficial, given the need to examine the roots of 
ethical knowledge as well as the place of ethics in a sapientially ordered organism of 
philosophy. 
                                                                                                                                               
certas et determinatas vias; inde est quod respectu horum potest salvari ratio artis” (STh, II-II, 47, 2 ad 
3). This is why Aquinas quotes Boethius who says that logic “non tam est scientia quam scientie 
instrumentum” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1, ad 2).  
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We should now focus on what St. Thomas says regarding the nature and status 
of logic. This will lead us to grasp his notion of understanding, the character of logical 
inference, and the nature of science in the strict sense. Then we will be able to discuss 
more competently the place and essential features of moral science.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. St. Thomas’s Logic 
 
 
For our topic it is especially important to see the status of logic as an art and as a 
rational science. The importance and necessity of logic is clear from the place it 
occupies in the order of learning and from the fact that it is simply called “the 
introduction to other sciences.”1 Since it is believed that moral claims cannot be inferred 
from descriptions because it is “logically illicit,” we need to see what in Aquinas’s 
writings could possibly establish such a prohibition. We shall consider some particular 
questions, because many assumptions held by St. Thomas in his personal works (which 
are not obvious to contemporary readers) are grounded precisely in the logic he 
assimilated.2 Intellectual formation today often significantly diverges from that of 
Aquinas’s contemporaries, so that many statements he makes while treating moral 
questions can remain obscure and susceptible to misunderstanding by the modern 
reader.3  
                                                 
1 E.g. In Meta., I, 1, n. 32; ibid., II, 5, n. 335. 
2 Over the last few decades there has been a considerable revival of the interest in the history of medieval 
logic. This interest bore fruit in many helpful studies which clarified radical differences within the field 
at the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries, i.e. differences between via antiqua and via moderna. I largely 
benefited from studies of one of the most outstanding in this field of today’s “younger generation” 
scholars, Gyula Klima, who combines a remarkable erudition in medieval logic with an amazing 
clarity in his translation of complex medieval theories into accessible contemporary categories of 
philosophy. 
3 Half a century ago, Innocentius M. Bocheński, in his monumental A History of Formal Logic 
(translated by Ivo Thomas [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961], original German 
edition: Formale Logic, Freiburg/Munchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 1956) opposed himself to the 
intepretation of development of logic as a steady growth: “Logic shows no linear continuity of 
evolution. Its history resembles rather a broken line. From modest beginnings it usually raises itself to 
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First, we should note that Aquinas basically adapted Aristotelian logic.4 
Aristotle created the discipline for the western world and in the times of Aquinas, 
scholars were engaged in a great rediscovery of this kind of logic.5 After ages of 
oblivion Europe of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries enjoyed new Latin translations of 
the logica nova. Some of Aristotle’s logical works had already been known. The logica 
vetus contained Categories and On Interpretation, Latinized long before by Boethius. 
Other books by Aristotle also became available, especially the Prior and Posterior 
Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations. St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas’s principal 
teacher and confrère in the young and dynamic Order of Preachers, had a lifelong 
project of rendering Aristotle intelligible to the Latin world and commented on many of 
Aristotle’s books. Before studying under Albert’s guidance, Thomas, as a boy at the 
abbey of Monte Cassino, took “under a private tutor, his first and promising steps in 
logic and natural science.”6 Later, when he arrived in Naples in 1239 (he was then about 
                                                                                                                                               
a notable height very quickly – within about a century – but then the decline follows as fast. Former 
gains are forgotten, the problems are no longer found interesting, or the very possibility of carrying on 
the study is destroyed by political and cultural events. Then, after centuries, the search begins anew. 
Nothing of the old wealth remains but a few fragments; building on those, logic rises again” (p. 12). 
This is why today’s treatment of ancient and medieval logical issues is vulnerable to simplistic 
presentations distorted by ideas coming from other epochs, especially from the period of so-called 
“classical” logic (i.e. logic from 16th to 19th centuries). Bocheński continues: “The ‘new’ logic which 
follows on a period of barbarism is not a simple expansion of the old; it has for the most part different 
presuppositions and points of view, uses a different technique and evolves aspects of the problematic 
that previously received little notice. It takes on a different shape from the logic of the past” (ibid.). 
Further regarding the “classical” logic: “the content of this logic is so poor, it is loaded with so many 
utter misunderstandings, and its creative power is so extremely weak, that one can hardly risk calling 
something so decadent a distinct variety of logic and so setting it on a level with ancient, scholastic, 
mathematical and Indian logic” (p. 14). Interestingly, MacIntyre’s introductory narration about the 
history of ethics in his After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981, p. 1-5) considerably resembles 
Bocheński’s description of the history of logic. 
4 William A. Wallace writes that although there have been some disputes concerning the extent to which 
Aquinas accepted and “baptized” Aristotle in the field of metaphysics and ethics, however “no one has 
ever questioned the fact that St. Thomas subscribed completely to the logical system of the Stagiryte” 
(The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology. A Study of Methodology in St. Thomas Aquinas 
[Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1962], p. 8). In the footnote he quotes also Etienne Gilson: 
“The traditional syncretism upon which (or within which) Thomas had to do his critical work was 
made up of many different elements. The logic that it used was entirely Aristotelian” (Elements of 
Christian Philosophy [New York: Doubleday, 1960], p. 16). 
5 Anthony Kenny finds some similiarity between this period and what has recently occurred in 
philosophy: “At the end of the medieval period scholars lost interest in the development of formal 
logic, and less attention was paid to the philosophical study of logic. It was only in the nineteenth 
century that formal logic was reborn, and the enormous renaissance in the subject led to the 
rediscovery, before and after the Second World War, of branches of logic which had been totally lost 
since the Middle Ages. In the last few decades scholars have come to realize that some of the most 
modern ideas of logic were things that were well known in the Middle Ages” (Kenny, Aquinas on 
Mind, p. 8). 
6 Michael Bertram Crowe, “Peter of Ireland: Aquinas’s Teacher of the Artes Liberales,” in Arts libéraux 
et philosophie au Moyen Age, Actes du IVe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale 
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fifteen), he studied the trivium and natural science under another Aristotelian scholar, 
Peter of Ireland.7 St. Thomas, who even in the beginning of the fourteenth century was 
esteemed as an “illustrious doctor of the sacred page, master in theology, … who, next 
to Albert, is considered the greatest philosopher among all clerics in this world,”8 com-
mented in full only on one logical work of Aristotle, the Posterior Analytics.9 Apart 
from that, because it was asked of him, he began but did not finish a commentary on the 
On Interpretation. The question why Aquinas decided to comment on the Posterior 
Analytics in the heat of his very intensive academic activity (the end of 1271-1272), is 
still to be resolved.10 We may surmise that the quality of this commentary was highly 
valued by the Parisian professors of the faculty of arts, from their official request of the 
Master of the Order of Preachers, after the death of St. Thomas, to send from Naples 
copies of this commentary together with his unfinished commentary on the On 
Interpretation.11  
As I have already mentioned, the first words of Aquinas’s commentary on the 
Posterior Analytics refer the reader to Aristotle’s claim in the Metaphysics that “the 
human race lives by art and reasoning.” I have also said that these “arts” are fixed 
procedures established by reason, whereby human acts reach their due end through 
                                                                                                                                               
(Montréal, Canada, 27.08 – 2.09.1967), edited by Henri Irénée Marrou et al. (Montréal-Paris: Institut 
d’Etudes Médiévales-Vrin, 1969), p. 618. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Words from Chronicle of the King of Aragon, James II by Peter Marsilio; quotation taken from 
Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino, p. 130.  
9 St. Albert said that this book is the apex, the most perfect and only absolutely desirable study among 
the logical works: St. Albert, In Poster., I. tr. I, cap. 1, ed. Borgnet, II, 2b. 
10 The popular hypothesis that it was his academic exercise to prepare himself to the further work has 
little probability because by that time he was finishing the II-II of STh; from the very beginning of this 
complex work he used the method presented in the In Poster. Besides, we can observe his 
methodological maturity very early, already in his In Boet. De Trin., where he goes far beyond the 
Boethian text to exhibit many issues contained in Poster. We could suspect that a serious historical 
research would give similar results to those documented by James Doig in his works on Aquinas’s 
In Meta. and In Eth. A common point of these two convincing studies is that, comparing St. Thomas’s 
work to already existing commentaries on Aristotle, we can perceive his efforts to correct the essential 
questions of his commenting predecessors (including Albert), in order to give to the philosophy 
students a coherent interpretation with the whole available Aristotelian corpus, as well as 
a clarification of what is unclear in Aristotle’s text. See Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1972); and idem, Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics (The New 
Synthese Historical Library, Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy, vol. 50 [Dordrecht-
Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001]).  
11 Jean-Pierre Torrell notes that these two works enjoyed quite considerable diffusion (Initiation à Saint 
Thomas d’Aquin : sa personne et son œuvre [Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1993], p. 227). The 
professors asked not only for Aquinas’s last writings but above all for the honor of transmitting to 
Paris the corpus of this Master: “tanti clerici, tanti patris, tanti doctoris,” see Chenu, Toward 
Understanding St. Thomas, p. 22. 
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appropriate means. As such, arts can concern every human act, even acts of reason 
themselves. Thus, this quotation from Metaphysics serves to justify the need for 
a special general art directing acts of reason. This is the art of logic.12 Aquinas defines 
logic as an art “directive of the acts of reason themselves so that man may proceed 
orderly, easily and without error in the very act of reason itself.”13 Later we shall ask 
what ensures that there is no error in the act of reason, i.e. what verifies the process of 
reasoning. However, before that we will consider more closely the general character of 
St. Thomas’s logic. 
 
 
2.1. Divisions of logic 
 
Since logic is concerned with the acts of human reason, in the introductions of 
both his commentaries, to On Interpretation and to Posterior Analytics, Aquinas offers 
a psychologically based overview of the kinds of acts that are exercised by human 
reason. This overview only indicates the order of specific logical books in the scope of 
logic. Thus Aquinas here sketches only what he treats in greater detail elsewhere.14 For 
our purposes, it will be helpful to follow this analysis in order to situate our perspective 
in the context of Aquinas’s philosophical plan as well as to outline our further 
considerations (contained in Chapters 3 and 4).  
St. Thomas distinguishes three kinds of acts of human reason. One is the 
understanding of indivisible and simple things, an intellectual grasping or conceiving of 
essence, the understanding of what something is.15 In this simple grasping of what 
something is, there is no question of truth or falsehood. An intellectual concept is 
                                                 
12 Cf. Edward Simmons, “The Nature and Limits of Logic,” The Thomist 24 (1961): 47-71. 
13 “Si igitur ex hoc quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur adinuenta est ars edificatiua uel fabrilis per quas 
homo faciliter et ordinate huiusmodi actus exercere potest, eadem ratione ars quedam necessaria est 
que sit directiua ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et 
sine errore procedat” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 4, lin. 17-24]). 
14 In In Peryerm., I, 2 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 11, lin. 113-125 and p. 12, lin. 220-224) Aquinas refers to the 
Philosopher’s De Anima, III, and indeed in his commentary he discusses this topic at length. Cf. also 
the final remark of the second lesson: Aristotle “excusat se a diligentiori horum consideratione, quia 
quales sint anime passiones et quomodo sint rerum similitudines, dictum est in libro De anima; non 
enim hoc pertinet ad logicum negocium, set ad naturalem” (p. 13, lin. 250-255). Other places cf. for 
example: STh, I, 79 and 84-89; In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 c. 
15 “Una quidem actio intellectus est intelligentia indiuisibilium, siue incomplexorum, secundum quam 
concipit quid est res” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 5, lin. 35-38]). “Una quidem, que dicitur 
indiuisibilium intelligencia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essenciam uniuscuiusque rei in se 
ipsa” (In Peryerm., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 5, lin. 2-5]). 
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neither true nor false: we merely grasp what a simple object is without comparing it to 
anything, without forming any judgment, and without inferring anything. Aquinas says 
that some people call it the informing of the intellect, or representing by means of the 
intellect. He adds that Aristotle hands down the logical doctrine concerning this act in 
the book of Categories.  
The second act of the human mind consists in putting together and taking apart 
what has been grasped by the first kind of intellectual act. It happens in affirming and 
denying something; that is, predicating something about something. This second kind of 
act of the intellect is called “composing and dividing” or “combining and dividing” 
(compositio vel divisio intellectus). Aquinas notes that in this act “the true or the false 
are for the first time present.”16 Aristotle treats this act of reason logically in the On 
Interpretation.  
The third act is distinguished according to what is characteristic of reason, 
properly speaking, i.e. “advancing from one thing to another in such a way that through 
that which is known one comes to a knowledge of the unknown.”17 This is the act in 
which inference plays an essential role. This is the subject of the remaining logical 
books by Aristotle.  
Aquinas arranges these remaining books according to the degree of necessity of 
the types of reasoning they describe. He compares the reasoning processes to commonly 
noticed acts of nature. In the acts of nature there is something that occurs always of 
necessity and cannot fail. In some acts nature succeeds in the majority of cases – it 
sometimes fails due to a defect of some principle, as for example when from animals of 
some species something monstrous is generated instead of a perfect animal of the same 
species. Yet this happens rarely, otherwise we could not say that nature fails or that 
something went wrong. Respectively, some reasoning can be necessary and cannot fail 
in attaining the truth – to this Aquinas adds: “by such a process of reasoning the 
certainty of science is acquired.”18 Apart from that, it can succeed in attaining the truth 
                                                 
16 “Secunda uero operatio intellectus est compositio uel diuisio intellectuum, in qua est iam uerum et 
falsum” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 4, lin. 42-44]). In In Peryerm., I, 1 he only mentions: “Alia est 
operatio intellectus scilicet componentis et diuidentis” (Leon. 1*/1, p. 5, lin. 5-6). 
17 “Discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deueniat in cognitionem ignoti” (In Poster., I, 1 
[Leon. 1*/2, p. 4-5, lin. 47-49]). 
18 “Per huiusmodi rationis processum sciencie certitudo acquiritur” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 5, lin. 
68-69]). 
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for the most part without producing necessity. There are also processes of reasoning 
which are defective on the side of their principles and always fail in attaining the truth.  
According to this division, Aquinas indicates three sub-parts of this part of logic 
(which is related to the third act of the intellect): judicative, investigative, and sophistry. 
Aristotle presents the latter in the book On Sophistical Refutations. The investigative 
part of logic, as the name suggests, concerns the whole field of human investigation or 
research, where even if there is not complete certitude there is nevertheless some level 
of certitude depending on the probability of the reasoning principles. Since there is a 
gradation in the power with which nature acts, there is also a gradation of certitude in 
this kind of reasoning. Aquinas again identifies three steps in this gradation and notes 
the works of Aristotle to which they correspond. First, when reason leans completely to 
one side of a contradiction but with fear concerning the other side, we do not achieve 
science strictly speaking but only belief or opinion. This domain is called by Aquinas 
topics or dialectics (topica sive dialectica). Aristotle considers this type of reasoning in 
the Topics. Within the scope of human experience, however, there is also a large sphere 
of reasoning that achieves even less than an opinion or belief but only a suspicion. Here, 
reason does not lean completely to either side of the contradiction, yet is still more 
inclined to one than to the other. Aristotle treats this second kind of reasoning in the 
Rhetoric. Finally, sometimes a mere fancy averts from one part of a contradiction or the 
other on the basis of some representation. Aquinas gives an example: “much as when a 
man turns in disgust from a certain food because it is described to him in terms of 
something disgusting.” Aristotle considers this field in the Poetics.  
The judicative part of logic, which is one of the three sub-parts of logic and is 
concerned with the third act of the intellect, deals with those processes of reason which 
bear certain and sure judgments about effects. Such judgments are obtained by resolving 
to the first principles (resolvendo in prima principia); that is why this part is called 
analytical, i.e., resolvent.19 The certainty of the judgment comes either only from the 
form of the syllogism – which is the subject of the book of the Prior Analytics – or 
“from the matter along with the form, because propositions employed are per se and 
                                                 
19 Cf. Eileen C. Sweeney, “Three Notions of resolutio and the Structure of Reasoning in Aquinas,” The 
Thomist (1994): 197-243. 
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necessary – and to this the Posterior Analytics is dedicated.”20 This book treats those 
issues toward which all previous logical considerations are directed.21  
St. Thomas says that all these books belong to “rational philosophy” (ad 
rationalis philosophia pertinent), which is another name for logic.22 The scope of logic 
in this plan is, therefore, considerable and somewhat startling for those formed in the 
spirit of contemporary logic. The division and distribution of Aristotle’s logical books is 
Aquinas’s invention,23 and is in line with his constant search for the intentio Aristotelis 
and for the proper order of everything he ponders. 
We saw that logic has the status of a liberal art but also, in some sense, of a 
speculative science. At this point I should introduce an important distinction which 
clarifies the notion of art and science in reference to logic. Logic has the status of an art 
when it is first learned and used in life or in the sciences (logica utens). It has the status 
of a speculative science when it is known in a scientific way and fulfills scientific 
conditions (logica docens).24 This distinction makes a difference when the word ‘logic’ 
                                                 
20 “Certitudo autem iudicii que per resolutionem habetur est uel ex ipsa forma sillogismi tantum, et ad 
hoc ordinatur liber Priorum analeticorum, qui est de sillogismo simpliciter, uel etiam cum hoc ex 
materia, quia sumuntur propositiones epr se et necessarie, et ad hoc ordinatur liber Posteriorum 
analeticorum, qui est de sillogismo demonstratiuo” (In Poster., I 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 6, lin. 80-87]). 
21 “Harum autem operationum [intellectus] prima ordinatur ad secundam: quia non potest esse 
compositio et diuisio, nisi simplicium apprehensorum; secunda uero ordinatur ad terciam, quia 
uidelicet oportet quod ex aliquo uero cognito, cui intellectus assenciat procedatur ad certitudinem 
accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis. … et ideo secundum praedictum ordinem trium operationum, liber 
Predicamentorum ad librum Peryermeneias ordinatur, qui ordinatur ad librum Priorum et 
consequentes” (In Peryerm., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 5, lin. 8-14 and 29-32]). “Consideratio huius libri 
directe ordinatur ad scienciam demonstratiuam” (ibid., 7 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 38, lin. 109-110]). 
22 E.g.: “Logica dicitur rationalis philosophia” (In Phys., III, 8, n. 2). 
23 In In Peryerm., Aquinas divides logic in a shorter manner: first operation of the intellect – 
Praedicamenta; second – Peryermeneias; third – Analyticorum.  
24 “Dicetur aliquis processus esse rationabilis quando aliquis utitur in aliqua scientia propositionibus que 
traduntur in logica, prout scilicet utimur logica, prout est docens, in aliis scientiis. … Et hic est alius 
modus quo logica utimur in scientiis demonstratiuis, non quidem ut est docens, set ut est utens. Et his 
duobus modis denominatur processus rationalis a scientia rationali: his enim modis usitatur logica, que 
rationalis scientia dicitur, in scientiis demonatratiuis” (In Boet. De Trin., 6, 1 ad 1am). “Licet autem 
dicatur, quod Philosophia est scientia, non autem dialectica et sophistica, non tamen per hoc removetur 
quin dialectica et sophistica sint scientiae. Dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est 
docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens, habet considerationem de 
istis intentionibus, instituens modum, quo per eas procedi possit ad conclusiones in singulis scientiis 
probabiliter ostendendas; et hoc demonstrative facit, et secundum hoc est scientia. Utens vero est 
secundum quod modo adinvento utitur ad concludendum aliquid probabiliter in singulis scientiis; et sic 
recedit a modo scientiae. Et similiter dicendum est de sophistica; quia prout est docens tradit per 
necessarias et demonstrativas rationes modum arguendi apparenter. Secundum vero quod est utens, 
deficit a processu verae argumentationis” (In Meta., IV, 4, n. 576). “Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur 
demonstrativa, solum doctrina pertinet ad logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam et ad alias particulares 
scientias quae sunt de rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in utendo 
principiis rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo intentionibus 
logicis. Et sic apparet, quod quaedam partes logicae habent ipsam scientiam et doctrinam et usum, 
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is used without qualification. For art, as was said above, is a fixed intellectual skill 
which concerns individual and contingent operations, acts of reason, and its end consists 
in some “product” or “work” – even if only interior in the case of logic. The subject 
matter of logic as an art, therefore, are acts of reason as ordered according to the 
principles of theoretical logic.25 A human being proceeds logically, that is, according to 
the art of logic, when his reason applies the rules of logic. These rules are either 
discovered on the basis of experience and particular judgments (true and false) or 
learned from someone else who discovered them earlier. They can be mastered only on 
an “artisanal” level (i.e., to know something of the rules and how to apply them), or can 
be known in a scientific way (i.e., to know perfectly their nature, and apart from the 
knowledge how to apply them, to know why they are such and so and cannot be 
otherwise).  
We do not need distinct knowledge of things to learn logic as a liberal art; it 
suffices to have a common confused knowledge. In other words, it is sufficient to know 
how things are commonly named and nominally defined.26 This confused knowledge 
suffices to start learning logic, because logic understood in this way is treated as 
a means of removing confusion in our knowledge, and of introducing us to the other 
sciences.27 The introduction to other sciences thus has the character of a general method 
that enables one to create particular methods of other sciences, to “proceed orderly, 
easily and without error.”28 Logic as an art is, in a sense, part of the art of living as 
human beings in this real world, an art of thinking and talking properly about all that 
                                                                                                                                               
sicut dialectica tentativa et sophistica; quaedam autem doctrinam et non usum, sicut demonstrativa” 
(ibid., n. 577). Cf. STh, I-II, 57, 6 ad 3. What “science” and “scientific” mean for Aquinas will be 
treated in Chapter 4. 
25 Cf. Robert W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 57. He translates logica utens as “applied logic” and logica docens as “pure 
logic” (p. 36). 
26 Nominal definitions tell us only what words mean; as such it is distinguished from real definitions, 
which tell us what a substance is.  
27 “Plures artes sint repertae quantum ad utilitatem, quarum quaedam sunt ad vitae necessitatem, sicut 
mechanicae; quaedam vero ad introductionem in aliis scientiis, sicut scientiae logicales” (In Meta., I, 1, 
n. 32). “Sunt etiam ad eruditionem necessaria, sicut scientiae logicales, quae non propter se quaeruntur, 
sed ut introductoriae ad alias artes” (ibid., 3, n. 57).  
28 “Quia diversi secundum diversos modos veritatem inquirunt; ideo oportet quod homo instruatur per 
quem modum in singulis scientiis sint recipienda ea quae dicuntur. Et quia non est facile quod homo 
simul duo capiat, sed dum ad duo attendit, neutrum capere potest; absurdum est, quod homo simul 
quaerat scientiam et modum qui convenit scientiae. Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam 
alias scientias, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis. Modus 
autem proprius singularum scientiarum, in scientiis singulis circa principium tradi debet” (In Meta., II, 
5, n. 335).  
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constitutes this world, about the whole reality accessible to our knowledge. It is also an 
art of inferring proper conclusions from what is experienced and thought.29 This is why 
logic should be taught first. At this point, we should turn to a more specific 
characterization of Aquinas’s logic.  
 
 
2.2. The subject of logic 
 
According to St. Thomas, logic should be taught first, despite its difficulty. As 
he writes:  
In learning we start from what is easier, unless necessity requires otherwise. For 
sometimes, in learning, it is necessary to begin, not with what is easier, but with the 
knowledge upon which further knowledge depends. This is the reason in learning 
that we must begin with logic, not because it is easier than the other sciences, for it 
has the greatest difficulty seeing that it is about what is secondarily understood, but 
rather because the other sciences depend upon it inasmuch as logic teaches the 
method of procedure in all the other sciences. Hence we must first know the method 
of a science before the science itself, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.30 
 
When logic is taught in a disciplined way, it is treated as a theoretical science. The 
difficulty of logic as a science comes from its subject. The subject of logic as 
a subordinated speculative science are not individual acts of reason ordered according to 
logical principles (this is the case for the subject of logic as an art), but rather something 
that results from the activity of reason:31 beings of reason (entia rationis)32 or, more 
specifically, relations of reason. In the text quoted above, Thomas says that logic 
                                                 
29 This approach to logic differs significantly from what happens to be proposed today to students as 
logic. One of the features of today’s deliberations in formal or symbolic logic is that it does not seem 
to have significant impact on the procedures of other sciences. On this topic see an interesting book by 
H. B. Veatch, Two Logics. The Conflict between Classical and eo-Analytic Philosophy (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969). Cf. also a discussion article by Otto Bird, “Veatch on the 
Humanities,” The ew Scholasticism 44 (1970): 125-132.  
30 “In addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magis facile nisi necessitas aliud requirat: quandoque enim 
necessarium est in addiscendo incipere non ab eo quod est facilius, set ab eo a cuius cognitione 
sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia ipsa sit 
facilior ceteris scientiis, – habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis,– set quia 
alie scientie ab ipsa dependent in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis; oportet 
autem primo scire modum scientie quam scientiam ipsam, ut dicitur in II Metaphisice” (In Boet. De 
Trin., 6, 1 ad 2am, ad 3). 
31 “Cum autem logica dicatur rationalis sciencia, necesse est quod eius consideratio uersetur circa ea 
quae pertinent ad tres … operationes rationis” (In Peryerm., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 5, lin. 15-17]). 
32 Cf. In Meta., IV, 4, n. 574; 17, n. 736. Schmidt suggests that ens rationis should be translated into 
English as “rationate being”, see Domain of Logic, p. 52-53. Cf. Robert W. Schmidt, “The Translation 
of Terms like Ens Rationis,” The Modern Schoolman 41 (1963-64): 73-75. But since not many authors 
accept this suggestion, I follow more common translation. 
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concerns what is secondarily understood, which renders it very difficult. Yet, what is 
secondarily understood? What are the beings and relations of reason? More importantly, 
why should we consider them in the work about the transition from the description of 
human nature to moral claims? From the text cited above we know that all further 
knowledge is dependent on that which is taught in logic. Thus, we can surmise that the 
issue introduced at this point has some relevance for moral science. In fact, it has great 
relevance for the very possibility and character of logical inference, as we will see later. 
The question of being and relation pertains in some way to metaphysics, but there is 
also a considerable place in logic to treat this question.33 In what follows, there will 
appear metaphysical issues which are necessary if we want to delimit the very subject of 
logic, but they will be mentioned only as useful clarifications to determine properly 
what is secondarily understood and what is the meaning of the phrases “being of 
reason” and “relation of reason.” 
In order to know what are beings of reason we should first learn that “being is 
said in many ways.”34 In other words, “being” is not a univocal term.35 Most often 
Aquinas proposes two fundamental meanings: first, when it signifies being in the sense 
of a real thing (real being); second, when it signifies the truth of a proposition (being of 
reason). The latter is said to be the subject of logic. Let us look more closely at what 
Thomas means by real being in order better to understand what he means by being of 
reason. It is important to see what beings of reason are not, because, as we know from 
                                                 
33 See very illuminating article by Hermann Weidemann, “Logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas,” in 
Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, Brian Davies ed., (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 77-95. Also Ralph McInerny’s “Being and Predication” and his critical 
“Note on Thomistic Existentialism” – both in the collection of his essays Being and Predication. 
Thomistic Interpretations, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 
p. 173-228 and 165-172 respectively.  
34 “Philosophus, in V Metaphys., text. 14, ostendit quod ens multipliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo dicitur 
ens quod per decem genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens, sive sit substantia, 
ut homo, sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis” (Super 
II Sent., 34, 1, 1 sol.). Cf. STh, I, 48, 2 ad 2; De malo, 1, 1 ad 19. “Esse dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo 
dicitur esse ipsa quidditas vel natura rei … Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae … Tertio modo 
dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod ‘est’ dicitur 
copula” (Super I Sent., 33, 1, 1 ad 1). 
35 I accept McInerny’s reading of Aquinas on the doctrine of analogy (Ralph McInerny, The Logic of 
Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961] and idem, Aquinas and 
Analogy [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996]. Stephen Brock briefly 
summarizes this approach in this way: “analogy is a logical matter, a matter of definitions. Analogy 
bears on things, not as they are ‘in themselves’, but as falling under our knowledge of them. … What is 
analogical, in this doctrine, is a term, not a thing” (Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas 
Aquinas and the Theory of Action [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997], p. 11).  
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the history of philosophy, some people, taking beings of reason for what they are not, 
have rejected or “shaved” them as an absurd multiplication of entities.  
Aquinas teaches that the word “being” (ens) is taken from the act of being or 
existing,36 and signifies “what exists” (habens esse)37 or “the act of existence” (actus 
essendi).38 As such it is the first object of the intellect (ens primum cognitum): “what is 
first apprehended by the intellect is being.”39 In fact, everything is perceived under the 
aspect of being: “whatever is known, is known as being.”40 And so “being is the proper 
object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible.”41 In the first place “being” signifies 
for us an extramental material thing, which, as such, is first grasped by the mind and is 
that to which what is understood is primarily referred.42 In other words, what is first 
understood is a sensible being under its most universal predicate. Why is this so? 
Because we are human beings. St. Thomas explains that if we were God, our very act of 
cognition would itself be the first object of our intellect and so it would be being 
properly speaking. If we were angels, our very essence would be the first object of our 
intellect and so it would be being properly speaking.43 Since, however, we are neither 
God nor angels – because of our bodily condition and the sensory beginning of our 
cognition – we must content ourselves with knowing primarily something extrinsic, 
which is the nature of material things, as something which is first grasped and primarily 
referred to.44 Things outside of our minds are called “real beings” or “beings of nature.” 
                                                 
36 Cf. In Peryerm., I, 5 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 30-31, lin. 355-391). 
37 Cf. De ver., 1, 1 c.  
38 “Hoc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi” (In Meta., IV, 2, n. 553). Cf. De pot., 7, 2 ad 1; 
Super I Sent., 8, 1, 1 sol. 
39 “Illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione intellectus est ens” (De ver., 21, 4 ad 4). Cf. ibid., 1 c; Super 
I Sent., 8, 1, 3; 19, 5, 1 ad 2; 24, 1, 3 ad 2; STh, I, 11, 2 ad 4. 
40 “Quidquid cognoscitur, cognoscitur ut ens” (Super I Sent., 38, 1, 4 ad 4). “Unde unicuique apprehenso 
attribuimus quod est ens” (STh, I-II, 55, 4 ad 1). “Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi 
notissimum et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit est ens” (De ver., 1, 1 c.). “Intellectus autem respicit 
suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis” (STh, I, 79, 7 c.). “Intellectus [entis] includitur 
in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit” (STh, I-II, 94, 2 c.). 
41 “Ens est proprium obiectum intellectus; et sic est primum intelligibile” (STh, I, 5, 2 c.). Cf. STh, I-II, 9, 
1 c.; CG, II, 98, n. 1835. 
42 “Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur” (De pot., 7, 
9 c.). 
43 Some seem to feel comfortable placing themselves in either of these two possibilities; cf. In Boet. De 
Trin., 1, 3. 
44 “Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est 
obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id 
quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse 
actus quo cognoscitur obiectum” (STh, I, 87, 3 c.). “Obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, 
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Therefore, real beings are beings properly speaking45 or perfected (completed) beings46 
and they exist apart from our thought.  
Real being is divided into ten categories called “predicaments” because they are 
the highest genera which we predicate of real beings.47 It will be helpful to consider 
how Aquinas treats the categories in order to see the range of what he calls “real 
being.”48 He did not write a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, but in his 
commentary on the Physics and on the Metaphysics he gives two systematized 
enumerations of Aristotelian categories.49 The shorter one reads: 
A predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways. This occurs in one way when 
the predicate states what the subject is, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for 
Socrates is the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first 
substance, i.e., a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated. 
A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as 
being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either essentially and 
absolutely and as something flowing from its matter, and then it is quantity; or as 
something flowing from its form, and then it is quality; or it is not present in the 
subject absolutely but with reference to something else, and then it is relation. 
A predicate is referred to a subject in a third way when the predicate is taken from 
something extrinsic to the subject, and this occurs in two ways. In one way, that from 
which the predicate is taken is totally extrinsic to the subject; and if this is not 
a measure of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of environment, as when it 
is said that Socrates is shod or clothed. But if it is a measure of the subject, then, since 
an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the predicament is taken either in 
                                                                                                                                               
scilicet ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest 
suum actum intelligere. Sed non primo, quia nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum 
praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut 
dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit” (STh, I, 87, 3 ad 1). Cf. In Meta., II, 1, 
n. 285. As we know from the history, this fundamental differentiation between the proper object of 
human intellect and objects of God and angels, was obviated by Scotus who postulated that the proper 
object of human intellect be ens commune, the univocal core of the term “being” that could be 
somehow directly attainable by us in our present condition.  
45 “Ens non dicitur pure aequivoce, set secundum prius et posterius, unde simpliciter dictum intelligitur 
de eo, quod per prius dicitur” (In Peryerm., I, 5 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 5, lin. 323-325]). 
46 “[Philosophus] distinguit ens quod es extra animam per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens 
perfectum” (In Meta., V, 9, n. 889). 
47 “Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V Metaphisice Philosophus dicit, ens per se dupliciter dicitur: uno 
modo quod diuiditur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum ueritatem. Horum 
autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud de quo affirmatiua propositio 
formari potest, etiam si illud in re nichil ponat; per quem modum priuationes et negationes entia 
dicuntur: dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi, et quod cecitas est in oculo. Sed primo 
modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit” (De ente, 1 [Leon. 43, p. 369, lin. 1-12]).  
48 Cf. Benedict M. Ashley, The Way toward Wisdom (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2006), p. 76-85; M. Marina Scheu, The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), p. 46-63. 
49 Categories can be considered on these three levels: logical, physical, and metaphysical, “But Aristotle 
treats them primarily as part of natural science, not of metaphysics or logic, and demonstrates 
empirically that these categories are required for any adequate description of physical phenomena” 
(Ashley, The Way toward Wisdom, p. 78). 
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reference to time, and so it will be when; or if it is taken in reference to place and the 
order of parts in place is not considered, it will be where; but if this order is 
considered, it will be position. In another way, that from which the predicate is taken, 
though outside the subject, is nevertheless from a certain point of view in the subject 
of which it is predicated. And if it is from the viewpoint of the principle, then it is 
predicated as an action; for the principle of action is in the subject. But if it is from 
the viewpoint of its terminus, then it will be predicated as a passion; for a passion is 
terminated in the subject which is being acted upon.50 
 
This account lists the general possibilities or ways in which a predication concerning 
real being can happen. Most basically we see that the categories concern entities as 
conceived by simple concepts. Obviously, the list of categories does not contain being 
itself or the other terms which transcend categories, such as thing, one, something, true, 
or good – these are called by Aquinas transcendentia,51 later labeled as transcendentals, 
because they transcend categories in the sense that they belong to all of them. The 
division into categories follows the various modes of real thing existing in the world:52 
things that we know from experience and try to describe. Although the categories 
follow the various modes of existence of things of this world, modes of existence of 
things do not necessarily follow our categories.53 St. Thomas assures us that in the cases 
of these categories which are enumerated above “nothing is placed in a category unless 
it is something existing outside the soul.”54 We might somewhat playfully call this rule 
                                                 
50 “Praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere. Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut 
cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur 
significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur. Secundo 
modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei 
per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est 
qualitas: vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid. Tertio modo ut 
praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum: et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo ut sit omnino extra 
subiectum: quod quidem si non sit mensura subiecti, praedicatur per modum habitus, ut cum dicitur, 
Socrates est calceatus vel vestitus. Si autem sit mensura eius, cum mensura extrinseca sit vel tempus 
vel locus, sumitur praedicamentum vel ex parte temporis, et sic erit quando: vel ex loco, et sic erit ubi, 
non considerato ordine partium in loco, quo considerato erit situs. Alio modo ut id a quo sumitur 
praedicamentum, secundum aliquid sit in subiecto, de quo praedicatur. Et si quidem secundum 
principium, sic praedicatur ut agere. Nam actionis principium in subiecto est. Si vero secundum 
terminum, sic praedicabitur ut in pati. Nam passio in subiectum patiens terminatur” (In Meta., V, 9, 
n. 891-892). Slightly different sequence with an ampler description is found in In Phys., III, 5, n. 15. 
51  Cf. De ver., 21, 3; Super I Sent., 2, 1, 5 ad 2; Super II Sent., 34, 1, 2 ad 1; STh, I, 30, 3 ad 1; 39, 3 ad 
3; 93, 9. For a discussion of Aquinas’s use of this term, see Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy & the 
Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden etc.: Brill, 1996), p. 91-93. 
52 Cf. In Meta., V, 9, n. 890.  
53 “We cannot automatically assume that every distinction introduced by the intellect in its thinking and 
expressed by us in speech follows from and points to a corresponding real diversity in the order of 
being. In fact, Thomas often criticizes the Platonists for making this mistake (see In VII Met., 1, 
n. 1254; In De Trinitate, 5, 3)” (John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas’s Derivation of the Aristotelian 
Categories [Predicaments],” Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 [1987], p. 18).  
54 “In nullo enim praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res extra animam existens” (De pot., 7, 9 c.). 
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“Aquinas’s version of the Razor,” because what he says amounts to something like non 
sunt praedicamenta multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.55 Instead, however, of saying 
that some categories are spurious or are used only by the unlettered and not by serious 
philosophers who know logic, Aquinas attempts to explain how the categories can be 
validly used.56 He seeks to understand how what is usually grasped in specific 
categories actually exists. For him, it would make no sense to talk scientifically about 
something if it did not somehow exist; all categories that do not refer to something real 
or are not based on reality are spurious and are unfit for science. Before “shaving” 
anything, in his non-eliminative method, he first examines carefully the reality of things 
and asks how to describe adequately what there is. He asks whether there is a mode of 
existence that can be ascribed to what is grasped in each category. Whenever the human 
mind endeavors to know real things thoroughly, to explain them, it is the reality of 
things itself that calls for these categories.57  
                                                 
55 John Deely remarks that: “Well before Ockham got the credit for inventing shaving, so to speak, 
Aquinas in his work used the so-called ‘Ockham’s razor’ – the idea that theoretical entities should be 
posited as seldom as possible” (Four Ages of Understanding. The First Postmodern Survey of 
Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century [Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001], p. 345). 
56 William McMahon in his article “The Medieval Sufficientiae: Attempts at a Definitive Division of the 
Categories” (Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 2 [2002]: 12-25) traces 
back the tradition of arguing that there should be ten and only ten categories and mentions those who 
debunked such “sufficientiae” as something unimportant in philosophy (e.g. Scotus or Buridan). He 
writes: “The belief that the categories were essentially frivolous became amplified more and more so 
that by the time of Kant … they were commonly regarded as completely arbitrary. Today, however, it 
is arguable that the advocates of the categories were really on the right track, as recent work in lexical 
semantics has resurrected the categorial distinctions and restored their honorific status” (p. 17). He 
gives William Frawley’s Linguistic Semantics (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992) and Ray 
Jackendoff’s Semantic Structures (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990) as examples for such recent 
works.  
57 Paul Vincent Spade writes: “Ockham’s ‘nominalism’ … is often viewed as derived from a common 
source: an underlying concern for ontological parsimony. This is summed up in the famous slogan 
known as ‘Ockham’s Razor’, often expressed as ‘Don’t multiply entities beyond necessity.’ Although 
the sentiment is certainly Ockham’s, that particular formulation is nowhere to be found in Ockham’s 
texts. Moreover, as usually stated, it is a sentiment that virtually all philosophers, medieval or 
otherwise, would accept; no one wants a needlessly bloated ontology. The question, of course, is which 
entities are needed and which are not. Ockham’s Razor, in the senses in which it can be found in 
Ockham himself, never allows us to deny putative entities; at best it allows us to refrain from positing 
them in the absence of known compelling reasons for doing so. In part, this is because human beings 
can never be sure they know what is and what is not ‘beyond necessity’; the necessities are not always 
clear to us. But even if we did know them, Ockham would still not allow that his Razor allows us to 
deny entities that are unnecessary. For Ockham, the only truly necessary entity is God; everything else, 
the whole of creation, is radically contingent through and through. In short, Ockham does not accept 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason” (“William of Ockham,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy [Fall 2006 Edition], edited by Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/ockham/).  
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Among the categories, substance is primarily called being because the main 
feature of substance is that it is not in something else, but plays the function of a subject 
for other realities described by the remaining nine categories of being. Those nine 
categories are called accidents because their common characteristic is to be in another: 
their existence is always an existence-in-something, they inhere in or belong to 
a substance.58 Being, however, is predicated of all these categories. As St. Thomas says: 
“Being is predicated of all the categories, not however in the same way, but primarily of 
substance, and posteriorly of the other categories.”59 In another place he says plainly 
that being is predicated analogically of the ten categories.60 The ability to distinguish 
when a predication concerns substance (predication simpliciter or per se) and when it is 
about accidents (predication secundum quid or per accidens) is crucial because the 
correctness of our reasoning results from this.61  
                                                 
58 “Accidentis esse est inesse” (In Meta., V, 9, n. 894). “In ipsa ratione entis prioritatem habet substancia, 
que est ens per se, respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio” (In Peryerm., I, 8 (Leon. 1*/1, 
p. 40, lin. 66-68]). 
59 “Ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per 
posterius de aliis praedicamentis” (In Meta., VII, 4, n. 1331). Cf. ibid. IV, 1, n. 535-536; V, 13, n. 951; 
XI, 3, n. 2197; De Malo, 7, 1, ad 1. 
60 “Ens praedicetur analogice de decem generibus” (Super I Sent., 22, 1, 3 ad 2). Cf. STh, II-II, 120, 2 c. 
After Aquinas there were severe criticisms of this doctrine and tendencies to discard analogous 
character of “being” in favour of univocity of “being”. One of the first opponents was Duns Scotus. 
But “it has often been pointed out that the adversaries Scotus had in mind when he insisted on the 
univocity of ‘being’ as common to substance and accident, or on the univocity of terms common to 
God and creature, did not include Thomas Aquinas” (Ralph McInerny, A History of Western 
Philosophy, vol. 2 [available at http://www2.nd.edu/Departments//Maritain/etext/hwp223.htm]). 
Nonetheless there was a significant difference between them: “Scotus wants ‘being’ to be common to 
substance and accident in such a way that it has exactly the same meaning as predicated of both. This 
Aquinas emphatically denies. Scotus and Aquinas are unalterably opposed on the matter of the 
univocity of ‘being’” (ibid.). Scotus’s direction was cultivated in a special way by William Ockham: 
“There is no surprise nor indeed novelty in Ockham’s reminder that being as being is not some 
individual entity apart from other beings, but what is distinctive of him is his contention that being is 
univocal in such a way that it applies in a wholly undifferentiated way to whatever is and, of course, 
whatever is an individual. … for Ockham the meaning of ‘being’ is all actual existents, and no doubt 
this is at the basis of his rejection of the distinction between essence and existence. … Once the 
univocity of being is understood in terms of a universe of things wholly undifferentiated in terms of 
their being, [there appears] a veritable flatland of reality where the only solid truth is that an individual 
thing is itself” (ibid., …hwp224.htm). See Robert Sweetman, “Univocity, Analogy, and the Mystery of 
Being according to John Duns Scotus,” in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, 
Covenant, and Participation, eds. James K. A. Smith and James H. Olthuis (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2005), 73-87; Catherine Pickstock, “Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance,” 
Modern Theology 21 (2005): 543-574 (see also in the same issue responses by several authors). For 
more general approach see E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/analogy-medieval/. 
61 “Ad logicam autem communiter pertinet considerare predicationem uniuersaliter, secundum quod 
continet sub se predicationem que est per se et que non est per se, set demonstratiue sciencie propria 
est predicatio per se” (In Poster., I, 35 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 129, lin. 20-25]). “Aliquid dicimur scire 
simpliciter, quando scimus illud in se ipso; dicimur scire aliquid secundum quid, quando scimus illud 
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Let us turn now to beings of reason. As we said before, whatever we know, we 
know as a being. But we know some things that are not real beings. Aquinas often gives 
an example of blindness to show that something can be known which has no real 
existence. We say that sight exists and blindness exists. Yet to be precise, sight exists in 
the mode of real being in the category of quality, whereas blindness is perceived as 
a privation, a lack of something that should be present. It is the lack of a capacity and 
not the existence of capacity of a certain kind. Blindness is perceived as the non-
existence of sight. Yet, it is known and predicated as existent. For example, we say: 
“Socrates is blind.” Is it true that blindness is in Socrates when Socrates is really blind? 
We should thus clarify the statement that whatever is known is known as being by 
adding that whatever we know about a thing is always in relation (either positive or 
negative) to some kind of existence. Indeed, our way of knowing things that have no 
real existence is through the ten categories. St. Thomas explains that “that which is not 
a being in nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and 
privations are said to be ‘beings of reason.’”62 Blindness does not exist in the mode of 
real being or of a being of nature: in this mode it is rather non-being (non ens); it exists, 
however, in the mode of a being of reason.63 Thus, blindness can be called being “even 
though it is nothing positive in reality.”64 Beings of reason are called beings but they are 
non-real beings in the primary sense of the term. However, they are beings in 
a particular way, and we should keep in mind their fundamental difference from real 
beings. Blindness is only one example of all possible kinds of beings of reason.  
St. Thomas says that beings of reason differ from real beings divided by the ten 
categories, in that beings of reason, though also a kind of being per se, have a different 
mode of existence.65 To their specific existence beings of reason require, beyond the 
actual state of affairs’ being in reality, the activity of the mind, which is able to 
conceive this state of affairs in such a way that the beings of reason are related to real 
                                                                                                                                               
in alio in quo est, uel sicut pars in toto … uel sicut accidens in subiecto … uel sicut effectus in causa 
… uel quocunque simili modo; et hoc est scire per accidens, quia scilicet scito aliquo per se, dicimur 
scire illud quod accidit ei quocunque modo” (ibid., I, 4 [p. 18, lin. 63-73).  
62 “Illud quod non est ens in rerum natura accipitur ut ens in ratione; unde negationes et privationes entia 
dicuntur rationis” (STh, I-II, 8, 1 ad 3). 
63 Cf. Gyula Klima, “Aquinas’ Theory of the Copula and the Theory of Being,” Logical Analysis and 
History of Philosophy 5 (2002): 159-176. 
64 “Etiam si illud in re nichil ponat” (De ente, 1 [Leon. 43, p. 369, lin. 7-8]). 
65 Cf. In Meta., V, 9, n. 889. 
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beings like an effect is to a cause.66 The being of reason is, therefore, a being secundum 
quid and not a being simpliciter; in this case the quid, according to which the being is, is 
reason. By contrast, real beings do not require our knowing in order for them to exist. 
They exist on their own, subsisting as substance or inhering in substance as accidents. 
They exist apart from and even in the absence of the activity of the human mind. The 
mind’s activity which is the basis for the existence of beings of reason is expressed in 
propositions. In other words, propositions are signs of this mental activity. This is why 
a being of reason is said to signify the truth of a proposition.67  
Being of reason is thus a result of the activity of the human mind and hence its 
existence – if we apply to it the division of being into substance and accidents – is 
a kind of accident inhering in the human mind as in its subject.68 In other words, 
ontologically speaking, beings of reason are accidents of the mind that conceives them, 
and are not real beings capable of existing outside of the mind.69 Conversely, it is also 
accidental to extramental things whether they are known by any human being or not: if 
it happens that a thing is known, this changes nothing in the thing itself. Therefore, we 
                                                 
66 “Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad primum, sicut effectus ad causam. Ex 
hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus 
significat per hoc verbum est prout est verbalis copula. Sed, quia aliquid, quod est in se non ens, 
intellectus considerat ut quoddam ens, sicut negationem et huiusmodi, ideo quandoque dicitur esse de 
aliquo hoc secundo modo, et non primo. Dicitur enim, quod caecitas est secundo modo, ex eo quod 
vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caecum; non tamen dicitur quod sit primo modo vera. Nam 
caecitas non habet aliquod esse in rebus, sed magis est privatio alicuius esse” (In Meta., V, 9, n. 896).  
67 “Ens per se dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, quod diuiditur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat 
propositionum ueritatem” (De ente, 1 [Leon. 43, p. 369, lin. 2-5]). 
68 “Mentis nostrae conceptus non est ipsa mentis nostrae essentia, sed est quoddam accidens ei, quia nec 
intelligere nostrum est ipsum esse intellectus” (De rationibus Fidei, 3, n. 958). Cf. De pot., 8, 1 c. 
69 Klima writes that “the first thing to realize about the distinction between real beings and beings of 
reason is that it does not constitute a division of a class into its subclasses, as, for example, the 
distinction between rational vs. non-rational animals constitutes the division of the class of animals 
into two kinds of animals, namely, humans and brutes. Real beings and beings of reason do not 
constitute in this way two subclasses, or two kinds of beings, indeed, not any more than real money 
and forged money would constitute two kinds of money. Just as it is only real money that is money 
simpliciter, that is, without qualification, so it is only a real being that is a being simpliciter, without 
qualification. As medieval logicians, as well as Aquinas himself, would say, the qualifications ‘of 
reason’ as added to ‘being’, or ‘forged’ as added to ‘money’ are examples of a “diminishing” 
qualification or determination, determinatio diminuens, whereas the qualification ‘real’ in both cases is 
a “non-diminishing” qualification, determinatio non diminuens.” And further “Therefore, asking the 
question: ‘What are nonexistent beings of reason?’, understood as asking about the nature of a curious 
kind of beings, namely, beings that do not exist, is just as misguided as asking about the actual legal 
currency rate between, say, yen and forged dollars. But, again, this of course does not mean that we 
cannot understand what we mean by the phrase ‘beings of reason’, on the contrary, as we just 
explained, such beings of reason are what certain expressions signify in virtue of the fact that we can 
think of them when we understand the expressions in question, whether they actually exist in rerum 
natura or not” (“The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being,” 
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 [1996]: 87-141). 
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can say that everything that is called being in the first sense, that is, real being, can also 
be being in the second sense, i.e., being of reason, “because everything which has 
natural being in reality can be signified to be in an affirmative proposition, as when we 
say colour is or man is. However, not everything which is being in the second way can 
be being in the first way.”70 Non-real beings or beings of reason are of two kinds: some 
of them have non-existence in their definition (e.g. blindness or asymmetry), and some 
of them, though they do not exist in reality, do not have this lack of existence in their 
definition (e.g. genus or golden mountains).71 According to this division, on the one side 
there are negations and privations, and on the other side there are some beings of reason 
which do not have a negative relation to existence in their definition. Only this second 
kind of being of reason may be the subject of logic.  
In order to appreciate the second type of beings of reason we should note that 
St. Thomas divides concepts into three kinds according to their relation to extramental 
reality.72 First, concepts acquired in acts of simple apprehension – these concepts are 
similitudes of things existing extra animam, and as such have an immediate foundation 
in the things from which they come. The conformity of the understanding with the thing 
understood accounts for the fact that the word which signifies this understanding (or this 
concept), properly signifies the real external thing.73 These are principally concepts 
which can be grouped into ten genera (obviously, besides transcendentals).  
Second, there are concepts that are not similitudes of things existing extra 
animam, but instead are similitudes of intentions that the intellect perceives (intentiones 
quas intellectus noster adinvenit) in the process of understanding those things (so-called 
                                                 
70 “Quia omne quod habet naturale esse in rebus, potest significari per propositionem affirmativam esse; 
ut cum dicitur: color est, vel homo est. Non autem omnia quae sunt entia quantum ad secundum 
modum, sunt entia quantum ad primum” (Super II Sent., 34, 1, 1 sol.). 
71 Cf. De ver., 3, 4 ad 6. Here we are only talking about nominal definition, in the sense of “ratio quam 
significat nomen” (In Poster., I, 4 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 19, lin. 111]; STh, I, 13, 8 ad 2) and not about real 
definition: “non entium enim non sunt difinitiones” in this sense (In Poster., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 11, lin. 
65]). 
72 “Ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam” (Super I Sent., 2, 1, 
3 sol.). “Eorum quae significantur nominibus, invenitur triplex diversitas” (Super I Sent., 19, 5, 1 sol.). 
Perhaps it would suffice to evoke the text from the De pot., 1, 1, ad 10, where St. Thomas says about 
two types of correspondence between the intellect and things: immediate and mediate. In the third kind 
of concepts distinguished in Super I Sent., 2, 1, 3 sol., there is no correspondence at all. 
73 “Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc 
quod concipitur de hoc nomine ‘homo’; et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re 
immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et 
quod nomen significans illum intellectum, proprie de re dicatur.” (Super I Sent., 2, 1, 3 sol.). 
2. St. Thomas’s Logic 
 75 
“second intentions”). The foundation of such intentions is remotely and mediately in 
real things: they are mediated likenesses of things. St. Thomas gives an example:  
the significatum of the noun ‘genus’ is not a similitude of any thing existing extra 
animam, but from the fact that the intellect understands animal as something common 
to many species, attributes to it an intention of genus; and so although such an 
intention does not have the immediate foundation in a thing but in the intellect, 
nonetheless its remote foundation is the thing itself.74 
 
What he says here indicates that this second type of concepts consists of logical 
concepts. Aquinas adds: “Thus the intellect is not false when it discovers such 
intentions. It is likewise with everything else that follows the mode of understanding.”75 
In what we understand from the real world, we can perceive certain unities, kinds, or 
types. The remote source of logic is thus in the simple experience of things. Through the 
process of abstraction reason can consider the fruits of its previous activity, fruits which 
have an immediate foundation in extramental things and are re-understood in various 
relations and compositions based on the similarities of those things as understood. 
These similarities to extramental things, even though they be remote, are still essential 
to any meaningful (only subjectively or a fortiori intersubjectively meaningful) 
discourse. They are also a sign of foundation in reality: logical concepts are not for 
Aquinas a pure fiction. 
It is true that no particular thing extra animam corresponds directly to logical 
concepts. There are nonetheless some forms the intellect distinguishes and grasps as 
existing in things (they are understood as existing in extramental reality), which 
correspond to logical concepts. These forms, when understood as existing in the mind 
and as common to many or as in relation to other forms, become logical concepts.76 
                                                 
74 “Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est 
aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt 
intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis ‘genus’ non est 
similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in 
pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum 
fundamentum non sit in re sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa” (ibid.). “Huic 
ergo intellectui quo intellectus intelligit genus non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus: 
sed intelligentiae, ex qua consequitur ista intentio, respondet aliqua res” (De pot., 1, 1 ad 10). 
75 “Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui 
consequuntur ex modo intelligendi” (Super I Sent., 2, 1, 3 c.). Cf. In Phys., II, 3, n. 5; In Boet. De 
Trin., 5, 3 ad 1. 
76 “Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam 
humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem 
intellectus intentio secundum quam dicitur species” (Super I Sent., 19, 5, 1 sol.). “Sicut est quaedam 
conceptio intellectus vel ratio cui respondet res ipsa quae est extra animam; ita est quaedam conceptio 
vel ratio cui respondet res intellecta secundum quod huiusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni 
hominis respondet res extra animam: rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei respondet solum 
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This is what justifies the claim that the intellect discovering logical intentions is not 
false, but acts on a higher level of generality than simple perception and judgment of 
what things extra animam are or are not.77  
St. Thomas distinguishes the third kind of concepts that we can have in mind: 
concepts that are pure fiction. As an example of such a concept, he gives the concept of 
Chimera, a mythological monster: “it is neither a similitude of anything extra animam, 
nor it truly follows the mode of understanding of a thing.”78 It is true that the concept of 
Chimera is something complex, created by the imagination from “imaginary material” 
gathered in the experience of the real world (it was described as something with three 
heads, lion-fronted and snake behind, a goat in the middle). Since, however, nothing in 
the real world corresponds to it, St. Thomas says simply that this concept is false. Note 
that the falsehood appears in a complex concept, created as a composition from simple 
apprehensions. 
We know already that there are some beings of reason which are not relations. 
However, it turns out that the logician strictly speaking deals only with relations of 
reason. These logical beings always have the character of relations, because relation is 
the only category that can be predicated of things whose any existence is in reason.79 
Negations and privations are examples of beings of reason which are not relations; 
                                                                                                                                               
res intellecta” (De pot., 7, 6 c.). “In omnibus autem intentionibus hoc communiter verum est, quod 
intentiones ipsae non sunt in rebus sed in anima tantum: sed habent aliquid in re respondens, scilicet 
naturam, cui intellectus huiusmodi intentiones attribuit; sicut intentio generis non est in asino, sed 
natura animalis, cui per intellectum haec intentio attribuitur” (Super I Sent., 33, 1, 1 ad 3). 
77 “Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta nihil respondet; sed ea quorum sunt huiusmodi 
rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in se ipsis sunt, sed solum prout intellectae sunt; sicut 
patet in ratione generis et speciei, et aliarum intentionum intellectualium: nam nihil est in rebus quae 
sunt extra animam, cuius similitudo sit ratio generis vel speciei. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus: quia 
ea quorum sunt istae rationes, scilicet genus et species, non attribuit rebus secundum quod sunt extra 
animam, sed solum secundum quod sunt in intellectu. Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in se ipsum 
reflectitur, sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas” (De pot., 7, 
6 c.). 
78 “Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum 
neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque 
consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam verae: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa” (Super I Sent., 2, 
1, 3 c.).  
79 “Sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; 
quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere: uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per 
intellectum et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuentur ab 
intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes 
ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam 
ordinem intellectuum ad invicem” (De pot., 7, 11). Cf. De ver., 21, 1. On relations in a broader context 
see Jeffrey Brower, “Medieval Theories of Relations,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2005 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/relat
ions-medieval/. 
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therefore, they are not the subject of logic. Furthermore, there are some relations of 
reason, which are not logical relations because even if they follow on our mode of 
understanding, they are founded on things as they really exist.80 The logician treats only 
such relations of reason that follow from our mode of understanding and are founded on 
things as known.81 These relations of reason are deliberate constructs of the mind, con-
structs that exist solely in the mind, but are based upon the way humans know reality. 
What we grasp from real beings or from beings of nature are some “intentions,” i.e. we 
grasp what something is. (These intentions are called “first intentions.”) When, 
however, we consider these intentions as that through which external things are known 
– in other words, when we consider these intentions as things existing in the mind – we 
consider these intentions only secondarily in reference to things known. Thus we are not 
reflecting on things, but on intentions. It is in this reflexive way that we come to 
understand the intentions by which the intellect knows real things. Aquinas calls them 
intentiones intellectae or intelligibiles:  
What is understood in the first place are things outside the soul and to them primarily 
the intellect refers in understanding. What is understood in the second place are 
certain ‘intentions’ and are consequent upon our mode of understanding, because in 
this second situation the intellect understands inasmuch it reflects on itself, 
understanding both the fact that it understands and the manner of its understanding.82 
 
Why does Aquinas refer to intentions in this context? We are obviously familiar with 
the word “intention” in moral discourse. Intention is one of the components of the moral 
                                                 
80 Ralph McInerny writes that: “Logical relations are attributed to known things precisely insofar as they 
are known. The intellect forms the relation of species by considering the order of that which is in the 
mind to that which is in the real order; it forms the relation of genus by considering the order of one 
concept to another. To say of a given nature that it is a species or a genus is to attribute a relation to it 
insofar as it is known. The foundation of the relation is in things as they are known by our minds. This 
is not the case with non-logical relations of reason. Non-logical relations of reason are said to follow 
on our mode of understanding in that the intellect understands one thing as ordered to another. Such 
relations, although they are not in things as they exist, are nonetheless founded on them as they exist” 
(Logic of Analogy, p. 41-42). Afterwards (p. 42-46) the author analyzes the text De Pot., 7, 11 where 
St. Thomas gives three conditions for a relation to be real (both extremes of the relation must be: 
1. beings; 2. really distinct entities; 3. able to be ordered one to another) and from that distinguishes 
four kinds of non-real relations which are only beings of reason but nonetheless are non-logical: 1. the 
relation between being and non-being, or between two non-beings (e.g. between two things perceived 
as future); 2. the relation of identity; 3. the relation between a relation and the subject of that relation 
(e.g. paternity and a man who is father); 4. the relation through which one understands B as related to 
A, because A is ordered to B yet B in reality is not ordered to A (e.g. a natural thing known is in such 
relation of reason to the human knowledge of this thing). These relations of reason are non-logical. All 
these belong to the set of first intentions. Cf. also STh, I, 13, 7; CG, IV, 14, n. 3504-3510. 
81 Cf. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, p. 128. 
82 “Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda 
autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus 
intelligit inquantum reflectitur super seipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit” (De 
pot., 7, 9 c.). On second intentions see also Super I Sent., 23, 1, 3 sol. 
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act. “Intentio,” however, has a broader meaning. Etymologically it signifies a tendency 
to something else.83 It can signify even a sensory similitude of a form of a thing 
received through senses.84 But in relation to logic “intention signifies a certain order of 
one thing to another. Yet an order of one thing to another can be only through the 
intellect to which it pertains to order.”85 Intention thus appears as something for which 
the activity of the intellect is required, because through the intellect’s action one thing is 
ordered to another. When treating logical intentions, by intentio St. Thomas means the 
relation of likeness in the intellect to the thing apprehended. By means of this relation, 
the intellect knows either an extramental thing or other similarities or regularities 
perceived in what exists in the intellect. This is so because for Aquinas, it is not from 
the fact that a similitude exists in the intellect that it is a principle of cognition, but from 
the fact that, while existing in the intellect, it is a representation of something.86 Hence, 
what is apprehended, that is, what exists as an apprehension in the mind, directs to the 
cognition of something else, namely, the external thing. This direction or reference of 
what is apprehended as existing in the mind is called intention.87 Yet, to know an extra-
mental thing thanks to the similitude (the intentio intellecta) is not the same as knowing 
the intention itself.88 The latter the intellect knows while reflecting upon its own work, 
that is, when the intellect takes for its object what is the fruit of the cognition of an 
extramental thing. This act of taking as an object the intention itself is secondary with 
                                                 
83 “Intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in aliquid tendere” (STh, I-II, 12, 1 c.). Cf. H. D. 
Simonin, “La notion d’intentio dans l’œuvre de Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue des Sciences 
philosophiques et théologiques 19 (1930): 445-463. 
84 E.g. STh, I, 78 , 3 c.; 4 c. 
85 “Intentio in ratione sua ordinem quemdam unius ad alterum importat. Ordo autem unius ad alterum 
non est nisi per intellectum, cuius est ordinare” (Super II Sent., 38, 1, 3 sol.). 
86 “Similitudo enim in vi cognoscitiva existens non est principium cognitionis rei secundum esse quod 
habet in potentia cognoscitiva sed secundum relationem quam habet ad rem cognitam; et inde est quod 
non per modum quo similitudo rei habet esse in cognoscente res cognoscitur sed per modum quo 
similitudo in intellectu existens est repraesentativa rei” (De ver., 2, 5 ad 17). 
87 “Id quod apprehendit [intellectus] ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum …, et hic vocatur intentio” 
(STh, I, 79, 10 ad 3). “Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re 
intellecta. Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur, neque est ipsa substantia 
intellectus; sed est quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta, quam voces exteriores 
significant” (CG, IV, 11, n. 3466). Cf. De ver., 4, 1; De pot., 9, 5 c.; STh, I, 27, 1 ad 2; 2; 34, 1; 3 c. 
88 “Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod aliud est 
intelligere rem et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super 
suum opus reflectitur: unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus et aliae de intentionibus intellectis. Quod 
autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis ex hoc patet quod esse intentionis intellectae in 
ipso intelligi consistit: non autem intellectus nostri, cuius esse non est suum intelligere” (CG, IV, 11, 
3466). 
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regard to the cognition which produces this intention.89 What is understood in the 
second place is called “second intentions.”90 Second intentions are properties of natures 
as they are known by us; they are attributed by the intellect to the nature as known and 
as it exists in the soul. Logic concerns, therefore, not the extra-mental reality itself 
immediately, but the ways of thinking and expressing in words and propositions what is 
grasped from the reality.91 This is why there is a difference between real sciences and 
logical sciences: logical sciences have for their object only second intentions. Intentions 
in the mind, although they themselves are accidents of quality inhering in the mind and 
perfecting the intellect, they have some accidents of their own, which are discovered by 
the intellect by comparison, and attributed to those intentions which already exist in the 
mind. These accidents of accidents are namely diverse relations, as was said before, 
through which the intellect knows something else: “relations which follow only the 
operation of the intellect in the very things understood, are relations of reason only, 
inasmuch as reason perceives them as existing between two things understood.”92  
Now, three kinds of these intentions are logical. The number of kinds of logical 
intentions flows from the three kinds of intellectual acts, mentioned during the division 
of logic in the previous section. There is thus first, the intention of universality and its 
particular kinds which follow the abstractive activity of the first act of intellect, the 
understanding. Secondly, the intention of attribution or predication which comes out of 
the intellectual judgment, the second act of the intellect. And thirdly, the intention of 
                                                 
89 “In omnibus potentiis quae possunt converti in suos actus, prius oportet quod actus illius potentiae 
feratur in obiectum aliud, et postmodum feratur in suum actum. Se enim intellectus intelligitse 
intelligere, prius oportet poni quod intelligat rem aliquam, et consequenter quod intelligat se 
intelligere: nam ipsum intelligere quod intellectus intelligit, alicuius obiecti est” (CG, III, 26, n. 2080). 
“Nullus autem percipit se intelligere nisi ex hoc quod aliquid intelligit, quia prius est intelligere aliquid 
quam intelligere se intelligere; et ideo pervenit anima ad actualiter percipiendum se esse per illud quod 
intelligit vel sentit” (De ver., 10, 8 c.).  
90 “Ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis 
intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, 
quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et 
huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae. Huiusmodi autem intentiones 
intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis 
cadunt. Et ideo subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde 
[Philosophus] concludit, quod subiectum logicae aequiparatur subiecto philosophiae, quod est ens 
naturae” (In Meta., IV, 4, n. 574). Cf. Super I Sent., 23, 1, 3; Super II Sent., 34, 1, 1 sol.  
91 “Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei” (In Meta., VII, 17, n. 1658). 
92 “Relationes quae consequuntur solam operationem intellectus in ipsis rebus intellectis, sunt relationes 
rationis tantum, quia scillicet eas ratio adinvenit inter duas res intellectas” (STh, I, 28, 1 ad 4). 
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consequence which follows reasoning, which is the discursive process of passing from 
one thing to another and discovering what is unknown from what is known.93  
Above I considered the categories while writing about real being. My goal was 
to show how real being is distinguishable from being of reason. Now, however, it is 
important to realize that the categories are also logical concepts, and that the work of 
discovering or specifying the categories belongs also to logic. We should note here the 
importance of the logical conception of the nine categories understood as accidents 
inhering in or belonging to a substance. Such a conception is for Aquinas an instrument 
for perfecting our description of what really exists: we can ascribe some characteristics 
to what we are trying to know in a perfect way, not only on the basis of the comparative 
activity of the human mind, but also on the basis of really existing features or forms.94 
This is a conception that belongs to logic as well as to metaphysics or the philosophy of 
nature, but on different levels of consideration. These real features or forms are real 
beings although they do not exist in the same way as substances exist. There are degrees 
in the kinds of real being. Some real features have only a “weak” existence.95 Despite 
the fear of creating an appearance of an implausible commitment to an “overpopulated 
                                                 
93 “In operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid 
per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; 
secundo, enuntiatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio” (STh, I-II, 90, 1 ad 2). 
94 As is known from the history of philosophy, this conception was soon widely replaced by nominalist 
beliefs. William Ockham for example left only substance and quality as categories of being and all the 
rest he “shaved” with his principle of parsimony as things that are not distinguishable from substance 
and quality. In this shaving he had nonetheless small exception for relation, but only within some 
theological questions – for him, despite the fact that our natural reason says the contrary, we should 
accept that relation is something existing outside of our mind only because God says so (sic!). Cf. 
Gyula Klima, “The Changing Role of Entia Rationis in Medieval Philosophy: A Comparative Study 
with a Reconstruction,” Synthese 96 (1993): 25-59. 
95 E.g.: “Cum relatio habeat debilissimum esse, quia consistit tantum in hoc quod est ad aliud se habere, 
oportet quod super aliquod aliud accidens fundetur, quia perfectiora accidentia sunt propinquiora 
substantiae, et eis mediantibus alia accidentia insunt” (In Phys., III, 1, n. 6). “Praedicti modi essendi ad 
quatuor possunt reduci. Nam unum eorum quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio 
et privatio, quam dicimus in ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negociatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum 
de eis affirmat vel negat aliquid. … Aliud autem huic proximum in debilitate est, secundum quod 
generatio et corruptio et motus entia dicuntur. Habent enim aliquid admixtum de privatione et 
negatione. Nam motus est actus imperfectus, ut dicitur tertio Physicorum. Tertium autem dicitur quod 
nihil habet de non ente admixtum, habet tamen esse debile, quia non per se, sed in alio, sicut sunt 
qualitates, quantitates et substantiae proprietates. Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, 
quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi 
per se existens, sicut sunt substantiae. Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur. 
Nam qualitates et quantitates dicuntur esse, inquantum insunt substantiae; motus et generationes, 
inquantum tendunt ad substantiam vel ad aliquid praedictorum; privationes autem et negationes, 
inquantum removent aliquid trium praedictorum” (In Meta., IV, 1, n. 540-543). 
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ontology,”96 since these entities do somehow exist, we should give them a proper place 
and not take offence at them because they do not exist as substances. (As a matter of 
fact, it is only an appearance because, thanks to the theory of analogy, “the ontological 
population” can enjoy a pleasant metaphysical space of things that really are, 
undisturbed by any invasion of fictive and unintelligible entities.) We should give them 
a proper place not only in natural science and metaphysics, but also in logical 
categories, which will allow us to talk about them in a logical way. The category of 
relation will especially turn out to be important for our topic. This conception of the 
categories is also a foundation for the theory of predication. With this logical 
conception, Aquinas integrates harmoniously his metaphysical analysis and they play 
together an important role in his philosophy of nature, ethics and theology. We shall 
return to this later. In the next two chapters, we will say more about those three kinds of 
logical intentions. 
Logic is possible because reason can reason about itself on the basis of its own 
activity.97 Yet the purpose of considering logical beings, as we already know, consists 
in the ordering of our knowledge of real things. As a quasi-science which exists for the 
sake of speculative sciences, logic deals with beings of reason which are proprieties of 
things as known, but its consideration is ordered to obtaining true knowledge about 
things as they exist.98 Thus, logic studies such intentions as genus and species, 
definitions, propositions and syllogisms, contraries, modes of predication, and the true 
and the false.99 In this sense, logic is secondary in relation to sciences (especially to the 
natural science) which are concerned with what is directly perceived from reality. Yet 
logic is first in relation to acquiring a method of attaining true knowledge about reality. 
This is perhaps the most essential characteristic of ancient logic as a science that 
distinguishes it from many approaches to contemporary logic: Aquinas, following 
                                                 
96 This expression is taken from Gyula Klima, “Buridan’s Logic and the Ontology of Modes” in: 
Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, edited by Ebbesen, S. Friedman, R. L. (Copenhagen: 
The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999), p. 473. 
97 Cf. In Poster., I, 1 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 3, lin. 14-24). 
98 “Logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam” (In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 10, lin. 49-
50]). “Res autem de quibus est logica non querentur ad cognoscendum propter se ipsas, set ut 
amminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 ad 2). 
99 “Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia uel natura se habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio speciei non est de 
hiis que conueniunt ei secundum suam absolutam considerationem, neque est de accidentibus que 
consequuntur ipsam secundum esse quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et nigredo; sed est de 
accidentibus que consequuntur eam secundum esse quod habet in intellectu. Et per hunc modum 
conuenit etiam sibi ratio generis uel differentie” (De ente, 3 [Leon. 43, p. 375, lin. 147-155]).  
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Aristotle, conceived logic as necessarily, although only remotely, based upon reality. 
This does not mean that their logic is based on metaphysics. Although both disciplines 
have comparable subjects (because they are universal: they cover all known things)100 
and although both study the true and the false,101 they differ in this: metaphysics, like 
the philosophy of nature, treats the order of things that human reason considers but does 
not make. Logic, on the other hand, treats the order that human reason makes among its 
acts while knowing or considering something.102 This “making” of logical entities is not 
arbitrary, because it is necessarily based on forms received from real material things in 
the process of cognition. In other words, philosophy of nature and metaphysics deal 
with the real order of things, logic deals with the logical order, which is secondary and 
follows the cognition of the real order. Moreover, the logical order is not considered for 
its own sake, but for the sake of the better knowledge of the real order. Therefore, logic 
is not based on metaphysics but on the human way of knowing the world. Thus, 
although it is necessary to distinguish methodologically the order of metaphysics and 
the philosophy of nature (the real order) from the order of logic, we should not separate 
them altogether, because logical order would not exist or have any sense without the 
real order.  
 
*   *   * 
 
Respecting the order of learning and faced with the claim that the transition from 
“is” to “ought” is “logically illicit,” in this chapter we turned our eyes to the kind of 
logic Aquinas used in his texts. We followed St. Thomas’s division of logic, which 
associates individual books of the Aristotelian Organon with three acts of human 
                                                 
100 “Subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit 
[Aristoteles] quod subiectum logicae aequiparatur subiecto philosophiae [primae]” (In Meta., IV, 4, 
n. 574). “Quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negociari ratio, logica autem est de operibus 
rationis, logica etiam erit de hiis que communia sunt omnibus, id est de intentionibus rationis, que ad 
omnes res se habent: non autem ita quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus sicut de subiectis: 
considerat enim logica sicut subiecta sillogismum, enunciationem, predicamentum aut aliquid 
huiusmodi” (In Poster., I, 20 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 75, lin. 116-124]). Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 6, 1, sol. 1. 
101 E.g.: “Philosophia prima considerat universalem veritatem entium … Cognitio veritatis maxime ad 
philosophiam primam pertinet” (In Meta., II, 1, n. 273). “Verum et falsum pertinent proprie ad 
considerationem logici” (In Meta., IV, 17, n. 736). 
102 “Ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quam ratio humana considerat sed 
non facit, ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et mathematicam et metaphysicam; ordo 
autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam” (In Eth., I, 1  
[Leon. 47/1, p. 4, lin. 28-33]). 
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reason. From that, already it appeared that his understanding of logic is somewhat 
different from modern and contemporary mainstream logics. Moreover, the distinction 
into logica docens and logica utens helped us to deal with his seemingly contradictory 
statements on the nature of logic. This distinction also implicitly brings with it some 
caution about how to respond to the question on the logically illicit character of the 
transition from “is” to “ought.” In logic as a scientific discipline (as opposed to logic as 
an art), that is, from the perspective of logica docens we could rightly doubt the 
possibility of making such a transition, for in this discipline we do not consider the fact 
that human being is a changing being, naturally inclined toward an end and directing his 
actions to an end. Indeed, no imperative sentence can follow from indicative sentences 
if premises are taken in abstraction from real conditions of human being; that is, if they 
are taken only on the logical level, in their formality. Whereas the situation changes 
significantly when the same question is considered in applied logic, that is, in logica 
utens, in logic which serves in other scientific disciplines and in shaping the way of 
life.103 
To grasp better the nature of such logic and, from there, the possibility of using 
logic in other disciplines in such a way that it would help to solve the problem of this 
dissertation, we proceeded to explore what exactly is the subject of logic. A proper 
understanding of what is secondarily understood (of beings of reason and relations of 
reason in Aquinas’s approach) helped us to see the roots of the possibility of a realistic 
discourse about what is not directly experienced sensorily. A short mention of the 
analogical character of the term “being” served to point out one of the fundamental 
differences between St. Thomas and alternative philosophical trends within which, later 
in time, the “Is/Ought” problem appeared and has persisted. The description of the 
character of basic Aristotelian categories had the same function. In addition, this 
description prepared us, on the one hand, to understand better being of reason, and on 
the other hand, laid some foundations for several topics treated in the second part of this 
work.  
                                                 
103 Although it is not a great discovery, it happens to be overlooked. In the same direction but from 
different presuppositions, C. H. Waddington says: “The validity of argument that one cannot logically 
proceed from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ depends entirely on what is the content of the notion conveyed by 
‘is’. In fact, any invocation of ‘is’ other than as a logical copula, involves an epistemology, and it is 
impossible to reduce the relation of ‘is’ to ‘ought’ to a matter of pure logic” (C. H. Waddington, 
The Ethical Animal [New York: Atheneum, 1961], p. 54). 
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Knowing the nature of logical intentions, which are relations of reason 
(precisely distinguished from real relations as well as from non-real but non-logical 
relations), we were able to appreciate properly, although still generally, the interplay 
between real sciences and logic. Logic, in Aquinas’s view, is necessarily, even though 
remotely, based upon reality, and it is a discipline which is supposed to lead us to know 
things as they really are and protect against errors in the acts of reason. 
Since we are interested in the different types of cognition of human nature, that 
may or may not provide the basis for inference of moral claims, what we have said thus 
far about the subject of logic should suffice for our purposes. Now I will move on to 
consider some issues which, on the one hand, follow from the described comprehension 
of the subject of logic and, on the other hand, will serve to clarify the problem of this 
study, mainly on the level of logic, but in some sense also on the level of epistemology. 
Thus, in Chapter 3, I will clarify some themes concerning understanding within the 
context of Aquinas’s semantics, and I will present some questions about his theory of 
predication (so, we can group these issues around the first and second kind of logical 
intentions). In Chapter 4, I will touch briefly on St. Thomas’s general methodology as it 
is presented in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics in order to explain what he 
meant when he spoke about logical inference and what he considered a perfect 
knowledge of something (this, in turn, can be associated with the third kind of logical 
intentions). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Theory of Signification and Predication 
 
 
On what grounds do we attribute the character of truth to a proposition? Can 
logic establish or analyze the special type of proposition that is neither determinately 
true nor determinately false without reference to the extra-logical? Would there be any 
mention of proceeding without error in our thinking if in logic we had no reference to 
the extra-logical? In order to explain these problems I shall refer briefly to St. Thomas’s 
theory of signification.1 After that we will be well prepared to touch some issues of 
Aquinas’s theory of predication. 
                                                 
1 The importance and “attractiveness” of St. Thomas’s solution of the problem of signification in the 
context of and in discussion with contemporary philosophy is splendidly presented by John 
P. O’Callaghan in his book Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of 
Existence (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003). For other comprehensive studies 
see especially: Gyula Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s 
Metaphysics of Being,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996): 87-141. In other article, “The 
Changing Role of Entia Rationis in Medieval Semantics and Ontology” (Synthese 96 [1993]: 25-59), 
Klima shows briefly the role of entia rationis in Aquinas’s semantics and how the role of this notion 
was simply eliminated by the entrance of Ockhamist semantics. In the article “Ontological Alternatives 
vs. Alternative Semantics in Medieval Philosophy” (European Journal for Semiotic Studies 3 [1991]: 
587-618) Klima demonstrates how the entrance of Ockhamist semantics, despite its logical 
independence, changed the research program for ontology and, through this, the paradigm of mental 
representation in the so-called via moderna trend of late-mediaeval philosophy. The author suggests 
that this move directly paved the way for modern treatments of ontological and epistemological 
questions in post-scholastic philosophy. It is clear that these changes in semantics, ontology and 
epistemology changed also the whole scientific project and more specifically the mode of moral 
explanation. In the article “On Being and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics and 
Philosophy of Science” (in Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the 
Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, edited by S. Knuuttila, R. Työrinoja, and 
S. Ebbesen, vol. 2, series B19, [Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1990], p. 210-221), Klima presents 
a complete semantic system constructed to represent Aquinas’s ontology. Nevertheless in 
“Understanding Matters from a Logical Angle” (Essay V of his Ars Artium [Budapest: Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, 1988], p. 111-149) he treats the issue of the independence of this semantic 
construction from that particular ontology. See also his “‘Socrates est Species’ – Logic, Metaphysics 
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The main question of the theory of signification, called also semantics, is how to 
account for the relationship between mind, words (or language), and the world. 
Semantics can be presented in the framework of the subject matter of logic, but issues 
treated in semantics are diversely related to the philosophy of nature and to 
metaphysics. Nonetheless, Aquinas’s theory of signification enjoys a certain 
“aloofness”2 from ontology or metaphysics. It can, to a certain extent, be understood 
also without reference to his philosophy of nature, although I will refer to both 
metaphysics and philosophy of nature several times, as St. Thomas himself does. He 
does so, and I follow him here, because logic is somehow indirectly concerned with acts 
of the intellect as those from which beings of reason result (i.e. acts of the intellect are 
considered so far as it is useful to capture the specificity of beings of reason). However, 
some topics which belong properly to metaphysics and philosophy of nature are 
invoked because keeping in mind some clarifying references to other disciplines is 
useful for integrating the whole picture of the reality that we intend to know. However, 
the signification of vocal sounds belongs for Aquinas to the principal consideration of 
logic.3  
For the subject of this work a brief presentation of St. Thomas’s theory of 
signification is necessary to justify today his scientific (including philosophical and 
theological) method. Furthermore, I claim that the very roots of the problem with the 
transition from “is” to “ought,” from descriptive phrases to prescriptive ones, come 
partially from a semantics that is alien to that of Aquinas. A different semantic 
paradigm, and the theory of predication that flows from it, contribute to the conviction 
that this transition is “logically illicit.” Salient and disputed issues pertaining to the 
                                                                                                                                               
and Psychology in Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Treatment of a Paralogism,” in Ars Artium, p. 165-185. 
See as well: Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1996), especially p. 54-85; E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of 
Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology 1 (1991): 39-67.  
2 Klima uses this expression (in “The Semantic Principles,” p. 133) quoting Desmond Paul Henry who, 
influenced by Stanisław Leśniewski’s ontology and some medieval conceptions, postulates the 
“Principle of Logical Aloofness”: see Henry’s That Most Subtle Question (Quaestio subtilissima): 
The Metaphysical Bearing of Medieval and Contemporary Linguistic Disputes (Manchester, England: 
Manchester University Press, 1984). 
3 “Quia logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio uocum, que est immediata ipsis 
conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius, significatio autem 
litterarum, tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad eius considerationem, set magis ad considerationem 
gramatici” (In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 10, lin. 49-55). 
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philosophy of nature and metaphysics, which deepen even more the chasm between “is” 
and “ought,” will be treated later. 
St. Thomas in his personal writings constructs his ideas within the framework of 
Aristotle’s “semantic triangle”. The terms of this triangle are: significant vocal sounds 
(names, and verbs, and sentences), passions of the soul (mental grasp of what something 
is), and things from which the passions have their origin.4 According to Aristotle, words 
signify things through the mediation of passions of the soul.5 At the beginning of his 
commentary to Peri hermeneias, Aquinas brings to the fore the usage of common 
names: as they are applied indifferently to many singulars of the same nature, they 
signify what is common to them, without bothering about individual nonessential 
features. Since what is common to them does not exist apart from singular things but in 
things, common names signify therefore general natures abstracted from singulars.6 
These common names indicate for Aquinas that words signify things only through the 
mediation of concepts. Indeed, it is impossible for words to signify things directly, 
because words, as vocal sounds, in themselves signify nothing. If I do not understand 
a language, if I do not know the signification of words uttered to me as signifying 
something, the words are for me only some vocal sounds which signify nothing. I can 
even use unknown words, but due to the fact that I do not understand them, these words 
signify nothing to me. For Aristotle and Aquinas, understanding constitutes the element 
that renders vocal sounds significant, i.e. refers vocal sounds to something which is 
outside the vocal sounds themselves. The understanding forms words: if there is no 
understanding, there is no word, but only vocal sounds.7 Yet, a fundamental question 
arises: what and how do we understand?  
 
 
                                                 
4 Cf. ibid (Leon. 1*/1, p. 10, lin. 20-48). 
5 Medieval authors generally agreed that the meaning of our words comes from our concepts, but differed 
in opinions on the nature of concepts, their kinds, and the way of representing, see Gyula Klima, “The 
Medieval Problem of Universals,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition), 
edited by Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/universals-medieval/. 
6 “Non enim potest esse quod [nomina et uerba et orationes] significent inmediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso 
modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen ‘homo’ naturam humanam in abstractione 
a singularibus, unde non potest esse quod significet inmediate hominem singularem. Vnde Platonici 
posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ydeam hominis separatam; set, quia hec secundum suam 
abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sentenciam Aristotilis, set est in solo intellectu, ideo 
necesse fuit Aristotili dicere quod uoces significant intellectus conceptiones inmediate, et eis 
mediantibus res” (In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 11, lin. 100-112]).  
7 “Nomina significant intellectus. Si igitur nihil intelligitur, nihil significatur” (In Meta., IV, 7, n. 615). 
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3.1. Understanding and the infallibility of the first act of the intellect 
 
According to Aristotle, since things of this world are the same to all men, so also 
are the passions of the soul. Aquinas claims that the passions of the soul, passiones 
animae in the Latin translation of Aristotle’s text, should be taken in this context as 
conceptions of the intellect (intellectus conceptiones).8 What the intellect apprehends 
differs from sensory cognition, because the senses apprehend only outward 
characteristics of things, while the imagination apprehends similitudes of bodies, and 
not their essences.9 The intellect in its first act apprehends from phantasms the simple 
and indivisible forms of things.10 Some of these forms are common to every knower; 
Aquinas gives several examples for such simple apprehensions: being and non-being, 
one, good, whole, part, equal and unequal etc.11 Other forms depend on the extent of 
one’s experience from which the intellect grasps what something is in itself (quod quid 
est)12 or what is its intelligible character (ratio),13 or what it is according to its 
definition.14 Obviously, such a definition can be only nominal, i.e. explaining a name of 
something. In this case, such a definition is not the ratio rei or quid rei, but ratio 
                                                 
8 Cf. In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 10-11, lin. 95-100]). 
9 “Sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum. Similiter neque imaginatio, 
sed apprehendit solas similitudines corporum. Intellectus autem solus apprehendit essentias rerum” 
(STh, I, 57, 1 ad 2). “Est autem differentia inter intellectum et sensum: nam sensus apprehendit rem 
quantum ad exteriora eius accidentia, quae sunt color, sapor, quantitas, et alia huiusmodi; sed 
intellectus ingreditur ad interiora rei. Et quia omnis cognitio perficitur secundum similitudinem quae 
est inter cognoscens et cognitum, oportet quod in sensu sit similitudo rei sensibilis quantum ad eius 
accidentia: in intellectu vero sit similitudo rei intellectae quantum ad eius essentiam” (CG, IV, 11, 
n. 3475). “Intellectus secundum suum nomen importat cognitionem pertingentem ad intima rei. Unde 
cum sensus et imaginatio circa accidentia occupentur quae quasi circumstant essentiam rei, intellectus 
ad essentiam ejus pertingit. Unde secundum Philosophum in III De anima, objectum intellectus est 
quid” (Super III Sent., 35, 2, 2, qc. 1 sol.). “It was John Locke’s failure to distinguish such generalized 
images that he called ‘ideas’ from true intellectual concepts that gave rise to modern empiricism. … 
A failure to distinguish between sensible similarity and abstract essential identity is one of the defects 
of Nominalism” (Benedict Ashley, The Way toward Wisdom [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2006], p. 108). 
10 Form is not a shape; it is the actuality of that what a thing is or becomes in its deepest structure – 
principium subsistendi, which is perceivable intellectually as quod quid est – principium cognoscendi. 
Cf. In Meta., I, 12, n. 183. 
11 “Quarundam propositionum termini sunt tales quod sunt in noticia omnium, sicut ens et unum et alia 
que sunt entis in quantum ens: nam ens est prima conceptio intellectus” (In Poster., I, 5 [Leon. 1*/2, 
p. 25, lin. 120-123]). Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 6, 4 c.; In Meta., IV, 6, n. 605.  
12 Cf. In Poster., II, 20 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 242-247). 
13 “Ratio autem non significat esse sed esse quid, idest quid aliquid est” (De pot., 8, 2 ad 11). 
14 “Intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quamdam intentionem rei 
intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius quam significat definitio” (CG, I, 53, n. 443). “Ratio quam significat 
nomen est definitio” (STh, I, 85, 2 ad 3). 
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nominis or quid nominis. In order to know a thing one must move from this definition to 
a real definition, i.e. one which expresses what a thing is in itself.15 The intellect at this 
point understands the essence of something or its quiddity.16 What a thing is essentially, 
in really existing things, is always connected with its non-essential proprieties or 
characteristics. The intellect can understand one thing without another despite the fact 
that both may be actually united in an extramental thing.17 This happens when some part 
of a unity is understood without the other, in other words when some part of a certain 
kind of unity does not enter into the definition of the other part.18 For example, we 
know what a triangle is, without necessarily thinking whether it is equilateral or 
isosceles. The intellectual grasp of something thus abstracts from other things (or from 
other parts when a part is conceivable without taking into consideration some other part 
of a thing which is in reality complex), and also it abstracts a universal essence of 
something from its singular extramental mode of existence (i.e. from matter).19 
Therefore the understanding of a thing through its definition is a grasping of its 
uncompounded quidditative form.20 This is why it is called the understanding of 
                                                 
15 Cf. In Poster., II, 8 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 203, lin. 91-130); De ver., 10, 12 ad 4 in contr.; In Meta., VII, 3, 
n. 1325-1330; 4, n. 1339. 
16 “Indiuisibilium intelligencia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essenciam uniuscuiusque rei in 
se ipsa” (In Peryerm., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 5, lin. 3-5]). “Intellectus apprehendit rem intellectam 
secundum propriam essentiam seu diffinitionem; unde et in III De anima dicitur quod obiectum 
proprium intellectus est quod quid est” (In Peryerm., I, 10 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 50, lin. 71-75]). “Obiectum 
autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei” (STh, I, 85, 6). Cf. STh, I, 13, 2 ad 1; In Boet. De Trin., 5, 
3. In Meta., X, 1, n. 1929-1930, 1933-36; VI, 4, n. 1232; Super I Sent., 19, 5, 1 sol., ad 7; In Phys., I, 1, 
n. 6-11; In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 4, lin. 35-40]). “One may speak either of the intelligible 
character of the thing or of an intelligible character. In the first case it means the quiddity viewed 
adequately and expressed by the definition of the thing; and in the second case it means some formal or 
intelligible feature of the thing, whether accidental or essential, or some constituent note of the essence 
or quiddity itself” (Robert W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas [The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966], p. 111). 
17 We are talking here about the abstraction performed by the first act of the intellect, so this is the 
second modus among the two described here: “Abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum 
compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alio, vel esse separatum ab eo. 
Alio modo, per modum simplicis et absolutae considerationis; sicut cum intelligimus unum, nihil 
considerando de alio” (STh, I, 85, 1 ad 1).  
18 “Ea uero que sunt coniuncta in rebus, intellectus potest distinguere, quando unum eorum non cadit in 
ratione alterius” (In Peryerm., I, 10 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 50, lin. 46-48]). Cf. CG, II, 75, n. 1551-1554. 
19 “Multa sunt coniuncta secundum rem, quorum unum non est de intellectu alterius: sicut album et 
musicum coniunguntur in aliquo subiecto, et tamen unum non est de intellectu alterius, et ideo potest 
unum separatim intelligi sine alio. Et hoc est unum intellectum esse abstractum ab alio. … animal 
potest intelligi absque homine, et homo absque Socrate et aliis individuis. Et hoc est abstrahere 
universale a particulari” (In Phys., II, 3, n. 5).  
20 If we entered into discussion with those among whom the “is/ought problem” arose it would be 
important to explain in greater detail St. Thomas’s doctrine of abstraction and the process of 
understanding because this was one of the main problems with which British Empiricism struggled and 
finally failed to understand, due to its dogmatic nominalist stance that it is impossible to distinguish 
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indivisibles (indivisibilium intelligentia), because the quidditative form is what allows 
us to know something as a whole. For example, we can physically divide an apple with 
a knife, but perceiving an apple we perceive it as a kind of unity. To be sure, an apple 
has its parts and parts of an apple have their own forms; yet, these forms are not forms 
of an apple but forms of parts of an apple.21  
In order to give a rough description of how understanding occurs, we should say 
that the intellectual apprehension of simple indivisible things presupposes the 
fundamental stage of sense perception – this stage will be discussed briefly in section 
7.3. Here, let it suffice to say that according to Aristotle and Aquinas sense cognition is 
the gate to intellectual cognition,22 and that the final fruits of sense cognition are 
phantasms, which are sensory similitudes of singulars in their singularity. We should 
say here also that phantasms are necessary to any actual intellectual cognition: we 
simply do not understand without phantasms.23 Yet phantasms are only the fruit of 
sensory cognition. Although they have some intelligible content, they are not the 
intellectual cognition itself. The agent intellect extracts from phantasms their intelligible 
content (quiddity) creating at the same time the intelligible species. We can understand 
the intelligible species in two ways: as the medium of cognition and as the object of 
                                                                                                                                               
what is inseparable in nature (cf. section 0.1). Since we do not enter here openly into this discussion, it 
suffices only to sketch Aquinas’s general position. For a more extended discussion of abstraction in 
Aquinas see Régis, Epistemology, translated by I. C. Byrne (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 253-
306; John Deely, Four Ages of Understanding (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), p. 345-
47; Ashley, The Way toward Wisdom, p. 101-109. See also a critique of “abstractionism” specifically 
understood done by Peter Geach in his Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects (London: 
Routledge and Keegan Paul, Ltd., 1957) as well as John Deely’s reaction to it: “Animal Intelligence 
and Concept-Formation” The Thomist 35 (1971): 43-93; and finally Anthony Lisska’s clarification of 
the context of Geach’s critique: “Deely and Geach on Abstractionism in Thomistic Epistemology” 
The Thomist 37 (1973): 548-568.  
21 The object of the indivisibilium intelligentia is a universal nature as opposed to individuals, and not a 
substantial form as opposed to prime matter (the distinction into forma totius, which is essence or 
quiddity, and forma partis, which is substantial form): cf. STh, I, 3, 3; In IV Sent., 44, 1, 1, qc. 2 ad 2; 
CG, II, 72, n. 1485; In Meta., I, 12, n. 183; VII, 9, n. 1469. 
22 “Principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae sunt materialia, et intelligibilia in potentia” 
(In Phys., I, 1, n. 7). “Cognitio nostra ortum habet a sensu” (ibid., II, 1, n. 8). “Cognitio sensus qui est 
cognoscitivus singularium, in nobis praecedit cognitionem intellectivam quae est universalium” 
(In Meta., I, 2, n. 46). “Cognitio a sensu incipit” (ibid., VII, 2, n. 1302). 
23 “Intelligere non est sine fantasmate, quod non est sine corporali passione” (In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 
1*/1, p. 11, lin. 119-120]). “Nam intellectus humanus … primum suae cognitionis initium ab 
extrinseco sumit: quia non est intelligere sine phantasmate” (CG, IV, 11, n. 3465). “Intellectus noster 
et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et 
tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, 
nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata” (STh, I, 85, 1 ad 5).  
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understanding; the first is an abstracted quiddity, the second is the universality itself .24 
St. Thomas says that the intelligible species, which informs the intellect and puts it into 
activity, should be considered as a principle for intellectual operation (intelligibilis 
operationis principium). In this it differs from the intention or ratio understood (intentio 
sive ratio intellecta), because the existence of the latter also consists in the very act of 
understanding, while the intention or ratio understood is quasi terminus intelligibilis 
operationis. Yet both the intelligible species and the intention understood are 
similitudes of the thing understood: the intelligible species is the form received, while 
the intention understood is a representation actively formed or expressed.25 The 
intellectual likeness is universal, which means applicable to many.26 This is not because 
the thing known is universal,27 or because something in the thing is universal. Nor is 
this because it is universal as an entity in the mind. Rather, the intellectual likeness is 
universal because the intellect knows particular things universally or generally,28 that is, 
in abstraction from all individualizing conditions always associated with extramental 
things.29 It is, therefore, universal not in its being, but in its mode of representing which 
                                                 
24 “Cum dicitur intellectum in actu, duo importantur, scilicet res quae intelligitur, et hoc quod est ipsum 
intelligi. Et similiter cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipsa natura rei, et 
abstractio seu universalitas” (STh, I, 85, 2 ad 2).  
25 “Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. Quae 
quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur; neque est ipsa substantia intellectus; sed est 
quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta, quam voces exteriores significant” (CG, IV, 
11, n. 3466) and see further. For a broader discussion of this topic see Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 
p. 98-111. 
26 Cf. In De An., II, 12 (Leon. 45/1, p. 115-116, lin. 96-150); STh, I, 12, 4 c. “Uniuersale dicitur esse 
quiescens in anima, in quantum scilicet consideratur preter singularia, in quibus est motus, quod etiam 
dicit esse unum preter multa, non quidem secundum esse, sed secundum considerationem intellectus 
qui considerat naturam aliquam, puta hominis, non respiciendo ad Sortem et Platonem, quodcunque, 
etsi secundum considerationem intellectus sit unum preter multa, tamen secundum esse est in omnibus 
singularibus unum et idem, non quidem numero, quasi sit eadem humanitas numero omnium 
hominum, sed secundum rationem speciei” (In Poster., II, 20 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 245, lin. 174-188]). 
27 This was the error of Platonists who confused the way things exist with the way in which we know 
them. Platonists posited some separated entities, so-called ideas and claimed that there subsist 
somewhere as ideal natures, universal things existing by themselves, beings properly speaking, of 
which material, perceptible things are merely participations. These mysteriously existing ideas were 
known in the first place and to them names were to refer properly speaking. Cf. In Peryerm., I, 2 
(Leon. 1*/1, p. 11, lin. 105-112); In Meta., I, 14, n. 224 (and further three lessons demolishing Plato’s 
position). 
28 “Ipse autem nature quibus accidit intentio uniuersalitatis sunt in rebus” (In De An., II, 12 [Leon. 45/1, 
p. 116, lin. 145-147]). “Ratio uniuersalitatis, que consistit in communitate et abstractione, sequitur 
solum modum intelligendi in quantum intelligimus abstracte et communiter” (De spir. creat., 9 ad 6); 
“Uniuersale quod facit intellectus agens est unum in omnibus a quibus ipsum abstrahitur” (ibid., 10 ad 
14). “Id quod cognoscit sensus materialiter et concrete, quod est cognoscere singulare directe, hoc 
cognoscit immaterialiter et abstracte, quod est cognoscere universale” (STh, I, 86, 1 ad 4). 
29 “Si enim accipiantur multa singularia que sunt indifferencia quantum ad aliquid unum in eis existens, 
illud unum secundum quod non differunt in anima acceptum est primum uniuersale” (In Poster., II, 20 
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enables it to be applied to many individuals. A similitude or likeness is nothing other 
than an actualization of human intellectual endowments caused by some cognitive 
contact with something of which the similitude or likeness is produced. This 
actualization consists in conformity of both bodily sense and immaterial intellect with 
the thing known.30 Although the senses grasp only the exterior accidents of things, the 
intellect grasps the essence or quiddity of the thing.31 The same form which constitutes 
the quiddity of a thing existing extra animam as a singular, also informs human 
cognition: in sense cognition with some or all individualizing conditions and in 
intellectual apprehension without them. This is not the same form numerically: the 
identity between the thing known and human cognition is a formal identity, not 
numerical. The form that I have in my mind differs numerically from the form you have 
in your mind, and our forms differ numerically from the form of the thing we both 
know. The form in the mind also differs ontologically from the form existing in 
things:32 the mind informed by the form of thing is not the thing itself. It remains this 
mind but now it is the mind knowing this thing.33 Yet it is the same form that we take 
from the thing in the cognitive process that forms our minds, that allows us to know and 
to speak about the same thing, and that allows us to experience that we know and speak 
                                                                                                                                               
[Leon. 1*/2, p. 246, lin. 243-247]). On abstraction from individualizing conditions see: STh, I, 54, 4; 
79, 3-4; 84, 2 and 6; 85, 1; 86, 1; CG, II, 77, n. 1581-1584; De spir. creat., 10 ad 4 and ad 17; De 
anima, 4; De ver., 10, 6 ad 2 and ad 7; In De An., III, 2 and 4 (Leon. 45/1, p. 208-213 and 218-223). 
30 “Cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam” (In Meta., V, 19, n. 1048). “Res non 
cognoscitur ab anima nisi per aliquam sui similitudinem existentem uel in sensu uel in intellectu” 
(In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 12, lin. 199-201]).  
31 “Est autem differentia inter intellectum et sensum: nam sensus apprehendit rem quantum ad exteriora 
eius accidentia, quae sunt color, sapor, quantitas, et alia huiusmodi; sed intellectus ingreditur ad 
interiora rei. Et quia omnis cognitio perficitur secundum similitudinem quae est inter cognoscens et 
cognitum, oportet quod in sensu sit similitudo rei sensibilis quantum ad eius accidentia: in intellectu 
vero sit similitudo rei intellectae quantum ad eius essentiam” (CG, IV, 11, n. 3475). Yet sense 
apprehension contains also what is universal and so interior regarding a thing: “Manifestum est enim 
quod singulare sentitur, proprie et per se, set tamen sensus est quodam modo etiam ipsius uniuersalis” 
(In Poster., II, 20 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 246, lin. 258-260]). Cf. In Phys., I, 1, n. 11. 
32 On the difficulties had by contemporary thinkers influenced by “classical representationalism” in 
understanding what it means that a form is in a thing or in a mind, see John O’Callaghan, “Concepts, 
Beings and Things in Contemporary Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas,” The Review of Metaphysics 53 
(1999): 69-98. After quoting eight senses of “in” from Aristotle’s Physics (among which only one 
sense is spatial) he concludes: “the spatial sense of ‘in’ for ‘classical representationalism,’ whether 
taken metaphorically or literally, is simply not at play in St. Thomas’s discussion of intellect and 
world, and the reading of Aristotle in that light” (p. 76-77).  
33 “Quod enim recipitur in aliquo recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis” (STh, I, 79, 6 c.). Cf. 84, 
4 c.; III, 11, 5 c.; CG, II, 50, n. 1264; 74, n. 1534; De Pot., 7, 10 ad 10; Quodl., VII, 1 c.  
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about the same thing.34 There is thus a formal identity of the knower and the known. 
The identity is guaranteed by the specificity of simple acts of human cognition 
characterized by their essential connection to their ultimate and proper objects, i.e. to 
the things of the sensible and intelligible reality. The similitude or likeness is thus an 
actualization of human cognition caused by a thing known.35 It is thus not what (quod) 
is known, but that by which (quo) an extramental thing is sensorily or intellectually 
known. In other words, the essential characteristic of a similitude or likeness existing in 
the mind is to refer to the extramental thing of which it is the similitude or likeness.36 
In its first act the intellect cannot fail. The explanation of this statement can be 
very short: St. Thomas says that to fail in this act amounts to failing to make this act at 
all. In this act “the intellect understands the quiddity or essence of a thing absolutely, 
but understands the quiddity or essence as existing in the thing, for instance what man is 
or what white is.”37 If one understands something other than the thing before him, one 
does not understand the thing, but something else or nothing at all: “for if someone is at 
variance with what is true, in this instance he does not understand.”38 This means that 
the unfailing character of the first act of the intellect is essentially connected with the 
                                                 
34 Klima uses the example of many copies of the same book: copies are distinct but they have the same 
content, each copy is a copy of the same book; there is no general book, but when the content of the 
book is known to us, we can know on a general level all copies of the book (abstracting for example 
from print characters, paper, format of the book, etc.). Even when there are different editions and 
format is changed, when the content of the book is the same, we say that this is the same book, not 
a similar one. It is maybe not similar on some secondary aspect, but it is the same because what is 
essential, the content is exactly the same: see Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals.” 
35 Cf. STh, I, 85, 2 c. 
36 Representing something in cognition is not necessarily connected with a production of some 
substantial “third thing” between knower and known as walking does not produce any substance 
named “a walk.” O’Callaghan insists on this point: “Nominalization of verbs into substantives is a way 
of talking about our activities, not a way of recognizing another realm of things in addition to our 
activities” (“Concepts, Beings and Things,” p. 79). Cf. also the chapter “The Third Thing Thesis” in 
his Thomist Realism, p. 159-198. See as well Gyula Klima, “Tradition and Innovation in Medieval 
Theories of Mental Representation,” Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 
4 (2004): 4-11, where he exploits an excellent example of the recording of a song on a CD to illustrate 
the fittingness of Aquinas’s account of representation. 
37 “Intellectus intelligit absolute cuiuscunque rei quiditatem siue essenciam per se ipsam, puta quid est 
homo uel quid album uel aliud huiusmodi” (In Peryerm., I, 3 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 14, lin. 41-44]). 
“Cognoscere res per earum similitudines in cognoscente existentes est cognoscere ea in seipsis, seu in 
propriis naturis” (STh, I, 12, 9 c.). 
38 “Quia, si quis a uero discordat, hic non intelligit” (In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 12, lin. 218-219]). 
“Circa quod quid est non decipitur intellectus nisi per accidens: aut enim per intellectum attingit aliquis 
quod quid est rei, et tunc vere cognoscit quid est res; aut non attingit, et tunc non apprehendit rem 
illam. Unde circa eam non verificatur neque decipitur. Propter quod dicit Aristoteles in tertio de 
Anima, quod sicut sensus circa propria obiecta semper est verus, ita intellectus circa quod quid est, 
quasi circa proprium obiectum” (In Meta., IX, 11, n. 1907). 
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very notion of the ability or ability’s act.39 We know the first act of intellect thanks to its 
correlation with its proper object, which is the quiddity of material things. Without the 
proper object the first act of intellect would not exist or be intelligible. Without the 
object there is no act of understanding. This act depends in its existence on the human 
being in whom it inheres, but it depends also on an object for its specification.40 The 
object specifies the act as a measure to something measured.41 To call something the 
first act of intellect there must be a human ability of understanding unfailingly its proper 
objects because the first act of intellect is something relational and is defined with 
respect to the extramental object.42  
Here, it is important to remark that in the order of discovery or research every 
ability is known by a certain kind of act and is defined by this kind of act. We know that 
we have sight because we see and we know that we have will because we want 
something. There are diverse characteristics of abilities that enter into our understanding 
of these abilities. For example, the possibility to shut our eyes does not deny the 
existence of our sight. Also, the fact that there is something like hearing does not deny 
the fact that we have sight. Accordingly, what Aquinas calls “the first act of intellect” is 
defined by a specific kind of intellectual activity, through which we grasp what 
                                                 
39 “Ad proprium obiectum unaquaeque potentia per se ordinatur, secundum quod ipsa. Quae autem sunt 
huiusmodi, semper eodem modo se habent. Unde manente potentia, non deficit eius iudicium circa 
proprium obiectum. Obiectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei. Unde circa quidditatem rei, 
per se loquendo, intellectus non fallitur. Sed circa ea quae circumstant rei essentiam vel quidditatem, 
intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinat ad aliud, vel componendo vel dividendo vel etiam 
ratiocinando. Et propter hoc etiam circa illas propositiones errare non potest, quae statim cognoscuntur 
cognita terminorum quidditate, sicut accidit circa prima principia, ex quibus etiam accidit infallibilitas 
veritatis, secundum certitudinem scientiae, circa conclusiones. Per accidens tamen contingit 
intellectum decipi circa quod quid est in rebus compositis … in rebus simplicibus, in quarum 
definitionibus compositio intervenire non potest, non possumus decipi; sed deficimus in totaliter non 
attingendo” (STh, I, 85, 6 c.). 
40 “Manifestum est enim, quod operationes secundum propria obiecta specificantur” (In Meta., XII, 11, 
n. 2605). 
41 For an extended discussion of this aspect see Régis, Epistemology, p. 175-183 and 192-197. 
42 This is also true about the acts of the senses in reference to their proper objects: “sicut res habet esse 
per propriam formam, ita virtus cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde, 
sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum suam formam, potest autem 
deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos 
pedes, non autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non deficit in cognoscendo 
respectu illius rei cuius similitudine informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad 
ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur circa sensibile proprium, sed circa 
sensibilia communia, quae consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens. Sicut autem 
sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine 
quidditatis rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut neque sensus circa sensibilia 
propria” (STh, I, 17, 3). 
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something is. When it happens that through our activity we fail to grasp, it is not 
through the first act of intellect that we failed.  
The theory of formal identity between thing known and knower in the 
intentional or representative order is thus the consequence of a simple and initial 
analysis of what a perception or apprehension is.43 From this analysis we know that 
a simple cognitive act is not the same as other cognitive acts (as, for example, judging 
or reasoning) and not the same as failing to make a simple cognitive act. The claim that 
all simple cognitive acts (sensory or intellectual) are necessarily veridical in reference to 
their proper objects thus contains not the necessity of efficient causality but of formal 
causality: if it is, it is such and such.44 In other words, Aquinas does not claim that 
objects of cognition necessarily cause their concepts in human minds (because the same 
effects can have different causes); instead, he claims that concepts arising from the first 
act of the intellect necessarily refer to the objects from which they arise.45 This is the 
necessity that stems from the very meaning of the phrase “simple cognitive act”: simple 
cognitive acts are only veridical acts of cognition of proper objects. In other words, non-
veridical acts in relation to proper objects are not acts of cognition.46 Either there is 
                                                 
43 For a broader discussion of this notion see Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, p. 194-201. 
44 Klima calls it “logical necessity” as opposed to “natural necessity”, cf. his “The Demonic Temptations 
of Medieval Nominalism: Mental Representation and ‘Demon Skepticism’” (Proceedings of the 
Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 4 [2004]: 37-44, here especially p. 44) and “Tradition and 
Innovation.” 
45 Klima writes that “in the framework of the efficient causality model … since mental acts have identity-
conditions of their own, irrespective of their objects, it may very well be the case that my concept is 
indistinguishable from that of the envatted brain, so there is no way of telling whether I myself, who is 
thinking about this problem, am not an envatted brain. In the formal causality model, however, the 
objects of concepts cannot be swapped without affecting their identity” (Klima, “Ontological 
Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics,” p. 618). He shows in this article that any possibility of such 
threat of an evil scientist is excluded in the formal causality model. See also his “The Demonic 
Temptations,” where he shows how the possibility of Demon-skepticism emerged with the emergence 
of Ockhamism, due to the rejection of the formal identity and taking the relationship between cognitive 
act and ultimate object to be contingent. 
46 See Gyula Klima, “Putting Skeptics in Their Place vs. Stopping Them in Their Tracks: Two Anti-
Skeptical Strategies,” http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/FILES/Inaugural.pdf (being his 
discussion of John Greco’s book Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The ature of Skeptical Arguments 
and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry [Cambridge University Press, 2000]). Klima opposes in this 
text the strong externalist position of Aquinas (sketched briefly in this paragraph), which renders the 
main skeptical premise logically impossible, to a line of coping with skepticism that is common to 
such philosophers as John Buridan, Descartes, Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and John Greco. See also 
remarks made by G. Klima in his “ulla virtus cognoscitiva circa proprium obiectum decipitur. 
Critical comments on Robert Pasnau: ‘The Identity of Knower and Known,’” 
http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/APA.htm. Quoting CG, III, 108, n. 2835 in the title, the 
author neatly explains in what the skeptical challenge consists and how the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
veridical externalism with its theory of formal unity rebuts it. Against the claim that the use of this 
theory begs the question, he writes: “Indeed, a Thomist who puts the theory to such use does not have 
to beg the question against the skeptic at all. Of course, the Thomistic rebuttal would constitute 
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a single cognitive act, or there is not: tertium non datur.47 There is no possibility of 
entering into error here; there is no possibility of a false first act of the intellect.48  
 
 
3.2. The signification of concepts and words 
 
From all this it follows that simple conceptions of the intellect are the same for 
all people who understand the same things. From the fact that Aristotle’s passions of the 
soul (which as we have seen, are the similitudes or likenesses of things) are the same to 
all men, it appears that these passions signify things naturally – nobody establishes their 
signification.49 Yet words, by which we name things according to our understanding 
(i.e. categorematic words), signify in another way.50 Words are not the same for all men, 
because there are many languages containing different words for the same things and 
the same conceptions in the intellect. Words have two types of signs: sounds or letters. 
                                                                                                                                               
question begging if the only basis of the theory of formal unity were the bland rejection of the skeptic’s 
main premise, namely, the simple, unjustified assertion that at least some of our cognitive acts are 
necessarily veridical. But this is not the case. The theory of formal unity is based on entirely 
independent grounds, namely, on the Aristotelian analysis of what a simple act of perception of a 
proper sensible is (actus sensus proprii), and what a simple act of intellectual apprehension is 
(indivisibilium intelligentia), distinguishing these acts from other mental acts, such as dreaming, 
imagining, remembering, judging, etc. … For an important consequence of the doctrine of formal unity 
is that it is part and parcel of the identity conditions of such a simple cognitive act what it is the 
cognition of. Therefore, that such an act is necessarily veridical is the consequence of the fact that what 
it is for something to be such a cognitive act is for it to be the form of such and such an object received 
by the cognitive subject, and so anything that is not so related to this object, as for example an act of 
hallucination induced by the demon, is not such a cognitive act.”  
47 “Intellectus autem circa quod quid est semper verus est, sicut et sensus circa proprium obiectum, ut 
dicitur in III de Anima. Sed per accidens in nobis accidit deceptio et falsitas intelligendo quod quid est, 
scilicet secundum rationem alicuius compositionis: vel cum definitionem unius rei accipimus ut 
definitionem alterius; vel cum partes definitionis sibi non cohaerent, sicut si accipiatur pro definitione 
alicuius rei, animal quadrupes volatile (nullum enim animal tale est); et hoc quidem accidit in 
compositis, quorum definitio ex diversis sumitur, quorum unum est materiale ad aliud. Sed 
intelligendo quidditates simplices, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., non est falsitas: quia vel totaliter non 
attinguntur, et nihil intelligimus de eis; vel cognoscuntur ut sunt” (STh, I, 58, 5 c.). Cf. In Meta., IX, 
11, n. 1901-1909. 
48 “Intellectus apprehendens quod quid est absque compositione et diuisione, semper est uerus” 
(In Peryerm., I, 3 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 16, lin. 155-157]). O’Callaghan writes that “the intellect by grasping 
the incomplex intelligible character can be called true, insofar as it is ‘adequate’ to (De anima 
commentary), or ‘conformed’ to (De interpretatione commentary), or ‘measured’ by (De 
interpretatione commentary) some real being. In fact, the intellect in this act, like sight perceiving 
color, is never deceived” (Thomist Realism, p. 18). Cf. Régis’s discussion of the first analogate of the 
word “truth”: Epistemology, p. 337-349. 
49 “Naturaliter … non ex institutione” (In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 12, lin. 208]).  
50 “Nomina enim imponuntur a nobis secundum quod nos intelligimus, quia nomina sunt intellectuum 
signa” (In Meta., V, 5, n. 824). 
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Neither of them signifies things naturally; their signification is established by 
convention.51 Words signify immediately passions of the soul (the conceptions of the 
intellect) but ultimately the things of which these passions are similitudes or 
likenesses.52 Since immediate significata do not exist in the real world, but only in the 
intellect, the ultimate significata of words are their proper ones. (It is also possible to re-
fer to the immediate significata, but only secondarily, as was said in the previous 
section.)53 Therefore, the specificity of Aquinas’s interpretation of the Aristotelian 
semantic triangle consists in noticing that “immediately” or “primarily” does not mean 
“properly” in this context. When St. Thomas says that a term signifies immediately or 
primarily a concept which is in the mind, this does not mean that the concept is the 
proper signification of this term. Properly speaking, the term signifies the thing known 
through the concept. The identity of the object of the intellect enters into the identity 
conditions of concepts. The necessary property of the concept is to refer to the thing 
which it signifies. If it does not refer to the thing, it is not the concept of the thing. Thus, 
the ultimate or secondary signification of the term is the proper one.54 
                                                 
51 Cf. In Peryerm., I, 2 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 11-12, lin. 166-183). Aquinas adds that there are some sounds 
which signify naturally, as an example of such he gives a gemitus infirmorum. But these are not words 
of a language unless in some remote sense.  
52 “Oportet passiones anime hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones quas nomina et uerba et orationes 
significant, secundum sententiam Aristotilis … uoces significant intellectus conceptiones inmediate, et 
eis mediantibus res” (In Peryerm., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 16, lin. 97-100, 110-112]). “Modus significandi 
vocum non consequatur immediate modum essendi rerum, sed mediante modo intelligendi; quia 
intellectus sunt similitudines rerum, voces autem intellectuum, ut dicitur in primo Perihermenias” 
(In Meta., VII, 1, n. 1245). “Vox est signum intellectus et intellectus est signum rei” (In Peryerm., I, 8 
[Leon. 1*/1, p. 39, lin. 21-22]). 
53 “Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum 
considerationem; unde iste terminus ‘homo’ non supponit pro natura communi, nisi propter exigentiam 
alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, ‘homo est species’” (STh, I, 39, 4). Cf. STh, III, 16, 7. 
54 For a better understanding of Aquinas’s position it is profitable to compare it with a competing view, 
namely, Ockham’s, who writes in his Summa Logicae: “Hoc enim nomen ‘homo’ non significat primo 
unam naturam communem omnis hominibus, sicut multi errantes imaginantur, sed significat primo 
omnes homines particulares … Ille enim qui primo instituit hanc vocem ‘homo’, videns aliquem 
hominem particularem, instituit hanc vocem ad significandum illum hominem et quamlibet talem 
substantiam qualis est ille homo. Unde de natura communi non oportuit eum cogitare, cum non sit 
aliqua talis natura communis.” For Aquinas it is obvious that there is no need to consider first some 
general nature, humanity, in order to perceive a particular human being, because it is impossible to 
consider general nature before perceiving a particular being: every consideration of generality comes 
from simple apprehensions of particulars. In another place Ockham says: “Unde hoc nomen ‘homo’ 
nullam rem significat nisi illam quae est homo singularis, et ideo nunquam supponit pro substantia nisi 
quando supponit pro homine particulari. Et ideo concedendum est quod hoc nomen ‘homo’ aeque 
primo significat omnes homines particulares.” Granted, the same is valid for Aquinas, provided we 
understand here res only as res extra animam. But for Aquinas it does not mean that only res extra 
amimam exist and nothing else; for him, according to his doctrine of analogy, there exist somehow also 
concepts as beings of reason. Another understanding of concepts in Ockham and omission of above 
mentioned separation of “primarily” from “properly”, compels him to say in his commentary to Peri 
hermeneias: “Hic primo notandum est quod non intendit Philosophus quod voces omnes proprie et 
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We can observe that words refer either to conceptions of the intellect or to the 
extramental things when we are attempting to clarify an ambiguous statement. For 
example, when we hear a phrase with the word “man,” we may wonder whether this 
word is being used to refer to a specific person or to signify more generally: in the latter 
case “man” refers only to a conception of the intellect, or, more properly, as Aquinas 
puts it, this common noun signifies human nature considered generally, that is 
humanity.55 This ambiguity occurs because words signify both concepts and really 
existing things. They signify concepts immediately and things ultimately – and, as we 
have seen, really existing things are the proper significata of words.56 For this reason 
St. Thomas says that in any name we should be aware of two aspects: that from which 
and that on which the name is imposed. According to these two aspects, he says that 
properly speaking a name signifies “the form, or quality, from which the name is 
imposed” and supposits for the thing on which it is imposed.57 This is a very important 
distinction because it allows us, if we combine it with Aquinas’s theory of concepts, to 
explain plausibly, for example, how it is possible to predicate the existence not only of 
                                                                                                                                               
primo significant passiones animae, quasi sint impositae ad significandum principaliter passiones 
animae. Sed multae voces et nomina primae intentionis sunt impositae ad significandum primo res, 
sicut haec vox ‘homo’ imponitur primo ad significandum omnes homines …” (all quotations from 
Ockham are taken from Klima, “Ontological Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics,” p. 595).  
55 In English it is perhaps less visible due to the presence of definite/indefinite articles, but there are 
many languages which do not have such articles; for example in Latin, Polish or Russian, where one 
can properly use a word ‘homo’ or its equivalent without any indication whether one means some 
specific human being or man as species. In a general consideration, terms refer to abstracted natures: 
“…significat enim hoc nomen ‘homo’ naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus” (In Peryerm., 
I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 11, lin. 102-105]). “Natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, 
ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum. Et hec natura sic considerata est que predicatur de 
indiuiduis omnibus. … Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus 
indiuiduantibus; et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia indiuidua que sunt extra animam, prout 
equaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines” (De ente, 
3 [Leon. 43, p. 374-375, lin. 68-72 and 91-96]).  
56 Klima gives a useful and telling example of the proper significatum or of the ultimate object of 
a cognitive act: “When you look into the mirror to fix your tie, you see your tie only through seeing its 
reflection. Still, of course, you do not fiddle with the reflection to fix your tie. Instead, you reach your 
tie, because what you see by looking into the mirror is your tie, the ultimate object of your act of sight, 
which you see through its immediate object, the reflection. Indeed, for the reflection to be this 
immediate object is for it to function only as something that directs your act of sight to its ultimate 
object. That is to say, to be this immediate object is to be recognized only as something through which 
[quo] you see the object you want to see, and, at the same time, not to be recognized as that which 
[quod] you want to see, as the ultimate object, to which your intention, attention and action are directed 
through or by the former” (“ulla virtus”). 
57 “Forma significata per hoc nomen homo, idest humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per 
se supponit pro persona; etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quae est 
suppositum distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed 
solum secundum considerationem: unde iste terminus homo non supponit pro natura communi, nisi 
propter exigentiam alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, homo est species” (STh, I, 39, 4 ad 3). Cf. Super 
I Sent., 21, 1, 1 ad 2; Super III Sent., 6, 1, 3 sol.; De ver. 4, 1, ad 8; STh, I, 31, 3 ad 3; 39, 5 ad 5. 
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a concept but also of any singular object in a way that this predication be substantially 
informative.58 
But to realize that a concept is applicable to many singulars, and therefore that 
the concept signifies something common to all these singulars, or that a common name 
supposits for some singulars, is not the domain of the first act of the intellect. Properly 
speaking, it is the second act of the intellect that allows us to see a singular as singular 
and a universal as universal, to perceive something like genus or species, to distinguish 
different kinds of predication and so on, because for all of these a comparison and 
a judgment is needed. Thus, in any attribution of logical intentions there is the 
possibility of error, because in any attribution there is always a need of comparison and 
judgment.59  
 
 
3.3. The second act of the intellect, the true and the false 
 
St. Thomas says that the same principle of infallibility of the first act of the 
intellect applies also to our senses: the activity of our senses has the same binary 
character – either they perceive their proper object or they do not perceive it. When 
a sense performs its proper activity, it can be called true insofar as it conforms through 
its own form to a thing existing outside the soul.60 Yet comparison between senses and 
intellect shows that there is a difference, because:  
                                                 
58 After many problems stemming from Kant, many of today’s philosophers think we should accept 
existence as a predicate; e.g. Jaakko Hintikka says, playing with Kant’s epoch-making statement: 
“I think it is the time to lay to rest the myth that ‘existence is not a predicate.’ It is embarrassingly clear 
what Kant’s grounds for maintaining this thesis were. They were largely due to the paucity of the 
logics and languages he was contemplating” (“Kant on Existence, Predication and the Ontological 
Argument,” in The Logic of Being: Historical Studies, Synthese Historical Library 28, ed. by 
J. Hintikka and S. Knuuttila [Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1986], p. 253). See also Juliet 
Floyd, “On the Use and Abuse of Logic in Philosophy: Kant, Frege, and Hintikka on the Verb ‘To 
Be’,” in The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka, The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 30, edited by 
R. E. Auxier and L. E. Hahn, p. 137-187 (Chicago: Open Court, 2006). See also Gyula Klima, 
“Existence and Reference in Medieval Logic,” in ew Essays in Free Logic, edited by A. Hieke and 
E. Morscher, p. 197-226 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001). 
59 “Si consideremus ea quae sunt circa intellectum secundum se, semper est compositio ubi est ueritas et 
falsitas, que nunquam inuenitur in intellectu nisi per hoc quod intellectus comparat unum simplicem 
conceptum alteri” (In Peryerm., I, 3 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 16, lin. 63-67]). 
60 “Et, sicut res dicitur uera per comparationem ad suam mensuram, ita etiam et sensus uel intellectus, 
cuius mensura est res extra animam: unde sensus dicitur uerus, quando per formam suam conformatur 
rei extra animam existenti. Et sic intelligitur quod sensus proprii sensibilis sit uerus. Et hoc etiam 
modo intellectus apprehendens quod quid est absque compositione et diuisione semper est uerus” (ibid. 
[lin. 149-157]).  
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although the sensation of the proper object is true, the sense does not perceive the 
sensation to be true, for it cannot know its relationship of conformity with the thing 
but only apprehends the thing. The intellect, on the other hand, can know its 
relationship of conformity and therefore only the intellect can know truth.61 
 
The conformity of senses with a thing known through the senses is similar to the 
conformity of the first act of the intellect. The conformity on this level is the basis of 
ascribing the character of truth to these cognitive operations. Thanks to the activity of 
the first act of the intellect, the transcendental term “truth” can be distinguished from 
“being,” because truth formally adds to being only the relation of conformity of thing 
and intellect.62 In this sense the truth has an immediate foundation in reality.63 However, 
this conformity cannot be judged by the first act of intellect, and thus known as truth, 
because to be conformed or not conformed can be said only by comparison of one thing 
with another. Cognition resulting from the first acts of the intellect would remain 
somehow discontinuous – we know only simple quiddities, which in these first acts are 
neither connected nor compared. In its first act, the intellect is, in fact, conformed to 
a thing known, but it cannot through this first act know its own conformity. Nothing, 
however, prevents the intellect from having other kinds of acts. Indeed, experience 
confirms this, because we compare simple concepts and we can reflect upon our acts of 
cognition. Hence Aquinas, following Aristotle, says that the conformity of our cognition 
with the cognitum, i.e. the truth, is judged by the second act of the intellect.64 When for 
example:  
the intellect grasps what is a mortal rational animal, it has in itself a likeness of man, 
but it is not according to this that it knows that it has this likeness, because it does not 
judge that man is mortal and rational animal. Hence truth and falsity is only in this 
second operation of the intellect, according to which it not only possesses a likeness 
of the thing known but also reflects on this likeness by knowing it and by making 
                                                 
61 “Licet autem in cognitione sensitiva possit esse similitudo rei cognitae, non tamen rationem huius 
similitudinis cognoscere ad sensum pertinet, sed solum ad intellectum. Et ideo, licet sensus de sensibili 
possit esse verus, tamen sensus veritatem non cognoscit, sed solum intellectus: et propter hoc dicitur 
quod verum et falsum sunt in mente” (In Meta., VI, 4, n. 1235). 
62 Cf. De ver., 1, 1 c.; In Meta., IV, 16, n. 721. “Cum enim veritas intellectus sit adaequatio intellectus et 
rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est, ad illud in intellectu 
veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua illud dicit” (CG, I, 59, n. 495). 
63 See a thorough discussion which substantiates this claim in Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, p. 85-89 
and 237-241. 
64 “Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, quantum est de 
se, non est rei aequatum nec rei inaequale: cum aequalitas et inaequalitas secundum comparationem 
dicuntur; incomplexum autem quantum est de se, non continet aliquam comparationem vel 
applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec verum nec falsum dici potest, sed tantum complexum, in quo 
designatur comparatio incomplexi ad rem per notam compositionis aut divisionis” (CG, I, 59, n. 496). 
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a judgment about it. Thus it is evident from this that truth is not found in things but 
only in the mind, and that it depends upon composition and division.65  
 
For this reason St. Thomas distinguishes two ways in which we find truth in something: 
in one way we find truth as in what is true, in a second way as in someone speaking or 
knowing what is true. We find the truth of the first way both in simple apprehensions 
and in the second act of intellect, which is composing and dividing. Yet the truth in the 
second way is found only while composing and dividing and not in simple 
apprehensions.66 This is the difference between being true and knowing the true. The 
intellect is able to reflect on its own activity which makes the thing known the object of 
knowledge. The thing known is known as subsisting outside the knower, “although 
there can be no apprehension of this thing except through that which of this thing exists 
in the knower.”67 The only way of apprehending the extramental reality for our intellect 
is mediated by sensory cognition resulting in phantasms. In other words, the thing 
known is the object of knowledge when the intellect reflects on the likeness of the thing 
that it has in itself.68 This ability to reflect is achieved by a different act than the first act 
of intellect, because a thing understood is a different object than that through which this 
                                                 
65 “Intellectus autem habet apud se similitudinem rei intellectae, secundum quod rationes incomplexorum 
concipit; non tamen propter hoc ipsam similitudinem diiudicat, sed solum cum componit vel dividit. 
Cum enim intellectus concipit hoc quod est animal rationale mortale, apud se similitudinem hominis 
habet; sed non propter hoc cognoscit se hanc similitudinem habere, quia non iudicat hominem esse 
animal rationale et mortale: et ideo in hac sola secunda operatione intellectus est veritas et falsitas, 
secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem rei intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam 
similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et diiudicando ipsam. Ex his igitur patet quod veritas non est in 
rebus sed solum in mente, et etiam in compositione et divisione” (In Meta., VI, 4, n. 1236). Cf. 
De ver., 1, 9 c.; 10, 9; Super III Sent., 23, 1, 2 ad 3. 
66 “Veritas in aliquo inuenitur dupliciter: uno modo sicut in eo quod est uerum; alio modo sicut in dicente 
uel cognoscente uerum; inuenitur autem ueritas sicut in eo quod est uerum tam in simplicibus quam in 
compositis, set sicut in dicente uel cognoscente uerum non inuenitur nisi secundum compositionem et 
diuisionem” (In Peryerm., I, 3 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 15, lin. 100-106]). 
67 “Res cognita dicitur esse cognitionis obiectum secundum quod est extra cognoscentem in se ipsa 
subsistens, quamvis de re tali non sit cognitio nisi per id quod de ipsa est in cognoscente” (De ver., 14, 
8 ad 5). 
68 “The intellect is not described here as having the strabismic power to look in two directions at once, 
one eye fixed on the thing and the other on the concept of the judgment! This spatial imagery, 
requiring the intellect to step outside itself to compare its knowledge with the physical thing it copies, 
is the result of a complete misunderstanding of the intellect’s life and wholly destroys the immanence 
of the operations of knowledge. … We know things existing outside ourselves, but we know them 
because they exist in us. Knowledge of truth is not arrived at by comparing things as known with 
things as existing, for that brings up the famous problem of the bridge with which the whole history of 
idealism is filled, and whose solution is impossible because it is a pseudoproblem. The intellect knows 
truth by reflecting upon itself, and not by eyeing both its act and the extramental thing” (Régis, 
Epistemology, p. 353). 
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thing is understood. St. Thomas says: “a man with one act of the intellect understands 
a stone, but with another act he understands himself as understanding the stone.”69  
 Aquinas maintains that in the second act of the intellect “the true or the false are 
for the first time present.”70 Moreover, this act is of necessity either true or false.71 
Simple forms are what they are, and are simply known or not known in the first act of 
intellect, without any third possibility – thus there is no place for falsehood. Yet they 
can be taken for what they are not, and then we perceive such a situation as a falsehood. 
Taking something for what it is not is the same as judging falsely its identity.72 The 
judging of the identity of something occurs in the intellect’s act of composing or 
dividing.73 Composition and division can be expressed in a proposition: a proposition is 
a sign of the activity of the second act of intellect. In other words, a proposition signifies 
the intellect’s composition or division. We cannot enter into the details of Aquinas’s 
theory of predication because we are here only interested in it in relation to his theory of 
scientific explanation. Hence, in what follows I will only present some crucial points. 
 
 
3.4. Propositions and the inherence theory of predication 
 
St. Thomas says that there are different types of signifying vocal sounds (voces 
significativae). Some signify the true and the false, while others do not.74 Simple 
                                                 
69 “Alio actu intelligit homo lapidem, et alio actu intelligit se intelligere lapidem” (STh, I, 28, 4 ad 2). 
St. Thomas says that these relations of reason which follow our mode of understanding can be 
multiplied to infinity, because a man with still another act can understand that he understands himself 
as understanding the stone; “et sic in infinitum multiplicantur actus intelligendi, et per consequens 
relationes intellectae.” Note that this infinity is conditioned by somebody’s will to multiply these acts 
of understanding which are different both logically (because concern other levels of generality) and 
really (because our acts of understanding are stretched in time). 
70 “Secunda uero operatio intellectus est compositio uel diuisio intellectus, in qua est iam uerum et 
falsum” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 4, lin. 42-44]).  
71 Cf. In Peryerm., I, 3 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 14, lin. 14-19). 
72 “Nam falsum aurum est verum aurichalcum” (ibid. [p. 16, lin. 143]). 
73 Even to state the identity of something, i.e. that something is identical with itself, our intellect does it 
as if there were two terms compared between them, although this something is only one in reality: 
“Intellectus utitur eo quod est unum secundum rem, ut duobus. Alias eiusdem ad seipsum relationem 
designare non posset. Unde patet, quod si relatio semper requirit duo extrema, et in huiusmodi 
relationibus non sunt duo extrema secundum rem sed secundum intellectum solum, relatio identitatis 
non erit relatio realis, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod aliquid dicitur idem simpliciter” (In Meta., 
V, 11, n. 912). 
74 “Hic agit de diuersa uocum significatione, quarum quedam significant uerum uel falsum, quaedam 
non” (In Peryerm., I, 3 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 14, lin. 3-5]). “Duplex est significatio uocis, una que refertur ad 
intellectum compositum, alia autem que refertur ad intellectum simplicem, prima significatio competit 
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concepts are neither true nor false. They only become so when coupled to “is” or “is 
not” or to other verbs signifying some activity. This is so because through the action of 
these verbs the judgment of the intellect is expressed.75 Simple concepts can form some 
imperfect utterances (orationes)76 which are not propositions. They can also form some 
perfect utterances that form complete sentences, such as questions, requests, imperatives 
or exclamations. Such sentences, however, do not have the characteristic of the true or 
the false. Only propositions, which are signs of the second act of intellect which is of 
necessity either true or false, are also of necessity either true or false.77 This is the very 
definition of a proposition: “a speech in which there is truth and falsity.”78 
A proposition itself is composed.79 It must have at least two logically heterogeneous 
elements, such as a name and a verb: these simple words (simplices dictiones)80 suffice 
to compose a proposition.81 Indeed, for St. Thomas the name and the verb are the most 
fundamental integral parts of a proposition.82 For him, the most general structure of 
                                                                                                                                               
orationi, secunda uero competit parti orationis” (ibid., I, 6 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 32, lin. 35-39]). “Et cum 
voces sint signa intellectuum, similiter dicendum est de conceptionibus intellectus. Quae enim sunt 
simplices, non habent veritatem neque falsitatem, sed solum illae quae sunt complexae per 
affirmationem vel negationem” (In Meta., VI, 4, n. 1224). 
75 “Cum solum circa compositionem et diuisionem sit ueritas et falsitas in intellectu, consequens est quod 
ipsa nomina et uerba, diuisim accepta, assimilantur intellectui qui est sine compositione et diuisione; 
sicut cum dico ‘homo’ uel ‘album’, si nichil aliud addatur: non enim adhuc est uerum uel falsum (set 
postea, quando additur esse uel non esse, fit uerum uel falsum” (In Peryerm., I, 3 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 17, 
lin. 203-211. Cf. p. 18, lin. 224-239 and p. 29, lin. 261-288]). 
76 “Oratio est uox significatiua … cuius partium aliquid significatiuum est separatum” (ibid., I, 6 [Leon. 
1*/1, p. 32, lin. 14 and 25-26]). 
77 “Perfecte orationis, quae complet sentenciam, quinque sunt species, uidelicet enunciatiua, deprecatiua, 
inperatiua, interrogatiua, uocatiua. … Harum autem orationum sola enunciatiua est in qua inuenitur 
uerum uel falsum, quia ipsa sola absolute significat [intellectus] mentis conceptum, in quo est uerum 
uel falsum” (ibid., I, 7 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 37, lin. 57-60 and 68-71]). 
78 “Enunciatio est oratio in qua est uerum uel falsum” (ibid. [p. 36, lin. 39-40]). 
79 “Sunt uoces significatiuae, complexe uel incomplexe” (ibid., I, 2 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 9, lin. 5]). 
80 “Simplicium dictionum triplex potest esse consideratio: una quidem secundum quod absolute 
significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum Predicamentorum; alio 
modo secundum rationem prout sunt partes enunciationis, et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro (et 
ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et uerbi, de quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum 
tempore uel sine tempore et alia huiusmodi que pertinent ad rationem dictionum secundum quod 
constituunt enunciationem); tercio modo considerantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur sillogisticus 
ordo , et sic determinatur de eis sub ratione terminorum in libro Priorum” (ibid., I, 1 [p. 6-7, lin. 83-
97]). 
81 “Potest autem ex solo nomine et uerbo simplex enunciatio fieri, non autem ex aliis orationis partibus 
sine his; … sola nomina et uerba sunt principales orationis partes” (ibid. [p. 7, lin. 103-108]). 
82 This clear logical standpoint was not obvious to everybody. The competing position, called two-name 
theory of predication, which was later to become the predominating one, consists in taking two terms 
(no matter whether they are names or verbs) joined with the copula as the fundamental structure of 
a proposition. Peter T. Geach in his essay “History of the corruptions of logic” (in Logic Matters 
[Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972], p. 44-61) compares Aristotle, who 
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a proposition consists in subject and predicate: accordingly, in a very basic 
consideration a name functions as the subject in the proposition, while “the verb is 
always posited on the part of the predicate.”83 This follows from the analysis of the 
distinct logical roles of names and verbs in proposition. Names (substantive and 
adjective) are vocal sounds signifying by convention, without time, no part of which is 
significant separately (i.e. they are syntactically simple).84 Conceived in this way, it is 
proper to names “to signify something as existing per se” and whereby to function as 
a subject in the proposition.85 The verb differs from the name in that that it signifies 
with time and is a sign of something being said of something else.86 As such, the verb 
                                                                                                                                               
wrote the very first treatise on formal logic, to biblical Adam who “began right, but soon wandered 
into a wrong path, with disastrous consequences for his posterity” (p. 44). The time of innocence 
epitomizes Aristotle’s early work, the Peri hermeneias, where onoma and rhema are fundamental 
components of the simplest propositions, and due to their logical nature, rhema are essentially 
predicative in propositions (Geach has defended this doctrine in many publications relating it to logical 
achievements of Frege and Russell). But in the Analytica Priora Aristotle changes his mind and begins 
to treat proposition as an attachment of one term (horos) to another term, without any essentially 
predicative term. This “marks a transition from the original name-and-predicable theory to a two-term 
theory” and it “was a disaster comparable only to the Fall of Adam” (p. 47). Aristotle made several 
stipulations to his two-term theory, used it cautiously and never identified terms with names, but some 
of his followers made a further step and passed from the two-term theory to the two-name theory. 
Geach quotes John Stuart Mill as the best known proponent of this theory in England (apart from 
Hobbes, for example). He adds: “The two-name theory has had a long history and much stronger 
representatives than Mill. It was the predominant logical theory of the Middle Ages, and was 
expounded by such great men as William of Ockham and Jean Buridan; though there was a minority 
party of logicians who insisted that naming and predicating were radically distinct, and this minority 
had the support of Aquinas” (p. 51-52). See also Geach’s “Nominalism” (in the same collection Logic 
Matters, p. 289-301), where he opposes Aquinas to Ockham in their coping with trinitarian and 
christological doctrines, and states that “Aquinas explicitly rejects the two-name theory of predication 
and truth” (p. 300). The two-name theory finally slid down to the contemporary two-class theory of 
categoricals with its doctrine of ‘distribution’ heavily criticized elsewhere by Geach for, among other 
things, confusing the relations of a name to the thing named and of a predicate to what it is true of: see 
his Reference and Generality. An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 19803). Henry B. Veatch says that the motivation of modern 
logicians to substitute classes for concepts has often been avowedly nominalistic (Intentional Logic 
[New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952], p. 116-117). Cf. also Louis-Marie Régis, L’Opinion selon 
Aristote (Paris-Ottawa: Vrin-Institute d’Etudes Médiévales, 1935), p. 129-130. 
83 “Verbum semper est ex parte praedicati” (In Peryerm., I, 5 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 26, lin. 48]). “Enunciatio 
constituitur ex subiecto et praedicato” (ibid., I, 9 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 47, lin. 115-116]).  
84 Cf. In Peryerm., I, 4 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 20, lin. 33-46 and 79-117). 
85 Cf. ibid., I, 5 (p. 26, lin. 52-72). “Nomen autem, prout a uerbo distinguitur, significat rem sub 
determinato modo, prout scilicet potest intelligi ut per se existens; unde nomina possunt subici et 
predicari” (ibid. [p. 29, lin. 250-255]). “Nomina et participia possunt poni ex parte subiecti et predicati, 
set uerbum semper est ex parte predicati” (ibid., [p. 26, lin. 46-48). “Aquinas distinguished between 
a general term that is taken (tenetur) materially and one that is taken formally. The term ‘fish’, say, 
taken materially is a subject of predication and relates to the objects (supposita) called ‘fish’ – e.g. in 
the sentence ‘A fish swims in the sea’; but the same term taken formally or predicatively relates not to 
individual fishes – if I say ‘A dolphin is not a fish’, my proposition relates to no individual fish – but 
rather to the nature of fish” (Geach, Reference and Generality, p. 201: he refers here to STh, I, 13, 12 
and 29, 4 ad 1). 
86 Cf. In Peryerm., I, 5 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 26, lin. 42-48 and 85-105). 
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on the one hand introduces a composition and is the principal, formal part of the 
proposition,87 and on the other hand it signifies an action or passion.88 The action 
signified by the verb functioning as the predicate is signified in the mode of an action, 
i.e. as it is proceeding from a substance and inhering in the substance as in its subject. 
(This mode is opposed to both the signification per se in abstraction and the 
signification of the very process or inherence as a certain thing.)89 Therefore, “the 
subject of an enunciation signifies as that in which something inheres,” whereas the 
nature of a predicate is to signify as that which inheres.90 Accordingly, subject and 
predicate terms have clearly different functions in a proposition: a subject relates to 
a suppositum, while a predicate relates to a form or nature which inheres in 
a suppositum. Hence, since judgment is essentially a comparison of apprehended 
natures, the proposition appears as the relation constituted between the natures, the one 
signified as the subject and the other as the predicate. From this emphasis on the 
“inhering” of the significatum of the predicate in the suppositum, this doctrine is called 
the “inherence theory of predication.”91 
                                                 
87 “Verbum est nota eorum que de altero predicantur, predicatum autem est principalior pars 
enunciationis, eo quod est pars formalis et completiua ipsius (unde uocatur apud Grecos propositio 
cathegorica, id est predicatiua), denominatio autem fit a forma, que dat speciem rei; et ideo potius fecit 
mentionem de uerbo tanquam de parte principaliori et formaliori. … in omni enunciatione oportet esse 
uerbum, quod importat compositionem quam non est intelligere sine compositis, … nomen autem non 
importat compositionem” (ibid., I, 8 [p. 41, lin. 109-116.130-134]). 
88 “Proprium nominis est ut significet rem aliquam quasi per se existentem, … proprium autem verbi est, 
ut significet actionem vel passionem” (ibid., I, 5 [p. 26, lin. 56-58]). “Cum enim uerbum proprie sit 
quod significat agere uel pati, hoc est proprie uerbum quod significat agere uel pati in actu, quod est 
agere uel pati simpliciter” (ibid. [p. 28, lin. 206-209). 
89 “Proprium autem verbi est, ut significet actionem vel passionem. Potest autem actio significari 
tripliciter: … alio modo, per modum actionis, ut scilicet est egrediens a substancia et inherens ei ut 
subiecto, et sic significatur per uerba aliorum modorum, que attribuuntur personis” (ibid. [p. 26, lin. 
58-66]). 
90 “Notandum est quod, quia subiectum enunciationis significatur ut cui inheret aliquid, cum uerbum 
significet actionem per modum actionis, de cuius ratione est ut inhereat, semper ponitur ex parte 
predicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in ui nominis, ut dictum est. Dicitur ergo 
uerbum semper esse nota eorum que de altero dicuntur, tum quia uerbum semper significat id quod 
predicatur, tum quia in omni predicatione oportet esse uerbum, eo quod uerbum importat 
compositionem, qua predicatum componitur subiecto” (ibid. [p. 27, lin. 108-119]). 
91 This phrasing appears in writings of some medievists, e.g. Lambertus Marie de Rijk, “Introduction” to 
his edition of Dialectica by Abaelard, (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1956), p. 37-38; Desmont Paul Henry, 
Medieval Logic and Metaphysics. A Modern Introduction (London: Hutchinson University Library, 
1972) (cf. also John Trentman’s note: “Leśniewski’s Ontology and some Medieval Logicians,” otre 
Dame Journal of Formal Logic 7 (1966): 361-364); and especially Gyula Klima, “Existence and 
Reference…”; idem, “Ockham’s Semantics and Metaphysics of the Categories,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Ockham, edited by P. V. Spade (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 118-142; idem, 
“Buridan’s Logic and the Ontology of Modes,” in Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, 
edited by S. Ebbesen (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999), 
p. 473-495; and idem, “The Changing Role of Entia Rationis.” Klima often presents the inherence 
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Both the subject and the predicate signify per modum compositionis et divisionis 
when joined together to constitute a proposition. Separately they do not signify in this 
way. To take only the most general name and verb as examples, neither the name 
“being” nor the verb “to be” or “is” signify whether something exists or not if taken 
separately – if they do not signify on their own the existence of something, no other 
name or verb will do so. “Being” signifies that which exists (quod est), but principally it 
signifies a thing that has existence. Also “to be” or “is” as said by itself does not signify 
whether something exists.92 St. Thomas notes, that although it signifies existence, as 
a sign of composition it is unintelligible without joining the extremes of composition.93 
                                                                                                                                               
theory of predication as proper to the via antiqua in medieval philosophy which is usually 
characterized by the label “moderate realism,” and juxtaposes it with the two-name theory, called also 
identity theory of predication which was proper to the via moderna, characterized by “nominalism.”  
92 “Ideo autem dicit quod hoc uerbum ‘est’ consignificat compositionem, quia non principaliter eam 
significat, set ex consequenti: significat enim id quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis 
absolute; nam ‘est’ simpliciter dictum significat esse actu, et ideo significat per modum uerbi. Quia 
uero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc uerbum ‘est’, est communiter actualitas omnis forme 
uel actus substancialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod, cum uolumus significare quamcunque formam 
uel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc uerbum ‘est’, simpliciter quidem 
secundum presens tempus, secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora; et ideo ex consequenti hoc 
uerbum ‘est’ significat compositionem” (In Peryerm., I, 5 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 31, lin. 391-407]). 
93 “Compositio in qua consistit ueritas et falsitas non potest intelligi nisi secundum quod innectit extrema 
compositionis” (ibid. [lin. 373-376]). Geach writes about Aristotle but to some degree these words 
apply also to Aquinas: “Aristotle neither had nor needed any theory of the copula; a proposition just 
consisted of a subject and a predicate” (“History,” p. 55). Cf. also his Reference and Generality, 
especially p. 59-62. And so the copula is considered by Aquinas simply as the predicate or part of the 
predicate, and it signifies either the actual existence/non-existence of the suppositum or the 
existence/non-existence of the significate of the predicate in the suppositum, according to the 
determination of the nature of this significate. Thus the verb “to be” or “is,” as it functions in 
proposition, is not only a syncategorematic particle joining two terms but retains its proper 
signification of actual existence. In other words, in a proposition the verb “to be” is used to assert the 
actuality of the suppositum of the subject in respect of what is signified in it by the predicate (cf. 
Klima, “Aquinas’ Theory of the Copula”). Klima, quoting an interesting discussion of Kant’s influence 
on Frege’s ideas on existence (Leila Haaparanta, Frege’s Doctrine of Being, Acta Philosophica 
Fennica, vol. 30, [Helsinki, 1985], p. 128-144; and idem, “On Frege’s Concept of Being,” in The Logic 
of Being. Historical Studies, edited by Hintikka Jaakko and Knuttila Simo [Dordrecht: Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1986], p. 269-289), says that “in mathematical logic, where there is no need of, indeed, 
no place for, a distinction between actual and non-actual elements of the universe of discourse, the 
notion of existence could successfully be analyzed in terms of particular, or existential quantification. 
(Such and such a number, set, function etc. exists, if and only if some number, set, function etc. is such 
and such.) But this analysis, backed up by the Kantian tradition (‘existence is not a real predicate’) on 
the one hand, and by the amazing successes of mathematical logic on the other, led to an overall 
identification of the two notions.” After that he adds: “The situation however, unavoidably led to 
certain ‘anomalies’ in the logical analysis of non-extensional contexts” (In the note, “for an imposing 
list of these ‘anomalies’ and an abundance of ‘epicycles’, so to speak, ‘to save the phenomena’,” he 
refers to Christopher John Fards Williams, What Is Existence? [New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1981]) – Klima, Ars Artium, p. 105.  
       Geach explains that “For the two-name theory, the copula has to be a copula of identity. For, in its 
pure form, the two-name theory says that an affirmative proposition is true because the subject and 
predicate terms name one and the same thing” (“History,” 53). This is why the two-name theory of 
predication is called by others also “the identity theory of predication”. Aquinas, distinguishing 
substantive names from adjective names, recognizes the possibility of predicating per identitatem or 
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Among propositions there are affirmations and negations (they constitute the subjective 
parts of the proposition). Affirmation is vox significativa de eo quod est and negation is 
vox significativa de eo quod non est. Aquinas warns us that we should refer this quod 
est and quod non est not only to the existence or nonexistence of a subject (“is” in 
function of the predicate) but also to the fact that the thing signified by the predicate is 
in the thing signified by the subject (“is” as a part of the predicate, i.e. as copula).94 The 
intellect grasps any composition as a whole, a unity, which expresses the actuality of 
some form signified by the predicate as inhering (in the case of affirmation) or as not 
inhering (in the case of negation) in the thing supposited for by the subject.95 The 
inherence of something in something, signified in the proposition, expresses the 
composition attained through the second act of the intellect, that is, the intellectual 
judgment that is necessarily either true or false. Thus, this composition is not in things, 
but in the mind.96 In relation to the basic structure of extramental being, in the intellect’s 
                                                                                                                                               
propter identitatem rei, because substantive names “significant non tantum formam, sed etiam 
suppositum formae, unde possunt praedicari ratione utriusque; et quando praedicantur ratione 
suppositi, dicitur praedicatio per identitatem; quando autem ratione formae, dicitur per 
denominationem, sive informationem: et haec est magis propria praedicatio, quia termini in 
praedicato tenentur formaliter. Adjectiva autem tantum significant formam; et ideo non possunt 
praedicari, nisi per informationem” (Super III Sent., 5, 3, 3 expos.). Cf. Super I Sent., 9, 1, 2 sol.; Super 
III Sent., 7, 1, 1 sol.; STh, I, 13, 12; 16, 7 ad 4; 39, 3 c.; 5 ad 5; 6 c. and ad 2; De pot., 9, 6 c. Aquinas 
also takes for granted that materially the subject and the predicate refer to the same thing (e.g. In 
Meta., V, 11, n. 908), but this is not a sufficient account for the veracity of predication. We are 
asserting the identity of two terms only in certain peculiar cases and such cases are not properly cases 
of predication at all. Cf. Herbert McCabe, “The Structure of the Judgment,” The Thomist 19 (1956): 
232-238. 
       Looking for reasons for this long-standing preference of the identity theory over the inherence 
theory, Klima says that the identity theory of predication was used by Ockham to carry out his 
metaphysical program, called “nominalist reduction”. See Gyula Klima, “The Square of Opposition, 
Common Personal Supposition and the Identity Theory of Predication within Quantification Theory” 
(as Essay II) in Ars Artium, p. 18-43. In Klima’s words: “Because it was this theory, namely the 
identity (or two-name) theory, which, unlike the then concurrent inherence theory, provided him with 
the possibility of reducing the categories of entities admitted by him in his ontology to two, namely to 
that of substance and that of quality. For, according to the inherence theory the function of the 
predicate is to signify particular forms, inhering in their subjects, and what makes a predication true is 
the actual inherence (inesse) of the form signified by the predicate in the thing supposited for by the 
subject. So, e.g., the proposition ‘Socrates is white’ is true, if and only if the whiteness of Socrates 
exists, or, the same expressed in the ‘material mode of speech’, Socrates is white by his whiteness” 
(p. 39-40).  
94 “Non est autem intelligendum quod hoc quod dixit: ‘quod est’ et ‘quod non est’ sit referendum ad 
solam existenciam uel non existenciam subiecti, set ad hoc quod res significata per predicatum insit uel 
non insit rei significate per subiectum” (In Peryerm., I, 9 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 47, lin. 63-68]). 
95 “Dicitur autem hic affirmatio compositio, quia significat praedicatum inesse subiecto. Negatio vero 
dicitur hic divisio, quia significat praedicatum a subiecto removeri” (In Meta., VI, 4, n. 1223). 
“Compositione enim et divisione opus non esset si in hoc ipso quod de aliquo apprehenderetur quid 
est, haberetur quid ei inesset vel non inesset” (CG, I, 58, n. 487). 
96 Cf. Régis, Epistemology, p. 317-334. 
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composition the subject is taken materially in a proposition, whereas the predicate is 
taken formally. Just as in extramental material being there is no form without matter nor 
matter without form, so too for this kind of being of reason: if there is no composition, 
there is no being of reason which is a proposition.  
Nevertheless, a judgment is true only if the intellect adequatur ad rem extra 
animam, i.e. only if the intellect conforms in its activity to what really is. This is the 
very nature of the proper operation of the intellect: to conform to things. What really is 
is said to be a cause of the truth of the intellect.97 Therefore, also the truth of an 
affirmative predication consists in a conformity: the predication is true when the form 
existing in the mind and signified by the predicate corresponds to the form in the thing 
as it is represented in the soul by means of phantasms. This correspondence means that 
in a proposition the form, signified (ultimately) by a common term in the position of the 
predicate, is actual in the thing signified (ultimately) by the term in the position of the 
subject. The proposition, therefore, is said to be true only if it expresses what actually is 
in things according to a given supposition. To put it differently, a predicate is true of a 
thing if and only if what the predicate signifies in respect of the thing actually exists or 
inheres in this thing.98 To signify this actuality in our minds we need a composition of 
                                                 
97 “Dicitur autem in enunciatione esse uerum uel falsum sicut in signo intellectus ueri uel falsi; set sicut 
in subiecto est uerum uel falsum in mente, ut dicitur in VI Metaphisice, in re autem sicut in causa, 
quia, ut dicitur in libro Predicamentorum, eo quod res est uel non est, dicitur oratio uera uel falsa” 
(In Peryerm., I, 7 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 36, lin. 41-47]). “Veritas nostrae enunciationis non est causa 
existencie rerum, set potius e conuerso” (ibid., I, 14 [p. 71, lin. 68-70]). “Oportet enim veritatem et 
falsitatem quae est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum autem 
intellectus compositionem format accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius: unde 
accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenentur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio 
intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa 
compositio formae ad materiam, aut eius quod se habet per modum formae et materiae, vel etiam 
compositio accidentis ad subiectum, respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis, compositioni, 
quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce” (In Meta., IX, 11, n. 1898). 
98 “False judgments represent a failure of the mind, not of its objects. It is mind which stands in need of 
correction. … The relationship of correspondence or of lack of correspondence which holds between 
the mind and objects is given expression in judgments, but it is not judgments themselves which 
correspond to objects or indeed to anything else. … The commonest candidate, in modern versions of 
what is all too often taken to be the correspondence theory of truth, for that which corresponds to 
a judgment in this way is a fact. But facts, like telescopes and wigs for gentlemen, were a seventeenth-
century invention. In the sixteenth century and earlier ‘fact’ in English was usually a rendering of the 
Latin ‘factum’, a deed, an action, and sometimes in Scholastic Latin an event or an occasion. It was 
only in the seventeenth century that ‘fact’ was first used in the way in which later philosophers such as 
Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey were to use it. It is of course and always was harmless, 
philosophically and otherwise, to use the word ‘fact’ of what a judgments states. What is and was not 
harmless, but highly misleading, was to conceive of a realm of facts independent of judgments or of 
any other form of linguistic expression, so that judgments or statements or sentences could be paired 
off with facts, truth or falsity being the alleged relationship between such paired items” (MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice?, p. 357-358). 
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what we apprehend (that is of what a thing is in itself or what is its essential or 
accidental property) with the fact that it is, or is actual, or exists according to a given 
likeness that necessarily refers us to the thing of which it is a likeness.99  
 
 
3.5. Ways of predication 
 
In order to judge properly whether a proposition is true or false it is necessary to 
take into account what a subject of a proposition supposits for, since a name which 
functions as a subject can supposit for a universal nature or a singular.100 Moreover, 
something can be enunciated about a universal in four ways. In two ways a universal is 
considered as existing in the intellect and separated from singulars. First, to such 
a universal we can attribute what pertains only to the operation of the intellect: this is 
already a familiar attribution of logical intention to a nature understood (e.g. “man is 
a species”). Secondly, to a universal as separated from singulars we can attribute 
something which  
does not belong to the act of the intellect but to the being that the nature apprehended 
has in things outside of the soul; for example, when we say “man is the noblest of 
creatures.” For this truly belongs to human nature as it is in singulars, since any single 
man is more noble than all irrational creatures; yet all singular men are not one man 
outside of the mind, but only in the apprehension of the intellect; and the predicate is 
attributed to it in this way, i.e., as to one thing.101 
                                                 
99 “To imagine that the intellect checks with exterior reality in order to see whether or not its judgment 
conforms with the existential mode of things is not only puerile but absurd, for we know only the 
reality that exists within us and nothing else. … Knowledge of truth does not consist in going from the 
world of thought to that of being, but in being united with the world of being in the effects that its 
physical and intentional activity has caused or actually causes in our soul. Because being makes us to 
be itself, we can refer to the likenesses we have of it to see whether or not the composition constructed 
by judgment corresponds with what is” (Régis, Epistemology, p. 357).  
100 “[Aristotiles] non diuisit nomina in uniuersale et particulare, set res; et ideo intelligendum est quod 
uniuersale dicitur quando non solum nomen potest de pluribus predicari, set id quod significatur per 
nomen est natum in pluribus inueniri” (In Peryerm., I, 10 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 51, lin. 109-114]). 
101 “De uniuersali aliquid enunciatur quatuor modis. Nam uniuersale potest uno modo considerari quasi 
separatum a singularibus, … secundum esse quod habet in intellectu; et sic potest ei aliquid attribui 
dupliciter. – Quandoque enim attribuitur ei sic considerato aliquid quod pertinet ad solam actionem 
intellectus, ut si dicatur quod homo est predicabile de multis aut uniuersale aut genus aut species; 
huiusmodi enim intentiones format intellectus attribuens eas nature intellecte, secundum quod 
comparat ipsam ad res que sunt extra animam. – Quandoque uero attribuitur aliquid uniuersali sic 
considerato, quod scilicet apprehenditur ab intellectu ut unum, tamen id quod attribuitur ei non pertinet 
ad actum intellectus, set ad esse quod habet natura apprehensa in rebus que sunt extra animam, puta si 
dicatur quod homo est dignissima creaturarum: hoc enim conuenit nature humane etiam secundum 
quod est in singularibus, nam quilibet homo singularis est dignior omnibus irrationalibus creaturis; set 
tamen omnes homines singulares non sunt unus extra animam, set solum in acceptione intellectus; et 
per hunc modum attribuitur sibi predicatum, scilicet ut uni rei” (ibid. [lin. 130-156]). 
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Then, there are two ways of attributing something to a universal as existing in singulars. 
Thus, in the third way we attribute to a universal something that concerns the universal 
nature itself, namely, when we attribute “something belonging to its essence or to 
essential principles, as in ‘man is an animal,’ or ‘man is risible.’” Finally, in the fourth 
way, an attribution to a universal is carried out in view of singulars in which the 
universal has its real existence, e.g. “when we attribute something to the universal that 
pertains to the action of the individual, as in ‘man walks.’”102 
Now, to a singular we can attribute something in three ways: as it is in the 
intellect (e.g. “Socrates is a singular”); according to its common nature (e.g. “Socrates is 
an animal”); and lastly, according to itself (e.g. “Socrates walks”).103  
These divisions enable us to discern the ways in which a proposition may be true 
or false, according to the various modes of predication. As we shall see, these divisions 
also help us in the domain of moral science, as when we try to predicate human nature 
in relation to particular characteristics, singular human beings, or singular human 
actions.104 
 
*   *   * 
 
Since there are three kinds of logical intentions (the intention of 1. universality, 
2. attribution or predication, and 3. consequence), in this chapter we embarked on a 
                                                 
102 “Alio autem modo attribuitur uniuersali prout est in singularibus; et hoc dupliciter. – Quandoque 
quidem ratione ipsius nature uniuersalis, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod ad essenciam eius pertinet 
uel consequitur principia essencialia, ut cum dico: ‘Homo est animal’, uel: ‘Homo est risibile’. – 
Quandoque autem attribuitur ei aliquid ratione singularis in quo inuenitur, puta cum attribuitur ei 
aliquod accidens indiuiduale, ut cum dicitur: ‘Homo ambulat’” (ibid. [lin. 157-166]). 
103 “Singulari autem attribuitur aliquid tripliciter: uno modo secundum quod cadit in apprehensione, ut 
cum dicitur: ‘Sortes est singulare’, uel ‘predicabile de uno solo’; quandoque autem ratione nature 
communis, ut cum dicitur: ‘Sortes est animal’; quandoque autem ratione sui ipsius, ut cum dicitur: 
‘Sortes ambulat’. Et totidem etiam modis negationes uariantur, quia omne quod contingit affirmare, 
contingit negare” (ibid. [lin. 167-176]). 
104 See for example how Aquinas applies these distinctions defining a person: “Respondeo dicendum, 
quod, ut supra dictum est, hoc nomen ‘persona’ secundum suam communitatem acceptum, non est 
nomen intentionis, sicut hoc nomen ‘singulare’, vel ‘generis’ et ‘speciei’; sed est nomen rei, cui accidit 
aliqua intentio, scilicet intentio particularis; et in natura determinata, scilicet intellectuali vel rationali. 
Et ideo in definitione personae ponuntur tria: scilicet genus illius rei, quod significatur nomine 
personae, dum dicitur ‘substantia’; et differentia per quam contrahitur ad naturam determinatam, in qua 
ponitur res, quae est persona, in hoc quod dicitur, ‘rationalis naturae’; et ponitur etiam aliquid pertinens 
ad intentionem illam, sub qua significat nomen personae rem suam; non enim significat substantiam 
rationalem absolute, sed secundum quod subintelligitur intentio particularis: et ideo additur 
‘individua’” (Super I Sent., 25, 1, 1 sol.). 
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brief study of the first two, in order to explain why we not only do not encounter any 
obstruction on the side of St. Thomas’s logic, but just the opposite: we find very useful 
tools to justify the transition from “is” to “ought.”  
We briefly saw how effectively Aquinas undermines the main skeptical premise 
in his analysis of a simple cognitive act and how he deals with the problem of cognitive 
representation within the framework of formal causality. This point, together with his 
genuine theory of signification, constitutes, in my opinion, one of the deepest layers of 
the justification of the transition from “is” to “ought,” if coupled with St. Thomas’s 
conception of science and with what will be said in the second part of this work. The 
theory of signification (with its integral part on supposition) also shapes the theory of 
predication, which treats the second kind of logical intentions as resulting from the 
second act of the intellect. Having explained in what the inherence theory of predication 
consists (as opposed to the identity theory of predication), we sought for the 
verificational factor of propositions. Consequently, we learned that for Aquinas we can 
properly ascribe the character of truth to indicative sentences because such predications 
signify the relationship of adequacy between the second act of the intellect and things. 
Imperative sentences, however, express the tendency of will and thus no character of 
truth can be ascribed to them, unless only remotely, namely insofar as the tendency of 
will is measured by the true judgment of the intellect. We also learned that what verifies 
propositions is the actuality of form signified by the predicate as inhering in the thing 
signified by the subject. Such theories of signification and predication allow St. Thomas 
to distinguish seven ways of predication (four ways of predication of a universal and 
three ways of predication of a singular) which are helpful in judging the veracity of 
sentences. It makes a great difference, of import for moral or normative judgments, 
when there is a possibility to predicate something of a universal nature as existing in 
singular things. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Scientific Methodology or Ways of Explanation 
 
 
The examination of the principles of human knowing conducted in the previous 
chapter has prepared us for an analysis of St. Thomas’s general scientific methodology, 
or what we could call the ways of reliable explanation. This analysis becomes necessary 
when we consider that although Aquinas calls all branches of philosophy and theology 
a science, his notion of science is considerably different from what today we usually 
mean by the word. Moreover, his theory of science is of key importance in our attempt 
to give a justification of the transition from “is” to “ought” in his writings. The search 
for this justification presupposes that we first recognize what Aquinas means when he 
speaks of sciences that treat of the “is” and those that treat of the “ought.” Although 
today we would rather place these questions within the scope of epistemology and the 
philosophy of science, for Aquinas they belong to the domain of logic, considering the 
third logical intention. 
In this chapter I will not offer an exhaustive presentation of Aquinas’s scientific 
method. Instead, I will only consider some aspects that will help settle the problem of 
this study. First, I will say something about the nature of reason as the third operation of 
the human mind. Next, I will explain briefly what the term scientia means for 
St. Thomas and develop the theme of perfect explanation through causes. Within this 
discussion I will also include some remarks about the syllogism as the fruit of reason’s 
operation, and the notion of inference and conclusion. Then, I will enumerate and 
briefly present the conditions for premises that allow syllogisms to be used in a proper 
demonstration. Finally, I will deal briefly with the medium of demonstration, the role of 
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real definition, the kinds of definitions in relation to demonstration, and first 
indemonstrable principles.  
 
 
4.1. Reason, learning, inference 
 
When we are talking about explanation, we are concerned with the third kind of 
logical intention, the intention of consequence, which was mentioned above in section 
2.2. It is the fruit of the third act of the human mind, properly belonging to ratio – 
reason – which as an act is called operatio ratiocinandi, or discursive reasoning. The 
proper feature of reason is the mind’s passing from one thing to another.1  
In our knowledge there are two kinds of discursive processes. One is according to 
succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to 
understand something else. The second kind of discursive process occurs according to 
causality, as when through principles we arrive at knowledge of conclusions. … This 
second kind of discursive process presupposes the first, for whoever proceeds from 
principles to conclusions does not consider both at once … because in this discursive 
process we proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when 
the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in 
the first but from the first.2  
 
Due to the weakness of human intellective power, we do not always grasp at once what 
something precisely is. We do not grasp every truth at once in simple apprehension, as 
do God and the angels.3 Human apprehension happens, for example, as in the way 
                                                 
1 “Tertia operatio, scillicet ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem 
ignotorum” (In Peryerm., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/1, p. 5, lin. 6-8]). “Tercius uero actus rationis est secundum id 
quod est proprium rationis, scilicet discurrere de uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deueniat in 
cognitionem ignoti” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 4-5, lin. 46-49]). “Cognitio discursiua est 
cognoscere unum cognitum per aliud cognitum absolute” (Quodl, XI, 2 ad 2). “Ratiocinari autem 
proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem alterius” (STh, I, 83, 4 c.). 
2 “In scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum successionem tantum: sicut cum, 
postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est 
secundum causalitatem: sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionum. … 
secundus discursus praesupponit primum: procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul 
utrumque considerant. … quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est 
quod, quando cognoscitur primum, adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in 
primo, sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis 
effectibus in causas: et tunc cessat discursus” (STh, I, 14, 7 c.). Cf. STh, I, 58, 3; De ver., 18, 2 ad 1; 
15, 1. 
3 “Ratio dicit quamdam obumbrationem intellectualis naturae, ut dicit Isaac quod ratio oritur in umbra 
intelligentiae. Quod patet ex hoc quod statim non offertur sibi veritas, sed per inquisitionem 
discurrendo invenit” (Super I Sent., 25, 1, 1 ad 4). “Ratio est intellectus quasi obumbratus” (Super II 
Sent., 7, 1, 2 sol.). “Ex imperfectione intellectualis naturae provenit ratiocinativa cognitio” (CG, I, 57, 
n. 481). “Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem 
cognoscendam” (STh, I, 79, 8 c.). 
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a child properly identifies a dog and so grasps something of the essence of dog. Usually, 
this apprehension is not a precise knowledge according to the essential definition of 
dog. In a similar fashion does our knowledge of being arise: in its first instance our 
knowledge is vague and imperfect. Though vague and imperfect, this knowledge 
suffices to support human living. In other words, it suffices that from this vague 
knowledge we form in the second act of the intellect a true and basic proposition that 
something either is or is not,4 and at the same time we conclude that it is impossible that 
something both be and not be.5 Still, we have not yet arrived at a perfect understanding 
of what being is. To use another example, when we understand what whole and part is, 
we can form at once a true proposition that a whole is greater than its part. Yet to 
explain what whole is and what part is, and how we distinguish a whole from a union or 
unity, is more difficult.6 These examples show that our simple understanding does not 
exhaust the intelligibility of something that is grasped. It usually takes several acts of 
our reason before we distinguish specific characteristics, differentiate them, work out 
the implications of our first understanding, and finally form a complete definition. 
Moreover, some truths are difficult for us to grasp, and therefore they require some 
process of reasoning, as for example when we try to understand clearly something like a 
moral virtue. Since moral virtues are not directly experienced sensorily, their essences 
are less evident than the essences of material beings.7 When we recognize that we have 
some confused knowledge about something, we ask questions in order to know it better. 
In so doing, we seek to find the causes or reasons of the object that makes us wonder. 
Knowledge of these causes leads us to acquiring a more specified knowledge of that 
object.8  
As we said in section 1.1, we wonder about those things that we do not know. 
Subsequently, we ask questions in order to gain some knowledge against what we see as 
undesirable, embarrassing, or troublesome ignorance. In our everyday life it often 
                                                 
4 Cf. In Poster., I, 5 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 25, lin. 116-130) and 19 (p. 70-71, lin. 18-53); In Meta., IV, 6, 
n. 606; In Meta., XI, 5, n. 2211-2212; In Phys., I, 6, n. 7-8. 
5 Cf. In Meta., III, 5, n. 387, 392; IV, 6, n. 600, 603, 605-606. 
6 Cf. STh, I-II, 94, 2 c.; 47, 6 c.; I, 17, 3 ad 2; 62, 8 ad 2; 84, 3 ad 3; In Poster., I, 43 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 164-
165, lin. 247-280, 299-323); In Meta., IV, 5, n. 595. 
7 “Ratiocinatur homo discurrendo et inquirendo lumine intellectuali per continuum et tempus obumbrato, 
ex hoc quod cognitionem a sensu et imagine accipit” (Super II Sent., 3, 1, 2 sol.). 
8 Cf. John A. Oesterle, “The Significance of the Universal ut nunc,” in The Dignity of Science: Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science, edited by James A. Weisheipl (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 
1961), p. 27-38. 
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suffices to have a reason that somehow explains an event or a thing. This explanatory 
reason is usually called by Aquinas a “cause.” In the word “because,” the English 
language has retained this notion of general explanatory reason as cause. In Aristotelian 
philosophy, the central issue in scientific methodology and ways of explanation is 
precisely the term “cause.”9 Although in contemporary philosophy cause and 
explanation are often viewed as two separated and hardly related topics, cause in 
Aquinas always affords an explanation, and a proper explanation always specifies cause 
or causes.10 According to Aristotle, quoted with complete approval by Aquinas, “we 
know something when we know its cause.”11  
Commenting on the text of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics wherein the 
Philosopher treats of the four causes, St. Thomas refers the reader to the account 
contained in the second book of the Physics and the fifth book of the Metaphysics.12 At 
first glance, it may seem strange that Aquinas talks about the four causes in a logical 
treatise and that he refers to other non-logical books for their proper understanding. Yet 
when we recall what Aquinas says about first and second intentions, his procedure 
becomes plainly understandable. Apart from what will be said about causes in this 
chapter, more will be said about them also in Chapter 6 where some topics from the 
realm of natural science will be treated. For the moment, let it suffice to say that causes 
are here taken as explanatory reasons, as answers to the questions provoked by our 
wonder.13  
                                                 
9 We can boldly say that without a proper understanding of this term we would understand very little of 
Aristotle or St. Thomas. Obviously, everybody knows somehow what a cause is; after all this is 
a commonly used term also in modern and contemporary philosophy. But it turns out that if we applied 
this modern and contemporary understanding of the term to the texts of Aristotle and Aquinas, very 
often these texts would be simply unintelligible or absurd.  
10 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues, The 
Aquinas Lecture, 1990 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), p. 4; Mark Nowacki, 
“Whatever Comes to Be Has a Cause of Its Coming to Be: A Thomist Defense of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason,” The Thomist 62 (1998): 291-302. 
11 “Quia tunc scimus cum causas cognoscimus” (In Poster., I, 4 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 21, lin. 235-236]). 
12 “Quia scire opinamur cum sciamus causam, ut in I habitum est, demonstratio autem est sillogismus 
faciens scire, ita consequens est quod medium demonstrationis sit causa; sunt autem quatuor genera 
causarum, ut in II Phisicorum et in V Metaphisice plenius manifestatur” (ibid., II, 9 [p. 206, lin. 13-
19]). 
13 “Admiramur enim aliquid cum, effectum videntes, causam ignoramus. Et quia causa una et eadem a 
quibusdam interdum est cognita et a quibusdam ignota, inde contingit quod videntium simul aliquem 
effectum, aliqui mirantur et aliqui non mirantur: astrologus enim non miratur videns eclipsim solis, 
quia cognoscit causam; ignarus autem huius scientiae necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans. Sic 
igitur est aliquid mirum quoad hunc, non autem quoad illum” (CG, III, 101, n. 2763). “Et illud 
desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis 
cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, 
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 Is this explanatory reason something new, something that we did not know 
before asking the question? For Aristotle, and for Aquinas, it was a vital question 
whether or not the knowledge of conclusions in reasoning amounts to the acquisition of 
some new knowledge, i.e., whether it is possible at all to learn something from what is 
already known. In other words, the question about the possibility of learning something 
new from what is already known is a question about the possibility of valid inference. In 
Plato’s philosophy, learning understood as acquiring new knowledge from that which is 
already known was impossible. On the one hand, if something is known, there is no 
need to learn about it. On the other hand, if something is not known, there is no 
possibility of learning about it since the very subject, about which something is to be 
known, is precisely unknown. The Platonic doctrine of remembering was the remedy 
for this dilemma: the knowledge fully exists in us already as innate ideas imprinted in 
our souls, but to be conscious of this knowledge we need only to remove the obstacles 
from our memory.14 According to this account, we know not material things in 
themselves but rather ideas that already exist in us, in which ideas of material things 
somehow imperfectly participate.  
Others apart from Plato attempted to respond to this dilemma. Some Sophists 
and nominalists of the Academy claimed that learning does not consist in the process of 
syllogizing but only in collecting totally new facts. Knowledge would be thus an 
aggregation of individual observations.15 Aristotle, followed by Aquinas, rejected both 
solutions and applied to the problem the ingenious doctrine of potency and act, which 
Aristotle fully presents in his Physics in the context of analysis of change in general. 
This doctrine is also useful in logic because a human being is a changing being: 
whenever he performs an act, he does it in time, as passing from some qualified potency 
to some qualified act. In the process of learning it is the same: one somehow knows and 
somehow does not know what one intends to know. Aquinas relates this position in the 
following way: 
For learning is, properly speaking, the generation of science in someone. But that 
which is generated was not, prior to its generation, a being absolutely, but somehow 
a being and somehow non-being: for it was a being in potency, although actually non-
being. And this is what being generated consists in, namely, in being converted from 
potency to act. In like fashion, that which a person learns was not previously known 
                                                                                                                                               
admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum 
essentiam causae” (STh, I-II, 3, 8 c.). 
14 Cf. In Poster., I, 1 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 8, lin. 138-160) and 3 (p. 15, lin. 36-96). 
15 Cf. ibid. (p. 16, lin. 85-96). 
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absolutely, as Plato preferred; but neither was it absolutely unknown, as they 
maintained whose answer was refuted above. Rather it was known in potency, i.e., 
virtually, in the pre-known universal principles; however, it was not actually known 
in the sense of specific knowledge. And this is what learning consists in, namely, in 
being brought from potential or virtual or universal knowledge to specific and actual 
knowledge.16 
 
This is how we can know a conclusion before inferring it, without destroying the 
meaning of the inference. There is something known before knowing the conclusion. 
What is foreknown is not the conclusion itself but various propositions, which contain 
somehow the elements from which the reason forms the conclusion. Reasoning is a kind 
of change, a movement from the state of potency regarding some knowledge to the state 
of actual possession of this knowledge.17 Every change begins in a kind of immobility 
and ends up in a kind of immobility. In Aristotelian philosophy, the beginning of every 
reasoning consists in an act of understanding of something – this is the necessary basis 
for asking any question. The aim of reasoning is a better understanding of something 
previously understood only generally and indistinctly. Note that actual knowledge, 
called also specific (propria), is contrasted with potential or virtual or universal 
knowledge. This actual knowledge is said to come from pre-known universal principles. 
A random succession of acts of cognition which are unrelated is not properly speaking 
a reasoning. There should be a special relation in the succession for it to be a process of 
reasoning, a relation, namely, that leads to a conclusion and is the relation of 
consequence.18  
 A syllogism is a form of reasoning in which, certain things being stated, 
something other than what is stated follows from their being so.19 In other words, 
a syllogism is a concatenation of three propositions such that the third follows from the 
preceding two. Thus, syllogisms are artificial constructs of the human mind, in which 
                                                 
16 “Addiscere enim proprie est scientiam in aliquo generari; quod autem generatur, ante generationem 
non fuit omnino ens, set quodam modo ens et quodam modo non ens, ens quidem in potencia, non ens 
uero actu; et hoc est generari, reduci de potencia in actum. Vnde nec illud quod quis addiscit erat 
omnino prius notum, ut Plato posuit, nec omnino ignotum, ut secundum solutionem supra inprobatam 
ponebatur, set erat notum potencia siue uirtute in principiis precognitis uniuersalibus, ignotum autem 
actu secundum propriam cognitionem; et hoc est addiscere, reduci de cognitione potenciali siue uirtuali 
aut uniuersali in cognitionem propriam et actualem” (In Poster., I, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 16, lin. 127-140]). 
17 “Docens causat scientiam in addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in VIII 
Physic.” (STh, I, 117, 1). 
18 “Discurrere de uno in aliud innotescendi causa” (Super IV Sent., 15, 4, 1, qc. 1 c.). 
19 “[Sillogismus habet] tres terminos ex quibus formantur due propositiones concludentes tertiam” 
(In Poster., I, 31 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 112, lin. 42-44]). “In syllogismo autem est triplex consideratio, 
secundum tres propositiones, ex quarum duabus tertia concluditur” (Super II Sent., 24, 2, 4 sol.).  
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two propositions, or premises, are arranged in such way, that they entail a third 
proposition, called a conclusion.20 A conclusion itself, taken separately, is a proposition, 
but as a part of a syllogism, it differs from any proposition by the logical relation of 
consequence. This relation has its subject in the conclusion, while its terms reside in the 
two propositions that precede and cause the conclusion. These two propositions are 
taken together as related to each other and are called the principles of a syllogism. 
A conclusion is constituted by a property (passio) attributed to or predicated of some 
subject. Such a conclusion is inferred from principles in which the property and the 
subject are contained along with a middle term.21  
The propositions forming a syllogism consist, therefore, in three terms: 1) the 
subject of the conclusion; 2) the predicate of the conclusion; and 3) the middle term or 
medium, i.e., something that justifies why the predicate is joined to the subject in the 
conclusion.22 A syllogism is thus a kind of objective relation constituted by the third 
operation of reason.23 If subject and predicate are taken separately their understanding 
brings no conclusion and no new knowledge. Thus, there should be a reason to join 
them and draw a conclusion. Yet it is possible that a person facing the principles, which 
de facto contain potentially the consequence leading to the conclusion, fails to see the 
conclusion.24 In this case, one either does not understand principles or he does not grasp 
the force of the reasoning.25  
What is this force of the reasoning? It is precisely the causal relation perceived 
through the act of the intellect.26 Premises are propositions, and as such are expressions 
                                                 
20 “Omnis sillogismus probat aliquid de aliquo per aliquod medium” (In Poster., II, 3 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 184, 
lin. 51-53]). Cf. STh, I-II, 90, 1 ad 2. 
21 Cf. In Poster., I, 2 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 10, lin. 17-27). 
22 Cf. ibid., I, 31 (p. 112, lin. 42-54); also 15 (p. 58, lin. 103-139) and 26 (p. 94, lin. 26-38). 
23 “In operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid 
per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; 
secundo, enuntiatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio” (STh, I-II, 90, 1 ad 2). 
24 “Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari absque hoc quod considerentur 
conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones 
deducuntur” (STh, I-II, 57, 2 ad 2). 
25 “Perfecta enim cognitio conclusionum duo exigit: scilicet principiorum intellectum et rationem 
ducentem principium in conclusiones. … in ratiocinando deficiat, aut vim ratiocinationis non 
comprehendat” (De ver., 14, 6 c.). 
26 “Cognitio principiorum est in conclusione sicut causa in causato, et e converso cognitio conclusionum 
etiam est in principiis sicut causatum in causa” (Super III Sent., 28, 1, 6 sol.). “Causae conclusionis in 
demonstrabilibus sunt praemissae” (In Meta., V, 6, n. 838). “Cognitio horum principiorum est causa 
cognitionis conclusionum” (In Poster., I, 7 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 31, lin. 95-96]). “In omni scientia discursiva 
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of beings of reason, existing only by virtue of the composing and dividing operation of 
the intellect. Propositions themselves do not formulate a new proposition and do not 
bring a new knowledge. They are, as it were, instruments through which the agent 
intellect manifests or actualizes what is contained in premises. In other words, the agent 
intellect draws the conclusion, which is a new comparison based upon a middle term 
that is the cause of joining predicates with the subjects contained in premises.27 It 
sometimes happens that drawing a conclusion is an arbitrary decision without any 
sufficient foundation, but in this case we are talking about a hasty, forced conclusion, 
which is an error in reasoning. Nonetheless, reason can also correctly, according to the 
truth, discover this causal relation between two premises, and can subsequently form 
a true conclusion.28 In the next section I will invoke several strict conditions for 
premises elaborated by Aristotle and adopted by Aquinas.  
Obviously, a true conclusion is caused by premises only when one compares not 
empty forms of the mind, but rather the apprehended natures of things, which are 
related somehow to each other, or some intentions seized from these natures. Because 
they are recognized as natures of things or something that follows from such natures, 
the relation of truth arises. This relation between natures existing in the mind is grasped 
by the intellect through the middle term contained in premises, and precisely in this 
consists the third kind of logical intentions enumerated above (section 2.2), the intention 
of consequence.29 It is a relation of propositions remotely founded on reality, as was 
                                                                                                                                               
oportet aliquid esse causatum: nam principia sunt quodammodo causa efficiens conclusionis; unde et 
demonstratio dicitur syllogismus faciens scire” (CG, I, 57, n. 477). 
27 Cf. In Poster., II, 20 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 246, lin. 223-235). “Prima autem principia demonstrationis … 
sunt in nobis quasi instrumenta intellectus agentis” (De ver., 10, 13 c.). “Intellectus in actu 
principiorum non sufficit ad reducendum intellectum possibilem de potentia in actum sine intellectu 
agente. Set in hac reductione intellectus agens se habet sicut artifex, et principia demonstrationis sicut 
instrumenta” (De anima, 4 ad 6). 
28 Cf. In Eth., I, 1 (Leon. 47/1, p. 4, lin. 32-35). “Ratio nostra componit principia in ordine ad 
conclusionem” (De ver., 15, 1 ad 5). 
29 It is true that without the agent intellect it would be difficult to explain how a conclusion follows from 
premises. If the intellect cannot act on its own according to what is perceived, that is to say, if the 
intellect is inert, then no conclusion follows, because no instrument does the job by itself, without 
being used by an agent. Again, the fact that for somebody, even for a philosopher, no conclusion 
follows from some two propositions, does not prove that this conclusion does not follow at all.  
       The existence of the agent intellect follows from the fact that the human being is a changing being, 
not yet fully actualized: “In omni natura que est quandoque in potencia et quandoque in actu oportet 
ponere aliquid quod est sicut materia in unoquoque genere (quod scilicet est in potencia ad omnia que 
sunt illius generis), et aliud quod est sicut causa agens et factiuum, quod ita se habet in faciendo omnia 
sicut ars ad materiam; set anima secundum partem intellectiuam quandoque est in potencia et 
quandoque in actu; necesse est igitur in anima intellectiua esse has differentias, ut scilicet sit unus 
intellectus in quo possint omnia intelligibilia fieri (et hic est intellectus possibilis, de quo supra dictum 
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said about all logical intentions.30 There would be no consequence if we took concepts 
without their essential characteristic of referring necessarily to really existing things, 
that is to say, if we took concepts without intentions. If we took concepts as only 
accidentally representing extramental things, no necessary consequence would follow 
from any operation of reason. As we have seen, a consideration of such concepts is 
possible also in Aquinas’s account, namely, when we create concepts which are pure 
fiction – nothing necessarily follows from such false concepts or from phrases built up 
from them. This is why it is extremely important to grasp properly the mechanisms of 
cognition, along with the mode of representing, and thus distinguish between the kinds 
of concepts by their relation to extramental reality. 
 
 
4.2. The role of material logic, conditions for demonstrative premises 
 
As Aquinas observed, Aristotle devoted several logical books (see the division 
of logic in section 2.1) to the fruit of the third act of intellect and its fruit, the intention 
of consequence, but for our purposes two of these works are the most important: Prior 
Analytics and Posterior Analytics. Both deal with the process of reasoning: the former 
under the formal aspect, and the latter under the material aspect.  
In logic it is possible to discover some formal rules of thinking according to the 
consequence perceivable in the very syllogistical form. These rules, however, do not 
touch the content of individual acts of cognition, or individual unities, called premises, 
joined together to form the syllogism. This formal aspect is the subject of the Prior 
Analytics.31 Aquinas commented only on the Posterior Analytics, which has for its 
subject the material aspect of cognition through syllogistic argument,32 and specifically 
                                                                                                                                               
est) et alius intellectus sit ad hoc quod possit omnia intelligibilia facere in actu (qui uocatur intellectus 
agens) et est sicut habitus quidam” (In De An., III, 4 [Leon. 45/1, p. 218, lin. 8-23]). 
30 For a more detailed discussion of the intention of consequence see Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 
p. 242-301. 
31 For an extensive analysis of many issues related with this aspect see Kevin L. Flannery, Acts Amid 
Precepts: The Aristotelian Logical Structure of Thomas Aquinas’s Moral Theory (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2001). 
32 St. Thomas interprets the difference between these two books, according to an old tradition (practically 
unique in his time), in terms of the formal and material components of syllogism. Aristotle himself 
never used the word ‘matter’ (hyle) in all of his Organon. Daniel W. Graham writes: “Aristotle never 
makes use of what seems to us a natural extension of the matter-form conception – the distinction of 
arguments into a formal and a material component. Yet the Greek commentators freely use this 
distinction. Certainly Aristotle has the general notion of an argument form, and it is one of his signal 
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this particular kind of syllogism, that is demonstration. This means that the main 
concern of this book is not only the formal rules of reasoning (although they have here 
their due importance and are quoted several times in St. Thomas’s commentary), but 
also, in a general way, the content of premises, so far as to provide a methodological 
instrument in what is common in all the sciences.33 Thus, according to the definition of 
logic, since it is an art “directive of the acts of reason themselves so that man may 
proceed orderly, easily and without error in the very act of reason itself,”34 this 
methodological instrument constitutes a logical model to be used analogically in any 
science, respecting the diversity of particular subjects of those sciences.35 The 
difference between the formal and material aspects of a syllogism is important because, 
as Aquinas says: 
deception through a syllogism can occur in two ways: in one way when it fails as to 
form, not observing the correct form and mode of a syllogism. In another way, when 
it fails in matter, proceeding from the false. Now there is a difference between these 
two ways, because one that fails in matter is still a syllogism, since everything is 
observed that pertains to the form of a syllogism. But one that fails in form is not even 
a syllogism, but a paralogism, i.e., an apparent syllogism.36 
 
                                                                                                                                               
contributions to the history of logic. But the intuitive extension of hylomorphic language to the realm 
of logic – the terminology of formal arguments and argument forms, of the matter and form of an 
argument – never appears in Aristotle. Aristotle has intelligible form and separable form, but not 
logical form” (Aristotle’s Two Systems [New York: Oxford University Press, 1999], p. 321). The 
author argues that Aristotle discovered the notion of matter only after finishing the Organon. This 
reportedly explains a certain dichotomy between his logical and scientific/philosophical treatises. 
Aquinas does not seem to perceive any serious dichotomy: his constant orientation towards 
distinguishing methods and aspects, and applying an analogical way of thinking allows him to see the 
works of Aristotle as a genuine unity. That Aristotle does not use the word “matter” in logical context 
Aquinas explains in this way: “quia materia magis proprie dicitur in sensibilibus, propter hoc noluit 
eam nominare causam materialem, set causam necessitatis” (In Poster., II, 9 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 207, lin. 
83-86]). 
33 Cf. ibid., I, 1 [p. 6, lin. 80-87]. 
34 “Ars quedam necessaria est que sit directiua ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu 
rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat; et hec ars est logica” (ibid. [p. 3, lin. 21-24]). 
35 Nonetheless, every particular science must elaborate its own particular way of applying this general 
methodology, see for example: In Meta., II, 5, n. 335; In De an., II, 3 (Leon. 45/1, p. 77-78, lin. 1-49). 
36 “Contingit autem per aliquem sillogismum deceptionem accidere dupliciter: uno modo quia peccat in 
materia, procedens ex falsis; alio modo quia peccat in forma, non seruando debitam figuram et 
modum; et est differencia inter hos duos, quia ille qui peccat in materia sillogismus est, cum 
obseruentur ibi omnia que ad formam sillogismi pertinent; ille autem qui peccat in forma non est 
sillogismus, set paralogismus, id est apparens sillogismus” (In Poster., II, 22 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 79, lin. 
26-36]).  
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The formal part of logic gives us only general rules to be applied in formally correct 
reasoning. Yet it is not a sufficient basis for saying that a given reasoning leads to a true 
and perfect knowledge.37 
We have said that in order to satisfy our wonder we ask questions that aim to 
discover an explanatory reason called a cause. Yet St. Thomas remarks that in order to 
know something perfectly it is not enough to know a cause, even if this cause is 
sufficient to produce such and such an effect of which cause we want to know, due to 
the fact that some causes can be impeded in producing their effects.38 Another important 
remark is that not everything that happens has a cause properly speaking: some things 
happen accidentally, and as accidents are not beings properly speaking (as was said in 
section 2.2), for they do not have a cause properly speaking.39 What follows from this is 
that not everything can be known in the same way, because things are in different ways.  
While defining art in section 1.2 as a virtue of cognition, we briefly mentioned 
the notion of science (scientia) as also one of the virtues of cognition. We said that 
Aquinas enumerates and discusses five such virtues: art, prudence, intellect, science and 
wisdom. As virtues of cognition they are always concerned with the truth. Science is 
distinguished from art and prudence because it concerns only necessary truths, not 
contingent ones. It is further distinguished from the intellect because science is 
                                                 
37 The positivist project proved (by its failure) that formal logic alone is impotent and cannot provide an 
epistemology sufficient to the needs of contemporary science. William A. Wallace in his book The 
Modeling of ature: Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of ature in Sythesis (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America, 1996) writes about a new consensus that has begun to emerge 
among philosophers of science “in last two decades,” according to which “empiricism is no longer the 
proclaimed epistemology behind the philosophy of science movement and various realist alternatives 
to it are being actively explored. Prominent among these are what some have referred to as naturalized 
epistemologies, wherein the concept of ‘natural kind’ is again assuming prominence and causal 
conceptions of reference are being investigated to replace the standard empiricist accounts. (…) the 
content or subject or matter being investigated, the content logic that in former times was regarded as 
‘material’ logic, must henceforth be taken to be on a par with ‘formal’ logic. … The most fundamental 
change behind this new consensus is a relinquishing by many philosophers of the doctrines David 
Hume hitherto imposed on their discipline. The reason for their doing so is clear, namely, the 
undisputed progress of science in the twentieth century, a progress that invalidates many of Hume’s 
key suppositions. … Simply put, we ought do for Hume what Galileo proposed to do for Aristotle … 
We should say that if Hume were alive today he would side with the anti-Humeans rather than with 
those who adamantly defend his outdated teachings” (p. 228-229). See also Jude P. Dougherty, “The 
Failure of Positivism and the Enduring Legacy of Comte,” in Recovering ature: Essays in atural 
Philosophy, Ethics, and Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph McInerny, Thomas Hibbs, John O’Callaghan 
(eds.), (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p. 25-36. 
38 “Hec est falsa, quod causa posita, etiam sufficienti, necesse sit effectum poni: non enim omnis causa 
est talis, etiam si sit sufficiens, cuius effectus impediri non possit; sicut ignis est sufficiens causa 
combustionis lignorum, set tamen per effusionem aque impeditur combustio” (In Peryerm., I, 14 
[Leon. 1*/1, p. 74-75, lin. 231-236]). 
39 “Non omne quod fit habet causam, set solum illud quod est per se; set illud quod est per accidens non 
habet causam, quia proprie non est ens, set magis ordinatur cum non ente” (ibid. [p. 74, lin. 223-227]). 
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a cognition through causes. It is finally specified from wisdom by the fact that it is 
a cognition through proper causes, and not the highest ones.40  
Many errors can arise in interpreting the notion of science as presented in both 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and in Aquinas’s commentary of it if we fail to 
distinguish science as a discipline (that is, as a set of objective rules and procedures 
ordered to explore some particular subject-matter) from science as a virtue (which is 
a quality of the mind characterized by a subjective possession of a proper 
demonstration). Aristotle’s treatise concerns itself mainly with science as a virtue: it 
shows when we could claim that we have the virtue of science.41 Apart from this 
important distinction we should still remember that the word “scientia” admits of 
analogous impositions. We have such a virtue when we know something in a perfect 
way, which means that we 1) know its cause, 2) know that the cause is what makes the 
object to be what it is, 3) and know that what we know could not be otherwise than it is. 
In St. Thomas’s words: 
To know something scientifically is to know it completely, which means to apprehend 
its truth perfectly. For the principles of a thing’s being are the same as those of its 
truth, as is stated in the second book of Metaphysics. Therefore, the one who knows 
scientifically, if he is to know perfectly, must know the cause of the thing known. But 
if he were to know the cause by itself, he would not yet know the effect actually – 
which means to know it absolutely – but only virtually, which means to know in 
a qualified sense and accidentally. Consequently, one who knows scientifically in the 
full sense must also know the application of the cause to the effect. Again, because 
science is also sure and certain knowledge of a thing, whereas a thing that could be 
otherwise cannot be known with certainty, it is further required that what is 
scientifically known could not be otherwise.42 
                                                 
40 Cf. CG, I, 94, n. 792-793. 
41 See for example the following remark: “There is, indeed, an extensive literature of medieval 
commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, and much of this literature is very important; we find in it 
a great deal of material on the authors’ attitudes to necessity, the structure of science, the relation 
between various sciences, the autonomy of philosophy vis-à-vis theology, and the like. However, it 
cannot be taken to be automatically relevant to the practice of reasoning in the Middle Ages: the 
logical metatheory (that of the syllogism) is far too restrictive, and the conditions placed on scientific 
demonstrations are far too stringent, for it to be a plausible description of very many actual processes 
of reasoning, in the Middle Ages or at any other time” (Graham White, “Medieval Theories of 
Causation,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/causation-medieval/). From this quotation we can 
see that the author repeats such widespread misreading of this work. What is also interesting in this 
article, is that, with a title referencing Medieval theories, one has the impression that this period begins 
in the fourteenth century and apart from Ockham there is little else to be referred to. If that is the case 
for the author, perhaps this is why we find him utterly perplexed when he talks about final causes, 
wishing to reduce them to efficient causality.  
42 “Scire aliquid est perfecte cognoscere ipsum, hoc autem est perfecte apprehendere ueritatem ipsius: 
eadem enim sunt principia esse rei et ueritatis ipsius, ut patet ex II Metaphisice; oportet igitur scientem, 
si est perfecte cognoscens, quod cognoscat causam rei scite; si autem cognosceret causam tantum, 
nondum cognosceret effectum in actu, quod est scire simpliciter, set uirtute tantum, quod est scire 
secundum quid et quasi per accidens, et ideo oportet scientem simpliciter cognoscere etiam 
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It is clear that for Aquinas to know a thing truly is to know intellectually the causes of 
a thing. This is the case because, as causes of a thing cause the being of the thing, they 
also cause the deepest truth of the thing in the mind which knows the thing. Note in the 
quotation above what Aquinas says as regards knowing the truth of the thing: “to 
apprehend its truth,” and not, for example, a truth about the thing, because he does not 
mean any proposition that could be validly predicated about the thing, but the deepest 
possible intellectual grasping of the ultimate why of the thing. 
These stipulations distinguish the perfect kind of knowledge (scientia 
simpliciter), called epistemic or scientific knowledge,43 from the imperfect kind of 
knowledge (secundum quid), that is, from accidental, uncertain or unnecessary, and only 
                                                                                                                                               
applicationem cause ad effectum; quia uero sciencia etiam est certa cognitio rei, quod autem contingit 
aliter se habere non potest aliquis per certitudinem cognoscere, ideo ulterius oportet quod id quod 
scitur non possit aliter se habere” (In Poster., I, 4 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 19, lin. 82-97]). 
43 The translation of this notion into today’s English as ‘scientific knowledge’ has some limitations 
because current qualifications of scientific knowledge can differ significantly from Aquinas’s scientia. 
Mainly, this is due to a fairly common agreement that science cannot be differentiated from opinion 
(since it happens to be understood as ‘a system of knowledge’ or ‘justified belief’ or as a kind of 
rhetoric).  
     Armand Maurer in his article “The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists” (in Being 
and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers, [Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990], p. 71-93) writes about the difference between Aquinas’s 
understanding of the unity of science in terms of one intellectual virtue and nominalists’ notion of 
science as a unified body of knowledge (or, in Kantian terms, as a system, a totality of knowledge 
arranged according to principles). Maurer, quoting contemporary dictionaries, remarks that this 
nominalist understanding is prevailing today. He relates that Leibniz acknowledged that “nominalists 
were the most profound scholastic sect and the one most in harmony with the spirit of modern 
philosophy” (p. 72). Moreover, Leibniz recognized that almost all the modern reformers of philosophy 
were nominalists. Maurer suggests that the nominalist notion of science, of which Ockham was chief 
theoretician and popularizer, “was conceived in opposition to St. Thomas’ doctrine of science, 
according to which an individual science is not in essence or primarily a system or body of knowledge 
but a single and simple habitus of the intellect” (p. 73). Ockham directly criticized Aquinas and was 
not able to accept his solution because of the pressuposed belief that “many materially different items 
share in a common nature (ratio)” (p. 82). Ockham would have to surrender the main axiomatic tenet 
of his nominalism, namely that reality is individual and in no way common or universal. “Ockham’s 
conception of reality as radically individual led to a new interpretation of the object of science. … 
‘Every science,’ he writes, ‘whether real or rational, is concerned only with propositions as with 
objects known, for only propositions are known’” (p. 83). 
     Another difficulty in translating scientia as ‘scientific knowledge’ is that to have recourse to a 
necessary cause of a thing is still not so fashionable in our days since some Scottish gentleman denied 
that the human mind had the ability ever to grasp a necessary causal connection. One of the leading 
encyclopedias of philosophy treats the problem of causality as if before Hume there was nothing 
interesting in philosophy (the same fate suffer many other problems). “Hume’s legacy” is indeed 
overwhelming; this is the opening gambit of the article on causation: “Two opposed viewpoints raise 
complementary problems about causation. The first is from Hume … The second is from Kant” 
(Nancy Cartwright, “Causation,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig 
London: Routledge, 1998, http://www.rep.routledge.com.proxycu.wrlc.org/article/Q010 (Accessed 
November 2006). Compared with the Aristotelian philosophy, this is a somewhat reductionistic 
account of causality. Cf. also Wallace, The Modeling of ature, p. xi-xii. 
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probable knowledge.44 As we have seen already, probable knowledge, for Aquinas, is 
also called opinion and can be born from the method of research, that is, dialectical 
method. To have an opinion is to assent to a proposition rather than to its opposite, but 
with an awareness that the proposition might be false and the opposite true. In sciences 
as disciplines we use the dialectical method in its richness wherever and whenever it is 
necessary or useful, but the dialectical method does not give us the virtue of science in 
the strict sense, because in opinion we have only an accidental relation to the truth. 
Opinion can be true or false. The virtue of science has a necessary relation to the truth: 
science as virtue either is true or it is not science. To acquire this virtue we must 
develop a proper demonstration, and in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle, according to 
Aquinas’s interpretation, went to great lengths to highlight under what conditions we 
can construct such a demonstration.  
This perfect kind of knowledge can be attained only through a valid 
demonstration: “scire seems to be nothing else than to understand the truth of 
a conclusion through demonstration.”45 Demonstration is a kind of syllogism. There are 
different kinds of syllogisms that use various kinds of premises, not all of which 
produce scientific knowledge. Special conditions for premises, precisely on the level of 
their content, must be fulfilled, or we cannot say that the syllogism is a perfect 
demonstration. St. Thomas comments on Aristotle’s formula: 
it is necessary that demonstrative science, i.e., science acquired through 
demonstration, proceed from propositions which are true, primary, and immediate, 
i.e., not demonstrated by some other middle, but clear in virtue of themselves (they 
are called ‘immediate’, inasmuch as they do not have a middle demonstrating them, 
but ‘primary’, in relation to other propositions which are proved through them); and 
which, furthermore, are better known than, prior to, and causes of, the conclusion.46 
 
All these conditions follow from the purpose of a demonstration (it is supposed to 
produce science)47 and thus constitute the material definition of demonstration. For 
                                                 
44 Cf. In Poster., I, 4 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 18-19, lin. 61-78). 
45 “Scire nihil aliud esse uideatur quam intelligere ueritatem alicuius conclusionis per demonstrationem” 
(ibid. [Leon. 1*/2, p. 20, lin. 142-144]). See a very helpful and comprehensive study by William 
A. Wallace, The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology. A Study of Methodology in St. Thomas 
Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1962). 
46 “ecesse est quod demonstratiua sciencia, id est que per demonstrationem acquiritur, procedat ex 
propositionibus ueris et primis et inmediatis, id est que non per aliquod medium demonstrantur, set per 
se ipsas sunt manifeste (que quidem inmediate dicuntur, in quantum carent medio demonstrante, prime 
autem in ordine ad alias propositiones que per eas probantur); et iterum ex notioribus et prioribus, et 
causis conclusionis” (In Poster., I, 4 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 20, lin. 164-173]). 
47 “Finis autem demonstratiui sillogismi est acquisitio sciencie” (ibid., I, 1 [p. 7, lin. 134-135]). 
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a valid syllogism there is no need for all these conditions, but a valid demonstration 
requires that all these be fulfilled, otherwise it would not bear a perfect scientia.48 
Generally speaking the principle of a demonstrative syllogism is two-fold: its middle 
and first indemonstrable propositions.49 This collection of conditions for premises is 
a development of these two general principles.  
Therefore, to be suitable for a demonstration, the following conditions must be 
met: propositions should be 1) true and express the truth, because what is not true, does 
not exist, since to be true and to be are convertible. What does not exist cannot be 
known, and all the more cannot be demonstrated. In formal considerations of the 
syllogism it is possible to infer a true conclusion from false premises. Thus, syllogism 
remains a syllogism, but it does not constitute a scientific demonstration. If there is 
a false premise, it is no longer a scientific demonstration.50 Subsequently, the 
propositions in the position of premises of demonstration should be 2) primary in the 
sense that they do not themselves need demonstration.51 Such premises are also called 
3) immediate because their subjects are joined with their predicates without any middle 
term, that is, the intellect connects them only from the meanings of the terms.52 In the 
case of any shortage of elements from which something can be demonstrated, 
a deficiency appears in the certainty of the conclusion, and so premises should also be 
necessary and not contingent.53 The demonstrable premises can be used in 
demonstration only if they are demonstrated beforehand, so as to reach eventually the 
                                                 
48 “Licet sillogismus non requirat premissas condiciones in propositionibus ex quibus procedit, requirit 
tamen eas demonstratio: aliter enim non faceret scienciam” (ibid., I, 4 [p. 20, lin. 1185-188]). Cf. ibid., 
I, 22 (p. 80-82, lin. 85-299). 
49 “Est autem duplex principium demonstratiui sillogismi, scilicet medium eius et prime propositiones 
indemonstrabiles” (ibid., II, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 174, lin. 5-7]). 
50 Cf. ibid., I, 4 [p. 20, lin. 194-196].  
51 “on tamen omne primum accipit demonstrator, set primum proprium illi generi circa quod 
demonstrat, sicut arismeticus non accipit primum quod est circa magnitudinem, set circa numerum” 
(ibid., I, 13 [p. 51, lin. 112-116]). 
52 “Non enim contingit aliquem habere scienciam nisi habeat demonstrationem eorum quorum potest esse 
demonstratio, et hoc dico per se, et non secundum accidens; et hoc ideo dicit quia possibile esset scire 
aliquam conclusionem non habens demonstrationem praemissorum, etiam si essent demonstrabilia, 
quia sciret eam per alia principia; et hoc esset secundum accidens” (ibid., I, 4 [p. 21, lin. 213-220]). 
53 “Oportet demonstrationem haberi per medium necessarium, alioquin nesciet quod conclusio sit 
necessaria, neque propter quid neque quia, cum necessarium non possit sciri per non necessarium” 
(ibid., I, 13 [p. 52, lin. 288-232]). “Demonstratio est de necessariis et ex necessariis” (ibid., I, 14 [p. 53, 
lin. 2-3]). 
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principles which are immediate and indemonstrable.54 Finally, propositions have to be 
4) causes of the conclusion, specifically efficient causes, insofar as through them the 
active intellect reduces the possible intellect from potency to act.55 Since premises are 
efficient causes, it must also follow that premises are to be the proper principles of 
a conclusion; that is, proportionate to it.56 This causal requirement follows from the very 
definition of demonstration and, as Aquinas explains: quia tunc scimus, cum causas 
cognoscimus.57  
The last condition has two more consequences, namely, that the premises be 5) 
prior and 6) better known than the conclusion. These in turn are closely connected with 
the signification of the word “cause.” Cause is in a natural way prior and better known 
than its effect. As there is no scientia of non-existents, the cause should be better known 
from the conclusion not only on the side of what it is, but also that it is. Another 
important distinction to be made in the “better known condition” is that, on the one 
hand, things are better known in reference to our human way of acquiring knowledge 
(quoad nos), and on the other, they are better known absolutely, that is, in themselves or 
according to their own nature (secundum naturam or simpliciter). What is better known 
simpliciter is usually less known quoad nos because our cognition is bound to the 
senses. Therefore, what is better known to us is the external and superficial 
characteristics of material beings which produce in us sensory data. A demonstration, 
however, is an operation of reason and not of sense. A gradation of knowing exists also 
                                                 
54 Cf. ibid., I, 4 (p. 21, lin. 211-233). “Quia conclusio demonstrationis non solum est necessaria, set etiam 
per demonstrationem scita, ut dictum est, sequitur quod demonstratiuus sillogismus sit ex necessariis” 
(ibid., I, 9 [p. 36, lin. 24-27]). “Conclusio necessaria non potest sciri nisi ex principiis necessariis; set 
demonstratio facit scire conclusionem necessariam; ergo oportet quod sit ex necessariis principiis. In 
quo differt demonstratio ab aliis sillogismis: sufficit enim in aliis sillogismis quod sillogizetur ex ueris, 
nec est aliquod aliud genus sillogismi, in quo oportet ex necessariis procedere, set demonstrantem 
tantum oportet hoc obseruare; et hoc est proprium demonstrationis, scilicet ex necessariis semper 
procedere” (ibid., I, 13 [p. 51, lin. 79-88). To explain further would be too complex for this short 
sketch, because we would have to say what it dici de omni means, show the four ways of per se 
predication, and say much more about what universale means. For details see In Poster., I, 9-13 (p. 36-
52).  
55 “Principia autem se habent ad conclusiones in demonstratiuis sicut cause actiue in naturalibus ad suos 
effectus (unde in II Phisicorum propositiones sillogismi ponuntur in genere cause efficientis); effectus 
autem, ante quam producatur in actum, praeexistit quidem in causis actiuis uirtute, non autem actu, 
quod est simpliciter esse; et similiter ante quam ex principiis demonstrationis deducatur conclusio, in 
ipsis quidem principiis precognitis precognoscitur conclusio uirtute quidem, non autem actu: sic enim 
in eis praeexistit. Et sic patet quod non precognoscitur simpliciter, sed secundum quid” (In Poster., I, 3 
[Leon. 1*/2, p. 14-15, lin. 23-35]). Cf. In Phys., II, 5, n. 10; De Anima, 4 ad 6. 
56 Cf. In Poster., I, 4 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 20, lin. 179-182 and p. 22, lin. 313-322). 
57 Ibid (p. 21, lin. 235-236). 
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in the intellectual order, according to which what is more universal is easier to grasp 
than what is specific.58 Since the aim of demonstration is to cause knowledge in us, 
bringing us from a potential into actual knowing, then the better known condition has to 
be taken in reference to us, provided that the intellectual order is governing the 
demonstration and not the order of sense. Demonstrations, being processes of reasoning, 
operate on intellectual knowledge. Therefore, the premises must be universal in nature, 
not singular. To sum up the foregoing, we can say that through demonstration we are 
passing from things which are better known to us to things better known absolutely.59 
 
 
4.3. Foreknowledge, indemonstrable principles, middle term, causes 
 
If the conclusion marks the final point of reasoning and the human striving for 
a perfect kind of knowledge and, in fact, a new truth discovered in this reasoning, then 
we have three elements that should be somehow known before completing the process 
of reasoning and which should be contained in the propositions that form the principles 
of demonstration: the subject, the predicate, and the justification for joining the 
predicate and subject. These three can be foreknown in two respects: that they are and 
what they are, though each one is known differently.  
                                                 
58 “Ea ex quibus procedit demonstratio sunt priora et notiora simpliciter et secundum naturam, non quo 
ad nos. – Et ad huius expositionem dicit quod priora et notiora simpliciter sunt illa que sunt remota 
a sensu ut universalia, priora autem et notiora quo ad nos sunt proxima sensui, scilicet singularia, que 
opponentur uniuersalibus siue oppositione prioris et posterioris, siue oppositione propinqui et remoti” 
(ibid. [lin. 247-255]). “Cognitio autem generis est quasi potencialis in comparatione ad cognitionem 
speciei, in qua actu sciuntur omnia essentialia rei; unde in generatione sciencie nostre prius est 
cognoscere magis commune quam minus commune” (ibid. [lin. 275-280]). “Ex singularibus autem, 
que sunt in sensu, non sunt demonstrationes, set ex uniuersalibus tantum, que sunt in intellectu. … in 
omni demonstratione oportet quod procedatur ex hiis que sunt notiora quo ad nos, non tamen 
singularibus, set uniuersalibus: non enim aliquid potest fieri nobis notum nisi per id quod est magis 
notum nobis” (ibid. [p. 22, lin. 289-296]). 
59 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 6, 4. “Demonstration is merely an instrument of our intellect by which we 
proceed from premises which are more certain quoad nos to conclusions which are certain quoad se” 
(Wallace, The Role of Demonstration, p. 21). For an interesting and more extensive discussion of 
conditions for premises of a demonstration see John Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 21-50. See also Edward D. Simmons, “Demonstration and 
Self-Evidence,” in The Dignity of Science: Studies in the Philosophy of Science, edited by James 
A. Weisheipl (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1961), p. 3-26; Wallace, The Modelling, p. 292-
300. 
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The first element somehow foreknown is the subject of the conclusion. In any 
science it must be known in both respects;60 that is, we should know beforehand that the 
subject is and also what it is. It can be either the subject of the whole science or simply 
one of its parts. Furthermore, ontologically speaking, it can belong either to the order of 
substance or of accident.61 Although we may not know the subject perfectly at the 
beginning, we do know quoquo modo de eis ‘quid est’ sub quadam confusione.62 We 
reason, therefore, in order to attain a better knowledge of the subject. And so this 
universal or general, confused, and opaque precognition of the subject allows us to ask 
questions that seek to explain, clarify, and understand it better. The goal is to understand 
the subject specifically and thoroughly. Without this precognition, however, no 
questions would be possible.  
It is proper to the predicate, as to all accidents, to exist or inhere in the subject 
(inesse). Because the existence of the predicate in the subject is to be stated in the 
conclusion, we are supposed to know, before concluding anything, only what the 
predicate is and not that it is. Yet we cannot know exactly what the predicate is 
according to its real definition when we do not know if it exists, for, as Aquinas claims, 
non entium non sunt definitiones. That is why the question “does it exist?” (an est) 
precedes the question “what it is?” (quid est). Therefore, we know beforehand only 
what is the signification of the name used to refer to this attribute. In other words, we do 
not know quid est but quid est quod dicitur.63  
The third element to be known in demonstrative syllogisms are indemonstrable 
principles that are usually assumed and do not enter expressly into the terms of 
a syllogism. As they are always propositions (as for example de unoquoque est 
affirmatio uel negatio uera)64 and as such cannot be defined (what is complex in this 
                                                 
60 Cf. In Poster., I, 2 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 11, lin. 43-49). “Rationem autem huiusmodi diuersitatis ostendit, 
quia non est similis modus manifestationis predictorum, scilicet principii, passionis et subiecti: non 
enim est eadem ratio cognitionis in ipsis; nam principia cognoscuntur per actum componentis et 
diuidentis, subiectum autem et passio per actum apprehendentis quod quid est; quod quidem non 
similiter competit subiecto et passioni, cum subiectum diffiniatur absolute, quia in diffinitione eius non 
ponitur aliquid quod sit extra essentiam ipsius, passio autem diffinitur cum dependencia ad subiectum 
quod in diffinitione eius ponitur; unde, ex quo non eodem modo cognoscuntur, non est mirum si eorum 
diuersa precognitio sit” (ibid. [p. 12, lin. 121-135]). 
61 Cf. ibid., I, 2 (p. 11, lin. 75-95) and I, 15 (p. 57, lin. 46-66). 
62 In Boet. De Trin., 6, 3. 
63 “Non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen” (In Poster., I, 2 
[Leon. 1*/2, p. 11, lin. 67-69]). Cf. section 1.1. 
64 Cf. In Poster., I, 2 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 11, lin. 57-58). 
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way, is not definable),65 we are able to know that they are true but not what they are. By 
knowing the truth of such principles in connection with the subject and predicate 
contained in premises, we can know the conclusion. Stated more precisely, we 
potentially or virtually know the conclusion. We know the conclusion potentially 
because we do not grasp it actually at once. We know it virtually for it is in virtue of 
these principles that the conclusion is known. The actualization in reasoning of the 
potentiality or virtuality of the conclusion occurs in a distinct consideration. If it did not, 
one timeless consideration would suffice to see a conclusion in the principles (as 
opposed to seeing the conclusion from the principles), and thus there would be no place 
for either inference or transition from one consideration to another.66 
There are two kinds of principles of demonstration: principia demonstrationis 
sicut medium and prima principia demonstrationis communia (or primae propositiones 
indemonstrabiles). The entire second book of the Posterior Analytics treats these two 
types of principles and the manner in which we come to know them.67 Every 
demonstration requires a medium or middle term, which is a definition.68 As we know, 
a definition is a quid rei or ratio rei (as opposed to quid nominis or ratio nominis). It 
captures the quiddity, substance, or essence of a thing, that which is is grasped by our 
intellect in its first operation. Granted that our intellect is not so powerful as to grasp at 
once every possible essence, we often do not understand exactly what something is. 
Instead, we seize it generally. Thus, we initially possess a confused knowledge, and 
oftentimes we can confuse this one thing with something else. There are some special 
and complex techniques to make certain that we have a proper definition of something, 
                                                 
65 “Ostensum est autem in VII Metaphysicae quod complexa non definiuntur” (ibid. [p. 10, lin. 31-32]). 
66 “Omnis ratiocinans alia consideratione intuetur principia et conclusionem” (CG, I, 57, n. 475). 
“Conclusiones in principiis sunt in potentia” (ibid., n. 476). “Discursus attenditur secundum quod 
semotim cognoscimus principia, et ex eis in conclusiones venimus: si enim in ipsis principiis 
intueremur conclusiones ipsa principia cognoscendo, non esset discursus, sicut nec quando aliquid 
videmus in speculo” (ibid., 76, n. 650). “Si enim intellectus noster statim in ipso principio videret 
conclusionis veritatem, numquam intelligeret discurrendo et ratiocinando” (STh, I, 58, 4 c.). “Primo 
aliquis intelligit ipsa principia secundum se; postmodum autem intelligit ea in ipsis conclusionibus 
secundum quod assentit conclusionibus propter principia” (STh, I-II, 8, 3 c.). “Primo enim intellectus 
fertur in principia tantum, secundario fertur per principia in conclusiones” (De ver., 8, 15 c.). 
67 Cf. In Poster., II, 1 (Leon. 1*/2. p. 174, lin. 1-21). 
68 “Ex diffinitione subiecti et passionis sumatur medium demonstrationis” (ibid., I, 2 [p. 11, lin. 48-49]). 
“Principium autem sillogismi dici potest non solum propositio sed etiam diffinitio” (ibid., I, 5 [p. 26, 
lin 177-178]). “In demonstrationibus autem semper proceditur ex diffinitionibus” (ibid., I, 22 [p. 81, 
lin. 127-128]). Cf. ibid., I, 13 (p. 50, lin. 60-65). “Demonstrationis autem medium est definitio” (STh, 
I, 3, 5 c.).  
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but these lie beyond the scope of our discussion.69 In any event, it is always important to 
have a proper definition, for in demonstrations our reason always proceeds from 
definitions. Thus, we may say that a definition is to the intellect like something 
described sensorily to the senses. Definitions carry a considerable share of the required 
evidence for demonstrations.70 Consequently, definitions are assumed in order to 
understand something about which a doubt or question could arise.71 In conclusion, a 
property is predicated about the subject so that the subject becomes better known, which 
means that knowledge about it is more specific. Thus, the principles of a demonstration 
should contain in some way the definition of the property and of the subject.72 
When we define something, we grasp intellectually what something is, and in so 
doing it becomes possible to predicate things that are not directly experienced through 
our senses. Since our knowledge about these things is in this way universal, that is, 
abstracted from here and now (from material and temporal conditions), the object of our 
knowledge can be changeable in itself, though our knowledge remains scientific in the 
proper sense, that is to say, necessary. To be sure, our knowledge of changeable things 
is necessary, but this does not mean that we can necessarily know all singulars to which 
a given definition or demonstration applies. Changeable things themselves are by their 
very definition not necessary. In order to have a perfect science, we should take for 
demonstration a medium that is true always and in all cases (semper et de omni). We 
could also take for a demonstration such a medium that is true not always but only in 
majority of cases (sicut frequenter or ut in pluribus). This kind of medium rests upon 
a hypothesis that there is a certain regularity that allows us to take a universal truth as 
holding for all cases sharing this regularity. In consequence, such demonstration will 
not be of perfect kind, yet still it will remain a valid demonstration that holds for the 
                                                 
69 About this difficult art of constructing proper definitions see In Poster, II, 2-8 and 13-16 (Leon. 1*/2, 
p. 180-204 and 220-231). 
70 “Cum enim aliquid diffinitur, ita se habet ad intellectum, sicut id quod sensibiliter describitur se habet 
ad uisum. Et ideo dicit quod hec, scilicet diffinita in demonstratiuis scienciis, sunt ut uidere intellectu” 
(ibid., I, 22 [p. 81, lin. 123-127]). 
71 Cf. ibid., II, 1 (p. 174, lin. 23-25). 
72 “Diffinitio passionis perfici non potest sine diffinitione subiecti: manifestum est enim quod principia 
que continet diffinitio subiecti sunt principia passionis. Non ergo demonstratio resoluet in primam 
causam, nisi accipiatur ut medium demonstrationis diffinitio subiecti. Sic igitur oportet concludere 
passionem de subiecto per diffinitionem passionis, et ulterius diffinitionem passionis concludere de 
subiecto per diffinitionem subiecti” (In Poster., II, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 177, lin. 251-263]). “Diffinitio 
principaliter quidem est substancie, aliorum autem in quantum se habent ad substanciam” (ibid., II, 6 
[p. 195, lin. 144-146]). 
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majority of cases.73 Our knowledge in this sense can be certain ut in pluribus, i.e., 
insofar as something of necessity is in changeable things.74 This is especially important 
when we think about different aspects of human nature and moral issues. 
As was said earlier, a demonstrative syllogism consists of a subject, a predicate, 
and a middle term. The four questions enumerated in section 1.1 ask about the middle 
term, which is the reason or cause why we assent to the inherence of the predicate in the 
subject of the conclusion. The first and third questions ask if there is a middle term; 
whereas the second and fourth, presupposing a positive answer to the previous two 
questions, ask just what that middle term is.75 St. Thomas explains: 
It is obvious that a cause is the middle in a demonstration which enables one to know 
scientifically, because to know scientifically is to know the cause of a thing. But it is 
precisely the cause that is being sought in all the above questions.76  
 
Thus, the function of the middle term is to justify the inherence of a predicate in the 
subject. In other words, the middle term contains all the force of the demonstrative 
argument.77 For the middle term it can be assumed to be either quid or propter quid, 
because an est and quia ask about the existence of the subject or predicate and, as such, 
are not used as middle terms in a strict demonstration (although they serve as such in a 
demonstration quia). Aquinas manifestly says that “the same is to know quid est as to 
know the cause of the question an est just as it is the same to know propter quid and to 
                                                 
73 “Possunt accipi quedam inmediata principia eorum que sunt frequenter, ita quod ipsa principia sint aut 
fiant sicut frequenter. Huiusmodi tamen demonstrationes non faciunt simpliciter scire uerum esse quod 
concluditur, set secundum quid, scilicet quod sit uerum ut in pluribus, et sic etiam principia que 
assumuntur ueritatem habent; unde huiusmodi sciencie deficiunt a scienciis que sunt de necessariis 
absolute, quantum ad certitudinem demonstrationis” (ibid., II, 12 [p. 219, lin. 109-118]). 
74 “Est autem considerandum quod de hiis quidem que sunt sicut frequenter, contingit esse 
demonstrationem, in quantum in eis est aliquid necessitatis” (ibid, I, 42 [p. 158, lin. 46-49]). “Anything 
which occurs rarely he [natural philosopher] suspects immediately as having a per accidens cause, and 
not amenable to treatment by the methods of his science” (Wallace, The Role of Demonstration, p. 50).  
75 “Id quod est medium est ratio eius de quo queritur an sit … Cum ergo, cognito ‘quia est’, querimus 
‘propter quid’ est, aut, cognito ‘si est’, querimus ‘quid est’, tunc quaerimus quid sit medium” 
(In Poster., II, 1 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 175, lin. 142-143, 155-157). 
76 “Manifestum est enim quod causa est medium in demonstratione, que facit scire, quia scire est causam 
rei cognoscere; causa autem est quod queritur in omnibus predictis questionibus” (ibid., II,1 [p. 176, 
lin. 185-189]). “Non ergo demonstratio resoluet in primam causam, nisi accipiatur ut medium 
demonstrationis diffinitio subiecti. Sic igitur oportet concludere passionem de subiecto per 
diffinitionem passionis, et ulterius diffinitionem passionis concludere de subiecto per diffinitionem 
subiecti” (ibid. [p. 177, lin. 255-261]). 
77 “Terram esse rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat naturalis, et per aliud astrologus, astrologus enim 
hoc demonstrat per media mathematica, sicut per figuras eclipsium, vel per aliud huiusmodi; naturalis 
vero hoc demonstrat per medium naturale, sicut per motum gravium ad medium, vel per aliud 
huiusmodi. Tota autem virtus demonstrationis, quae est syllogismus faciens scire, ut dicitur in I Poster. 
dependet ex medio” (STh, I-II, 54, 2 ad 2). Cf. In Poster., I, 41 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 156, lin. 369-373); 
In Phys., II, 3, n. 9. 
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know the cause of the question quia est.”78 This follows the general rule that there has 
to be a cause for any thing’s existence.79 In books of logic the principle of causality 
comes to the fore as something evident for St. Thomas. I hope it will be clearer from the 
second part of this study that this principle follows simple understanding of what 
a contingent being is. A contingent being means “such that has not a sufficient cause in 
itself,” which amounts to “that which is caused.” Once we understand what it means “to 
be caused,” we understand also that there has to be a cause.80 As such, this principle is 
indemonstrable, but it is evident thanks to a proper understanding of terms.  
What are these causes? St. Thomas enumerates them as follows: 
There are four kinds of causes … One of these is the quod quid erat esse, i.e., the 
formal cause, which is the completeness of a thing’s essence. Another is the cause 
which, if given, the caused must also be given: this is the material cause, because 
things which follow on the necessity of matter are necessary absolutely, as is 
established in Physics II. The third is the cause which is the source of motion, i.e., the 
efficient cause. But the fourth is that for the sake of which something is performed, 
namely, the final cause. And so it is clear that through the middle term in 
a demonstration all these causes are manifested, because each of these causes can be 
taken as the middle term of a demonstration.81 
 
One thing can have all four causes and according to these causes the process of 
explanation is completed. In things that have four causes, two of them are intrinsic 
(matter and form, which constitute the essence of the thing) and two are extrinsic 
(efficient and final cause). Because one cause is in a way the cause of another, there 
exists a sequence among causes: “the agent acts for an end and unites the form to the 
                                                 
78 “Idem est scire quid est et scire causam questionis ‘an est’, sicut idem est scire ‘propter quid’ et scire 
causam questionis ‘quia est’” (In Poster., II, 7 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 198, lin. 28-31]). “Sicut se habet 
quaestio propter quid ad quaestionem quia, ita se habet quaestio quid est ad quaestionem an est: nam 
quaestio propter quid quaerit medium ad demonstrandum quia est aliquid, puta quod luna eclipsatur; et 
similiter quaestio quid est quaerit medium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum doctrinam traditam in 
II Posteriorum. Videmus autem quod videntes quia est aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant propter 
quid” (CG, III, 50, n. 2278). 
79 “Oportet quod eius quod est rem esse, sit aliqua causa” (In Poster., II, 7 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 198, lin. 33-
34]). 
80 Cf. In Poster., II, 18 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 236, lin. 27-42).  
81 “Sunt autem quatuor genera causarum … Una est ‘quod quid erat esse’, id est causa formalis, que est 
completiua essencie rei; alia autem est causa, qua posita necesse est causatum poni, et hec est causa 
materialis, quia ea que consequntur ex necessitate materie sunt necessaria absolute, ut habetur in 
II Phisicorum; tercia autem causa est que est principium motus, id est causa efficiens; quarta autem 
causa est cuius gracia fit aliquid, scilicet causa finalis; et ita patet quod per medium demonstrationis 
omnes hee cause manifestantur, quia quelibet harum causarum potest accipi ut medium 
demonstrationis” (In Poster., II, 9 [p. 206, lin. 17-31]). See also further in this lesson for the examples 
how particular causes are taken as a medium in demonstration. 
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matter.”82 The efficient cause can be impeded in its operation in natural things; 
therefore, such contingency disqualifies it from any valid scientific demonstration.83 
Nonetheless, there is a possibility of demonstrating from the final cause, which is 
somehow a cause of the efficient. Supposing that the end is to be attained, we can show 
what is necessary for the efficient cause to be (the same works for formal and material 
cause). Aquinas gives an example of such demonstration ex suppositione finis, 
demonstrating virtue from the end of the human being, that is, from happiness.84 This 
leads to the claim that the final cause is the cause of causes.85 In this way, we can 
construct a definition that answers not only the question quid est but also propter quid. 
Obviously, there are things that happen by chance or luck, i.e., things that do not have 
a cause per se, but per accidens. Again, St. Thomas gives an example from purposeful 
human action, which can have a cause either per se (entering the house to take 
something) or per accidens (unconsciously avoiding somebody’s attack by the fact of 
entering the house to take something – the avoidance was not directly caused by the 
agent).86  
In one place Aristotle says that there are things that do not have causes, that is, 
external causes, which are not the essence of something.87 St. Thomas interprets his 
words in three ways, the third of which seems to be the most plausible reading. It relates 
that there exist things having no cause in the subject genus of some particular science, 
as for example when in arithmetic we suppose what unity is and that it is.88 The 
definitions of such immediate things (immediate in relation to the subject genus) are 
simply accepted as some immediate indemonstrable principles. And so, Aquinas, 
following Aristotle, says that there are three kinds of definitions in relation to 
demonstration:  
                                                 
82 “Nam agens operatur propter finem et unit formam materie” (ibid. II, 7 [p. 198, lin. 40-41]). 
“Manifestum est enim in rebus habentibus quatuor causas, quod una causa est quodam modo causa 
alterius” (ibid., II, 8 [p. 202, lin. 28-30]).  
83 For a long discussion and analysis of the possibility of a true predication about singular future events, 
see In Peryerm., I, 13-15 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 66, lin. 85 – p. 82, lin. 122). This passage contains also 
a defense of the roots of contingency, which defense, St. Thomas admits, seems “logici negotii modum 
excedere” (ibid., I, 14 [p. 79, lin. 522]). 
84 Cf. In Poster., II, 7 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 198, lin. 45-68). 
85 Cf. ibid., II, 8 (p. 202, lin. 27-43). 
86 Cf. ibid., II, 9 (p. 209, lin. 291-314). 
87 “Presupponit quod quorundam est quedam altera causa, quorundam autem non” (ibid., II, 8 [p. 201, 
lin. 5-7]). 
88 Cf. ibid., II, 8 (p. 202, lin. 65-69). 
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For there is a definition which is an indemonstrable reason of what something is; and 
this is that which he said to be of immediate things. Another kind of definition is as it 
were a demonstrative syllogism of what something is; and this does not differ from 
a demonstration as only in form, i.e., according to different arrangement of words … 
The third kind of definition is that which only signifies what something is, and this 
one is a conclusion of demonstration.89 
 
 These immediate indemonstrable principles deserve special attention in this 
study, for they (or their feature, namely, their autonomy) seem to be a key issue for 
a proper interpretation of the “Is/Ought Thesis.” St. Thomas recognizes the validity of 
Aristotle’s proof that in demonstrative sciences we need first indemonstrable principles, 
because otherwise we would fall into circularity.90 It is impossible to demonstrate 
everything. Some propositions are simply self-evident in themselves, because their 
predicate is contained in the subject.91 In other words, propositions are self-evident that 
can be seen as necessarily true once their terms are known. Besides being true, this type 
of proposition is also immediate, so as to ground the necessity of a scientific 
conclusion.92 Self-evident propositions are necessarily true and immediate, and this 
makes them at the same time primary, because they have no propositions prior to them. 
Reasoning is compared to understanding as movement to rest. And just as in every 
movement there is some initial immobility, so also reasoning proceeds from certain 
truths absolutely understood, namely, from first principles.93 In every demonstration we 
need some principles that are better known than the conclusion, and there should be 
some principles which are not conclusions but are best known in themselves, without 
any demonstration. Therefore, there is no scientia of these immediate indemonstrable 
                                                 
89 “Ex hoc ergo concludit quod triplex est genus definitionis per comparationem ad demonstrationem: 
quedam enim est diffinitio que est indemonstrabilis ratio eius ‘quod quid est’, et hec est illa quam 
dixerat esse immediatorum; alia uero est diffinitio que est quasi quidam sillogismus demonstratiuus 
eius ‘quod quid est’, et non differt a demonstratione nisi casu, id est secundum diuersam acceptionem 
et positionem dictionum … tercia autem est diffinitio que est solum significatiua ipsius ‘quid est’ et est 
conclusio demonstrationis” (ibid., II, 8 [p. 204, lin. 179-191]).  
90 Cf. In Poster., I, 7-8 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 41-35). “Non est in omnibus eodem modo causa inquirenda, 
alioquin procederetur in infinitum in demonstrationibus, sed in quibusdam sufficit quod bene 
demonstretur, id est manifestetur, quoniam hoc ita est; sicut in his quae accipiuntur in aliqua scientia ut 
principia; quia principium oportet esse primum, unde non potest resolvi in aliquid prius” (In Eth., I, 11 
[Leon. 47/1, p. 40, lin. 99-106]). 
91 “Propositiones per se notae sunt quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur” (In Meta., IV, 5, n. 595). 
“Principia per se nota sunt illa quae statim intellectis terminis cognoscuntur ex eo quod praedicatum 
ponitur in definitione subiecti” (STh, I, 17, 3 ad 2). Cf. In Poster., I, 30 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 109-110, lin. 
70); II, 5 (p. 192, lin. 167-192); STh, I, 82, 2; 85, 6; I-II, 94, 2; I-II, 47, 6; De malo, 3, 3; 16, 7 ad 18; 
De ver., 11, 1; Quodl., 8, 4; In De ebdom., 1 (Leon. 50, p. 269, lin. 118-185). 
92 Cf. Edward D. Simmons, “Demonstration and Self-Evidence,” p. 3-26. 
93 Cf. STh, I, 79, 8. 
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principles, because to have scientia we need to have a demonstration. If we cannot have 
a demonstration of these principles, we do not have any scientia of them. Along with 
Aristotle, Aquinas rejects the Platonic opinion that we have the habit of these principles 
but it escapes our notice. As evidence to the contrary, we form demonstrations for 
which it is necessary to have some principles which are better known, and are 
indemonstrable. We cannot be unconscious that we have such a knowledge of 
principles.94 It is also unacceptable to Aristotle and Aquinas to suggest that the 
knowledge of these principles is generated in us totally anew, following utter ignorance 
and without any other habit.95 
 Aristotle says that it is necessary for us to have, from the beginning, a kind of 
cognitive power, which precedes the knowledge of the principles but is less certain than 
the knowledge of principles. St. Thomas concludes that “the knowledge of principles 
does not come about in us from pre-existing knowledge in the same way as things 
which are known through demonstration.”96 This cognitive power we share with other 
animals; it is sense cognition. Sense cognition is not equal in every animal. Some 
animals seem not to have memory of this cognition, whereas others do. Further, some 
animals seem not to calculate over what remains in memory, while some animals 
visibly do so.97 In the case of human beings there is still another step to be made: 
Now, from memory many times referred to the same thing, but in diverse singulars, 
there arises experience, because experience seems to be nothing else than taking 
something from many things retained in the memory. However, experience requires 
some reasoning about the particulars, in that one is compared to another: and this is 
peculiar to reason.98 
 
As an example, Aquinas speaks of someone remembering that some herb cured fever 
many times. This already is called an experience. Reason does not stop at any particular 
experience. From many particular cases it takes something common (unum commune), 
which can be considered as something universal, without considering every feature of 
each particular experience – “and this something common accepts as a principle of an 
                                                 
94 Cf. In Poster., II, 20 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 243, n. 41-56). 
95 Cf. In Poster., II, 20 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 243-244, lin. 57-79). 
96 “Non eodem modo principiorum cognitio fit in nobis ex praeexistenti cognitione sicut accidit in hiis 
que cognoscuntur per demonstrationem” (In Poster., II, 20 [p. 244, lin. 99-102]). 
97 Cf. ibid. (p. 244, lin. 103-133). 
98 “Ex memoria autem multociens facta circa eandem rem, in diuersis tamen singularibus, fit 
experimentum, quia experimentum nichil aliud esse uidetur quam accipere aliquid ex multis in 
memoria retentis. Sed tamen experimentum indiget aliqua ratiocinatione circa particularia, per quam 
confertur unum ad aliud, quod est proprium rationis” (ibid., II, 20 [p. 244-245, lin. 147-154]). 
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art and science.”99 We have already treated briefly in section 3.2 what is universal and 
that it is the domain of the first act of the intellect to form it in the mind. We also 
mentioned in section 1.2 the difference between art and science, namely, that art 
concerns things that can be made (factibilia), whereas science concerns things that are 
necessary. Respectively, when the universal is taken about things that are to be made 
(e.g. healing or agriculture), it pertains to art and constitutes a rule for an art, and “if the 
universal bears on things which are always in the same way, it pertains to science.”100 
And lest anyone think that there is perhaps an exception, for example in moral science, 
St. Thomas adds clearly: “and this way [of acquiring principles], as described above, is 
the same for the principles of all sciences and arts.”101 Therefore we acquire the 
knowledge of first indemonstrable principles from our senses in the way of specifically 
understood induction.102 Because they are universal, these principles belong to the 
domain of intellectual knowledge. Senses alone cannot account for the existence and 
functioning of such principles, hence it is necessary to presuppose such a nature of the 
mind which can fully account for it. This is why the possible and active intellect are in 
this context mentioned by Aristotle. Yet it is good to note that the cognitive powers 
through which we acquire universal concepts are not themselves strictly speaking the 
habit of first principles, because this habit grasps not a universal nature but an evident 
common proposition which follows from the understanding of terms.103  
                                                 
99 “Et hoc commune accipit ut principium artis et sciencie” (ibid. [p. 245, lin. 162-163]). “Ex ipso enim 
lumine naturali intellectus agentis prima principia fiunt cognita, nec acquiruntur per ratiocinationes, 
sed solum per hoc quod eorum termini innotescunt. Quod quidem fit per hoc, quod a sensibilibus 
accipitur memoria et a memoria experimentorum et ab experimento illorum terminorum cognitio, 
quibus cognitis cognoscuntur huiusmodi propositiones communes, quae sunt artium et scientiarum 
principia” (In Meta., IV, 6, n. 599). Cf. Super III Sent., 34, 1, 2; 23, 3, 2 ad 1; STh, I-II, 51, 1. 
100 “Et ideo si uniuersale consideretur circa ea que semper eodem modo sunt, pertinet ad scienciam” 
(In Poster., II, 20 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 245, lin. 203-205]). 
101 “Et iste modus qui dictus est competit in principiis omnium scienciarum et artium” (ibid. [lin. 206-
207]). Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 6, 4 c. 
102 “Quia igitur uniuersalium cognitionem accipimus ex singularibus, concludit manifestum esse quod 
necesse est prima uniuersalia prinicipia cognoscere per inductionem” (In Poster., II, 20 [Leon. 1*/2, 
p. 246, lin. 282-285]). For a larger discussion of this Aristotelian solution and on its superiority over 
modern empiricist models see James D. Madden, “Aristotle, Induction, and First Principles,” 
International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2004): 35-52. “Ipsa autem principia non eodem modo 
manifestantur, sed quaedam considerantur inductione, quae est ex particularibus imaginatis, sicut in 
mathematicis, puta quod omnis numerus est par aut impar; quaedam vero accipiuntur sensu, sicut in 
naturalibus, puta quod omnie quod vivit indiget nutrimento; quaedam vero consuetudine, sicut in 
moralibus, utpote quod concupiscentiae diminuuntur si eis non obediamus; et alia etiam principia aliter 
manifestantur, sicut in artibus operativis accipiuntur principia per experientiam quandam” (In Eth., I, 
11 [Leon. 47/1, p. 40, lin. 106-116]). 
103 “Quidam posuerunt intellectum agentem idem esse cum intellectu qui est habitus principiorum. Quod 
esse non potest, quia intellectus qui est habitus principiorum presupponit aliqua iam intellecta in actu, 
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*   *   * 
 
Having discussed the first and second kinds of logical intentions in Chapter 3, in 
Chapter 4 we moved onto the topic of the third logical intention: the intention of 
consequence. This intention plays an essential role in the reasoning, that is, in drawing 
conclusions. Thus, in the context of what was said in Chapter 3, we were well prepared 
to appreciate Aquinas’s scientific methodology, which is for him a general manner of 
reliable explanation. The task of creating scientific methodology belongs to the third 
part of Aristotelian logic.  
St. Thomas’s scientific method is one of the privileged ways of saying what 
there is and what should be. What is most important is that this scientific method 
provides not only a description of phenomena, but also a causal explanation, which may 
– and sometimes should – include material, formal, efficient and final causality. We saw 
how the proper understanding of the first and second intentions is of use for the very 
foundations of scientific explanation. The logical inference was presented in the context 
of the conception of learning, which is based for Aristotle and Aquinas on the genuine 
act-potency conception. Following St. Thomas’s texts we analyzed what reasoning is 
and emphasized the role of the active intellect in drawing conclusions. We also noticed 
that concepts without their essential characteristic of referring necessarily to really 
existing things (concepts without intentions), would not allow us to draw any 
conclusion. And concepts which only accidentally represent extra-mental things would 
not allow us to draw necessary conclusions. Yet to understand how this general 
scientific method can be applied to particular sciences we focused on the distinction into 
formal and material logic.  
When causal explanation fulfills several conditions, enumerated and discussed 
by Aquinas, it may become a demonstration, which constitutes the source of science. 
We know by now that in order to fulfill these conditions sometimes it is necessary to 
demonstrate through final cause, ex suppositione finis. We only generally mentioned 
this possibility as it is treated in logic, but we will treat it once again in the second part. 
                                                                                                                                               
scilicet terminos principiorum per quorum intelligenciam cognoscimus principia” (In De An., III, 4 
[Leon. 45/1, p. 219, lin. 26-34]). More extensive elaboration of how we know the first indemonstrable 
principles see Régis, Epistemology, p. 369-423 and Joseph M. Christianson, “Aquinas: The Necessity 
and Some Characteristics of the Habit of First Indemonstrable (Speculative) Principles,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1988): 249-296. 
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Already now, however, it seems to be clear that the rejection of this logical instrument 
for attaining true demonstrations results in many difficulties for determining what there 
is and what should be.  
Another important component was to see kinds and functions of definitions in 
science, as well as the source and status of first indemonstrable principles. We did not 
enter into all the details of this elaborate theory of science, because this is not directly 
our topic. What was of interest to us was to see how the semantical framework and 
general approach of cognition result in the way of explanation in sciences. But we 
should still examine which particular science could provide such an explanation of the 
human being that it could possibly give the basis for moral science. This is not yet fully 
visible because we have not yet treated all the necessary elements constituting 
Aquinas’s understanding of our cognitive capacities. 
From what was said in the fourth chapter, at least one thing is worth special 
stress before we move to the second part. As we have seen, in St. Thomas’s view of 
science we should distinguish between science as a habit or intellectual virtue 
(i.e. somebody’s possession of a valid demonstration) and science as a discipline 
(i.e. a methodologically determined field of human knowledge with objective rules and 
procedures). Now, the requirement of necessity for premises dictates that when in 
a science an accident is taken as a subject for some property, it is necessary that there be 
a demonstration that this accident inheres in a substance, because the substance is its 
cause. That is to say, it is possible to take as a subject in science not only a substance, 
which in no way can be taken as a property of something, but also an accident really 
inhering in a substance, as well as an accident which constitutes a subject for other 
properties. In this case, the definition of the subject is assumed in this science of the 
accident, i.e., taken as proved or made evident in the science of this substance, which 
causes this accident. The definition of such an accident always refers to the real 
substance in which it inheres, even if this substance does not belong directly to the 
subject matter of a given science. Therefore, for a complete understanding of such 
a caused subject of science, there is a need for some previous demonstration, which 
belongs to a more fundamental or more general science.104 If one has no demonstration 
                                                 
104 Cf. In Poster., I, 2 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 11-12, lin. 75-112). “Demonstratiua sciencia non potest esse 
accidentium que non sunt per se, sicut determinatum est ‘per se’ superius, scilicet quod accidens ‘per 
se’ est in cuius diffinitione ponitur subiectum, sicut par aut impar est ‘per se’ accidens numeri; album 
autem animalis non est ‘per se’ accidens, quia animal non ponitur in eius diffinitione. Quod autem de 
huiusmodi accidentibus que non sunt per se, non possit esse demonstratio, sic probat: accidens quod 
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of what it is possible to demonstrate about the subject, one does not have a science but 
dialectical knowledge or opinion. Obviously, the demonstration about the subject is 
impossible within a particular discipline, because “no science demonstrates its 
principles”: each discipline should remain within its limits under the threat of an error in 
demonstrating.105 Particular sciences differ from dialectics in so far as they do not 
question about premises, but only about conclusions.106 A particular discipline remains 
a science in so far as it is a discipline respecting scientific rules. But a person who 
wants to acquire the science of something (science as an intellectual virtue), according 
to some particular discipline, has to be aware of the way of demonstrating about the 
subject, even if it exceeds the limits of this particular science as a discipline.  
This conclusion is important, especially when we want to account for the status 
of moral science, which has an accident for its subject (namely human action), 
considered under a special aspect (ordered to an end).107 Moral science takes for granted 
and does not prove that human action is really caused by human beings, nor does it 
consider the character of this or these causes. For St. Thomas it was obvious that false 
anthropological solutions result in undermining the relation of causality in human 
activity and so may simply destroy the principles of moral science and the whole of 
moral science.108 Anthropology, as the science of human being, constitutes one of the 
                                                                                                                                               
non est per se contingit non inesse (de hoc enim accidente loquimur); si ergo demonstratio fieret de 
accidente quod non est per se, sequeretur quod conclusio demonstrationis non esset necessaria, cuius 
contrarium supra ostensum est. Quod autem accidens quod non est ‘per se’, non necessario insit, ex 
hoc potest haberi: Si enim aliquod accidens ex necessitate et semper insit subiecto, oportet quod 
causam habeat in subiecto, qua posita, non possit accidens non inesse. Quod quidem contingit 
dupliciter: uno modo, quando ex principiis speciei accidens causatur, et tale accidens dicitur per se 
passio uel proprium; alio modo quando accidens causatur ex principiis indiuidui, et hoc est accidens 
inseparabile. Omne autem accidens quod causatur ex principiis subiecti, si debeat diffiniri, oportet 
quod subiectum ponatur in sua definitione: nam unumquodque diffinitur ex propriis principiis; et sic 
oportet omne accidens, quod ex necessitate inest subiecto, esse accidens per se. Illa ergo quae non sunt 
per se, non ex necessitate insunt” (ibid., I, 14 [p. 53-54, lin. 14-46]). 
105 “Nulla enim sciencia probat sua principia … quia contingit in aliqua sciencia probari principia illius 
sciencie, in quantum illa sciencia assumit principia alterius sciencie, sicut geometra probat sua 
principia secundum quod assumit formam philosophi primi” (In Poster., I, 21 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 77, lin. 
73-79; cf. lin. 80-110). Before saying this, St. Thomas clarified: “Et quod dictum est de geometria, 
intelligendum est in aliis scienciis, quia scilicet propositio uel interrogatio dicitur proprie alicuius 
scientie ex qua demonstratur uel in ipsa sciencia uel in sciencia ei subalternata” (ibid. [lin. 54-58]). 
106 “Sciendum tamen est quod interrogatio aliter est in scientiis demonstratiuis et aliter est in dyalectica: 
in dyalectica enim non solum interrogatur de conclusione, set etiam de premissis, de quibus 
demonstrator non interrogat, set ea sumit quasi per se nota uel per talia principia probata; set interrogat 
tantum de conclusione; set, cum eam demonstrauerit, utitur ea ut propositione, ad aliam conclusionem 
demonstrandam” (ibid., [p. 76-77, lin. 32-40]). 
107 Cf. In Eth., I, 1 (Leon. 47/1, p. 4, lin. 40-43). 
108 Criticizing Plato, who “non uult hominem ex anima et corpore esse, sed animam corpore utentem et 
uelut indutam corpore,” and Plotinus, who “ipsam animam hominem esse testatur,” St. Thomas says 
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integral parts of the science which has for its subject changing being.109 One cannot 
know scientifically the moral character of human acts without knowing what human 
acts are and what human nature is, as you cannot know what even and odd are without 
knowing what number is. To be sure, we can know somehow the moral character of 
human acts without having an explicit knowledge of the nature of human acts or an 
explicit knowledge of human nature. But if we agree with Aquinas that ethics is a moral 
science, then it is not sufficient to know somehow – we should strive to know in 
a scientific way, as far as it is possible. In order to fulfill to a proper degree the 
conditions of scientific knowledge, understood as having the virtue of science in moral 
matters, we cannot dispense ourselves from studying a science on which ethics is based 
as an accident on a substance.  
Note how far this is from our contemporary conviction that if one is a moralist, 
one has no need to bother about other sciences. It is true that within the domain of moral 
science one cannot demonstrate the subject, one can only assume it. Yet, this does not 
mean for Aquinas that the person who wants to have the virtue of science in moral 
matters, i.e. to possess moral demonstrations, can dispense himself from having 
demonstrations of more fundamental issues. Methodological order kept only within 
a particular science (understood as a discipline) like, for example, moral science, 
coupled with having a blind eye to any influence of other sciences, results in the fact 
that this order simply does not supply any science (understood as a virtue). For Aquinas 
we should also keep methodological order among sciences as disciplines in order to 
really possess a virtue of science, and, above all, to possess wisdom. Obviously, the 
situation changes when we start to think about moral theology, but not so significantly 
                                                                                                                                               
that “Secundum istorum positionem, destruuntur moralis philosophie principia: subtrahitur enim quod 
est in nobis. Non enim est aliquid in nobis nisi per uoluntatem; unde et hoc ipsum uoluntarium dicitur, 
quod in nobis est. Voluntas autem in intellectu est, ut patet per dictum Aristotilis in III De anima … Si 
igitur intellectus non est aliquid huius hominis ut sit uere unum cum eo, sed unitur ei solum per 
fantasmata uel sicut motor, non erit in hoc homine uoluntas, sed in intellectu separato. Et ita hic homo 
non erit dominus sui actus, nec aliquis eius actus erit laudabilis uel uituperabilis: quod est diuellere 
principia moralis philosophie. [Quod est] absurdum, et uite humane contrarium” (De unitate 
intellectus, 3 [Leon. 43, p. 305-306, lin. 261-265 and 336-355]). Also from the opinion, according to 
which there is “unus intellectus omnium, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit unus intelligens, et per 
consequens unus uolens, et unus utens pro sue uoluntatis arbitrio omnibus illis secundum que homines 
diuersificantur ad inuicem. … Quod est manifeste falsum et impossibile: repugnat enim hiis que 
apparent, et destruit totam scientiam moralem et omnia que pertinent ad conuersationem ciuilem, que 
est hominibus naturalis, ut Aristotiles dicit” (ibid., 4 [p. 308, lin. 81-85 and 91-95]). According to 
Aquinas, also claiming that not the intellectus possibilis but the intellectus passivus is the act of the 
body, is “destructivum totius moralis philosophiae et politicae conversationis” (CG, II, 60, n. 1374). 
109  Cf. In Poster., I, 25 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 89-92). 
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as to invalidate the main claim of this paragraph. We shall return to this problem in 
following chapters.  
I have not yet directly taken up the problem of defining goodness in the quest for 
the foundations of moral science – the problem advanced by G. E. Moore. From what 
has been said so far on defining basic concepts and on acquiring indemonstrable 
principles we may, however, already account for some considerable discrepancies 
between the approaches of Aquinas and Moore. I will delay this discussion until some 
additional clarifications have been furnished in the second part, so that we may be better 
armed to handle the issue.
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Aquinas’s Way of Constructing Human “Is” 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The Division of Theoretical Sciences 
 
 
While delineating the scope of art in section 1.1, it was already mentioned that 
the element distinguishing the speculative sciences from the practical ones is what could 
be called a “feasibility feature,” that is, in the practical sciences (this category comprises 
all arts and moral science) we consider what we can do or make, whereas in the 
speculative sciences we consider what we cannot make but only discover. The aim 
therefore of practical science is an action or operation, while the aim of speculative 
science is simply knowledge.1 For now we will leave aside practical sciences. Our 
concern at the moment is this question: how many ways can one speak scientifically of 
what is. We saw in Chapter 4 that in the Aristotelian approach the descriptive sciences, 
or sciences of matter of fact, are never merely descriptive of our sense experience. 
Though this is a necessary first step in growing in scientific knowledge, the descriptive 
sciences persevere toward reasoning and grasping intellectually the causes of our 
experience. This is why the descriptive sciences are more properly called the 
speculative sciences. To proceed in our study of determining how and why Aquinas 
grounds the “ought” in the “is,” we need to examine his treatment of the speculative 
sciences and identify in exactly which one he places the human “is.” By studying in 
greater detail St. Thomas’s particular study of the “is,” we may uncover the beginnings 
of his movement toward the “ought.” 
                                                 
1 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1. 
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Since in the speculative sciences knowledge is always the domain of the 
intellect, which itself is immaterial, the object of the speculative faculty (speculabilium) 
must conform to the immateriality of the intellect. Immateriality is a prerequisite of 
intelligibility. Accordingly, St. Thomas holds that material things to which we have 
immediate cognitive access are unintelligible in themselves unless in our cognitive 
powers they become immaterial and unless an active cognitive power renders them 
intelligible.2 Immateriality may thus be called a condition for the object of science. This 
condition arises from the nature of the intellective faculty and thus concerns our mode 
of apprehending the object of science. There is another condition for the object of 
science which arises from the nature of the virtue of science. Following Aristotle, 
Aquinas repeats several times that science considers what is necessary, because science 
is supposed to achieve a certitude that the object cannot be other than it is. The 
requirement of necessity in this context means that the object should be immobile or 
immobilized, because something moving and changing is always other than it was 
before and thus there is in it some opposition to the necessity condition of science. On 
the basis of these two conditions – immateriality and immobility – the speculative 
sciences can be distinguished.3  
Because they can differ in the degree of their immateriality and immobility, 
diverse objects of the speculative faculty do not conform to the intellect in the same 
way. In order to understand these differences we should know that: 
when habits or powers are distinguished according to their objects, they are not 
distinguished according to just any difference of objects, but according to those which 
essentially characterize the objects as objects. For instance, to be either animal or 
plant is accidental to a sensible thing as sensible; and so the distinction of the senses 
is not taken from this difference, but rather from the difference of colour and sound. 
Consequently, the speculative sciences must be distinguished according to the 
differences among objects of speculation precisely as objects of speculation.4 
                                                 
2 Material things are actually sensible but not intelligible in themselves: “Sicut Philosophus dicit in III 
De anima, ‘sicut separabiles sunt res a materia, sic et que circa intellectum sunt’: unumquodque enim 
intantum est intelligibile, inquantum est a materia separabile. Vnde ea que sunt secundum naturam a 
materia separata, sunt secundum se ipsa intelligibilia actu; que uero sunt a nobis a materialibus 
condicionibus abstracta, fiunt intelligibilia actu per lumen nostri intellectus agentis” (In De sensu, I, 
prohem. [Leon. 45/2, p. 3, lin. 1-9]). “Ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale. Sed 
quia Aristotiles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia 
existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu: sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium quas 
intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu” (STh, I, 79, 3 c.). Cf. In Meta., IV, 14, n. 706-707. 
3 Cf. Super Boet. De Trin., 5, 1. 
4 “Quando habitus uel potentie penes obiecta distinguuntur, non distinguuntur penes quaslibet 
differentias obiectorum, set penes illas que sunt per se obiectorum in quantum sunt obiecta: esse enim 
animal uel plantam accidit sensibili in quantum est sensibile, et ideo penes hoc non sumitur distinctio 
sensuum, set magis penes differentiam coloris et soni; et ideo oportet scientias speculatiuas diuidi per 
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According to St. Thomas, every specific object of speculation is distinguished by an 
essential difference in the way of consideration. Particularly, the main concern is about 
the manner of defining what is considered in speculative science (speculabilium):  
since every science is established through demonstration, and since the definition is 
the middle term in demonstration, it is necessary that sciences be distinguished 
according to the diverse modes of definition.5 
  
Three kinds of speculabilia can be distinguished according to the degree of remoteness 
from matter and motion.6 Despite this distinction, it is important to remember that these 
speculabilia may originate from or concern the same real thing.  
St. Thomas follows Aristotle in saying that there are three speculative sciences 
which complementarily deal with this diversity: natural science, mathematics and 
metaphysics.7 These sciences are distinguished on the basis of the manner of defining 
because definition is the middle term in demonstration and the diversity of speculative 
sciences follows precisely from the different characteristics of definitions.8 Natural 
science (physica or scientia naturalis or philosophia naturalis) treats such speculabilia, 
which exist only in matter and cannot be understood without sensible matter. 
Mathematics considers speculabilia which exist in matter but can be understood without 
                                                                                                                                               
differentias speculabilium in quantum speculabilia sunt” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1). Cf. In Poster., I, 41 
(Leon. 1*/2, p. 154-155, lin. 242-300); STh, I, 77, 3; I-II, 54, 2. 
5 “Sciendum est igitur quod, cum omnis scientia sit in intellectu, per hoc autem aliquid fit intelligibile in 
actu, quod aliqualiter abstrahitur a materia; secundum quod aliqua diversimode se habent ad materiam, 
ad diversas scientias pertinent. Rursus, cum omnis scientia per demonstrationem habeatur, 
demonstrationis autem medium sit definitio; necesse est secundum diversum definitionis modum 
scientias diversificari” (In Phys., I, 1, n. 1). 
6 “To say that the basic sciences are divided by (a) three kinds of immobility; (b) three kinds of 
immateriality; (c) three orders of abstraction; or (d) three modes of definition is to say the same thing” 
(Vincent Edward Smith, The General Science of ature [Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 
1958], p. 14). 
7 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1; In Meta., VI, 1, n. 1166. 
8 “Ad cognoscendum differentiam scientiarum speculativarum adinvicem, oportet non latere quidditatem 
rei, et ‘rationem’ idest definitionem significantem ipsam, quomodo est assignanda in unaquaque 
scientia. Quaerere enim differentiam praedictam ‘sine hoc’, idest sine cognitione modi definiendi, nihil 
facere est. Cum enim definitio sit medium demonstrationis, et per consequens principium sciendi, 
oportet quod ad diversum modum definiendi, sequatur diversitas in scientiis speculativis” (In Meta., 
VI, 1, n. 1156). “Et quia habitus alicuius potencie distinguuntur specie secundum differentiam eius 
quod est per se obiectum potencie, necesse est quod habitus scienciarum, quibus intellectus perficitur, 
distinguantur secundum differenciam separabilis a materia, et ideo Philosophus in VI Metaphisice 
distinguit genera scienciarum secundum diuersum modum separationis a materia: nam ea que sunt 
separata a materia secundum esse et rationem pertinent ad metaphisicum, que autem sunt separata 
secundum rationem et non secundum esse pertinent ad mathematicum, que autem in sui ratione 
concernunt materiam sensibilem pertinent ad naturalem” (In De sensu, I, 1, n. 1 [Leon. 45/2, p. 3, lin. 
9-22]). 
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sensible matter, meaning that in their definition there is no sensible matter.9 Finally, 
metaphysics (metaphysica or scientia divina or theologia or philosophia prima) reflects 
on what does not depend on matter at all.10  
 
 
5.1. Natural science 
 
Devoid of Heraclitean and Platonic pessimism, in the Aristotelian account 
natural science can be a science in the strict sense despite the fact that it treats things 
existing in matter which cannot be understood without sensible matter (such really 
existing things are by definition mobile, changeable, unnecessary). Natural science is 
possible because it treats such things insofar as there exists something of necessity in 
them. Aquinas remarks that “nothing is so contingent that it did not have something 
necessary in it.”11 It was indicated in sections 3.1 and 4.3 that we are able to abstract 
necessary universals from unnecessary singulars.12 These universals are not mobile in 
themselves, since when they are considered in science they are abstracted from their 
individuating conditions in temporal and spatial dimensions, i.e. from materia signata, 
or materia particularis or singularis. As Aquinas explains: “The forms and natures of 
                                                 
9 “Et ex hoc accipitur differentia inter mathematicam et scientiam naturalem; quia naturalis scientia est 
de his in quorum definitionibus ponitur materia sensibilis. Mathematica vero est de aliis, in quorum 
definitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis, licet habeant esse in materia sensibili” (In Meta., XI, 7, 
n. 2258). 
10  Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 c. and ad 1; In Phys., I, 1, n. 2; In Meta., XI, 7, n. 2264. 
11  “Nihil enim est adeo contingens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat” (STh, I, 86, 3). “Omnis motus 
supponit aliquid immobile, cum enim transmutatio fit secundum qualitatem, remanet substantia 
immobilis; et cum transmutatur forma substantialis, remanet materia immobilis. Rerum etiam 
mutabilium sunt immobiles habitudines, sicut Socrates etsi non semper sedeat, tamen immobiliter est 
verum quod, quandocumque sedet, in uno loco manet. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet de rebus mobilibus 
immobilem scientiam habere” (STh, I, 84, 1 ad 3). 
12  “Vt autem probatur in VII Metaphisice, cum in substantia sensibili inueniatur et ipsum integrum, id 
est compositum, et ratio id est forma eius, per se quidem generatur et corrumpitur compositum, non 
autem ratio siue forma, set solum per accidens … et ideo forme et rationes rerum quamuis in motu 
exsistentium, prout in se considerantur absque motu sunt; et sic de eis sunt scientie et diffinitiones” 
(In Boet. De Trin., 5, 2 c.). “Immanuel Kant … raised the question as to how scientific knowledge is 
possible at all, considering that science must be always contingent and concrete. His answer was in 
terms of the famous distinction between phenomena and noumena. He proposed that the phenomena, 
or the appearances of things, can be known scientifically, whereas the noumena, or things-in-
themselves, are forever inaccessible to human reason. Once Kant’s solution was accepted, natural 
philosophy as traditionally understood became impossible and natural science inherited the only task 
that was left, that, namely, of collecting data and analyzing phenomena as these present themselves in 
human experience” (William A. Wallace, “Defining the Philosophy of Science” as Essay I in From 
a Realist Point of View: Essays on the Philosophy of Science, 2nd ed. [Lanham-New York-London: 
University Press of America, 1983], p. 2-3).  
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things, though they be forms and natures of things existing in motion, are without 
motion according as they are considered in themselves.”13  
Admittedly, therefore, natural science considers such speculabilia that contain in 
their definitions sensible matter.14 But this sensible matter is understood, which means 
it belongs to the intellectual realm and not to the senses. As such this intellectual matter 
is called materia sensibilis non signata, or materia communis or universalis.15 Back in 
section 3.5 we saw that one can attribute something to a universal not only as it exists in 
the intellect, but also as it exists in singulars. Moreover, this attribution to a universal 
can refer either to the essence (or essential principles) of the singular thing or to some of 
its accidents, as for example to quantity, quality, or action. By now, it should be clearer 
that natural science does not consider universals as they are in the intellect. These fall 
under the domain of logic or metaphysics. Instead, the universals proper to natural 
science are those that exist under material and mobile conditions.16 We must allow this 
brief description of natural science to suffice for the moment. In the next chapter we 
will give the issue more adequate attention. 
 
 
5.2. Mathematics 
 
Mathematical speculabilia differ from those of natural science by means of 
another kind of abstraction. In natural science there is an abstraction of a whole from its 
                                                 
13 “Forme et rationes rerum quamuis in motu exsistentium, prout in se considerantur, absque motu sunt” 
(In Boet. De Trin., 5, 2). 
14 Aquinas gives an example: “Ut in diffinitione hominis oportet accipere carnem et ossa” (In Boet. De 
Trin., 5, 1 c.). 
15 “Oportet quod secundum hoc aliquid sit mobile, quod est hic et nunc; hoc autem consequitur rem 
ipsam mobilem secundum quod est indiuiduata per materiam exsistentem sub dimensionibus signatis; 
unde oportet quod huiusmodi rationes, secundum quas de rebus mobilibus possunt esse scientie, 
considerantur absque materia signata et absque omnibus his que consequntur materiam signatam, non 
autem absque materia non signata, quia ex eius notione dependet notio forme que determinat sibi 
materiam; et ideo ratio hominis, quam significat diffinitio et secundum quam procedit scientia, 
consideratur sine his carnibus et sine his ossibus, non autem sine carnibus et ossibus absolute. Et quia 
singularia includunt in sui ratione materiam signatam, uniuersalia uero materiam communem, ut dicitur 
in VII Metaphisice, ideo predicta abstractio non dicitur forme a materia absolute, set uniuersalis 
a particulari” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 2 c.). Cf. ibid., 5, 2 ad 2. “Materia signata est individuationis 
principium a qua abstrahit omnis intellectus secundum quod dicitur abstrahere ab hic et nunc; 
intellectus autem naturalis non abstrahit a materia sensibili non signata: considerat enim hominem et 
carnem et os, in cuius definitione cadit sensibilis materia non signata” (De ver., 2, 6 ad 1). Cf. In Phys., 
II, 5, n. 4. 
16 “Rationes autem uniuersales rerum omnes sunt immobiles, et ideo quantum ad hoc omnis scientia de 
necessariis est; set rerum quarum sunt ille rationes, quedam sunt necessarie et immobiles, quedam 
contingentes et mobiles, et quantum ad hoc de rebus contingentibus et mobilibus dicuntur esse 
scientie” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 2 ad 4). Cf. ibid., 5, 2 c. 3; In Meta., VI, 1, n. 1155. 
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parts (abstractio totius), which here means an abstraction of a universal from 
particulars. This kind of abstraction is present in every science: each employs the 
abstraction of universals from particulars, for this is the condition of all intellectual 
knowledge.17 Mathematical abstraction (abstractio formae), however, abstracts a form 
from materia sensibilis non signata.18 This abstraction is not another step in the process 
of general abstraction proper to natural science, but it is another process, another kind of 
abstraction. This must be emphasized, because when we are talking about abstraction of 
form from matter, as opposed to the abstraction of universal from particular, we never 
mean the abstraction of substantial form, for “substantial form and matter corresponding 
to it, depend on each other, and one without another is unintelligible.”19 The abstraction 
proper to mathematics involves abstracting only the accident of quantity. 
St. Thomas states that not every form can be abstracted from matter in this way, 
but only such forms whose essence is intelligible independent from sensible matter.20 
Sensible matter (signata or non signata) is called also materia corporalis since it is a 
foundation for sensible qualities. Apart from sensible matter there is also something like 
intellectual matter. Substance is called in this way insofar as it constitutes the basis for 
quantity.21 Aquinas clarifies that all accidents are compared to their substance as form 
to matter and so their intelligibility depends upon substance; that is to say, they are 
understandable only as existing in substance.22 Earlier in section 2.2, while enumerating 
different categories, we said nothing about the proper order of accidents in relation to 
substance, because we were concerned more about the relation between real being and 
the being of reason. Now, considering the division of sciences, we are faced with this 
                                                 
17 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 c. 5. Cf. also Edward D. Simmons, “In Defense of Total and Formal 
Abstraction,” The ew Scholasticism 29 (1955): 427-440. 
18 Cf. De ver., 2, 6 ad 1. 
19 “Cum dicimus formam abstrai a materia, non intelligitur de forma substantiali, quia forma substantialis 
et materia sibi correspondens dependent ad inuicem, ut unum sine alio non possit intelligi, eo quod 
proprius actus in propria materia fit; set intelligitur de forma accidentali, que est quantitas et figura” (In 
Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 c.). 
20 “Forma autem illa potest a materia aliqua abstrai, cuius ratio essentie non dependet a tali materia, ab 
illa autem materia non potest forma abstrai per intellectum a qua secundum sue essentie rationem 
dependet” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 c.). 
21 Cf. STh, I, 85, 1 ad 2. 
22 “Vnde cum omnia accidentia comparentur ad substantiam subiectam sicut forma ad materiam, et 
cuiuslibet accidentis ratio dependeat ad substantiam, impossibile est aliquam talem formam 
a substantia separari” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 c.). The matter or material cause of a substance is part of 
the substance, while the matter or material cause of an accident is not part of the accident but rather its 
appropriate subject: cf. STh, I-II, 55, 4; In Meta., VIII, 4, n. 1742-1745. 
5. The Division of Theoretical Sciences 
 150
order of accidents because it is the key to understanding the difference between natural 
science and mathematics.  
We recognize an order to exist between individual accidents of a substance 
(which means, that some of them are related to substance more fundamentally than 
others) when we perceive that the comprehension of some accidents does not depend on 
the comprehension of others, though the comprehension of some accidents does depend 
in this way. Hence, there are some accidents which are more fundamentally or primarily 
related to their substance than others, while the others require understanding both their 
substance and its other accidents to become intelligible. Consequently, we receive the 
dictum that what is more knowable intellectually, that is what has precedence in the 
intellectual order, can be understood without what is posterior, but not conversely.23 
Accordingly, in the analysis of accidents, quantity appears as the most fundamental 
accident, which we can understand only in dependence upon substance and without any 
dependence on other accidents.24 Obviously, this “without any dependence” is to be 
taken secundum rationem, et non secundum esse,25 because in reality quantity does not 
exist without sensible matter and it would be impossible to perceive a quantity as it 
exists in things without other accidents.26 Quantity, therefore, is posterior in our 
perception as regards quality, for it is known through some sensible qualities. But being 
prior in relation to substance, quantities can be understood without sensible qualities, in 
abstraction from sensible matter, although not in abstraction from intellectual matter. In 
other words, quantity can be considered apart from matter but not apart from substance 
because with substance quantity is essentially united secundum rationem et secundum 
                                                 
23 “Manifestum est autem quod posteriora non sunt de intellectu priorum, sed e converso: unde priora 
possunt intelligi sine posterioribus, et non e converso” (In Phys., II, 3, n. 5). 
24 “Set accidentia superueniunt substantie quodam ordine: nam primo aduenit ei quantitas, deinde 
qualitas, deinde passiones et motus. Vnde quantitas potest intelligi in materia subiecta antequam 
intelligantur in ea qualitates sensibiles, a quibus dicitur materia sensibilis; et sic secundum rationem 
sue substantie non dependet quantitas a materia sensibili, set solum a materia intelligibili” (In Boet. De 
Trin., 5, 3 c.). “Inter accidentia omnia quae adveniunt substantiae, primo advenit ei quantitas, et deinde 
qualitates sensibiles et actiones et passiones et motus consequentes sensibiles qualitates. Sic igitur 
quantitas non claudit in sui intellectu qualitates sensibiles vel passiones vel motus: claudit tamen in sui 
intellectu substantiam. Potest igitur intelligi quantitas sine materia subiecta motui et qualitatibus 
sensibilibus, non tamen absque substantia” (In Phys., II, 3, n. 5). 
25 Cf. De pot., 9, 5 ad 8. 
26 “Quantitas dimensiva secundum suam rationem non dependet a materia sensibili, quamvis dependeat 
secundum suum esse” (Super IV Sent., 12, 1, 1 qc. 3 ad 2). “Quae enim coniuncta sunt in re, interdum 
divisim cognoscuntur … Sic etiam et intellectus intelligit lineam in materia sensibili existentem, 
absque materia sensibili: licet et cum materia sensibili intelligere possit. Haec autem diversitas accidit 
secundum diversitatem specierum intelligibilium in intellectu receptarum: quae quandoque est 
similitudo quantitatis tantum, quandoque vero substantiae sensibilis quantae” (CG, II, 75, n. 1551). 
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esse.27 Sensible qualities and movement can only be understood by presupposing 
quantity.28  
Mathematics is interested only in the accident of quantity and what pertains to it. 
In his science, therefore, the mathematician puts aside all the remaining accidents.29 
Mathematics is the abstract study of the quantities of physical objects. Hence, “the 
mathematician does not consider lines, and points, and surfaces, and things of this sort, 
and their accidents, insofar as they are the boundaries of a natural body,”30 to which we 
have an immediate cognitive contact through our senses. The mathematician abstracts 
from all these sensible qualities. This is possible because quantities and their accidents 
do not contain in their notions any sensible matter. Therefore, quantities and their 
accidents can be understood without any reference to sensible matter. Because sensible 
matter is also the subject of motion, it follows that all mathematical consideration 
secundum intellectum is abstracted also from any movement.31 It is worth underlining, 
however, that in Aquinas’s account mathematical consideration would not occur if we 
had no experience of sensible matter. Only after knowing material things as they are in 
their real existence, are we able to abstract some accident which is prior in se but not 
quoad nos, and treat it as separated, even if, as it exists, it is never separated. St. 
Thomas concludes that 
it is evident that mathematical science studies some things insofar as they are 
immobile and separate from matter, although they are neither immobile nor separable 
from matter in being. … Hence mathematical science differs from the philosophy of 
                                                 
27 “Manifestum est autem quod quantitas prius inest substantiae quam qualitates sensibiles. Unde 
quantitates, ut numeri et dimensiones et figurae, quae sunt terminationes quantitatum, possunt 
considerari absque qualitatibus sensibilibus, quod est eas abstrahi a materia sensibili, non tamen 
possunt considerari sine intellectu substantiae quantitati subiectae, quod esset eas abstrahi a materia 
intelligibili communi. Possunt tamen considerari sine hac vel illa substantia; quod est eas abstrahi 
a materia intelligibili individuali” (STh, I, 85, 1 ad 2). Cf. In Meta., VIII, 5, n. 1762. 
28 “Qualitates sensibiles non possint intelligi non preintellecta quantitate, sicut patet in superficie et 
colore; nec etiam potest intelligi esse subiectum motus quod non intelligitur quantum” (In Boet. De 
Trin., 5, 3 c.). “Res alique sunt sensibiles per qualitatem, quantitates autem preexistunt qualitatibus, 
unde mathematicus concernit solum id quod quantitatis est absolute, non determinans hanc uel illam 
materiam” (In De an., I, 2 [Leon. 45/1, p. 12, lin. 235-239]). 
29 “Quantitas potest intelligi in materia subiecta antequam intelligantur in ea qualitates sensibiles, 
a quibus dicitur materia sensibilis … Et de huiusmodi abstractis est mathematica, que considerat 
quantitates et ea que quantitates consequuntur, ut figuras et huiusmodi” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 c.). Cf. 
also Bertrand Mahoney, The otion of Quantity in a Thomistic Evaluation of the Sciences (River 
Forest, Ill., 1951). 
30 “Quia enim mathematicus considerat lineas et puncta et superficies et huiusmodi et accidentia eorum 
non inquantum sunt termini corporis naturalis, ideo dicitur abstrahere a materia sensibili et naturali” 
(In Phys., II, 3, n. 5). 
31 “Mathematica consideret ea quae sunt sine motu, sine quo actio et factio esse non possunt (In Meta., 
VI, 1, n. 1160). Cf. In Phys., II, 3, n. 5 and 7; In Meta., VIII, 5, n. 1760-1761; XI, 7, n. 2260. 
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nature in this respect, that while the philosophy of nature considers things whose 
definitions contain sensible matter (and thus it considers what is not separate insofar 
as it is not separate), mathematical science considers things whose definitions do not 
contain sensible matter. And thus even though the things which it considers are not 
separate from matter, it nevertheless considers them insofar as they are separate.32 
 
For St. Thomas, the abstraction that distinguishes mathematics from natural science in 
no way lessens mathematics’ status as a science. Compared to natural science, 
mathematics has only a different formal subject, whereas it shares with natural science 
the same sensory source of knowledge. It can happen that the natural scientist and 
mathematician may be drawn to the same really existing substance. Mathematics, 
however, does not say a word about what does not fall into its scope, because it 
abstracts from everything but the accident of quantity. Nor does the mathematician deny 
the discoveries of natural scientist. He would be overreaching if he concludes that 
nothing but quantity is capable of or even worth study.33 To be sure, mathematics 
considers only a part of reality. It fulfills its task by disregarding the material part of 
existing bodies, which falls under the purview of the natural scientist. Mathematical 
being is thus more abstract than the being of natural science, but not so abstract as not to 
be imaginable. Indeed, the imagination is of great use in mathematics. It is precisely to 
the evidence of imagination that the verification of mathematical arguments is reduced, 
whereas the verification in natural science is reduced to the evidence of external 
senses.34  
                                                 
32 “Hoc est manifestum, quod scientia mathematica speculatur quaedam inquantum sunt immobilia et 
inquantum sunt separata a materia sensibili, licet secundum esse non sint immobilia vel separabilia. … 
In hoc ergo differt mathematica a physica, quia physica considerat ea quorum definitiones sunt cum 
materia sensibili. Et ideo considerat non separata, inquantum sunt non separata. Mathematica vero 
considerat ea, quorum definitiones sunt sine materia sensibili. Et ideo, etsi sunt non separata ea quae 
considerat, tamen considerat ea inquantum sunt separata” (In Meta., VI, 1, n. 1161). 
33 “Et nihil differt quantum ad veritatem considerationis, utrum sic vel sic considerentur. Quamvis enim 
non sint abstracta secundum esse, non tamen mathematici abstrahentes ea secundum intellectum, 
mentiuntur: quia non asserunt ea esse extra materiam sensibilem (hoc enim esset mendacium), sed 
considerant de eis absque consideratione materiae sensibilis, quod absque mendacio fieri potest” 
(In Phys., II, 3, n. 5). Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 ad 1. 
34 “In qualibet cognitione duo est considerare, scilicet principium et terminum. Principium quidem ad 
appreensionem pertinet, terminus autem ad iudicium: ibi enim cognitio perficitur. Principium igitur 
cuiuslibet nostre cognitionis est in sensu … Set terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter: 
quandoque enim est in sensu, quandoque in ymaginatione, quandoque autem in solo intellectu. … 
Quedam uero sunt, quorum iudicium non dependet ex his que sensu percipiuntur, quia quamuis 
secundum esse sint in materia sensibili, tamen secundum rationem diffinitiuam sunt a materia sensibili 
abstracta; iudicium autem de unaquaque re potissime fit secundum eius diffinitiuam rationem. Set quia 
secundum rationem diffinitiuam non abstraunt a qualibet materia, set solum a sensibili et remotis 
sensibilibus conditionibus remanet aliquid ymaginabile, ideo in talibus oportet quod iudicium sumatur 
secundum id quod ymaginatio demonstrat; huiusmodi autem sunt mathematica. Et ideo in 
mathematicis oportet cognitionem secundum iudicium terminari ad ymaginationem, non ad sensum, 
quia iudicium mathematicum superat appreensionem sensus” (In Boet. De Trin., 6, 2 c.). 
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5.3. Metaphysics 
 
These two speculative sciences, natural science and mathematics, differ from the 
third, metaphysics, again on the account of the immateriality and immobility of the 
object. The intelligibility of the object of metaphysics is said to be independent from 
matter altogether. Metaphysical speculabilia are not only abstracted from materia 
signata as in natural science, “but from sensible matter altogether, and not only 
secundum rationem – as it is the case in mathematics, but also secundum esse, like in 
God and intelligences [i.e. angels].”35 Since these speculabilia de facto exist without 
matter, they are not, properly speaking, abstracted from matter. We come to know them 
as really separated from matter. Tied as our knowledge is to sensible phenomena, the 
existence of such beings – altogether separated from matter and therefore from motion – 
is not evident to us. As Aquinas states, the connatural objects of the human mind are 
sensible things. Everything else we know only if it is anchored in the knowledge of this 
connatural object. Consequently, human knowledge always remains dependent both 
epistemologically and linguistically on the knowledge of sensible things. Thus the 
possibility and need for such a science as metaphysics is not conceivable until we 
conclude the existence (which means, we should answer the question an sit) of at least 
one cause that is immaterial.36  
Natural science itself leads to the search for immaterial causes, for the natural 
scientist cannot fully explain the world of change without ultimately discovering that 
there must be a first cause, which itself cannot be material.37 Therefore, the dynamism 
of natural science leads to studying the first cause because no effect is fully known if its 
                                                 
 
35 “Ea vero sunt maxime a materia separata, quae non tantum a signata materia abstrahunt, sicut formae 
naturales in universali acceptae, de quibus tractat scientia naturalis, sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et 
non solum secundum rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et 
intelligentiae” (In Meta., prooem.) 
36 Cf. Ralph McInerny, Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), p. 187. 
37 “De primo motore non agitur in scientia naturali tamquam de subiecto uel de parte subiecti, set 
tamquam de termino ad quem scientia naturalis perducit. Terminus autem non est de natura rei cuius 
est terminus, set habet aliquam habitudinem ad rem illam, sicut terminus linee non est linea set habet 
ad eam aliquam habitudinem. Ita etiam et primus motor est alterius nature a rebus naturalibus, habet 
tamen ad eas aliquam habitudinem, in quantum influit eis motum, et sic cadit in consideratione 
naturalis, scilicet non secundum ipsum set in quantum est motor” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 2 ad 3). 
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cause remains unknown.38 After the preparation, consisting in a meticulous analysis of 
change, matter and form, fourfold causality, and many other elements taken from our 
sensory experience of material things, Physics culminates in Book VII and VIII in the 
proof of the existence of the Unmoved Mover which is the immaterial First Cause.39 
Therefore, since there is other being than material, we need another theoretical science 
besides natural science and mathematics.40  
As Aquinas relates, this conclusion changed Aristotle’s understanding of the 
scope of natural science. If there were no such immaterial and unchanging being, the 
subject of natural science would contain everything that exists. In other words, if the 
existence of immaterial being were not known, the only known being would be 
a material and changing being. Natural science, therefore, would consider ens 
simpliciter, or being in general, or being as being. Accordingly, substance and accident, 
essence and existence, potency and act, one and the many, truth and goodness, causes 
and effects, and everything else that belongs to being as being, would be properly and 
exhaustively treated in natural science, for in what other way could one treat all these 
topics except in reference to material beings. Aquinas repeats this several times in his 
commentaries that in this case natural science would be philosophia prima.41 To be 
                                                 
 
38 “In naturalibus oportet semper supremam causam unicuiusque requirere … procedere usque ad causam 
supremam; et hoc ideo est quia effectus nescitur nisi sciatur causa … quousque perveniatur ad primam 
causam” (In Phys., II, 6, n. 7).  
39 More on this point see the section 7.2. See also Ashley’s discussion of this argument according to the 
interpretation of St. Thomas, in relation to metaphysics, in The Way toward Wisdom, p. 92-124. He 
states clearly: “No step in this argument requires a metaphysical notion of Being as ens commune, but 
only the analysis of ens mobile proper to natural science. If the argument were proper to metaphysics, 
it would be circular, since metaphysics presupposes the argument’s conclusion, namely, that 
immaterial being exists” (p. 96). Referring to the achievements of Jan Salamucha of the Kraków 
School of Thomism, he adds also: “The purely logical coherence of Aquinas’s demonstration of the 
existence of immaterial substances has never been refuted but has been shown to be valid by the 
modern methods of symbolic logic” (p. 163).  
40 There is also one less evident way of arriving at the existence of somehow separable form, namely in 
the analysis of human being: “Terminus considerationis scientiae naturalis est circa formas quae 
quidem sunt aliquo modo separatae, sed tamen esse habent in materia. Et huiusmodi formae sunt 
animae rationales; quae quidem sunt separatae inquantum intellectiva virtus non est actus alicuius 
organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi; sed in materia sunt in quantum dant esse naturale 
tali corpori” (In Phys., II, 4, n. 7). “Sed quomodo se habeant formae totaliter a materia separatae et 
quid sint, vel etiam quomodo se habeat heac forma, idest anima rationalis, secundum quod est 
separabilis et sine corpore existere potens, et quid sit secundum suam essentiam separabile, hoc 
determinare pertinet ad philosophum primum” (ibid., n. 9). 
41 “Si non est aliqua alia substantia praeter eas quae consistunt secundum naturam, de quibus est physica, 
physica erit prima scientia. Sed, si est aliqua substantia immobilis, ista erit prior substantia naturali; et 
per consequens philosophia considerans huiusmodi substantiam, erit philosophia prima. Et quia est 
prima, ideo erit universalis, et erit eius speculari de ente inquantum est ens, et de eo quod quid est, et 
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sure, there would still be many other particular sciences that treat being under other 
particular forms such as celestial being, living being, or human being etc. But since all 
of these sciences are directed toward human perfection, which is happiness, particular 
disciplines need to have a common science which could unite them all and be 
architectonic for all possible knowledge. Moreover, since science consists of an 
explanation through causes, the most noble science should be this which explains 
through ultimate or highest causes, because such an explanation comprises universally 
every other particular explanation. Such a science is rightly called “wisdom.”42  
Nonetheless, since it is proved within the limits of natural science that material 
being is not the only existing kind of being, which means that there exists at least one 
immaterial being, the notion of being appears to be larger than that treated in natural 
science, and thus it exceeds the scope of natural science’s own principles and method. It 
was already said that in any science we should first know what its subject is and the 
middle through which it demonstrates.43 Also, every science should inquire about the 
principles and causes of its own subject.44 Hence the principles of the subject determine 
the limits of the science.45 Therefore, the competence of natural science ends in the 
scientific discovery of something other than material being, in the demonstration of the 
First Cause as other than the changing, contingent universe. Natural science leaves to 
another science the name “wisdom” and the task of exploring what positively the First 
Cause is: 
For the ancients did not think any substance existed other than corporeal mobile 
substance about which the natural scientist is concerned. And therefore it was 
believed that only natural scientists treated of the totality of nature and consequently 
of being, even of the first beings. But this is false since there is a certain science that 
is superior to natural science, for nature, that is, those natural things that have an 
intrinsic principle of motion, is itself only one genus of universal being. For not all 
                                                                                                                                               
de his quae sunt entis inquantum est ens: eadem enim est scientia primi entis et entis communis, ut in 
principio quarti habitum est” (In Meta., VI, 1, n. 1170). Cf. ibid., III, 6, n. 398; IV, 5, n. 593; XI, 7, 
n. 2267.  
42 “Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perfectionem, quae est eius 
beatitudo. Unde necesse est, quod una earum sit aliarum omnium rectrix, quae nomen sapientiae recte 
vindicat. Nam sapientis est alios ordinare” (In Meta., prooem.). Cf. CG, III, 25, n. 2063; 79, n. 2543; 
STh, I-II, 66, 5; II-II, 45, 1; In Meta., I, 2, n. 50. Cf. also section 4.2, footnote 42 for the specific notion 
of the unity of science in Aquinas. 
43 “Ea autem quae primo oportet cognoscere in aliqua scientia, sunt subiectum ipsius, et medium per quod 
demonstrat” (In Phys., II, 1, n. 1). 
44 “Quaelibet scientia debet inquirere principia et causas sui subiecti, quae sunt eius inquantum 
huiusmodi” (In Meta., VI, 1, n. 1145). 
45 “Consideratio speculativae scientiae non se extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in 
principiis sicentiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur” (STh, I-II, 3, 6). Cf. STh, I, 1, 7; II-II, 4, 1. 
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being is of this kind, since it is proved in Physics VIII that there exists some immobile 
being. This immobile being is superior to and nobler than the mobile being that 
natural science studies.46  
 
Knowing that the notion of being is not exhausted in material being, Aristotle and 
Aquinas along with him step back from such qualifications as “material” or 
“immaterial,” “changing” or “unchanging,” and consider being as indifferent in regard 
to such qualifications. This kind of unspecified being is called being simply speaking 
(ens simpliciter), or being as being, or common being (ens commune).47  
It was already mentioned that in speculative sciences there is certain conformity 
of the object known to the immateriality of the intellect.48 More exactly it can be said 
that what is more separated from the matter is more knowable.49 And this is really the 
case with this totally immaterial First Cause – it is the most knowable, the most 
intelligible, because absolutely separated from matter. However, this is so objectively 
(in se), but it cannot be so for human being (quoad nos) in this present condition due to 
the human intellect’s dependency on the senses. Intellectual beings, known only through 
the intellect (and such is the First Cause, since it is immaterial), are intelligible for us 
only by the mediation of their material effects experienced through the senses.50 We can 
                                                 
 
46 “Antiqui enim non opinabantur aliquam substantiam esse praeter substantiam corpoream mobilem, de 
qua physicus tractat. Et ideo creditum est quod soli determinent de tota natura, et per consequens de 
ente; et ita etiam de primis principiis quae sunt simul consideranda cum ente. Hoc autem falsum est … 
cum probatum sit in octavo Physicorum, esse aliquod ens immobile” (In Meta., IV, 5, n. 593). Cf. 
In Meta., IV, 13, n. 690; 17, n. 748. 
47 “It is important to distinguish between the concept of ‘being-as-such’ and the concept of being which 
we acquired in our first cognitive notions. The first concept which falls under our apprehension is 
being, and this concept contains in act, although confusedly, all beings, because outside this concept 
literally nothing exists. One must avoid the danger of identifying this concept of being and that of 
‘being-as-such.’ The former is superficial and confused knowledge; it is easily grasped and is common. 
The latter abstracts from all matter and is acquired only after a protracted intellectual analysis” 
(Antonio Moreno, “The Nature of Metaphysics,” The Thomist 30 [1966], p. 122).  
48 “Intelligibile enim et intellectum oportet proportionata esse, et unius generis, cum intellectus et 
intelligibile in actu sint unum” (In Meta., prooem.). 
49 “Cum unaquaeque res ex hoc ipso vim intellectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa 
esse maxime intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata” (In Meta., prooem.). 
50 “Magis universalia secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam primo in intellectu 
cadit ens. … Sed quantum ad investigationem naturalium proprietatum et causarum, prius sunt nota 
minus communia; eo quod per causas particulares quae sunt unius generis vel speciei pervenimus in 
causas universales. Ea autem quae sunt universalia in causando sunt posterius nota quoad nos, licet sint 
prius nota secundum naturam; quamvis universalia per praedicationem sint aliquo modo prius quoad 
nos nota quam minus universalia, licet non prius nota quam singularia; nam cognitio sensus qui est 
congnoscitivus singularium in nobis praecedit cognitionem intellectivam quae est universalium …. Illa 
enim quae sunt a materia penitus separata secundum esse, sicut substantiae immateriales, sunt magis 
difficilia nobis ad cognoscendum quam etiam universalia; et ideo ista scientia quae sapientia dicitur 
quamvis sit prima in dignitate est tamen ultima in addiscendo” (In Meta., I, 2, n. 46). 
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really know something only on the basis of 1) abstraction through the first act of the 
intellect, 2) dividing and composing what we grasped, and, finally, 3) by looking for 
causes. We cannot abstract the First Cause because it is already in itself separated from 
matter, totally immaterial and not falling under sensory cognition and so completely 
unattainable to the senses. In the same way we cannot abstract either ens commune as 
different from material and changing being before we get to know that material being is 
not identical with ens commune. We could venture to make a conceptual distinction 
between ens commune and material being and say that these are not the same 
conceptually, yet it would be an insufficient basis for another specific discipline: 
metaphysics would not be distinguishable from natural science. Only by proving that 
there is at least one immaterial and unmoved being can we achieve a sufficient reason 
for constructing the science of metaphysics as distinct from natural science.51  
In general, we can know a cause through its effects insofar as the effects are 
commensurate to their cause, otherwise we know that the cause exists and not much 
about what it is.52 However, Aquinas shows that material and changing being is an 
incommensurate effect of the First Cause. The First Cause is attained through effects 
which are contingent and mobile beings. As such they are insufficient to manifest the 
proper nature of the First Cause. They only reveal that it is and something about its 
nature by some similarities.53 This is one of the reasons why, according to St. Thomas, 
the First Cause is not, strictly speaking, the subject of metaphysics, but its condition and 
aim: 
                                                 
 
51 This, however, is not necessary within Scotistic thought because of Scotus’s distinction between 
intuitive and abstractive cognition. Thanks to the intuitive cognition it is possible to grasp intellectually 
clearly enough the subject of metaphysics without the need of tortuous analysis in natural science. 
(Interestingly, there are some Thomistic schools which also would like to resolve the problem of the 
beginning of metaphysics in a similar manner.) Katherine Tachau in her book Vision and Certitude in 
the Age of Ockham considers the introduction of this distinction as the initial frame for the shift of 
emphasis from being to discourse by the end of Latin era in philosophy: “Despite the difficulties 
presented by his innovation in grafting intuition onto the process induced by species, the dichotomy of 
intuitive and abstractive cognition was rapidly and widely adopted by Parisian trained theologians. 
Within a decade of the Subtle Doctor’s death, its acceptance on the other side of the English Channel 
was also ensured. That is not to say that his understanding was uniformly employed; nor, indeed, that 
all who employed the terminology of intuitive and abstractive cognition considered Scotus’s an 
adequate delineation of the modes of cognition; nevertheless, the history of medieval theories of 
knowledge from ca. 1310 can be traced as the development of this dichotomy” (Katherine H. Tachau, 
Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics 
1250-1345 [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988], p. 80-81). 
52 Cf. In Poster., I, 23 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 85-86, lin. 37-162). 
53 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 1, 2; 6, 4. 
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The subject of a science is this of which causes and properties we seek, and not the 
causes themselves of any subject. Since the knowledge of the causes of some subject 
is the aim to which the consideration of a science reaches.54 
 
Knowing that an immaterial First Cause exists, we can state that being can exist 
as separated from matter. But this statement, as indicated, pertains to another operation 
of the intellect than the act of abstraction. The act of abstraction is performed by the 
first act of the intellect, the indivisibilium intelligentia. It was already said that 
abstraction can happen in two ways: either it is the abstraction of a whole from its parts 
(universal from particular – this is the abstractio totius, proper to natural science, 
although it is the condition of all intellectual knowledge), or the abstraction of form 
from sensible matter (this is the abstractio formae, proper to mathematics). A common 
feature in abstraction is what is cognitively abstracted from something else exists in 
thing as united.55 The situation changes when things are not united in reality, or at least 
can exist separately. In this case we should talk rather about separation than abstraction. 
To state that something is not something else, or at least can exist without something 
else, is the domain of the second act of the intellect, compositio et divisio intellectus. 
The second act is called a judgment, and in this specific case it is a negative judgment in 
which we state that there is a substance or there are substances that cannot be material 
and therefore materiality does not necessarily belong to the notion of being.56 The 
                                                 
 
54 “Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae 
alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quem consideratio 
scientiae pertingit” (In Meta., prooem.). Cf. In Meta., IV, 1, n. 533; In Boet. De Trin., 1, 2 ad 1. “The 
subject of a science accessible in the light of human reason is not the first principles themselves, nor is 
it one or another of the attributes. Rather it is that which has first principles and causes or elements into 
which it is resolvable, and it is that which has attributes which can be demonstrated of it. This is the 
case in all the sciences: in physics and in mathematics. Therefore, the subject of metaphysics is 
common being as such, not the first principles, nor God, nor the separated substances, nor the attributes 
of common being” (William H. Kane, “The Subject of Metaphysics,” The Thomist 18 (1955), p. 513). 
55 “Abstractio non possit esse proprie loquendo nisi coniunctorum in esse, secundum duos modos 
coniunctionis predictos, scilicet qua pars et totum uniuntur uel forma et materia” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 
3 c.). 
56 Therefore the judgment of separation does not fall upon the act of existence as such. “The judgment of 
separation, it is true, falls upon existing beings, but not upon existence of these beings as such. 
Existence is identical in all beings. Essence is the principle of distinction of existing beings, as 
Aquinas clearly says: ‘The distinction of beings is not due to their existence: since they agree in it … 
hence things are distinguished because they have different natures, by which existence is acquired in 
different ways’ (CG, I, 26, n. 3). … The judgment separates the concept of being as being from the 
concept of matter and mobility” (Antonio Moreno, “The Nature of Metaphysics,” p. 112). Yet “the 
judgment of separation does not positively preclude matter. This occurs with spiritual substances, and 
their science is theology: ‘First in the sense that it is not of the nature of the thing called separated to be 
able in no way to exist in matter and motion, as God and the angels … the theology of Sacred Scripture 
treats of beings separated in the first sense as its subject’ (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 4). The judgment of 
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negative judgment that being is not necessarily material but can be also immaterial, 
separates the notion of being as known naturally through phantasms and is worked out 
in an analogical reasoning (because immaterial being is known to us only by analogy to 
material)57 to appear finally as indifferent to both qualifications “material” and 
“immaterial.” Aquinas claims that separation belongs properly to metaphysics.58 Thus, 
knowing that there is at least one being that is immaterial, we do not abstract being as 
being, but rather state that it exists as separated, and consider it as separated from or 
independent of any matter.59 According to St. Thomas, the failure to distinguish 
between abstraction and separation was the cause of the error of Pythagoras and 
Platonists who put mathematical beings and universals as separated from matter.60  
Since everything what exists is being and is known as being, metaphysics, 
treating the most general notion of being, should treat somehow everything that exists. 
Thus metaphysical speculabilia are twofold:  
there are some speculabilia, which do not depend upon matter secundum esse, 
because they can exist without matter, whether they never are in matter as God and 
angels, or in some they are in matter and in others not, such as substance, quality, 
being, potency, act, one and many, etc.61 
                                                                                                                                               
separation is ‘precisive’; namely, it does without matter in the sense that matter is not positively 
precluded nor is it positively included. Matter is not positively precluded because then metaphysics 
would be the science of spiritual substance only, which it is not. On the other hand, matter is not 
included either, for this would transform metaphysics into a physics dealing with mobile beings. The 
concept of being is not opposed to the concept of materiality; materiality simply is not included, and 
consequently, its ‘ratio’ or formal concept is not material” (Moreno, p. 117-118). 
57 “Intelligibile uidetur magis dici per remotionem quam per positionem: ex hoc enim est unumquodque 
intelligibile, quod est a materia immune uel separatum” (In Boet. De Trin., 1, 2 ad 4). 
58 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 c. Cf. also Louis B. Geiger, “Abstraction et séparation d’après S. Thomas In 
de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 31 (1947): 3-40; 
J. D. Robert, “La métaphysique, science distincte de toute autre discipline philosophique selon Saint 
Thomas d’Aquin,” Divus Thomas 50 (1947): 206-223. 
59 “In his autem que secundum esse possunt esse diuisa magis habet locum separatio quam abstractio. … 
Substantia autem, que est materia intelligibilis quantitatis, potest esse sine quantitate; unde considerare 
substantiam sine quantitate magis pertinet ad genus separationis quam abstractionis” (In Boet. De 
Trin., 5, 3 c.). 
60 “Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio inuenitur: una secundum operationem intellectus 
componentis et diuidentis, que separatio dicitur proprie, et hec competit scientie divine siue 
metaphisice; alia secundum operationem qua formantur quiditates rerum, que est abstractio forme 
a materia sensibili, et hec competit mathematice; tertia secundum eandem operationem que est 
abstractio uniuersalis a particulari, et hec competit etiam phisice et est communis omnibus scientiis, 
quia in scientia pretermittitur quod per accidens est et accipitur quod per se est. Et quia quidam non 
intellexerunt differentiam duarum ultimarum a prima, inciderunt in errorem ut ponerent mathematica et 
uniuersalia a sensibilibus separata, ut Pittagoras et Platonici” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 c.). 
61 “Quedam uero speculabilia sunt que non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse 
possunt, siue nunquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et angelus, siue in quibusdam sint in materia et in 
quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa, et huiusmodi” (In Boet. De 
Trin., 5, 1). 
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In metaphysics as a philosophical discipline we cannot know much about God, only that 
he exists and thanks to the threefold way of analogical reasoning (via causalitatis, 
remotionis et eminentiae) we can say something about him.62 We are talking here about 
metaphysics as philosophy. Aquinas calls it also theology,63 but distinguishes between 
philosophical theology (theologia philosophica) and theology of Sacred Scripture 
(theologia sacrae Scripturae).64 The latter is based on supernatural revelation; it is the 
science which is a certain participation through faith in the knowledge of God and the 
saints. The knowledge about angels is even more disputable in metaphysics understood 
as philosophy. Strictly speaking, no philosophical science can have for its subject 
simple substances, i.e. such that are not composed of matter and form (such are God and 
angels), because every propter quid knowledge implies a composition. Obviously, we 
can consider them as causes of effects which are more known to us.65 But we can say 
much more about such speculabilia that may or may not exist in matter, i.e. are the most 
universal common features of immaterial and material beings.66 Such objects of 
                                                 
 
62 “Naturali ratione de Deo cognoscere non possumus nisi hoc quod percipitur de ipso ex habitudine 
effectuum ad ipsum, sicut illa que designant causalitatem ipsius et eminentiam super causata et que 
remouent ab ipso imperfectas conditiones effectuum” (In Boet. De Trin., 1, 4). Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 
5, 4 c.  
63 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 c. 
64 “Sic ergo theologia siue scientia diuina est duplex: una in qua considerantur res diuine non tamquam 
subiectum scientie, set tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia quam philosophi prosequntur, 
que alio nomine metaphisica dicitur; alia uero que ipsas res diuinas considerat propter se ipsas ut 
subiectum scientie, et hec est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 4 c.). 
65 “Palam est quod in substantiis simplicibus, quae non sunt compositae ex materia et forma, non est 
aliqua quaestio. In omni enim quaestione, ut habitum est, oportet aliquid esse notum, et aliquid quaeri 
quod ignoramus. Tales autem substantiae, vel totae cognoscuntur, vel totae ignorantur, ut in nono infra 
dicetur. Unde non est in eis quaestio. Et propter hoc de eis etiam non potest esse doctrina, sicut est in 
scientiis speculativis. Sed ne videatur consideratio talium substantiarum omnino aliena esse a physica 
doctrina, ideo subiungit, quod alter est modus quaestionis talium. In cognitione enim harum 
substantiarum non pervenimus nisi ex substantiis sensibilibus, quarum substantiae simplices sunt 
quodammodo causae. … Et ideo in doctrinis et quaestionibus de talibus, utimur effectibus, quasi medio 
ad investigandum substantias simplices, quarum quidditates ignoramus” (In Meta., VII, 17, n. 1669-
1671). 
66 “Quicumque enim scit universalia, aliquo modo scit ea quae sunt subiecta universalibus, quia scit ea in 
illa: sed his quae sunt maxime universalia sunt omnia subiecta, ergo ille qui scit maxime universalia, 
scit quodammodo omnia” (In Meta., I, 2, n. 44). “Ea autem quae sunt universalia in causando, sunt 
posterius nota quo ad nos, licet sint prius nota secundum naturam, quamvis universalia per 
praedicationem sint aliquo modo prius quo ad nos nota quam minus universalia, licet non prius nota 
quam singularia; nam cognitio sensus qui est cognoscitivus singularium, in nobis praecedit 
cognitionem intellectivam quae est universalium. … Illa enim quae sunt a materia penitus separata 
secundum esse, sicut substantiae immateriales, sunt magis difficilia nobis ad cognoscendum, quam 
etiam universalia: et ideo ista scientia, quae sapientia dicitur, quamvis sit prima in dignitate, est tamen 
ultima in addiscendo” (ibid., n. 46). 
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theoretical reasoning exist not in the same way in material and immaterial beings, 
except analogically.  
Hence, metaphysics plays the role of a common science, which treats being as 
being, in the sense that it treats all actually existent substances, whether material or 
immaterial, in their contingent condition, and subordinated to the First Cause as their 
ultimate principle.67 Unlike mathematics, the science of metaphysics leaves nothing out 
of consideration: it considers everything secundum communem rationem entis.68 It 
leaves aside only the becoming of material being (fieri or devenire), its changeable and 
dynamic character, its passing from non-being to being, because this consideration is 
reserved to natural science.69 The fact that its subject is being as being does not say that 
every other science is a part of metaphysics because every other science treats some part 
of being or some aspect of being and treats it according to a special mode, which is 
necessarily distinct from that of metaphysics.70  
To metaphysics pertains also the consideration of the truth of all first principles 
of demonstration.71 It does not belong to other sciences to examine the truth of these 
principles because they are assumed in every other particular science as true on the 
                                                 
 
67 For more explanations and a thorough discussion see Ashley, The Way towards Wisdom, p. 134-144 
and 146-169. He enumerates in his book eight chief ways of understanding Aquinas’s views on the 
nature of metaphysics: 1. Essentialist or Conceptualist, 2. Platonizing, 3. Transcendental, 4. Existential, 
5. Phenomenological, 6. Analytic, 7. Semiotic, 8. Aristotelian (cf. p. 46-54 for short a characterization 
of each). From what I have written so far it can be already seen that I espouse his position, which is 
classified as Aristotelian Thomism. He gives two conditions for the validity of metaphysics in this 
approach: “1. There can be no valid metaphysics fomally distinct from natural science unless its 
subject, Being as Being (esse), as it analogically includes both material and immaterial being, has first 
been validated in a manner proper to the foundations integral to natural science by a demonstration of 
the existence of immaterial being as the cause of material beings. 2. Modern natural science can 
achieve such a demonstration, but only if its own foundations are rendered unequivocally consistent 
with sense observation by an analysis such as is exemplified by Aristotle’s Physics as interpreted by 
Aquinas” (p. 53). Throughout the whole book he develops his argument supporting such reading of St. 
Thomas’s texts and refutes the objections coming from other interpretations. 
68 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 4 ad 6; In Meta., VII, 11, n. 1526; In Meta., XII, 2, n. 2427. 
69 “Ipsa speculatio mathematici est sine materia et motu … Theologia, id est tertia pars speculatiue, que 
dicitur diuina, uel metaphisica, uel philosophia prima, est sine motu” (In Boet. De Trin., expos. cap. II). 
70 “Quamuis subiecta aliarum scientiarum sint partes entis, quod est subiectum metaphisice, non tamen 
oportet quod alie scientie sint partes ipsius: accipit enim unaqueque scientiarum unam partem entis 
secundum specialem modum considerandi, alium a modo quo consideratur ens in metaphisica. Vnde 
proprie loquendo subiectum illius non est pars subiecti metaphisice: non enim est pars entis secundum 
illam rationem qua ens est subiectum metaphisice, set hac ratione considerata ipsa est specialis scientia 
aliis condiuisa. Sic autem posset dici pars ipsius scientia que est de potentia uel que est de actu aut de 
uno uel de aliquo huiusmodi; quia ista habent eundem modum considerandi cum ente de quo tractatur 
in metaphisica” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 ad 6). 
71 “Dicitur etiam philosophia prima, in quantum alie omnes scientie ab ea sua principia accipientes, eam 
consequntur” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 c.). Cf. In Meta., IV, 1, n. 595. 
5. The Division of Theoretical Sciences 
 162
basis of the reasonableness of our ordinary experience. Every particular science in this 
differs from dialectics: that they do not ask about the validity of their principles, but 
about conclusions. Only a universal science can ask questions about the most general 
principles. Dialectics is universal but when it asks about the principles, it does not 
function as a science, but as an art. Metaphysics considers first principles of 
demonstration as a universal science. This is why metaphysics is called “First 
Philosophy.” Although it is impossible to prove such first principles precisely because 
they are first, yet it is possible to lead adversaries’ arguments ad absurdum.  
Aquinas says that metaphysics is the first philosophy but he says also that it 
presupposes the conclusions of natural science.72 Here the distinction in methods about 
which we were talking in sections 1.1 and 4.1 proves helpful in explaining this seeming 
contradiction. Metaphysics reflects on all the lower sciences in via resolutionis, 
although uses the conclusions of natural science, because these are better known to us in 
via inventionis.73 Natural science reasons from sensible qualities, which are always 
some effects of substances which cause them. The reasoning from effect to cause is 
always a reasoning of some discovery: through an effect we are looking for a proper 
cause. Such reasoning is proper to natural science. Metaphysics is the first philosophy 
because of the highest intelligibility of its subject, but our knowledge of this subject is 
mediated by sensory cognition of material being, and thus in relation to our cognitive 
capacities, the subject of metaphysics is the most obscure. In this perspective 
metaphysics is the last, and it should be taught after all other sciences.74 Metaphysics 
uses many things settled in natural science, but St. Thomas says: 
there is not necessarily a vicious circle because metaphysics presupposes conclusions 
proved in the other sciences while it itself proves their principles. For the principles 
                                                 
 
72 “Scientie que habent ordinem ad inuicem hoc modo se habent quod una potest uti principiis alterius, 
sicut scientie posteriores utuntur principiis scientiarum priorum, siue sint superiores siue inferiores; 
unde metaphisica, que est omnibus superior, utitur his que in aliis scientiis sunt probata. Et similiter 
theologia, cum omnes alie scientie sint huic quasi famulantes et preambule in uia generationis, 
quamuis sint dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum” (In Boet. De 
Trin., 2, 3 ad 7). Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 ad 9. 
73 Cf. Jan A. Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics: The via resolutionis in Thomas Aquinas,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1989): 405-418. 
74 “Philosophi enim, qui naturalis cognitionis ordinem sequntur, preordinant scientiam de creaturis 
scientie diuine, scilicet naturalem metaphisice, set apud theologos proceditur e converso, ut creatoris 
consideratio considerationem preueniat creature” (In Boet. De Trin., prooem.). “Theologia, id est 
scientia diuina … que alio nomine dicitur metaphisica, id est trans phisicam, quia post phisicam 
discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia deuenire” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 
1). 
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that another science (such as natural philosophy) takes from first philosophy do not 
prove the points which the first philosopher takes from the natural philosopher, but 
they are proved through other self-evident principles. Similarly the first philosopher 
does not prove the principles he gives the natural philosopher by principles he 
receives from him, but by other self-evident principles. So there is no vicious circle in 
their definitions. Moreover, the sensible effects on which the demonstrations of 
natural science are based are more evident to us in the beginning. But when we come 
to know the first causes through them, these causes will reveal to us the reason for the 
effects, from which they were proved by a demonstration quia. In this way natural 
science also contributes something to divine science, and nevertheless it is divine 
science that explains its principles.75 
 
In the Aristotelian philosophy that Aquinas espouses, every first principle must 
be grounded in our sensory experience which has the character of evidence to which we 
can refer our judgments and reasonings. Our understanding of terms in first principles is 
necessarily related to sensory cognition of material being, and if first principles are used 
in arguments about something other than material, as is the case in metaphysics, there 
always remains some analogical reference to what is better known to us.76 If this 
reference in metaphysics to the immediate sensory experience is lacking in somebody’s 
thinking, he is said to repeat words and formulas without knowing what he is talking 
about.77  
We can now identify the singularity of Aquinas’s approach to metaphysics. He 
considers this “first philosophy” as a science profoundly and inextricably dependent on 
                                                 
 
75 “Nec tamen oportet quod sit circulus quia ipsa supponit ea que in aliis probantur cum ipsa aliarum 
principia probet, quia principia que accipit alia scientia, scilicet naturalis, a prima philosophia, non 
probant ea que item philosophus primus accipit a naturali, set probantur per alia principia per se nota; 
et similiter philosophus primus non probat principia que tradit naturali per principia que ab eo accipit, 
set per alia principia per se nota; et sic non est aliquis circulus in diffinitione. Et preterea, effectus 
sensibiles, ex quibus procedunt demonstrationes naturales, sunt notiores quoad nos in principio, set 
cum per eos peruenerimus ad cognitionem causarum primarum, ex eis apparebit nobis propter quid 
illorum effectuum ex quibus probabantur demonstratione quia; et sic et scientia naturalis aliquid tradit 
scientie diuinae et tamen per eam sua principia notificantur” (In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 ad 9). 
76 Weisheipl, after a careful analysis of early medieval writings and representative thirteen-century 
predecessors of Albert the Great and Aquinas, in this way summarizes his survey: “In the view of 
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas each science is granted autonomy within its own field of 
inquiry; particular sciences are not absorbed into more universal sciences, such as metaphysics; and all 
the mathematical sciences are considered subordinate to natural philosophy, which is the point of 
departure for metaphysics. This view may be considered authentically Aristotelian. According to the 
other view which was predominant in the thirtheen century the classification of the sciences 
corresponds to the hierarchy of forms in nature: natural science is subalternated to the four 
mathematical sciences, and mathematics is subalternated to metaphysics. Each science is resolved into 
a higher and more universal science, and mathematics is the key which unlocks both nature and 
metaphysics. This view, although contaminated with the doctrine of universal hylemorphism, may be 
considered representatively Platonic” (idem, ature and Motion in the Middle Ages, 237 [essay ix: 
“Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought”]).  
77 “Non attingunt mente, licet ea dicant ore” (In Eth., VI, 7 [Leon. 47/2, p. 358, lin. 191-192]).  
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the earlier analysis of natural science. The character of human cognition necessitates 
this order. Therefore, from St. Thomas’s perspective, any attempt to loosen the bonds 
between metaphysics and natural science amounts to dooming metaphysics to empty 
arbitrariness. Such a loosened metaphysics will appear to say no more about being and 
reality than does poetry. In our search for the “is” that governs ethics, we understand the 
importance played by natural science. To arrive at an understanding of “is,” 
metaphysics is dependent upon its discoveries. 
 
 
5.4. Which science should consider human being? 
 
On the basis of the previous division we can say already that we may describe 
human being (construct the “is” of human being), or at least something of human being, 
within the scope of these three sciences but in different ways.  
In metaphysics as a discipline what is said about being as being, one and many, 
potency and act, substance and accident, truth and goodness – all these we can validly, 
although analogically, apply to human being. There is even an undisputable advantage 
of metaphysics over other sciences regarding the explanation of human being, that to 
metaphysics belongs to explain the beginning of the human soul.78 A metaphysical 
explanation would be according to the highest causes, so proper to wisdom in the 
absolute sense.79 It is known that the higher a cause is, the more it causes. Transposing 
                                                 
 
78 But only the beginning because – as Aquinas shows – creation is not a motion (cf. e.g. STh, I, 45, 2 ad 
2; De pot., 3, 2). Yet “consideratio de anima pertinet ad naturalem. Et hoc ex modo diffiniendi 
concludit. … Probat autem propositum hoc modo. Operationes anime et passiones sunt operationes 
corporis et passiones, ut ostensum est. Omnis autem passio cum diffinitur oportet quod habeat in sui 
diffinitione illud cuius est passio. Nam subiectum semper cadit in diffinitione passionis. Si ergo 
passiones huiusmodi non sunt tantum anime, set etiam corporis, de necessitate oportet quod in 
diffinitione ipsarum ponatur corpus. Set omne in quo est corpus seu materia pertinet ad naturalem. 
Ergo et passiones huiusmodi pertinent ad naturalem. Set cuius est considerare passiones, eius est 
considerare subiectum ipsarum. Et ideo iam phisici est considerare de anima aut omni, simpliciter, aut 
huiusmodi, scilicet de ea que est affixa corpori; et hoc dicit quia reliquerat sub dubio utrum intellectus 
sit potencia affixa corpori” (In De an., I, 2 [Leon. 45/1, p. 11, lin. 139-160]). 
79 Cf. CG, I, 94, n. 792-793; In Poster., I, 44 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 170, lin. 290-291). “Causa autem altissima 
dupliciter accipi potest, vel simpliciter, vel in aliquo genere. Ille igitur qui cognoscit causam 
altissimam in aliquo genere et per eam potest de omnibus quae sunt illius generis iudicare et ordinare, 
dicitur esse sapiens in illo genere, ut in medicina vel architectura … Ille autem qui cognoscit causam 
altissimam simpliciter, quae est Deus, dicitur sapiens simpliciter, inquantum per regulas divinas omnia 
potest iudicare et ordinare” (STh, II-II, 45, 1 c.). “Circa naturales substantias et generabiles necesse est 
sic versari, si quis recte consideret causas, ut scilicet omnes assignentur et proximae. Et hoc est 
5. The Division of Theoretical Sciences 
 165
this rule into the realm of knowledge, it can be said that the higher the known cause is, 
the more things it explains.80 
Yet there is a fundamental disadvantage to the metaphysical knowledge of 
human being, if it be taken in the sense of a self-sufficient discipline that obviates the 
need for considerations proper to natural science. Such a metaphysical explanation 
would be too general to perceive the specificity of human being with the whole 
problematic related to our bodily condition. If we content ourselves with metaphysical 
knowledge of human being, without a previous study of human being in natural science, 
we would still have a universal knowledge as opposed to a specific knowledge (see 
section 4.1). Thus, our knowledge of human being would be simply imperfect, because 
our knowledge attains perfection only when we know specifically all that can be known 
in this way.81 From such universal and imperfect knowledge, it is true, not much would 
follow for our moral life. Moreover, metaphysical considerations leave aside the 
becoming of material beings (fieri or divenire). Taking metaphysics as the science for 
the construction of the human “is” may result in providing a perfectly static, a-historic, 
lifeless, and ossified image of human being. In this case it is easier to admit that from 
such a human being nothing could be required to do from the fact that he is what he is. 
To apply a metaphysical explanation to something to which we have a more direct 
cognitive access, leaving aside the science that properly considers things to which we 
have such an access, would be perhaps valid in some cases, but does not seem valid 
when we think about human being and what we ought or ought not do. This will 
become clearer from our further explanations.  
Mathematics can also be useful in describing human being, insofar as human 
being is a quantitative being. St. Thomas acknowledges that mathematics fulfills to the 
highest degree the scientific necessity condition. But any attempt to establish 
mathematical certainty in non-mathematical matters, in Aquinas’s account, would have 
to rest upon an utter misunderstanding of what science is and what our cognitive 
capacities are. Mathematical being is entirely unchangeable because it is abstracted 
                                                                                                                                               
necesse, ex eo quod hae causae sunt tot, ut dictum est. Et oportet causas cognoscere ad hoc quod 
aliquid sciatur, quia scire est causam cognoscere” (In Meta., VIII, 4, n. 1739). 
80 “Quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit in causando” (STh, I, 65, 3 c.). “Quanto 
fuerit causa universalior, tanto ad plura se extendit et efficacius producit” (CG, II, 98, n. 1837). 
81 Cf. In Phys., I, 1, n. 7. “Non solum oportet assignare omnes causas, sed oportet etiam dicere causas 
proximas, ut incipiendo a causis primis perveniamus ad causas proximas. Per causas enim primas 
habetur cognitio de re aliqua solum in universali et imperfecte. Per causas autem proximas habetur 
cognitio rei et perfecta” (In Meta., VIII, 4, n. 1738). 
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from sensible matter and considered as separate. As such mathematics requires in 
demonstration basically only formal cause. The material cause is not considered since, 
as was said, the subject is totally abstracted from sensible matter.82 Efficient and final 
cause are needed only where there is a motion or something understood only in 
reference to some kind of motion. Since motion is possible only where there is sensible 
matter and becoming, both causes are of no use in mathematical demonstration. 
Mathematical being is considered as motionless. Hence, striving to apply mathematical 
method to subjects that are changeable (and are changeable because in their definition 
sensible matter is contained), is to disregard in science all the realm which is 
demonstrated or explained according to material, efficient and final causality. A 
scientific explanation of a changing being, which limits itself basically only to formal 
causality is severely deficient, for it disregards what is proper to such a subject, namely, 
its changing character.83 This approach explains only one and not the most important 
aspect of changing being.  
To be sure, mathematical principles can be used in natural science, and Aquinas 
was a great proponent of such a methodological maneuver. But thanks to his 
exceptional methodological clarity, he would never allow to confuse natural science 
                                                 
 
82 In a sense one could say that mathematics demonstrates also from material cause, but it is material 
cause specifically understood, namely as the subject of quantity (“secundum quod materia est 
cognitionis principium” and not “principium fiendi” – cf. In Meta., VIII, 4, n. 1733-1745). Aquinas 
comments on Aristotle’s text presenting the way of demonstrating from the material cause, and says 
that Aristotle “proponit exemplum in mathematicis. Nec est contra id quod dicitur in III Metaphisice, 
quod mathematice sciencie non demonstrant per causam materialem: mathematica enim abstrahit 
quidem a materia sensibili, non autem a materia intelligibili, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphisice, que quidem 
materia intelligibilis consideratur secundum quod aliquid diuisibile accipitur uel in numeris uel in 
continuis; et ideo, quandocunque in mathematicis aliquid demonstratur de toto per partes, uidetur esse 
demonstratio per causam materialem: partes enim se habent ad totum secundum rationem materie, ut 
habetur in II Phisicorum; et quia materia magis proprie dicitur in sensibilibus, propter hoc noluit eam 
nominare causam materialem, set causam necessitatis” (In Poster., II, 9 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 206-207, lin. 
70-86]). 
83 Yves Simon makes this remark against Russell’s claim that universal is a mathematical property: “we 
may not attribute to it a dynamism, a tendency to force its way in a world of becoming” (Yves Simon, 
The Tradition of atural Law [New York: Fordham University Press, 1965], p. 44). Obviously, 
according to Aquinas we may not attribute to any universal a dynamism but only attribute a dynamism 
on a universal level to things signified through this universal. “Science is often portrayed as 
a knowledge so exact that it is mathematical in form. Tobias Dantzig has written, ‘Read your 
instruments and obey mathematics; for this is the whole duty of the scientist.’ The frequent restriction 
of the term science to mean exact and metrical knowledge has a history dating back at least as far as 
Isaac Newton. Like Galileo, who measured the effects of gravity but hesitated to investigate the nature 
of gravity itself, Newton, at least according to his own intentions, confined his science of nature to 
mathematical laws concerning ‘properties.’ … Such apparent descriptions of mere ‘properties’ without 
pushing on to ‘causes’ have led to the view which strongly emphasizes that correlations and 
measurements are the very essence of science” (Smith, The General Science of ature, p. 2).  
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with mathematical science. Already Aristotle proposed, and St. Thomas developed the 
idea of so-called mixed sciences (scientia mediae), i.e. sciences which are between 
mathematics and natural science.84 In them mathematical principles are applied to 
motion, time, and physical dimensions, yet this application touches only the quantitative 
aspects of physical reality, and not the sensible, or natural, aspects.85 Thus, mere 
mathematical principles cannot provide sufficient tools to explain the production of 
natural effects.86 The explanation of natural effects must be supplemented by employing 
the tools of natural science. Despite the fact that these scientiae mediae proceed from 
mathematical principles, since their consideration ends up with natural matter, they are 
said to be more natural than mathematical.87  
Since human being cannot be properly defined without sensible matter, because 
we are evidently material and changing, we conclude that natural science emerges as the 
most fitting of the speculative sciences to create an integral description and explanation 
of human being.  
According to Aquinas, natural science can be divided in a way similar to the 
speculative sciences as a whole, namely, in keeping with the diverse manners of 
separation from matter. In the case of natural science only the first kind of abstraction is 
                                                 
 
84 “In his analysis of scientiae mediae Aquinas went further than Albert or any of his predecessors” 
(James A. Weisheipl, ature and Motion in the Middle Ages, ed. by William E. Carroll [Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985], p. 235 (in essay IX: “Classification of the 
Sciences in Medieval Thought”). Cf. B. L. Mullahy, “Subalternation and Mathematical Physics,” Laval 
Théologique et Philosophique, 2 (1946): 89-107. 
85 Cf. In Boet. De Trin., 5, 3 ad 5-8. Mixed sciences are subordinated to arithmetic or geometry and take 
from them principles demonstrated strictly (propter quid) as true, and apply these principles to their 
own subjects, which results in demonstrating through a remote cause (demonstratio quia per causam 
remotam). There are differences in relation between demonstration quia and propter quid when 
considered in the same science, or in two subordinated sciences, or in two nonsubordinated sciences – 
cf. In Poster., I, 23-25 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 84-92). “The mathematical principles used in astronomy, optics, 
and mechanics can indeed demonstrate the quantitative characteristics measured, but they can only 
describe, and not demonstrate propter quid, the production of natural effects” (Weisheipl, ature and 
Motion, p. 236).  
86 “Scientiae mediae … accipiunt principia abstracta a scientiis pure mathematicis, et applicant ad 
materiam sensibilem; sicut perspectiva applicat ad lineam visualem ea quae demonstrantur a geometria 
circa lineam abstractam; et harmonica, idest musica, applicat ad sonos ea quae arithmeticus considerat 
circa proportiones numerorum; et astrologia considerationem geometriae et arithmeticae applicat ad 
caelum et ad partes eius. Huiusmodi autem scientiae, licet sint mediae inter scientiam naturalem et 
mathematicam, tamen dicuntur hic a philosopho esse magis naturales quam mathematicae, quia 
unumquodque denominatur et speciem habet a termino: unde, quia harum scientiarum consideratio 
terminatur ad materiam naturalem, licet per principia mathematica procedant, magis sunt naturales 
quam mathematicae” (In Phys., II, 3, n. 8). Cf. also In Poster., I, 41 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 151-152, lin. 31-
48). 
87 Cf. In Phys., II, 3, 8.  
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concerned, but still in our cognition, we abstract forms of things that are common to 
every changeable being (for example, we perceive what change is – as this form which 
is the most common for changeable being – or what body is) or forms that are more 
particular (for example, what vegetative or intellectual life are). The more particular 
forms are related to those that are more universal in that they share in the same nature 
per modum concretionis sive applicationis.88 Universal forms, therefore, function as 
common principles to what participates in their distinctive character. Because of this it 
is important to keep the order of learning also within natural science. The parts of 
natural science that treat the more common features of changeable being should be 
taught first so as to avoid useless repetition in those parts that treat particular aspects of 
changeable being common only to certain groups of such beings.89  
Thus, natural science begins with what is the most common to all natural things 
– motion and principles of motion.90 St. Thomas observes that Aristotle covered this in 
the Physics. Since every other part of natural science considers more concrete issues, 
the Physics is presupposed in them all. The conclusions of this foundational study are 
used afterwards but treated as already manifest and are not repeated.91 The second part 
of natural science considers the most perfect kind of motion common to all bodies, 
namely, local motion. This question Aristotle elaborated in On the Heavens.92 The next 
kind of motion, mutual transmutation of elements, as well as generation and corruption, 
is treated in On Generation and Corruption, which constitutes the third part of natural 
                                                 
 
88 Cf. Sententia De sensu, I, 1 (Leon. 45/2, p. 4, lin. 31-37). Cf. also paper by Marie George, “Aristotle 
and Aquinas on the Division of Natural Philosophy,” presented during The University of Notre Dame 
Thomistic Institute July 14-21, 2000 (http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/ti00/george.htm) and 
especially Benedict M. Ashley, “Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato and De memoria et reminescentia as 
Thomistic Sources,” (http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/ti00/ashley.htm). 
89 Cf. In De generatione, prooem., n. 2. 
90 Cf. Sententia De sensu, I, 1 (Leon. 45/2, p. 4, lin. 31-37). 
91 “Illa igitur que dicta sunt de anima subiiciantur uel supponantur, idest utamur ipsis in sequentibus 
tanquam suppositionibus iam manifestis, de reliquis autem dicamus, et primum de primis, id est primo 
de communibus et postea de propriis: iste enim est debitus ordo sciencie naturali, ut determinatum est 
in principio libri Physicorum” (ibid. [p. 7, lin. 154-160]).  
92 “Et ideo post considerationem motuum et mobilium in communi, quae fuit tradita in libro Physicorum, 
primo oportuit quod tractaretur de corporibus secundum quod moventur motu locali, in libro de Caelo; 
quae est secunda pars scientiae naturalis” (In De generatione, prooem., n. 1). 
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science.93 In the fourth part, Aristotle discusses the different species of the 
transmutations of elements, as is seen in his On Meteorology.94  
These four parts of natural science are followed by books concerning living 
bodies, which constitute a distinctive class of mobile being. This class is divided into 
three according to the level of generality with which living bodies are considered. 
Firstly, the most common principle of all living bodies is treated, namely, the soul. 
Aristotle devoted to this topic his On the Soul. Secondly, Aquinas says that Aristotle 
wrote several books in which he applied these most general considerations contained in 
On the Soul to more concrete questions or beings but still on some level of generality. In 
these books he discusses some special issues that belong commonly to all animals or to 
many genera of animals or else to all living beings. To this set pertain for example On 
Sense and the Sensible, On Memory and Recollection, On the Motion of Animals, etc.95 
Thirdly, all these considerations are applied to singular species of animals and plants 
according to what is distinctive to particular species.96  
Within these broad divisions almost the whole natural science is contained. St. 
Thomas underlines this “almost” because, as he remarks, “not all natural things can be 
known by man.”97 Aquinas wrote commentaries only to some of Aristotle’s works in 
natural science. First he commented on On the Soul. Right after that he commented on 
                                                 
93 “Est autem considerandum quod de unoquoque quod in pluribus invenitur, prius est considerandum in 
communi, quam ad species descendere: alioquin oporteret idem dicere multoties, ita scilicet quod in 
singulis id quod est commune repeteretur, sicut probat Philosophus in I de Partibus Animalium. Et ideo 
prius oportuit de generatione et corruptione in communi determinare, quam ad partes eius descendere. 
Similiter etiam considerare oportet quod, si in aliquo genere aliquod primum invenitur quod sit causa 
aliorum, eiusdem considerationis est commune genus et id quod est primum in genere illo: quia illud 
primum est causa totius generis, oportet autem eum qui considerat genus aliquod, causas totius generis 
considerare. … Sunt autem in genere generabilium et corruptibilium quaedam prima principia, scilicet 
elementa, quae sunt causa generationis et corruptionis et alterationis in omnibus aliis corporibus. Et 
inde est quod Aristoteles in hoc libro, qui est tertia pars scientiae naturalis, determinat non solum de 
generatione et corruptione in communi et aliis motibus consequentibus, sed etiam de generatione et 
corruptione elementorum” (In De generatione, prooem., n. 2). 
94 “Quia igitur Aristoteles in libro de Generatione determinavit de transmutationibus elementorum in 
communi, necessarium fuit ad complementum scientiae naturalis, determinare de speciebus 
transmutationum quae accidunt circa elementa: et de his determinat in hoc libro, qui intitulatur 
Meteorologicorum. Est igitur intentio eius in hoc libro determinare de transmutationibus quae accidunt 
circa elementa, secundum singulas species” (In Meteor., I, 1, n. 2). 
95 Benedict Ashley remarks that the order of the division of natural science differs significantly from that 
presented by Aristotle (whom Aquinas’s teacher, St. Albert, followed faithfully). Ashley suggests that 
it may be partly explained by the fact that “while Aristotle follows the via inventionis or order of 
investigation, Aquinas follows the via doctrinae or order of demonstration” (Ashley, “Aristotle’s De 
sensu et sensato”). 
96 Cf. Sententia De sensu, I, 1 (Leon. 45/2, p. 4, lin. 44-47). 
97 Cf. In Meteor., I, 1, n. 9. 
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On Sense and the Sensible and On Memory and Recollection. It is said that 
simultaneously with these three he commented on the Physics. We have also his 
unfinished commentaries on On Meteorology, On the Heavens, and On Generation and 
Corruption (Aquinas died before finishing the last two works). Noteworthy is the fact 
that St. Thomas started writing his commentaries on Aristotle’s books of natural science 
relatively late, in 1267, and he was working on them intensively until his death.98 Yet 
his knowledge of the material contained in these books is impressive already in his early 
works, especially in In Sententiarum and in De Veritate.  
Contrary to his teacher, St. Albert the Great, Aquinas did not write a Summa de 
homine and we do not know how it would look like in his synthesis. This fact introduces 
some difficulty in presenting St. Thomas’s science of man or anthropology. His Summa 
theologiae is a theological text that presents some anthropological questions from this 
special, theological point of view and using a theological method.99 An essay of 
extracting the philosophical content from this work may furnish only a fragmentary 
picture of Aquinas’s anthropology. In doing this we should remember that anthropology 
is for St. Thomas a subjective part of natural science,100 because human being is for him 
a species of an animal, albeit the most noble, but still a species of animal. Thus, 
anthropology constitutes a subjective part of natural science. According to the division 
related above, anthropology should be placed at the end, as one of the most specific 
sciences about one species. As such, anthropology presupposes many things that are 
                                                 
 
98 St. Thomas’s concern with the natural science is clearly visible throughout his writings: “The fact that 
he turned from his Summa theologiae toward the end of his life to write commentaries on the Physics, 
the De caelo, the De generatione et corruptione, and the Meteorology indeed attests to the importance 
he attached to natural philosophy, and this not only in its most general part dealing with ens mobile in 
communi but also with its special disciplines that treat of the phenomena of nature in all their specific 
detail” (Wallace, “A Thomistic Philosophy of Nature,” p. 30). 
99 “Deinde considerandum est de potentiis animae in speciali. Ad considerationem autem theologi 
pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et appetitivis, in quibus virtutes 
inveniuntur. Sed quia cognitio harum potentiarum quodammodo dependet ex aliis, ideo nostra 
consideratio de potentiis animae in speciali erit tripartita, primo namque considerandum est de his quae 
sunt praeambula ad intellectum; secundo, de potentiis intellectivis; tertio, de potentiis appetitivis” 
(STh, I, 78 pr.). Ashley notes that “the utterly absurd opinion still current among scientists that 
Aristotle had a ‘deductive not an inductive’ conception of science” has been intensified by the fact that 
Aquinas’s anthropology “is often presented from his theological expositions whose methodology is 
necessarily quite different from that of natural science, proceeding as it does from revelation and 
primarily in view of the spiritual aspect of humanity rather than from what can be learned about 
humanity from sensory experience” (Ashley, “Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato”). 
100 “Triplex est pars, scilicet integralis, ut paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt partes domus; subiectiva, 
sicut bos et leo sunt partes animalis; et potentialis, sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae” 
(STh, II-II, 48 c.). 
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more general than the science about man. As was indicated, these more general things 
are considered earlier, and therefore in anthropology they are not repeated but are 
treated as already manifest.  
 
 
*   *   * 
 
This chapter makes a transition from the logical part of this dissertation to the 
part which shows Aquinas’s way of constructing the human “is.” We asked therefore 
about available possibilities of saying scientifically what there is. St. Thomas’s 
explanation of the division of sciences reveals on the one hand his mastery of 
Aristotle’s epistemology and methodology as we find it in the Posterior Analytics and, 
on the other hand, it reveals his determination to find appropriate tools with which to 
disclose the reality of things to our capacity for scientific knowledge. This division 
presupposes both that things have natures and that we are capable of gaining a certain 
knowledge of them through abstraction. Another interesting presupposition related to 
this division (related because it is based as well on the genuine doctrine of abstraction) 
consists in a clear non-separating distinction between objects of cognitive faculties and 
things: one thing or one kind of things may be seen as several objects according to 
diverse aspects under which the thing is considered. In other words, for Aquinas our 
distinct perceptions are not necessarily distinct existences.101 Within this framework of 
different objects and diverse methodologies, science remains nonetheless as one 
perfecting the quality of the mind.  
Inscribed explicitly into an epistemology the unity of science creates the need 
for the order of learning. The limits of our cognitive powers, which bring to the fore 
those objects more obvious quoad nos, require that natural science precedes (not only 
pedagogically but also epistemologically) metaphysics. To be a universal science, 
metaphysics must presuppose natural science, whereas metaphysics understood as 
wisdom must include the results of natural science. Following the lead of St. Thomas in 
looking for a science that could construct an adequate human “is” as the basis for ethics, 
we conclude that natural science should be chosen as the most fitting for this task.  
                                                 
101 Cf. section 0.1. 
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Now we will consider more closely what follows from the specificity of the 
object of natural science on the level of the mode of scientific explanation. We will 
refer also to mathematical and metaphysical methods as they can help in describing 
something of human being, but not human being properly speaking.
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Explanation in Natural Science 
 
 
In the previous chapter we saw the division of speculative sciences according to 
the differences in the object of speculative faculty. Differences in objects result in 
differences in particular methods of explanation. St. Thomas soberly observes that: 
the method followed in investigation must be appropriate both to things and to us: for 
unless it is appropriate to the things studied, these could not be grasped, and unless it 
is appropriate for us, we could not comprehend.1 
 
We saw briefly in Chapter 4 what Aquinas means by “science” and what his general 
scientific method was. This general method should be analogically applied to every 
particular science in order to meet the requirements of types of things considered and 
our cognitive capacities in relation to these things.  
Before we start the description of the method of natural science we should 
underline that according to St. Thomas it is in the specification of knowledge that 
science obtains its perfection. He compares science, which achieves only universal and 
not specific knowledge, to something between pure potency and ultimate end: it is truly 
a science that contains some degree of actual knowledge, but since in its generality it 
does not attain to specific topics, it remains in potency relative to these specific topics.2 
                                                 
 
1 “Modus quo aliqua discutiuntur, debet congruere et rebus et nobis: nisi enim rebus congrueret, res 
intelligi non possent, nisi uero congrueret nobis, nos capere non possemus” (In Boet. De Trin., expos. 
cap. II). 
2 “Innatum est nobis ut procedamus cognoscendo ab iis quae sunt nobis magis nota, in ea quae sunt 
magis nota naturae; sed ea quae sunt nobis magis nota, sunt confusa, qualia sunt universalia; ergo 
oportet nos ab universalibus ad singularia procedere” (In Phys., I, 1, n. 6). “Sciendum est quod confusa 
hic dicuntur quae continent in se aliqua in potentia et indistincte. Et quia cognoscere aliquid 
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This makes natural science, in a sense, more difficult than mathematics and 
metaphysics, because “whenever there are many factors to be considered in order to 
know something, knowledge is more difficult.”3 However, general remarks concerning 
the subject and proper method of natural science are indispensable if we want to have 
a proper understanding of the more specific issues contained in particular sciences that 
constitute subjective parts of natural science. Subjective parts are treated as species 
specifying subject-genus and determining general principles established in the 
foundational consideration.4 Thus, these general considerations on mobile being and its 
principles are all presupposed and not repeated in the science on animals as well as in 
the science on one of the species of animals: human being.5 
                                                                                                                                               
indistincte, medium est inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum, ideo, dum intellectus noster 
procedit de potentia in actum, primo occurrit sibi confusum quam distinctum; sed tunc est scientia 
completa in actu, quando pervenitur per resolutionem ad distinctam cognitionem principiorum et 
elementorum. Et haec est ratio quare confusa sunt primo nobis nota quam distincta. Quod autem 
universalia sint confusa manifestum est, quia universalia continent in se suas species in potentia, et qui 
scit aliquid in universali scit illud indistincte; tunc autem distinguitur eius cognitio, quando 
unumquodque eorum quae continentur potentia in universali, actu cognoscitur: qui enim scit animal, 
non scit rationale nisi in potentia. Prius autem est scire aliquid in potentia quam in actu: secundum 
igitur hunc ordinem addiscendi quo procedimus de potentia in actum, prius quoad nos est scire animal 
quam hominem” (ibid., n. 7). Cf. In Meteor., I, 1, n. 1. 
3 “Ubicumque autem ad aliquid cognoscendum oportet plura considerare, est difficilior cognitio” (In 
Boet. De Trin. 6, 1). 
4 There were some attempts to interpret Aquinas’s natural science as separate from particular sciences, 
which treat more specific problems, so as to speak rather about the philosophy of nature as opposed to 
natural sciences. This manner of reading St. Thomas was undertaken probably in order to get rid of 
“discredited physics of Aristotle” present in Aquinas’s writings without detriment to other valuable 
theories and analysis. William Wallace opposes this interpretation, namely that philosophy of nature 
should be understood as something essentially different than science of nature. He says: “For 
St. Thomas there is no distinction between philosophia naturalis and scientia naturalis: both 
philosophia and scientia are for him cognitio certa per causas, and the essential difference between the 
Physics and the remaining natural treatises lies only in the fact that the former is concerned with 
a general analysis of nature and change whereas the latter are more specific and concrete in the 
subjects of their consideration” (Wallace, “A Thomistic Philosophy of Nature” as Essay II in From 
a Realist Point of View, p. 32). Cf. id., “Defining the Philosophy of Science” as Essay I in ibid., p. 1-
21; Charles De Koninck, “The Unity and Diversity of Natural Science,” in The Philosophy of Physics, 
edited by V. E. Smith (Jamaica, N.Y.: St. John’s University Press, 1961), p. 5-24; and especially 
Michael Augros, “Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy,” The Thomist 68 (2004): 105-141. 
5 Cf. In De an., I, 1 (Leon. 45/1, p. 4, lin. 1-10). “Sed quia ea quae consequuntur aliquod commune, prius 
et seorsum determinanda sunt, ne oporteat ea multoties pertractando omnes partes illius communis 
repetere; necessarium fuit quod praemitteretur in scientia naturali unus liber, in quo tractaretur de iis 
quae consequuntur ens mobile in communi” (In Phys., I, 1, n. 4). Aquinas adds here that it is similar 
with metaphysics as regards every other science: “sicut omnibus scientiis praemittitur philosophia 
prima, in qua determinatur de iis quae sunt communia enti inquantum est ens” (ibid.), yet from what 
was written above about metaphysics it should be clear that the foundational part of natural science is 
pressupposed in particular parts of natural science in a different way than metaphysical considerations. 
Metaphysics in the order of learning is presupposed according to the principle: “discentis oportet 
credere,” whereas the foundational part of natural science should be actually learned before any 
particular part. 
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The mode of procedure in natural science corresponds to the typical manner in 
which the rational soul operates, thus it can be considered as the closest to our human 
way of knowing. In other words, it is most in conformity with the natural operation of 
the human mind:  
it seems to belong to the nature of every man to advance from the imperfect 
knowledge which covers a good description of things to a perfect knowledge of them 
by filling in the details. This he does by investigating first one part and then another. 
For it belongs to man’s nature to use reason in order to know the truth. Reason has 
this peculiar characteristic that it proceeds from one thing to another … Thus to man 
belongs to progress in the knowledge of the truth little by little.6 
 
In this man is contrasted with angels, intellectual substances, who at once, without any 
inquiry or reasoning grasp the truth. Like the rational soul receives its intelligible 
species from sensible things, so also does natural science proceed from what is more 
known quoad nos and less known secundum naturam. In addition, as it is proper to 
reason to obtain some knowledge about one thing from the knowledge of another, so it 
is proper to natural science to prove some thing through another, which can be 
completely exterior.7  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
6 “Ad naturam cuiuslibet hominis pertinere videtur ut ea quae bene continent descriptionem alicuius rei 
perducat, scilicet de imperfecto ad perfectum, et particulatim disponat, primo scilicet unam partem et 
postea aliam investigando. Ad hominis enim naturam pertinet ratione uti ad veritatis cognitionem; 
rationis autem proprium est ab uno in aliud procedere … et ideo ad hominem pertinet paulatim in 
cognitione veritatis proficiat” (In Eth., I, 11 [Leon. 47/1, p. 39, lin. 28-33). 
7 “In scientiis enim mathematicis proceditur per ea tantum que sunt de essentia rei, cum demonstrent 
solum per causam formalem, et ideo non demonstratur in eis aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed per 
propriam diffinitionem illius rei. … Set in scientia naturali, in qua fit demonstratio per causas 
extrinsecas, probatur aliquid de una re per aliam rem omnino extrinsecam; et ita modus rationis 
maxime in scientia naturali obseruatur, et propter hoc scientia naturalis inter alias est maxime hominis 
intellectui conformis” (In Boet. De Trin., 6, 1 ad 1am). Cf. also In Boet. De Trin., 6, 1 ad 1am ad 3. 
Wallace says that natural philosopher “normally proceeds in his reasoning from one thing to another 
that is really distinct from it. Sometimes the second thing is completely extrinsic to the first as when he 
reasons from the moved to the mover, in demonstrating propter quid that whatever is moved is moved 
by another (cf. In Phys., VII, 1, n. 6). This need not always be the case, however, for he frequently 
reasons from one thing to another which is within the same composite, but is really distinct from the 
first. For instance, he thus reasons from substantial form to prime matter, and from motion to its proper 
subject, the thing moved, both of which are really distinct from each other, but found within the same 
composite. And even in this case, he is not always limited to this type of process: he can treat of things 
that are only rationally distinct, as for instance, when he reasons from motion to action or to passion, 
both of which, while really distinct from each other, are distinguished from motion by a mere 
distinction of reason (cf. In Phys., III, 5, n. 10)” (William A. Wallace, The Role of Demonstration in 
Moral Theology. A Study of Methodology in St. Thomas Aquinas [Washington, D.C.: The Thomist 
Press, 1962], p. 30). 
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6.1. The principles of mobile being – basic hylomorphism 
 
In St. Thomas’s interpretation, Aristotle in Book I of the Physics treats the 
principles of natural things, whereas in Book II he considers the principles of natural 
science.8 In Book I Aristotle discusses with his predecessors, on the one hand, 
manifested deficiencies of their theories, which aimed to account for changing being, 
and on the other hand, dialectically shows that his solution corresponds better to our 
ordinary experience of changing being. We should examine briefly the principles of 
natural things in order to appreciate the genuineness of the Aristotelian solution of this 
foundational part of natural science. Aquinas fully embraced it and it will help us in 
solving the problem of this dissertation.  
Aristotelian solution consists in distinguishing three principles of changing 
being: form, matter, and privation. Most generally speaking, form gives the actuality to 
matter, thus it is that because of which and toward which the change occurs. Matter is 
the subject of change and signifies some being in potency. This being in potency can be 
already somehow actualized by a substantial form, and thus change which occurs in 
such a subject is an accidental change (potency of coming to be such), or it can be not 
actualized at all, and thus the change is substantial (potency of coming to be).9 In strict 
terms matter is: 1) the first subject from which a thing comes to be per se, and not per 
accidens, and 2) is in the thing after it has come to be. These two elements of the 
definition of matter distinguish it from privation. For privation is that from which 
a thing comes to be per accidens, and is that which is not in the thing after it has come 
to be.10 Sometimes in order to distinguish the subject of becoming per se, the term 
“prime matter” is used as opposed to “matter” which imprecisely can be used for both 
                                                 
8 “Postquam philosophus in primo libro determinavit de principiis rerum naturalium, hic determinat de 
principiis scientiae naturalis” (In Phys., II, 1, n. 1). 
9 “Materia que est in potentia ad esse substantiale dicitur materia ex qua, que autem est in potentia ad 
esse accidentale dicitur materia in qua. Item proprie loquendo quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale 
dicitur subiectum, quod uero est in potentia ad esse substantiale dicitur proprie materia” (De principiis 
naturae, 1 [Leon. 43, p. 39, lin. 16-23]).  
10 “Hoc enim dicimus materiam, primum subiectum ex quo aliquid fit per se et non secundum accidens, 
et inest rei iam factae (et utrumque eorum ponitur ad differentiam privationis, ex qua fit aliquid per 
accidens, et non inest rei factae) (In Phys., I, 15, n. 11). Obviously, privation is not in the thing in the 
sense of privation of this already existing form, but nonetheless “materia a priuatione non denudatur; in 
quantum enim est sub una forma, habet priuationem alterius et e conuerso.” This means that “priuatio 
est principium in fieri et non in esse” (De principiis naturae, 2 [Leon. 43, p. 40, lin. 20-22 and 44-45]). 
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kinds of change.11 Prime matter is known only by analogy to the subject of accidental 
change: prime matter is related to substantial form as the subject of accidental change is 
related to accidental form. Prime matter is thus an element of a theory which helps to 
conceive of unqualified coming to be and ceasing to be in nature. It is knowable only in 
relation to form “since everything which is known is known through its form”12 and 
never exists or can exist separately. Prime matter is therefore a concept signifying the 
subject of substantial change, a pure potentiality,13 a being in potency.14 As such this 
concept is inferred from our immediate experience of subjects of accidental change and 
from the fact that things come into being and die away. Neither form nor prime matter 
but only something composed from matter and substantial form (compositum) may 
become or be destroyed (generari vel corrumpi).15  
                                                 
11 “Ipsa autem materia que intelligitur sine qualibet forma et priuatione, sed subiecta forme et priuationi, 
dicitur materia prima, propter hoc quod ante ipsam non est alia materia” (ibid., 2 [p. 41, lin. 74-78]).  
12 “Natura quae primo subiicitur mutationi, idest materia prima, non potest sciri per seipsam, cum omne 
quod cognoscitur, cognoscatur per suam formam; materia autem prima consideratur subiecta omni 
formae. Sed scitur secundum analogiam, idest secundum proportionem” (In Phys., I, 13, n. 9). 
13 “Materia prima, quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus…” (STh, I, 115, 1 ad 2). 
14 “Materia prima que est ens in potencia” (In De an., II, 1 [Leon. 45/1, p. 70, lin. 213]). “Actualitas 
potentialitati repugnat” (STh, I, 54, 1). As is well known, the doctrine of pure potentiality of prime 
matter (theologically speaking it means that it is impossible for God even miraculously to create matter 
without form), as well as related to that the doctrine of the necessity for a substance to have only one 
substantial form, were condemned in Paris by bishop Tempier in 1277. This could be a reason why 
some younger thinkers than Aquinas believed the contrary (e.g. Duns Scotus). On historical and 
contemporary difficulties in understanding the pure potentiality of prime matter see Christopher Byrne, 
“Prime Matter and Actuality,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995): 197-224. After quoting 
several Thomistic interpretations the author rejects the doctrine of pure potentiality of prime matter and 
says that his position is similar to that of Robert Sokolowski, “Matter, Elements and Substance in 
Aristotle,” The Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970): 263-288. Steven Baldner in this way 
summarizes their argument: “In order that prime matter be real, it must have some role to perform. 
A role that matter can have is that of being quantified in three dimensions, in place, in time, etc. But in 
order for matter to have the role of being thus quantified, it must be actual. A purely potential prime 
matter, however, is not actual. It thus cannot be quantified and can have no role to perform. If prime 
matter as pure potentiality has no role to perform, it cannot be real” (Steven Baldner, “Matter, Prime 
Matter, Elements” a paper delivered at the Notre Dame University Maritain Center Thomistic Institute, 
24 July, 1998, www.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/ti98/baldner.htm). Subsequently, distinguishing 
prime matter from matter and from elements, Baldner explains Aquinas’s teaching and in what consists 
common misunderstanding. On the nature of prime matter see also the very learned and insightful 
work of John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to 
Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), p. 312-327. 
15 Cf. In Phys., I, 15, n. 11; In De generatione, I, 6, n. 7-10. Aquinas notes that many failed to see form 
and matter as principles of being, because they considered forms in the way substances are to be 
considered. Whereas according to him “sicut esse non est formae, sed subiecti per formam, ita nec 
fieri, quod terminatur ad esse, est formae, sed subiecti” (De virtutibus, 1, 11 c.). A well known latter 
example of such confusion gave Suarez who regarded form and matter as imperfect or incomplete 
substances, therefore not as principles of being but rather as beings in their own right; see David 
M. Knight, “Suarez’s Approach to Substantial Form,” Modern Schoolman 39 (1962): 219-239.  
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Privation is the opposite of form, i.e. the lack of a form in subject, which allows 
us to perceive a change happening from some qualified potency toward the actuality of 
some form in matter. Privation is thus the same with matter if considered as a subject of 
change, yet conceptually there is an essential difference between them (sunt unum 
subiecto sed differunt ratione).16 Namely, matter is a cause of becoming in receiving 
form, whereas privation as a negation of form is not a cause, that is, is not a constitutive 
element of any becoming being, but rather signifies a non-being. Matter, in receiving 
form, is itself actualized and becomes a constitutive element of a real material being. 
Privation, with the advent of form, simply disappears, because it is a property of 
uninformed matter.17 Privation, as a lack of form, is thus merely a being of reason seen 
only in relation to some already existent, but not fully actualized, compositum of matter 
and form. This being of reason, privation, allows us to perceive an accidental change.18  
Thus, form and matter are principles per se of changing being, while privation is 
a principle only per accidens. Yet matter and privation are distinctive principles for 
“transmutable being” (sunt principia entis transmutabilis), which is the subject of 
natural science.19 In this point matter and privation are opposed to form, which is 
generally treated in metaphysics: “because form is a principle of being, and being as 
such is the subject of First Philosophy.”20 Nonetheless, form is considered initially in 
natural science, insofar as it happens to exist also (and happens to be known to us 
principally) as existing in natural and corruptible things.21 In such things it is crucial to 
remember that form is of two kinds:  
                                                 
16 Cf. In Phys., I, 15, n. 5. Let us remark that in the nominalist approach it is impossible to make this 
distinction. 
17 Cf. In Phys., I, 15, n. 8. “Materia est non ens secundum accidens, sed privatio est non ens per se” 
(ibid., n. 4). “Materia est prope rem, et est aliqualiter, quia est in potentia ad rem, et est aliqualiter 
substantia rei, quia intrat in constitutionem substantiae: sed hoc de privatione dici non potest” (ibid.). 
18 “Ista natura quae subiicitur, scilicet materia, simul cum forma est causa eorum quae fiunt secundum 
naturam, ad modum matris: sicut enim mater est causa generationis in recipiendo, ita et materia. Sed si 
quis accipiat … privationem, protendens intellectum circa ipsam, imaginabitur ipsam non ad 
constitutionem rei pertinere, sed magis ad quoddam malum rei: quia est penitus non ens, cum privatio 
nihil aliud sit quam negatio formae in subiecto, et est extra totum ens: ut sic in privatione locum habeat 
ratio Parmenidis, quidquid est praeter ens est non ens; non autem in materia, ut dicebant Platonici” (In 
Phys., I, 15, n. 7).  
19 Cf. In Phys., I, 15, n. 12. 
20 “De principio formali, utrum sit unum vel plura, et quot et quae sint, pertinet determinare ad 
philosophiam primam, et usque ad illud tempus reservetur: quia forma est principium essendi, et ens 
inquantum huiusmodi est subiectum primae philosophiae” (In Phys., I, 15, n. 12). 
21 “Medicus enim non considerat de nervo inquantum est nervus, hoc enim pertinet ad naturalem, sed 
inquantum est subiectum sanitatis … . Et similiter naturalis non considerat de forma inquantum est 
forma, sed inquantum est in materia” (In Phys., II, 4, n. 10). 
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one is perfect and completes the species of a natural thing, as in the case of the form 
of fire or water or man or plant; the other is an incomplete form which neither 
perfects any natural species nor is the end of the intention of nature, but is something 
on the road of generation and corruption. For it is plain in the generation of 
composites, for example, of an animal, that between the principle of generation, 
which is the seed, and the ultimate form of the complete animal, there are many 
intermediate generations (as Avicenna says in his Sufficiency) which have to be 
terminated to certain forms, none of which makes the being complete in species, but 
rather an incomplete being which is the road to a certain species. Likewise, on the 
side of corruption there are many intermediate forms that are incomplete: for the body 
of an animal is not, as soon as the soul is separated, immediately resolved into the 
elements; rather this takes place by means of many intermediate corruptions in which 
many imperfect forms succeed one another in the matter, such as the form of a dead 
body, then the form of a putrefied body, and so on.22  
 
Thus the fact that things are changing may imply some difficulties in identifying what is 
the perfect form of a thing.  
Moreover, form is not directly given to our sense experience because form 
belongs to the order of the intellectual apprehension. Form determines what a thing is. It 
is apprehended when we grasp the nature of a thing and try to define it. This can occur 
only through sensorily perceived accidents. Hence, although form is not immediately 
given in sense experience, nonetheless, it is derivable from it. This means that form is 
not given to our sense experience, but nonetheless it is contained as codified in our 
sense experience from which the intellect reads off what the form is.23 The extended 
consideration of form, a consideration which could be indifferently applied to material 
and immaterial beings, needs to be postponed until the time for metaphysics comes.24 
                                                 
22 “Duplex est forma: una quidem perfecta, quae complet speciem alicuius rei naturalis, sicut forma ignis 
vel aquae aut hominis aut plantae; alia autem est forma incompleta, quae neque perficit aliquam 
speciem naturalem, neque est finis intentionis naturae, sed se habet in via generationis vel corruptionis. 
Manifestum est enim in generatione compositorum, puta animalis, quod inter principium generationis, 
quod est semen, et ultimam formam animalis completi, sunt multae generationes mediae, ut Avicenna 
dicit in sua Sufficientia; quas necesse est terminari ad aliquas formas, quarum nulla facit ens 
completum secundum speciem, sed ens incompletum, quod est via ad speciem aliquam. Similiter etiam 
ex parte corruptionis sunt multae formae mediae, quae sunt formae incompletae: non enim, separata 
anima, corpus animalis statim resolvitur in elementa; sed hoc fit per multas corruptiones medias, 
succedentibus sibi in materia multis formis imperfectis, sicut est forma corporis mortui, et postmodum 
putrefacti, et sic inde” (In De generatione, I, 8, n. 3). 
23 “Differentiae substantiales, quia sunt ignotae, per differentias accidentales manifestantur: et ideo 
multoties utimur differentiis accidentalibus loco substantialium. … Omnes enim formae substantiales 
differunt secundum magis et minus perfectum … Potest etiam dubitari de hoc quod dicit, quod cuius 
differentiae magis significant hoc aliquid, magis est substantia: cum tamen dicatur in praedicamentis 
quod substantia non suscipit magis et minus. Sed dicendum quod per hoc non intendit significare 
intensionem et remissionem substantiae in praedicamento substantiae; sed maiorem vel minorem 
perfectionem in speciebus substantiae, secundum dictam formarum differentiam” (In De generatione, 
I, 8, n. 5). Cf. Wallace, The Modeling of ature: Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of ature in 
Sythesis (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1996), p. 10. 
24 Cf. In Phys., I, 15, n. 12.  
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Yet it is good to remember that the essential characteristic contained in the concept of 
form as understood in natural science, i.e. its giving actuality to matter, is transferred 
from our perception of proper operations in things.25 
Aquinas stresses the importance of Aristotle’s distinction between matter and 
privation, opposing it to the position of the Platonists. The Platonists also held a certain 
duality on the part of matter, but they distinguished instead between the great and the 
small (magnum et parvum), without mentioning privation. Privation, since not clearly 
distinguished from matter, was either omitted altogether by them or included into the 
great and the small. Thus they had other three principles of changing being: form, the 
great, and the small.26 This solution allowed them to consider changing being 
exclusively mathematically, because the great and the small are related to quantity and 
as such are considered primarily in mathematics.27  
Surprisingly, Aristotle, stressing the necessity for a clear distinction between 
matter and privation in natural things and processes, speaks about form as something 
divine, and the best, and desirable. Aquinas comments on it saying that form is 
something divine:  
because every form is some participation in the likeness of the divine being, which is 
pure act. Since each thing is in act, insofar as it has form. Form is the best because act 
is the perfection of potency and is its good; and from this it follows as a consequence 
that form is desirable, because every thing desires its own perfection. Privation, on the 
other hand, is opposed to form, since it is nothing other than the removal of form. 
                                                 
25 “Sicut videtur ex communi hominum intellectu, nomen actus primo fuit attributum operationi; sic enim 
quasi omnes intelligunt actum; secundo autem exinde fuit translatum ad formam, inquantum forma est 
principium operationis et finis” (De pot., 1, 1). Steven Brock remarks that “Neglect of the point about 
form as act … seems to play a part in the rather sophomoric criticism sometimes directed against 
‘classical’ metaphysics for being ‘substance-based’ and, therefore, for promoting a view of reality as 
fundamentally ‘static’, which is to say, lifeless, inert, merely ‘given’. Moreover, Aquinas’s treatment 
of form as sharing in the nature of act, ‘insofar as it is a principle and end of operation’, reflects 
important elements in his analysis of operation itself” (Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas 
Aquinas and the Theory of Action [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997], p. 10-11).  
26 Cf. In Phys., I, 15, n. 5. One of reasons why they do not distinguish matter from privation, Aquinas 
says, was this: “quia videbatur eis quod id quod est numero unum vel subiecto, sit etiam ratione unum” 
(n. 2). Compare it with one of Hume’s dogmas, which he could not render consistent but was unable to 
renounce, namely “that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences” (cf. section 0.1).  
27 This might remind Decartes’s identification of bodies with res extensa, cf. Edward Slowik, 
“Descartes’s Physics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition), edited by 
Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/descartes-physics/. Cf. also Daniel 
E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonen, “Descartes on Causation,” The Review of Metaphysics 50 (1997): 
841-872 – these authors show how Descartes reduces all causes only to a specifically understood 
formal cause (as we already know, explanation according to formal cause is proper to mathematics), 
which resulted in the practical elimination of traditional natural science.  
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Hence, because what is opposed to the good and removes it is evil, it is clear that 
privation pertains to evil.28 
 
It might seem at least inappropriate for today’s scientists even to suggest such 
“unscientific” statements about natural things. Aquinas without any embarrassment 
follows Aristotle in this remark. Not only in the divine character of form,29 but also in 
the insistence that form is the best and desirable. Note the scope of this statement: 
Aristotle is talking about everything that exists. Everything we know that exists is 
known through its form. And thus everything, insofar as it has an actualizing form, is in 
a way divine, the best, and desirable. Does he destroy in this one sweeping statement 
the chasm between fact and value? From where does he take it that everything desires 
its own perfection?  
Already Avicenna argued against Aristotle, saying that matter cannot desire 
form. Yet St. Thomas replies that his objections are easy to solve. It suffices to 
understand properly the concepts used by Aristotle. He explains: 
Natural appetite is nothing but the ordination of things to their end in accordance with 
their proper natures. Not only a being in act is ordered to its end by an active power, 
but also matter insofar as it is potency. For form is the end of matter. Therefore for 
matter to desire form is nothing other than matter being ordered to form as potency to 
act. And because matter still remains in potency to another form while it is under 
some form, there is always in it an appetite for form. … [matter] is in potency to other 
forms while it has some form in act.30 
 
To be a potency towards substantial being, is plainly a necessary mark of matter. But 
one might ask: could we not understand matter without this essential tendency toward 
form? In other words, could we not create such a concept of matter that would have no 
essential tendency or would not be a potency? Of course we could. However, such 
a concept would have no correspondence to reality; it would be something similar to the 
                                                 
28 “Forma est quoddam divinum et optimum et appetibile. Divinum quidem est, quia omnis forma est 
quaedam participatio similitudinis divini esse, quod est actus purus: unumquodque enim in tantum est 
actu in quantum habet formam. Optimum autem est, quia actus est perfectio potentiae et bonum eius: et 
per consequens sequitur quod sit appetibile, quia unumquodque appetit suam perfectionem. Privatio 
autem opponitur formae, cum non sit aliud quam remotio eius: unde cum id quod opponitur bono et 
removet ipsum, sit malum, manifestum est quod privatio pertinet ad malum” (In Phys., I, 15, n. 7). Cf. 
Lawrence Dewan, St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things, The Aquinas Lecture, 2007 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007). 
29 Cf. In Peryerm., I, 3 (Leon. 1*/1, p. 16, lin. 138-147). 
30 “Nihil est igitur aliud appetitus naturalis quam ordinatio aliquorum secundum propriam naturam in 
suum finem. Non solum autem aliquid ens in actu per virtutem activam ordinatur in suum finem, sed 
etiam materia secundum quod est in potentia; nam forma est finis materiae. Nihil igitur est aliud 
materiam appetere formam, quam eam ordinari ad formam ut potentia ad actum. Et quia sub 
quacumque forma sit, adhuc remanet in potentia ad aliam formam, inest ei semper appetitus formae: … 
[materia] est in potentia ad alias formas, dum unam habet in actu” (In Phys., I, 15, n. 10). 
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concept of Chimera – simply a false concept. In science we are not interested in such 
concepts because we want to know what things really are and not so much what things 
we could imagine. Matter is always for the sake of form (materia est propter formam)31 
and form is always the aim of matter (forma est finis materiae).32 The tendency of 
matter towards form is nothing imposed from the outside of matter, it is its essential 
mode of being, and it is recognized as such through an analysis of changing being. It is 
not a tendency towards something grasped cognitively by matter beforehand as its good 
– it would be a sheer absurdity to claim something like that. In the signification of the 
term “matter” there is simply contained that it is necessarily something relational, 
something that is always tending towards form as its perfection. It is known exclusively 
in relation to form as something perfect. This is why everything desires its own 
perfection.  
Obviously, there appears the topic of Creation, namely, that God made the world 
with this inherent structure in all changing beings. And so the tendency of matter would 
be, in this manner, imposed from the outside. Thus, there could arise a reluctance to 
accept anything like the tendency of matter toward form because it would lead to the 
acknowledgment of some cause for this tendency. Yet nothing is imposed from outside 
because this would suggest that there was already some matter to which the Creator 
added the characteristic of tending towards form. Matter is or is not, and if it is, one of 
its essential features is exactly the fact that it is tending. If we understand Creation as 
Aquinas understands it (i.e. that the divine causality in created things is radically 
different from the causality of secondary causes), God’s creative power is at work in 
everything that exists, giving to things their very existence, existence that is according 
to their natures established by God, and natures with proper operations.33 Thus nothing 
is imposed but things are simply created as having such natures and operations. If these 
natures and proper operations are intelligible without any reference to God, why should 
we have any problems in understanding matter in this way? Moreover, in this initial 
analysis of motion there is nothing about God the Creator, nor does this analysis 
logically depend on the doctrine of Creation: this is only an endeavor to describe and 
analyze motion as something that appears most strongly in our simple experience. In 
                                                 
31 In Poster., II, 8 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 202, lin. 31).  
32 In Phys., I, 15, n. 10. 
33 Cf. e.g. De pot., 3, 5. 
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philosophy first we answer the question an est – in the case of motion in general it is 
obvious that it does exist. Then we try to describe it, find its qualities, and discern 
essential qualities from merely accidental in order to define it. Only at the end do we 
ask propter quid, that is, why the motion in general exists. Thus, for Aquinas we arrive 
at God the Creator in our natural reasoning later, thus the description of matter does not 
depend on our knowledge of the First Cause and its power.  
The desire ascribed to matter – it is good to emphasize – is not a mental reality.34 
Only in the case of some animals it may be the domain of psyche and only in the case of 
human being it can be recognized as such. Rather it is in a way the most profound 
relation inhering in every changing and not yet fully actualized being, the deepest 
tendency or inclination (relation is often called ad aliquid in Aquinas’s Latin and also 
matter is always from the outset ad aliquid, namely ad formam) of every becoming 
material being.35 It is something belonging to the very dynamic constitution of material 
beings. Matter is identical with its potentiality and its relation to form. The “is” of 
material being is – independent of the subjective decision of individuals or of their state 
of consciousness – always tending, becoming, and changing. And in natural science the 
“is” of material being is recognized exactly in this condition. To neglect this aspect is to 
neglect the most profound character of material things. Therefore, it could be said that 
matter is most properly called a principle of changing being and is most properly treated 
in natural science, since form, another principle per se, exceeds the scope of natural 
science and is properly considered in metaphysics, and privation is only a principle per 
accidens.  
                                                 
34 Wallace helps us to understand in what sense the term ‘end’ is used for teleology in nature by 
distinguishing three different meanings of this word: “The first and simplest meaning is that of end in 
the sense of terminus, the point at which a process stops. … A second meaning of end or goal adds to 
the idea of terminus the notion that it is somehow a perfection or good attained through the process. … 
The third meaning of end is more specialized still, for it adds to the notion of termination and 
perfection that of intention or aim. … Much of the difficulty with teleology in nature arises from 
conceiving all final causality as intentional or cognitive and not sufficiently differentiating the 
cognitive from the terminative and the perfective” (Wallace, The Modeling of ature, p. 16-17). 
35 Obviously, we should not think that matter is simply in the category of relation, rather it has a 
relational character due to its essential ordering to form: “materia est de numero eorum quae sunt ad 
aliquid, quia dicitur ad formam. Quod non ideo dicitur quasi ipsa materia sit in genere relationis, sed 
quia cuilibet formae determinatur propria materia” (In Phys., II, 4, n. 9). Some authors have called this 
special kind of relation between matter and form a ‘transcendental relation’. John Wippel notes 
(The Metaphysical Thought, p. 320, n. 96) that A. Krempel, in his La doctrine de la relation chez saint 
Thomas: exposé historique et systématique (Paris, 1952) was trying to abolish this line of interpretation 
by saying that there is only a logical relation between individual matter and its substantial form, as well 
as only an accidental relation between the body and the soul. Wippel disagrees with him and quotes 
other critics. 
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The understanding of matter in this essentially dynamic perspective,36 and also 
as clearly distinguished from privation, results in the need for other than mathematical 
method of inquiry. For although mathematical principles can be applied to physical 
reality in order to describe something of it, namely its quantitative aspects, still a vast 
range of non-quantitative aspects remains scientifically untouched. For Aquinas, such 
non-quantitative aspects would include precisely potency, besides also actuality, form, 
finality, causality, and existence.37 In Platonic approach, since matter is not 
distinguished from privation, non-being is attributed to matter, and thus such 
a relational and dynamic vision of matter is not so present.  
Let us note also that such a positive understanding of matter was for Aquinas an 
exquisite tool in integrating the effects of natural reasoning about material things with 
his sound theological treatment of the goodness of created things, the goodness of the 
work of the Only Good, the God Creator. It is well known that this question was vital 
for St. Thomas because of multiform errors of his contemporaries, errors stemming 
from the same source, imbued with Neo-Platonism Manichaeism.  
 
 
6.2. The principles of natural science 
 
Now we turn from principles of natural things, treated in the previous section, to 
the principles of natural science. Thus, following St. Thomas’s texts, I will recall the 
                                                 
36 William Wallace writes about Aristotle’s understanding of prime matter as “a type of conservation 
principle that persists through all natural changes in the universe” and then he adds: “Surprisingly, 
scientists have come to develop a similar conception in recent years. No longer do they attempt to 
identify one final substance, a single super-quark, for example, that is the ultimate building block of 
the universe. Instead their emphasis is on delineating factors that are conserved in all the 
transformations that take place in the world of nature. … They have been successively formulated as 
the conservation of matter, energy, mass, and finally, after Einstein’s discovery of mass-energy 
equivalence (E = mc2), mass-energy. Perhaps the last named, mass-energy, comes the closest to 
conveying the Aristotelian idea of protomatter as the basic stuff of the universe. … matter, as a basic 
constituent of all natural entities, is no longer seen as the passive and inert component it was 
previously thought to be. Rather it is a powerful and potential principle that lies at the base of the most 
cataclysmic upheavals taking place on our planet” (Wallace, The Modeling of ature, p. 8-9). Wallace 
quotes also Werner Heisenberg who suggests that “the matter of Aristotle, which is mere ‘potentia,’ 
should be compared to our concept of energy” (ibid., p. 9). 
37 Weisheipl describes how in the fourteenth century the area of phenomena considered capable of 
mathematization was extended and how this process developed until Galileo. Cf. Weisheipl, “The 
Evolution of Scientific Method” [as essay X in ature and Motion…], p. 239-260. In this line see also 
William Wallace, “Quantification in Sixteenth-Century Natural Philosophy” in: Recovering ature: 
Essays in atural Philosophy, Ethics, and Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph McInerny, ed. by Thomas 
Hibbs and John O’Callaghan (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p. 11-24. 
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most general principles of science and apply it to natural science. Then, I will 
distinguish natural things or processes from all other things or processes. Next, I will 
define nature and characterize it briefly in order to narrow down the scope of 
perceivable principles and causes only to those treated in natural science. Finally, I will 
show how causes as principles of natural science emerge from a simple analysis of 
natural motion.  
As was said, for Aquinas, in every science what must first be known are its 
subject and the medium by which it demonstrates.38 The medium is the formal object of 
science.39 The formal object of science, in turn, is the definition of the formal subject 
(i.e. the definition of the aspect of the real being which is considered in a given 
science).40 Accordingly, it is already known that the subject of natural science is 
manifested through the senses because it was said that natural science considers such 
speculabilia that contain in their definition sensible matter. This means that natural 
science generally treats the whole reality of material and sensible being. This is its 
material subject. The formal subject of natural science is motion or change. It is taken as 
a common property of every material being, which defines the nature of the sensible 
world on the most general level. It can be taken as a descriptive definition of the 
subject: changeable or mobile being.  
Among changeable or mobile beings we can distinguish between those that 
come from nature and those which come from other causes.41 The main difference 
between things becoming from nature (naturalia) and every other thing, is that natural 
things seem to have in themselves some principle of change and rest42 (either according 
to place, or according to increase and decrease [i.e. according to quantity], or according 
to alteration [i.e. according to quality]).43 Other things do not have such interior 
principle, except per accidens, that is, insofar as non-natural things are made from 
                                                 
38 “Ea autem quae primo oportet cognoscere in aliqua scientia, sunt subiectum ipsius, et medium per quod 
demonstrat” (In Phys., II, 1, n. 1). 
39 Cf. STh, II-II, 1, 1. 
40 For a longer explanation see Melvin A. Glutz, The Manner of Demonstrating in atural Philosophy, 
River Forest, Ill., 1956, p. 43-51. 
41 “Inter omnia entia, quaedam esse dicimus a natura; quaedam vero ab aliis causis, puta ab arte vel a 
casu” (In Phys., I, 1, n. 2). 
42 “Naturalis enim philosophia de naturalibus est; naturalia autem sunt quorum principium est natura; 
natura autem est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est; de his igitur quae habent in se principium 
motus, est scientia naturalis” (ibid., n. 3). 
43 Secundum locum, secundum augumentum et decrementum, secundum alterationem – cf. ibid., II, 1, 
n. 2. 
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natural ones.44 That things have in themselves some principle of change and rest is 
observed on the basis of some regularity of occurrences. Such motions which occur 
regularly are susceptible to scientific treatment.45 In natural science changes are studied 
in order to discover the inner constitution of things that undergo these changes. Singular 
or random changes do not provide us with appropriate means to discover the proper 
causes of the bodies to which these changes happen. Thus such changes as the result of 
violence and artificially imposed action, chance and fortune, strictly speaking do not fall 
within the ambit of natural science. And only natural motion or natural change, which is 
characterized by regularity and some determination, gives us a sufficient basis to attain 
a scientific knowledge of the inner constitution of things. Other kinds of motion may 
provide some kind of knowledge about things; nonetheless in science we do not seek 
any cognition but a certain cognition.46 
This inner principle in natural things is called “nature” and it is defined as “the 
principle of change and rest in the thing in which it is primarily and per se and not per 
accidens.”47 Thus nature is perfectly distinguished from every other principles of 
motion.48 Nature, in the sense of principle, refers both to matter and form because they 
                                                 
44 “Inquantum scilicet materia et substantia corporum artificiatorum sunt res naturales” (ibid.).  
45 “Etiam fortuna et casus computantur inter causas, cum multa dicantur fieri vel esse etiam propter 
fortunam et casum” (In Phys., II, 7, n. 1). Cf. In Meta., XI, 8, n. 2284-88.  
46 “In scientiis non quaeritur qualiscumque cognitio, sed cognitionis certitudo” (In Phys., I, 1, n. 7). 
47 “Natura nihil aliud est quam principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non 
secundum accidens” (ibid., 1, n. 5). In STh, III, 2, 1 Aquinas explains that this name “nature” comes 
from our observation of living things, but its signification is extended to include every principle of 
change specified in quoted before definition: “quia principium generationis in rebus viventibus est 
intrinsecum, ulterius derivatum est nomen naturae ad significandum quodlibet principium intrinsecum 
motus, secundum quod Philosophus dicit Phys. II.” Cf. STh, I, 29, 1 ad 4; 115, 2 c; CG, IV, 35, n. 3729 
and 41, n. 3788. If somebody has any doubts whether Aquinas took this definition of Aristotle as his 
own or perhaps only relates what Aristotle said, keeping his own reserves for himself, it is good to see 
how St. Thomas literally derides those who wanted to correct this definition: “Unde deridendi sunt qui 
volentes definitionem Aristotelis corrigere, naturam per aliquid absolutum definire conati sunt, 
dicentes quod natura est vis insita rebus, vel aliquid huiusmodi” (In Phys., II, 1, n. 5). Cf. ibid., n. 8. 
James A. Weisheipl in the article “The Concept of Nature” (in ature and Motion in the Middle Ages, 
1-23) identifies those who tried to define nature not in relative terms but in absolute terms: among 
them was John Philoponus, St. Albert and Roger Bacon (17, notes 67-69). He notes also that in 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there was the same tendency to the point that “Aristotelians of the 
seventeenth century referred to ‘nature’ as a virtue or as an occult specific quality” (ibid.). 
48 In order to find a proper definition, it is distinguished from casus and fortuna: cf. In Phys., II, 10, n. 9-
10. Casus and fortuna are causes per accidens. Casus is what happens per se frustra or vanum or else 
inane. This is why St. Thomas treats the principle natura nihil facit frustra as an evident consequence 
of a proper understanding of the term natura (cf. “frustra est, quod ordinatur ad finem, quem non 
attingit” [STh, I, 25, 2 ad 2]; “frustra enim est, quod non sequitur finem, ad quem est” [In Meta., II, 1, 
n. 286] ; “frustra est quod est ad aliquem finem quem non potest attingere” [De pot., 1, 2 ad 1]). In this 
way Aquinas explains this principle in In Polit., I, 1/b (Leon. 48 A, p. 78, lin. 115-120), : “Dicimus 
enim quod natura nichil facit frustra, quia semper operatur ad finem determinatum; unde, si natura 
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are per se constitutive principles of things and according to the diversity of forms and 
corresponding to them matters, there is a diversity of natures. So natural science should 
consider both matter and form. But nature is said differently about matter than about 
form: nature said about matter means that nature is a subject, whereas nature said about 
form means that nature is in the subject.49 Aquinas remarks also that we should not 
think that since nature is said about matter and form, so compositum can be called 
nature, just as substance is said about form, and matter, and compositum. “Compositum 
from matter and form, e.g. man, is not nature itself, but is something from nature, 
because nature is understood as principle, while compositum as being principled.”50 
Thus, it is important to regard nature in singulars as something inhering in a subject.  
For Aristotle and Aquinas the existence of natural motion, and therefore the 
existence of nature, is simply evident to our senses. We see it in every instance of 
something happening always or almost always (i.e. for the most part, sicut frequenter, 
or ut in pluribus). E.g. that man is born with two eyes – it is natural, and we rightly 
expect that man be born with two eyes and not with three or one. If man is not born with 
two eyes, we say that it happened by chance, because usually it is otherwise and in 
human affairs we call it an ill fortune or misfortune. But the regularity of normal 
occurrences is expected and we do not say that what is normal happened by chance but 
rather that it is natural. That something happens by chance is equivalent to something 
happening in minority of cases.51  
These regularities are perceivable and their discovery discloses essential features 
of a thing which is the subject of such regular change. The evidence of sensory 
experience is sufficient for natural science and even it would be a sign of ignorance to 
try to demonstrate that natural changes occur.52 This is so because in demonstrating 
                                                                                                                                               
attribuit alicui rei aliquid quod de se est ordinatum ad aliquem finem, sequitur quod ille finis detur illi 
rei a natura.” Cf. section 7.2, footnote 38. 
49 “Definit ea quae a natura denominantur. Et dicit quod habentia naturam sunt illa quae habent in seipsis 
principium sui motus. Et talia sunt omnia subiecta naturae: quia natura est subiectum, secundum quod 
natura dicitur materia; et est in subiecto, secundum quod natura dicitur forma” (In Phys., II, 1, n. 6).  
50 “Posset autem aliquis credere quod quia materia dicitur natura et etiam forma, quod compositum possit 
dici natura; quia substantia dicitur de forma et materia et de composito. Sed hoc excludit dicens quod 
compositum ex materia et forma, ut homo, non est ipsa natura, sed est aliquid a natura; quia natura 
habet rationem principii, compositum autem habet rationem principiati” (ibid., 2, n. 4). 
51 “Cum esse a fortuna et esse ut in paucioribus convertantur” (ibid., 8, n. 2). 
52 “We must admit that in each physical reality there is something ultimately given in experience, which 
is none other than the spontaneous manifestation of its characteristics and proper activities. There is 
nothing ‘behind’ this spontaneity, as far as the body is concerned; it is just ‘given’ in experience. … 
Together with this spontaneity there are also certain receptivities for external influence, receptivities 
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anything we must have something more evident than what we want to demonstrate, and 
there is nothing more evident than our experience of natural changes, which could prove 
that some things happen always or in the majority of cases.53  
The change at issue here should be understood as not only concerning distinctive 
activities of things that are obvious for anybody but also their responses to some 
exterior factors, even artificially created, as it is often the case in research 
experimentations. It is often very laborious to discover such characteristics that 
distinguish some kind of things from all other kinds of things and captures in the most 
appropriate way what its exact nature in its specificity is. But through this kind of 
observation, comparison and analysis, the inner dimension of things can be revealed to 
us. It is important to understand nature as the inner dimension of things because it is not 
only what can be measured or pictured to the senses in some other way. Natures are 
those deepest structures of things through which, knowing them, we thoroughly 
understand things, i.e., through which things appear to us as causally explained. Initially 
we obviously have some understanding of things, which we experience, but we usually 
do not achieve at once distinct and comprehensive knowledge of natures of things. 
Instead, we grasp them in a general and unspecified manner, and then our vague 
understanding may be further developed and refined thanks to our more abundant 
experience and reasoning.54  
                                                                                                                                               
which are compatible with the spontaneous characteristic of each body. To both of these intrinsic 
sources, the spontaneous and the receptive, Aristotle gives the name nature … Aristotle’s point is that 
if we wish to understand natural phenomena, we must admit an internal spontaneity (nature) within 
concrete Bodies for their characteristic behavior. He is not appealing to an abstraction, nor to anything 
outside the acting body. He is insisting that we see spontaneous activity and all we can say is that it is 
spontaneous; the source of characteristic spontaneity he calls ‘nature.’ Therefore he says, that such 
a reality exists is obvious, and it would be absurd to attempt any ‘proof’” (Weisheipl, “The Concept of 
Nature,” p. 10-11). 
53 “Excludit praesumptionem quorundam volentium demonstrare quod natura sit. Et dicit quod ridiculum 
est quod aliquis tentet demonstrare quod natura sit, cum manifestum sit secundum sensum quod multa 
sunt a natura, quae habent principium sui motus in se. Velle autem demonstrare manifestum per non 
manifestum, est hominis qui non potest iudicare quid est notum propter se, et quid non est notum 
propter se: quia dum vult demonstrare id quod est notum propter se, utitur eo quasi non propter se 
noto. … Naturam autem esse, est per se notum, inquantum naturalia sunt manifesta sensui. Sed quid sit 
uniuscuiusque rei natura, vel quod principium motus, hoc non est manifestum. Unde patet per hoc 
quod irrationabiliter Avicenna conatus est improbare Aristotelis dictum, volens quod naturam esse 
possit demonstrari, sed non a naturali, quia nulla scientia probat sua principia. Sed ignorantia 
principiorum moventium non impedit quin naturam esse sit per se notum, ut dictum est” (In Phys., II, 
1, n. 8). “Natura consequitur suum effectum vel semper vel ut in pluribus” (STh, I, 63, 9 c). “Natura 
non deficit nisi in paucioribus” (CG, III, 85, n. 2602).  
54 Cf. Wallace, The Modeling of ature, p. 4-5. Cf. also Benedict M. Ashley, “The Anthropological 
Foundations of the Natural Law: A Thomistic Engagement with Modern Science,” in St. Thomas 
Aquinas and the atural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives, edited by J. Goyette, 
M. S. Latkovic, and R. S. Myers (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press, 2004), p. 3-16. 
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While logic and metaphysics speak about quiddities and essences, natural 
science tends to speak rather about natures, meaning sometimes almost the same, 
although the term “nature” adds this aforementioned dynamic characteristic to what is 
meant by the quiddity or essence of a thing. When the term “nature” is used in the static 
sense as “the essence, which the definition signifies,”55 that is in the sense of the 
substance, it is not its principal sense but rather a transferred one, secundum quamdam 
metaphoram et nominis extensionem.56 Nature is the principle of some change, thus 
using this term in natural science we mean that we do not consider fruits of the activity 
of mind, nor anything petrified in perfect immobility, nor any mysterious entities from 
the heaven of ideas. We consider primarily what things are in their material, changing 
condition, in their processes of becoming and deteriorating, in their multiple 
dependencies and relations with other such things and states. The term “nature” 
suggests also that what a thing is is only progressively disclosed to us and even that 
possibly it is never exhaustively understood.57 Wherefore this term connotes a constant 
openness to the experience which deepens our understanding of what something is.  
We were talking about matter and form as per se and inner principles of 
changeable being. Matter and form taken as nature are distinct causes of the thing which 
is composed of them. Since in Aristotelian science we look for causes of things, matter 
and form are obviously treated at length in natural science and they constitute the first 
principles of natural science as principles for understanding things in the order of 
becoming and in the order of being.58 Yet these two causes are not sufficient to account 
scientifically for natural being or natural motion according to the conditions in which 
we experience them. If we understand “cause” as signifying “that upon which 
something depends in being or becoming”59 (as in the question: what is the cause that 
                                                 
55 “Extensum est nomen naturae ad significandum essentiam cuiuscumquae rei in natura existentis: ut sic 
natura alicuius rei dicatur essentia, quam significat definitio” (CG, IV, 35, n. 3729). Cf. In Phys., II, 2, 
n. 151. 
56 In Meta., V, 5, n. 823. In this lectio 5 St. Thomas comments on the Aristotle’s list of 5 principal 
significations of the word “nature” and 2 transferred significations. Aquinas remarks that although to 
consider the term “nature” “non videatur ad primum philosophum, sed magis ad naturalem pertinere,” 
such a treatment can be justified in metaphysics “quia natura secundum sui quamdam acceptionem de 
omni substantia dicitur” (n. 808). Cf. James A. Weisheipl, “The Concept of Nature” (Essay I in his 
ature and Motion in the Middle Ages, 1-23), p. 5-8. 
57 Cf. In Meteor., I, 1, n. 9. 
58 “Quaelibet scientia debet inquirere principia et causas sui subjecti, quae sunt ejus inquantum 
hujusmodi” (In Meta., VI, 1, n. 1145). 
59 “Causae autem dicuntur ex quibus aliqua dependent secundum suum esse vel fieri” (In Phys., I, 1, 
n. 5).  
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this something is? or what is the cause that this stuff is this something?), form appears 
as that through which absolutely speaking something is an existent. Matter is that from 
which a being in act is reduced from being in potency. Now, natural being comes into 
being from matter and form but neither matter can act on its own nor form, but only 
some already actualized compositum.60 Only what is actualized in being can act, and 
nothing unactualized can act. Hence, another agent is needed to reduce potency to act 
because form as active principle of natural being is not an efficient cause or a mover.61 
Thus, in order to explain a natural process, we need to see what comes into being 
(through formal cause), and what makes this something to come into being (efficient 
cause), and what is the subject of this coming into being (material cause).62  
Apart from that it is essential to remark that the act of efficient cause is directed 
to cause something. Every efficient cause causes something and it is thereby defined by 
the effect. The cause which does not cause is not a cause (except in potency, but then 
also an order to the effect is needed to call it a cause). However, in St. Thomas’s 
approach, in science (including whole philosophy) we do not consider potential being 
but actual and potential only insofar as it illuminates what is actual. Thus, when we are 
talking about causes in science, we are talking principally about actual causes which are 
determined to actual effects and not only about potential causes which can be 
determined to this or that, according to the imagination or futuristic visions.  
No motion can come about without efficient cause, and no efficient cause 
operates except for some end. Every singular action is somehow determined and one of 
the principal determinations is its direction, i.e. its end.63 In the line of this simple 
observation Aquinas repeats many times in his writings that omne agens agit propter 
finem. The end or aim of the agent is not necessarily chosen or known by the agent – to 
know the end is necessary only in such agents of which actions are not determined, that 
                                                 
60 “Quod enim est in potentia non potest se reducere ad actum, sicut cuprum quod est potentia ydolum 
non facit se ydolum, sed indiget operante qui formam ydoli extrahat de potentia in actum. Forma etiam 
non extraheret se de potentia in actum: et loquor de forma generati, quam diximus esse terminum 
generationis; forma enim non est nisi in facto esse, quod autem operatur est in fieri, id est dum res fit. 
Oportet ergo preter materiam et formam esse aliquod principium quod agat, et hoc dicitur esse 
efficiens, uel mouens, uel agens, uel unde est principium motus” (De principiis naturae, c. 3 [Leon. 43, 
p. 41-42, lin. 3-15]). This is the fundamental root of the principle “omne quod movetur ab alio 
movetur” – cf. section 7.2.  
61 Cf. In De caelo, III, 7, n. 8-9; In Phys., II, 1, n. 4; 5, n. 5; De ver., 22, 3; De pot., 3, 7. 
62 Cf. In Phys., II, 11, n. 5. 
63 “Omne quod agit non agit nisi intendendo aliquid” (De principiis naturae, 3 [Leon. 43, p. 42, lin. 17]). 
Cf. In Meta., II, 4, n. 319. 
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is in voluntary agents.64 Yet this adage is not about some mental process, but only about 
the general truth that every observable motion has its direction toward something. 
Otherwise motion would not be observable and, in fact, it would not be a motion. Nor 
does this adage specify what the end is. Therefore, the direction of efficient cause to its 
effect belongs to the very signification of the term “efficient cause.” In science efficient 
cause is analyzable insofar as it is characterized by a determined direction. If it were not 
determined to any concrete direction, it could be only an abstract notion of efficiency or 
action. In mind we can conceive an efficient cause or action as undetermined. In reality 
if something acts, this real action is always somehow determined. We can know that 
something is capable of acting haphazardly, without any determination, and that to act it 
must be determined by itself or something other. Yet every concrete action is perceived 
thanks to its determination. To know an undetermined efficient cause is to know a cause 
in potency, yet without a specific determination it is useless for scientific consideration 
because of the lack of necessity.65 This determined directiveness of efficient cause or its 
acting for an end distinguishes another reason that should be taken into consideration in 
accounting for natural being or natural motion. Aristotle and Aquinas warn us that if we 
do not take into account the fact that nature acts for the sake of something, or that nature 
acts towards something, we will destroy the notion of nature and what is according to 
nature: “it is against the notion of nature to claim that nature does not act for the sake of 
something.”66 This reason, for the sake of which an agent acts, is called “final cause.” 
Final cause is “that toward which the action of the agent tends.”67 In other words, it is 
                                                 
64 “Omne agens, tam naturale quam uoluntarium, intendit finem; non tamen sequitur quod omne agens 
cognoscat finem, uel deliberet de fine. Cognoscere enim finem est necessarium in hiis quorum actiones 
non sunt determinate, sed se habent ad opposita, sicut se habent agentia uoluntaria; et ideo oportet 
quod cognoscant finem per quem suas actiones determinent. Sed in agentibus naturalibus sunt actiones 
determinate, unde non est necessarium eligere ea que sunt ad finem. … possibile est agens naturale 
sine deliberatione intendere finem. Et hoc intendere nichil aliud erat quam habere naturalem 
inclinationem ad aliquid” (De principiis naturae, c. 3 [Leon. 43, p. 42, lin. 20-30 and 38-41]). 
65 “Omne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi 
a casu” (STh, I, 44, 4). Cf. CG, III, 2.  
66 “Ille qui sic dicit, naturam scilicet non agere propter aliquid, destruit naturam et ea quae sunt 
secundum naturam. … contra rationem naturae est, dicere quod natura non agat propter aliquid … 
epilogando dicit, manifestum esse quod natura sit causa, et quod agat propter aliquid” (In Phys., II, 14, 
n. 8). According to this indication we should not wonder why “nature” became mysterious and 
problematic in moral discourse once final causality was rejected from scientific discourse. 
67 In Phys., II, 10, n. 15. “Cuius causa fit [est] de ratione finis” (In Phys., II, 4, n. 8; cf., 5, n. 6; In De 
caelo, II, 18, n. 4). “Finis nihil aliud est, quam illud, cuius gratia alia fiunt” (In Eth., I, 9 [Leon. 47/1, p. 
31, lin. 40-41]). “Hoc dicimus esse finem, in quod tendit impetus agentis” (CG, III, 2, n. 1869). “Finis 
est, in quo quiescit appetitus agentis vel moventis et eius, quod movetur” (ibid. 3, n. 1880; cf. 16, 
n. 1985-1987). “Causalitas finis in hoc consistit, quod propter ipsum alia desiderantur” (CG, I, 75, n. 
64). “Sicut autem influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appeti et 
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that for the sake of which something is done: the goal or purpose of a being or an 
operation. It is a determination to act always this or this rather than that.  
One may ask: why should we take into consideration another distinct cause if the 
directiveness is inscribed into the very signification of efficient cause? Do we not 
consider what signifies final cause by already thinking about the efficient cause? The 
answer is: in a way we do, in a way we do not. Generally speaking, we do consider the 
signification of final cause when we are thinking about efficient cause because these 
two causes are correlative and their proper understanding is conditioned by each other. 
Nonetheless, when we consider real things these causes are distinct and constitute 
different tools in science. Efficient cause is often simply insufficient in scientific 
explanation as we will see it better in the next section. 
But it is right also to ask in what consists the difference between formal and 
final cause, because we said before that form as a principle of natural thing is that 
because of which and toward which the change occurs. Indeed, in natural things formal 
and final cause often coincide numerically. However, applying it to a scientific 
consideration, we may encounter much difficulty in discovering the formal cause with 
precision; and often by proceeding from the final cause, it is possible to reveal what 
something is according to its form. Yet a distinction should be introduced here: the final 
cause that coincides with the formal cause is the cause of generation (finis cuius) and 
not of the thing which is generated (finis quo). Thus, form which is the end of 
                                                                                                                                               
desiderari” (De ver., 22, 2 c.). “Finis dicitur trahere” (In Phys., VII, 3 n. 7). “All natural science 
explanations through law-like efficient causality must also be through final causality, that is, they must 
be teleological (or ‘teleonomic’). As a matter of plain fact, therefore, in current natural science, 
explanation through final causality is not only actually used covertly (under such other terminology as 
‘directedness,’ ‘function,’ adaptation’), but it is always the ultimate mode of explanation” (Ashley, The 
Way toward Wisdom, p. 324). For a survey of contemporary philosophical examples of return to the 
teleological explanation see e.g. Mark Perlman, “The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of 
Teleology,” The Monist 87 (2004): 3-51. He writes: “By the twentieth century, analytic philosophers 
were positively allergic to any mention of teleology or teleological function. It was seen as an insidious 
metaphysical notion that was to be tossed out with the rest of metaphysics. … while it is perhaps not so 
surprising that philosophers would go against common sense in rejecting teleology (indeed some take 
it as an essential part of philosophy to oppose common sense), it is surprising that analytic 
philosophers, with their strong focus on science, would reject a notion that is so central to some areas 
of science, most notably, biology and engineering sciences. Of course, the Positivists would have said 
that biology’s reliance on teleology jeopardized its standing as a science at all, and certainly prevented 
it from being a basic natural science. They were similarly suspicious of sociology and psychology. The 
Logical Behaviorists even sought to sanitize psychology of all such metaphysically polluted terms. 
Indeed, Logical Positivists had ambitions to sanitize all of science from metaphysics. But these 
projects failed to find anything to adequately fill the important role teleological functions play, 
particularly in biology and psychology. So began the modern philosophical movement to legitimize 
teleology” (p. 4-5) – and further he develops “a taxonomy of teleological theories” of present-day 
philosophers. 
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generation (call it objective or internal end) is that toward which every imperfect being 
aims. Then, we can perceive that a thing may also act for an end that is not the form of 
the thing (subjective or external end).68 Aquinas explains this in the following example: 
“The aim of human generation is human form; whereas the aim of human is not his 
form but through his form he is able to act towards the aim.”69 Thus, natural science 
should consider not only form as form but also form as end, purpose, or aim.70  
Form as end is manifestly always something good, as was said about form in 
relation to matter in describing principles of natural things, that it is something divine, 
perfect and desirable. It is good because it is the perfection toward which the 
potentiality of the compositum necessarily aims, and goodness, in turn, is defined as 
quod omnia appetunt. This definition of goodness caused some problems during the 
history of philosophy: one example of this was exemplified in section 0.2. We will say 
more later, in Chapter 8, about the analyzability of goodness, but now let it suffice to 
say that “good” is a basic and primary concept and we should not expect to have 
a definition of such a primary concept in terms of something more basic or more known 
than that. Similarly, when we want to define being or explain what being is, we cannot 
define it properly speaking, because we cannot indicate the causes, that is, something 
simpler than being itself. Again, as was already said, for Aristotle and Aquinas it would 
be a sign of ignorance to explain something more known by something which is less 
known. Being and goodness are rather indicated than defined, indicated or elucidated 
indirectly, namely, through something consequent, a proper effect. Goodness is 
                                                 
68 “Natura rei, quae est finis generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, 
vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem” (STh, I-II, 49, 4 ad 1). 
69 “Multoties contingit quod tres causae concurrunt in unam, ita quod causa formalis et finalis sint una 
secundum numerum. Et hoc intelligendum est de causa finali generationis, non autem de causa finali 
rei generatae. Finis enim generationis hominis est forma humana; non tamen finis hominis est forma 
eius, sed per formam suam convenit sibi operari ad finem. Sed causa movens est eadem secundum 
speciem utrique earum. Et hoc praecipue in agentibus univocis, in quibus agens facit sibi simile 
secundum speciem, sicut homo generat hominem. In his enim forma generantis, quae est principium 
generationis, est idem specie cum forma generati, quae est generationis finis. … Non igitur agens 
semper est idem specie cum forma, quae est finis generationis: nec iterum omnis finis est forma: et 
propter hoc signanter apposuit multoties. Materia vero non est nec idem specie nec idem numero cum 
aliis causis; quia materia inquantum huiusmodi est ens in potentia, agens vero est ens in actu 
inquantum huiusmodi, forma vero vel finis est actus vel perfectio” (In Phys., II, 11, n. 2). Cf. ibid., 4, 
n. 8. 
70 “Ostendit quod naturalis considerat etiam finem. Et dicit quod etiam forma et quod quid est pertinet ad 
considerationem naturalis, secundum quod etiam finis est et cuius causa fit generatio. Dictum est enim 
supra quod forma et finis coincidunt in idem; et quia natura operatur propter aliquid, ut infra 
probabitur, necesse est quod ad naturalem pertineat considerare formam non solum inquantum est 
forma, sed etiam inquantum est finis. Si autem natura non ageret propter aliquid, consideraret quidem 
naturalis de forma inquantum est forma, sed non inquantum est finis” (ibid., II, 11, n. 6). 
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indicated by an inclination, tendency, desire, appetite or something of this sort, and in 
the case of such a term it suffices to have it indicated in this way that it could function 
in any scientific consideration in the Aristotelian sense of science. It is not that 
something is good because and insofar as it is desired, but rather the opposite. The 
appetite or desire is the effect that points at the cause – the essence of good. Those who 
disagree with this manner of indicating goodness are not to be disputed within the scope 
of natural science but in metaphysics, because a consideration of goodness treats not 
only natural science but also ethics. For the moment we content ourselves to say that 
appetitus naturalis discloses the goodness appropriate to the nature in which is this 
tendency. 
In the cases of ends of things generated we rightly may say that it is not true that 
they are always good because we know from our own experience that it happens quite 
often that people choose to do wrong rather than good. However, the term “good” as 
used in this context contains not only an objectively true good but also what 
subjectively seems to be good but, in fact, is not (bonum apparens). Aristotle and 
Aquinas claim that the proper object of the human will is goodness and thus every 
human being always follows what is recognized as goodness, although it happens that 
something objectively wrong is actually recognized as good.71 Nothing would move to 
action except under the aspect of good. Therefore, the cause per se of acting (what 
moves the agent) is goodness, whereas per accidens it happens that there occurs an error 
through an incorrect or defective evaluation or estimation.72 
Hence, there is no obstacle for Aquinas to say that finis habet rationem boni, or 
the other way round, that bonum habet rationem finis, because both are contained 
mutually in their significations. And these both in turn signify cause: finis vel bonum 
habet rationem causae. Thus, final cause is, on the one hand, what is desired or first in 
intention (intention broadly speaking, as that for the sake of which a change occurs), 
and, on the other hand, it is the end or goal of motion (and as such is correlated with or 
opposite to the source of motion, which is the efficient cause).73 Such a twofold final 
                                                 
71 Cf. CG, III, 1, n. 1863. 
72 “Quandoque in his quae agunt per electionem contingit finem esse malum; ideo ad hanc dubitationem 
tollendam, dicit quod nihil differt utrum causa finalis sit vere bona vel apparens bona, quia quod 
apparet bonum non movet nisi sub ratione boni. Et sic ultimo concludit tot esse species causarum quot 
dictae sunt” (In Phys., II, 5, n. 11). 
73 “Sic igitur causam finalem per tria notificat; scilicet quia est terminus motus, et per hoc opponitur 
principio motus, quod est causa efficiens: et quia est primum in intentione, ratione cuius dicitur cuius 
causa: et quia est per se appetibile, ratione cuius dicitur bonum. Nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. 
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cause is an exquisite tool in explaining natural processes. Since a cause per se which 
moves the mover is goodness, goodness of form on the level of intrinsic causes or 
goodness of action as an extrinsic cause correlated with efficient cause, the final cause 
is said to be the strongest among other causes (potissima) and the cause of causes 
(causa causarum).74 This is so because:  
it is evident in things that have four causes that one cause is in some way the cause of 
another. Matter is because of form, and not the other way around; so the definition 
that is taken from formal cause is the cause of the definition taken from the material 
cause of the same thing. Likewise, because the thing generated attains its form 
through the action of the generator, it follows that the agent is in some way the cause 
of the form, and is the definition of the definition. Furthermore, every agent acts 
because of the end; hence the definition taken from the end is somehow the cause of 
the definition taken from the agent cause. We cannot proceed further in kinds of 
causes: hence it is said that the end is the cause of causes.75 
 
Therefore, there are neither more nor less than four causes that should be taken into 
account in natural science: material and formal causes are intrinsic causes and efficient 
and final causes are external causes of natural things. Since form is that through which 
absolutely speaking something is an existent, and three other causes are considered 
insofar as something receives existence, in immobile things only formal cause is 
considered.76 But natural science considers all four causes, because natural things can 
be explained in the light of them all and a perfect explanation contains them all.77  
                                                                                                                                               
Unde exponens quo modo causa finalis efficienti opponatur, dicit quod est finis generationis et motus, 
quorum principium est causa efficiens. Per quae duo videtur duplicem finem insinuare. Nam finis 
generationis est forma ipsa, quae est pars rei. Finis autem motus est aliquid quaesitum extra rem quae 
movetur” (In Meta., I, 4, n. 71).  
74 “Finis vel bonum habet rationem causae. Et haec species causae potissima est inter alias causas: est 
enim causa finalis aliarum causarum causa” (In Phys., II, 5, n. 11). “Finis inter alias causas primatum 
obtinet” (CG, III, 17, n. 1997); “Finis est causa causarum” (STh, I, 5, 2 ad 1). Cf. ibid., 4 c.; 105, 5 c.; 
I-II, 1, 2 c.; Super I Sent., 8, 1, 3 sol.; In Meta., III, 4, n. 377; In Meta., V, 3, n. 782. 
75 “Manifestum est enim in rebus habentibus quatuor causas, quod una causa est quodam modo causa 
alterius: quia enim materia est propter formam et non e converso, … diffinitio que sumitur ex causa 
formali est causa diffinitionis que sumitur ex causa materiali eiusdem rei; et quia generatum 
consequitur formam per actionem generantis, consequens est quod agens sit quodam modo causa 
forme et diffinitio diffinitionis; ulterius autem omne agens agit propter finem, unde et diffinitio que a 
fine sumitur est quodam modo causa diffinitionis que sumitur a causa agente; ulterius autem non est 
procedere in generibus causarum, unde dicitur quod finis est causa causarum” (In Poster., II, 8 [Leon. 
1*/2, p. 202, lin. 28-43]). “Efficiens autem est ratio forme, quia enim agens agit sibi simile, oportet 
quod secundum modum agentis sit etiam modus forme que ex actione consequitur; ex fine autem 
sumitur ratio efficientis, nam omne agens agit propter finem. Oportet ergo quod diffinitio que sumitur 
a fine, sit ratio et causa probatiua aliarum diffinitionum que sumuntur ex aliis causis” (ibid., I, 16 
[p. 61, lin. 67-74]). Cf. De Principiis aturae, n. 10; In Meta., V, 3, n. 782. 
76 “Necesse est autem quatuor esse causas. Quia cum causa sit ad quam sequitur esse alterius, esse eius 
quod habet causam, potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo absolute, et sic causa essendi est forma per 
quam aliquid est in actu; alio modo secundum quod de potentia ente fit actu ens. Et quia omne quod est 
in potentia, reducitur ad actum per id quod est actu ens; ex hoc necesse est esse duas alias causas, 
scilicet materiam, et agentem qui reducit materiam de potentia in actum. Actio autem agentis ad 
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Since causes are said in many ways, it happens that one and the same thing has many 
causes per se, and not per accidens … Thus sometimes to one thing many definitions 
are assigned according to the diversity of causes, but a perfect definition contains all 
causes.78 
 
In Aristotelian philosophy efficient cause is necessarily coupled with final cause. 
As matter is inconceivable without form, so efficient cause in scientific consideration is 
inconceivable without final cause. Random or undetermined efficiency does not 
contribute much to scientific efficiency. In other words, random and undetermined 
changes, contingent or chance events, are really caused and as something real are 
obviously taken into account in scientific reasoning, yet such causes are useless in any 
demonstration. They shape scientific inquiry because their possibility excludes some 
demonstrations concerning contingent things. Such demonstrations could be valid if 
chance or fortune did not interfere. But exactly in these cases the correlative of efficient 
cause, final cause is manifested as truly distinct and very helpful in gaining scientific 
knowledge. Now we turn to the section which shows the application of aforementioned 
principles into the manner of demonstrating in natural science. 
                                                                                                                                               
aliquid determinatum tendit, sicut ab aliquo determinato principio procedit: nam omne agens agit quod 
est sibi conveniens; id autem ad quod tendit actio agentis, dicitur causa finalis. Sic igitur necesse est 
esse causas quatuor. Sed quia forma est causa essendi absolute, aliae vero tres sunt causae essendi 
secundum quod aliquid accipit esse; inde est quod in immobilibus non considerantur aliae tres causae, 
sed solum causa formalis” (In Phys., II, 10, n. 15). 
77 Benedict Ashley, in his historical survey of opposed theologies of the body, writes about Galileo as the 
one who “not only added something to the Aristotelian notion of science, he also made a very 
significant subtraction. His concern to formulate his theories mathematically led him to abandon 
Aristotelian teleology, and to retain only arguments based on material, formal, and agent causes. The 
effect of this was that as physics developed in the seventeenth century it rapidly became mechanistic, 
reverting to the Democritean type of science which Plato had in part accepted, but Aristotle vigorously 
rejected, and seeking to explain phenomena in terms of goal-less forces acting on inert particles in 
empty space. … Now in the seventeenth century this effort was renewed by René Descartes …, who 
early in life made a fundamental mathematical invention, namely analytical geometry, took 
mathematics as the model for all thought because of its wonderful deductive clarity and certitude. In 
fact he abandoned the Aristotelian concept of truth as the correspondence between theory and sense 
experience for a consistency theory based on logical coherence with self-evident axioms derived not 
from sense experience but from innate ideas” (Ashley, Theologies of the Body: Humanist and 
Christian [Braintree, Massachusetts: The Pope John XXIII Center, 1985], p. 207). In this context see 
Aquinas’s pertinent remark from which we can see that modern problems with natural science echo an 
old Platonic error concerning universals: “species, quas ipsi [i.e. Platonici] ponebant, non tangunt 
causam finalem, quod tamen videmus in aliquibus scientiis, quae demonstrant per causam finalem, et 
propter quam causam omne agens per intellectum et agens per naturam operatur, ut secundo 
Physicorum ostensum est. Et sicut ponendo species non tangunt causam quae dicitur finis, ita nec 
causam quae dicitur principium, scilicet efficientem, quae fini quasi opponitur. Sed Platonicis 
praetermittentibus huiusmodi causas facta sunt naturalia, ac si essent mathematica sine motu, dum 
principium et finem motus praetermittebant” (In Meta., I, 17, n. 259). 
78 “Cum causae dicantur multipliciter, contingit unius et eiusdem esse multas causas per se et non per 
accidens … Et inde est quod aliquando unius rei assignantur plures definitiones secundum diversas 
causas; sed perfecta definitio omnes causas complectitur” (In Phys., II, 5, n. 7). 
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6.3. The method of natural science 
 
The possibility of an occurrence of a cause per accidens which would hinder the 
causal force of some cause per se in the world of nature, introduces some complications 
in the way of demonstrating in natural science. This is so because causes which are first 
in becoming or generation (i.e. matter and mover) only in some cases cause something 
necessarily. For example, from the fact that something is generated from contraries, it 
necessarily undergoes corruption, or when the sun approaches the North Pole, the days 
necessarily are longer for those who live near to this pole. When something follows 
from necessity from matter or mover, it is possible to use such material or efficient 
cause as the middle term in a demonstration. But in many instances matter or mover do 
not cause with necessity.79 It is a platitude to say that nature’s necessity is far from 
absolute. The fact that nature does not act absolutely necessarily is due precisely to the 
efficient and material causes. Since these causes sometimes fail in natural processes 
(i.e. their natural effects do not occur because of chance and fortune), we should be 
vigilant against taking such causes which may fail as the principles of demonstration. 
There can be no demonstration from cause to effect in the case of causes that can be 
impeded. Otherwise the demonstration would lack in the condition of necessity. For 
example, it is not necessary that from properly accomplished insemination a healthy 
animal will be born – usually it is born healthy, but not always because there could 
appear some factor which interferes with the causal process so that it is not perfectly 
achieved or it is thwarted altogether.80 Whenever such causal force81 of matter or mover 
might fail, these causes are unfitted to the usage in demonstration.  
                                                 
79 “Non omnia quae sunt ex materia, habent ex materia necessitatem” (In Poster., II, 9 [Leon. 1*/2, 
p. 206, lin. 63-64]). 
80 “Ostendit quomodo naturalis demonstrat per omnes causas. Et primo quomodo demonstrat per 
materiam et moventem, quae sunt causae priores in generatione; … in naturalibus reddendum est 
propter quid penitus, idest secundum quodlibet genus causae: ut, quia hoc praecessit, sive illud sit 
materia sive movens, necesse est hoc esse consequenter; ut si aliquid generatum est ex contrariis, 
necesse est illud corrumpi, et si sol appropinquat ad polum Septentrionalem, necesse est fieri dies 
longiores et frigus diminui et calorem augeri apud eos qui habitant in parte Septentrionali. Sed tamen 
considerandum est quod non semper ex praecedente materia vel movente necesse est aliquid subsequi; 
sed quandoque subsequitur aliquid simpliciter, idest ut semper, ut in his quae dicta sunt; quandoque 
autem ut frequenter, ut ex semine humano et movente in generatione, ut frequentius sequitur 
generatum habere duos oculos, quod tamen aliquando deficit. Et similiter ex hoc quod materia sic est 
disposita in corpore humano, accidit generari febrem propter putrefactionem ut frequentius; quandoque 
tamen impeditur” (In Phys., II, 11, n. 7). 
6. Explanation in Natural Science 
 198
In these cases, in order to fulfill the necessity condition, demonstration should 
begin from what is later in becoming or generation; that is from what should be the 
effect. This demonstration would have this pattern: if something is to become, such and 
such things are required, or, put it differently: this must be so, if that is to be so. 
Aquinas gives an example: if a human being is to be born, it is necessary that human 
semen be active in generation.82 This example would not follow backwards: from the 
fact that human semen is active in generation, it does not follow that a human being will 
be born. So we cannot proceed conversely in such demonstration. Demonstrating 
according to this pattern employs a formal cause, usually called “what something is” 
(quod quid est). But because of taking this cause in a suppositional manner in the order 
of final cause to be attained (we were already talking about the possibility of the 
coincidence of these two causes), this formal cause is called in this context “what 
something was to be” (quod quid erat esse). In this suppositional manner from final 
cause other causes may also be demonstrated, because in things having four causes the 
efficient takes its ratio from final, formal from efficient and material from formal cause, 
as we read in the quotation above.83 Aquinas notes that in natural science (as also even 
more so in ethics) explanation often must be made ex suppositione finis.84  
On the logical level in natural science the conclusion follows necessarily from 
premises when the demonstration is properly constructed (i.e. when the demonstration 
respects the rules of particular methodology of natural science). If it did not follow 
necessarily, there would be no demonstration, and consequently, there would be no 
science. Yet this particular methodology tells us that necessity is usually suppositional 
as regards things signified by terms, namely, that what is signified by the conclusion 
occurs necessarily if nature attains its end. Thus, the necessity of things demonstrated in 
natural science is not an absolute necessity (necessitas absoluta or necessitas 
consequentis) but a hypothetical necessity (necessitas sub conditione or conditionata or 
necessitas consequentiae), that is, the conclusion of the reasoning follows necessarily 
but all things signified by the terms of the reasoning do not necessarily follow in the 
                                                                                                                                               
81 I am talking about causal force confident that by now it is plain to the reader that it does not signify 
any mysterious powers bubbling in some stuff but rather it signifies an intellectual grasp of the real 
order of changing things in their diverse dependencies.  
82 Cf. In Phys., II, 11, n. 8.  
83 That is: In Poster., II, 8 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 202, lin. 28-43). 
84 Cf. ibid., I, 16 (p. 61, lin. 61-96); II, 7 (p. 198, lin. 27-92); II, 9 (p. 208-209, lin. 233-266); In Phys., II, 
15, n. 2. 
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same way.85 From such a demonstration we know that things follow under the condition 
that the nature attains its end. Yet due to the contingent character of natural things, 
i.e. due to the possibility of an interference from chance or fortune, nature attains its end 
either always or in majority of cases.86  
In fact, the whole of natural science presupposes on the one hand that nature 
itself acts for an end, and on the other hand that nature’s ends will be achieved regularly 
and for the most part, even if not with the mathematical necessity that would guarantee 
their absolute occurrence. It is a basic suppositio finis87 that is present throughout this 
science because this science treats natural motion, which implies some regularity of the 
attainment of end.88 Things exist and act in typical and regular pattern because they are 
                                                 
85 “Non ita interrogatur de premissis contingentibus quasi conclusio sit necessaria absolute propter 
interrogata, id est propter premissa contingentia, set quia necesse est premissa dicenti conclusionem 
dicere, et dicere uera in conclusione, si ueraciter sunt que premissa sunt. Quasi dicat quod, licet ex 
premissis contingentibus non sequatur conclusio necessaria necessitate absoluta, set quot est ibi 
necessitas consequencie tantum secundum quod conclusio sequitur ex praemissis” (In Poster., I, 14 
[Leon. 1*/2, p. 54, lin. 83-92]). “Et notandum quod duplex est necessitas: scilicet necessitas absoluta et 
necessitas conditionalis. Necessitas quidem absoluta est que procedit a causis prioribus in uiam 
generationis, que sunt materia et efficiens: sicut necessitas mortis que prouenit ex materia et ex 
dispositione contrariorum componentium: et hec dicitur absoluta quia non habet impedimentum; hec 
etiam dicitur necessitas materiae. Necessitas autem conditionalis procedit a causis posterioribus in 
generatione, scilicet a forma et fine: sicut dicimus quod necessarium est esse conceptionem si debeat 
generari homo; et ista est conditionalis, quia hanc mulierem concipere non est necessarium simpliciter, 
sed sub conditione: si debeat generari homo. Et haec dicitur necessitas finis” (De principiis naturae, 
c. 4 [Leon. 43, p. 44, lin. 79-94]). Cf. CG, I, 67, n. 565; De ver., 24, 1 ad 13; Super I Sent., 38, 1, 5 obj. 
4 and ad 4. 
86 “Est autem considerandum quod de hiis quidem que sunt sicut frequenter contingit esse 
demonstrationem, in quantum in eis est aliquid necessitatis.” (In Poster., I, 42 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 158, lin. 
46-49]). 
87 Wallace analyzed St. Albert’s writings on natural science and compared them with St. Thomas’s texts. 
It is clear that Aquinas followed Albert’s awareness of tight dependency between Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics and his Physics. Aquinas even “introduces the Latin equivalent of Aristotle’s expression 
from the Physics, ex hypotheseos, in fact, into his exposition of the Posterior Analytics, explaining 
there that in cases like these [i.e. natural processes admitting a possibility of defective agents, non-
eternal occurences, and temporal intervals between cause and effect] demonstrations must be made ex 
suppositione finis – essentially the same doctrine contained in Albert the Great’s physical writings” 
(Wallace, “A Thomistic Philosophy of Nature,” p. 31). Cf. William Wallace, “Albertus Magnus and 
Suppositional Necessity in the Natural Sciences,” in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, edited by 
James A. Weisheipl (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980), p. 103-128. 
88 Aquinas indicates that both motion and nature must be “supposed” (est necessarium motum et naturam 
supponi) before one can formulate a scientia naturalis – see In Phys., I, 2, n. 7 and cf. ibid., II, 1, n. 8. 
“For him [Aquinas], therefore, all of natural philosophy can be scientific only ex suppositione, that is, 
ex suppositione naturae, on the supposition of there being nature, of there being natural kinds with all 
their properties and established laws of operation. St. Thomas’s way of conceiving the scientiae 
naturales was therefore ‘scientific’ without being absolutist in any sense, and on that account could 
pose no threat whatever to theology. But Bishop Tempier and others saw his science as a metaphysics 
that would place rational limits on God and on the divine power. And unfortunately in our own day 
there are many who try to make natural philosophy into a metaphysics once again, this time not to the 
detriment of theology, but to the more serious detriment of the special sciences that contribute so 
abundently to our understanding of nature” (Wallace, From a Realist, p. 43). 
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so determined by their natures. The nature of a thing is the reason why such regularity 
occurs. Thus, natures are evidenced by the regularity of occurrence. This determination 
of natural factors in producing regular effects is called “finality in nature.”89  
Therefore, true demonstrations in natural science are certain, if we understand 
by “certain” “firmness of adherence of a knowing power to what it knows.”90 In this 
sense conclusions of physical demonstrations can be used as the principles for other 
sciences without any risk of incurring a lack of necessity which obviates the possibility 
of constructing a science. However, St. Thomas says that there is another signification 
of the term “physical certitude”: 
Names that pertain to the order of knowledge are transferred to natural operations, as 
when it is said that nature operates wisely, and infallibly; and thus there is said to be 
certitude in nature’s tending to an end.91  
 
This is a transferred sense, for as there is a certitude of order or tendency in nature, so 
the certitude of nature’s operation is not absolute, since nature can be impeded in its 
operation. Hence, any attempt of re-transferring this derivative sense of certitude back 
to the order of knowledge, results in spurious reasoning based on equivocation.92  
The fact that natural science is concerned with naturalia, which act for an end 
determined by nature, and so that it most properly demonstrates through the final 
cause,93 is the most distinguishing mark of natural science in comparison with 
                                                 
89 For an exhaustive explanation why it is said that nature acts for an end see In Phys., II, 12-14; De Ver, 
5, 2; 22, 2; CG, III, 2. “In this post-modernist era we have of course become much less judgmental and 
chauvinistic when studying the values and achievements of other cultures and eras. Nevertheless, there 
still exists a strong if implicit tendency to view … Aristotelian teleology as illegitimate 
anthropomorphizations of fundamentally lifeless and mindless natural processes. In practically any 
book on the subject, one will sooner or later come across passages which reveal this lingering 
modernist bias. The imputation of anthropomorphic projection ultimately derives from the doctrine of 
René Descartes, which puts Mind and Nature into separate compartments. Although Descartes’ 
infamous duality is very much out of fashion, it still appears to be deeply ingrained. This would only 
be expected, given that the Scientific Revolution, with its explicit rejection of soul as natural 
explanatory principle, was founded on the Cartesian duality. And the dominating force within our 
civilization – both intellectually and materially – is surely still the science and technology made 
possible by the Scientific Revolution” (Edward Engelmann, “Aristotelian Teleology, Presocratic 
Hylozoism, and 20th Century Interpretations,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64 [1990], 
p. 298). 
90 “Certitudo proprie dicitur firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cognitivae in suum cognoscibile” (Super III 
Sent., 26, 2, 4). 
91 “Nomina quae ad cognitionem pertinent, ad naturales operationes transferuntur; sicut dicitur quod 
natura sagaciter operatur et infallibiliter; et sic etiam dicitur certitudo in natura tendente in finem” 
(Super III Sent., 26, 2, 4 sol.). 
92 Cf. Wallace, The Role of Demonstration, p. 52-53. 
93 “Naturalis quidem assignare debet utramque causam, scilicet materialem et finalem, sed magis 
finalem, quia finis est causa materiae, sed non e converso. Non enim finis est talis quia materia est 
talis: sed potius materia est talis quia finis est talis, ut dictum est” (In Phys., II, 15, n. 5). 
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mathematics and metaphysics. Mathematical being does not act, does not become, does 
not tend, is not inclined to anything – it is perfectly motionless. Hence, there is no need 
and even no possibility to explain anything according to efficient or final cause. 
Erroneous mathematization of natural science would result (and in fact history testifies 
that it did result) in the rejection of final causality94 and huge problems with efficient 
cause as an explanative factor. Metaphysical consideration leaves aside becoming, as 
was indicated in a previous chapter (section 5.3). If we surrendered the temptation to 
neglect learning natural science and started with metaphysics in our search of the basis 
for ethics, there would arise a serious inconvenience. This inconvenience would consist 
in the fact that without a proper understanding of becoming or motion, we simply do not 
understand what nature is: ignorato motu, ignoratur natura.95 Therefore, if we content 
ourselves with such a motionless essence of human being, as was already said, nothing 
would follow from that for ethics. 
 
*   *   * 
 
It does not belong to my task in this work to present an elaborated Thomistic 
anthropology as a science on which ethics could repose. From what is said so far about 
the foundational treatise of natural science it should be clearer that the specificity of 
consideration in such an anthropology creates a necessary framework for ethics. Try 
only to remove from Aquinas’s ethics or from his whole theology the hylomorphic 
structure of his thought. It is impossible. This structure, elaborated in natural science, is 
one of the deepest structures of his reflection. Apart from that, causal explanation 
common to every science also originates in analysis of this basic part of natural science. 
(As we noted in section 4.1, even logic in St. Thomas’s interpretation refers to this 
analysis as to something foundational.) The explanation of human being according to 
formal, material, efficient and final cause, contains already not only the information 
about what is, but also what ought to be because of the existence of the nature shared by 
constantly changing individuals.  
                                                 
94 Cf. Finalité et Intentionalité. Doctrine Thomiste et Perspectives Modernes. Actes du colloque de 
Louvain-la-euve et Louvain, 21-23. Mai 1990, ed. by Fellon, J. and McEvoy, J., (Louvain-la-Neuve: 
Éditions de L’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1992). 
95 “Circa primum utitur tali ratione natura est principium motus et mutationis, ut ex definitione in 
secundo posita patet (quomodo autem differant motus et mutatio, in quinto ostendetur): et sic patet 
quod ignorato motu, ignoratur natura, cum in eius definitione ponatur. Cum ergo nos intendamus 
tradere scientiam de natura, necesse est notificare motum” (In Phys., III, 1, n. 2). 
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The philosophical science of human being, along the lines of Aristotelian natural 
science, takes also into account the necessarily dynamic dimension of human existence, 
indicated even in the primary signification of the term “nature.” It is further developed 
in the hylomorphic analysis of the source of human development and activity. Such an 
approach to what human being is could not neglect as well the necessarily relational 
character of man in the multitude of orders constituting him. These orders exist within 
man himself (natural but without precluding supernatural), in the interpersonal space 
(human but, again, without precluding divine), and finally in the realm of things. This 
kind of anthropology searches for the highest and most universal cause of man. Such an 
aspiration to find the highest and most universal causes is not an exclusive property of 
metaphysics. Natural science also seeks to explain according to the highest causes; that 
is, as far as it is possible for the human intellect and within the framework of this 
discipline: 
it is necessary to seek in natural things the supreme cause of each thing … Hence in 
natural things we should proceed to the supreme cause. This is so because the effect is 
not known unless the cause is known. Hence if the cause of an effect is also the effect 
of some other cause, then it cannot be known unless its cause is known, and so on 
until we arrive at a first cause.96 
 
In the next chapter I will emphasize three issues considered by Aquinas in 
natural science which need to be understood properly in order to grasp the originality 
and attractiveness of his approach. Because we wonder how an explanation of human 
nature might supply the basis for “ought” judgments, we should follow St. Thomas’s 
general account of motion in order to see the deeply relational character of natural 
beings. This relational character of natural beings, or beings-in-motion, supplies basic 
descriptive tools in accounting for more specific areas of natural science, such as for 
example anthropology. These descriptive tools require that in the treatment of human 
being we include also diverse orders. I will also touch upon the question of our 
knowledge of God in natural science, as well as some questions concerning our sensory 
experience. These lessons from natural science will help us to see in what sense 
Aquinas’s ethics can and should be “naturalistic.”  
 
                                                 
96 “In naturalibus oportet semper supremam causam uniuscuiusque requirere… Et ideo oportet in rebus 
naturalibus procedere usque ad causam supremam. Et hoc ideo est, quia effectus nescitur nisi sciatur 
causa; unde si alicuius effectus causa sit etiam alterius causae effectus, sciri non poterit nisi causa eius 
sciatur; et sic quousque perveniatur ad primam causam” (In Phys., II, 6, n. 10). 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Some Lessons from Natural Science 
 
 
In this chapter, three themes from the domain of natural science will be 
underlined in order to clarify the basis for claiming that Aquinas justified the transition 
from “is” to “ought.” I do not attempt to present exhaustively these three topics but only 
to indicate some salient directions of St. Thomas’s thought which differ significantly 
from the thought that makes the transition from “is” to “ought” problematic. Firstly, the 
notion of motion will be considered along the lines of Aquinas’s Commentary on the 
Physics so as to show how this analysis influences our understanding of nature as 
profoundly relational. Secondly, I will offer some remarks about the theistic context of 
St. Thomas’s ethics. Thirdly, I will emphasize the importance of Aquinas’s teaching on 
the cogitative power as a teaching that deals with the “internalist assumption” issue. 
 
 
7.1. Motion, relations, and nature 
 
We are considering what kind of human “is” could possibly furnish the basis for 
inferring an “ought.” Since man is obviously material and changeable, we should first 
see what man shares with the whole of changeable being at the most universal level. 
St. Thomas repeats that this is the proper order of considering things: first what is the 
most common, then what is specific. The initial analysis of changeable being and its 
principles from Book I of Aristotle’s Physics, in St. Thomas’s interpretation, resulted in 
the hylomorphic schemata of matter, form, and privation (section 6.1). This initial 
analysis was restrained in Book II to a special kind of motion, characterized by regular 
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occurrence, that is, to motion proper to natural things. We learned that nature is the 
inner principle of motion and rest and that nature is not a subject of motion, but it 
inheres in a subject that undergoes a motion (section 6.2). In order to analyze closer 
such a special regular motion, four aspects were specified which accompany every 
instantiation of natural change. In this manner, an analysis of regular motion developed 
into four main principles of natural science, namely, into material, formal, efficient, and 
final cause.  
In the beginning of his commentary to the Book III of the Physics, St. Thomas 
underlines the importance of the analysis of motion in the foundational part of natural 
science, remarking that motion is in the definition of nature. Thus, a simple conclusion 
follows: ignoratu motu, ignoratur natura.1 After the centuries of the history of 
philosophy that separate us from Aquinas, we might develop this statement by saying 
that the deficient accounts of motion result in a deficient understanding of nature. And 
from such deficient understanding of nature nothing would follow for the moral life or 
ethics.2 We should ask, therefore, what is so important in the Aristotelian account of 
motion, as interpreted by Aquinas, that it might improve our understanding of nature?3  
                                                 
1 “Circa primum utitur tali ratione natura est principium motus et mutationis, ut ex definitione in secundo 
posita patet (quomodo autem differant motus et mutatio, in quinto ostendetur): et sic patet quod 
ignorato motu, ignoratur natura, cum in eius definitione ponatur. Cum ergo nos intendamus tradere 
scientiam de natura, necesse est notificare motum” (In Phys., III, 1, n. 2). 
2 Interestingly, Hans Jonas also postulates a revision of the notion of ‘nature’: “Ontology as the ground 
of ethics was the original tenet of philosophy. Their divorce, which is the divorce of the ‘objective’ and 
‘subjective’ realms, is the modern destiny. Their reunion can be effected, if at all, only from the 
‘objective’ end, that is to say, through a revision of the idea of nature. And it is becoming rather than 
abiding nature which would hold out any such promise” (Hans Jonas, “Epilogue” to The Phenomenon 
of Life, on “Nature and Ethics” [New York: Harper, 1966], p. 283). “When G. E. Moore tells us that 
‘there is no evidence for supposing Nature to be on the side of the Good,’ we may wonder exactly what 
notion of ‘Nature’ stands before his mind; but we may be certain that it is not the Aristotelian notion of 
a fundamental natural unit with a constitutional relation to action, operation, movement, growth, 
development, and the realization generally of its richest potentialities” (John Deely, “Evolution and 
Ethics,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 43 [1969], p. 177). Cf. also 
Giuseppe Tanzella-Nitti, “The Aristotelian-Thomistic Concept of Nature and the Contemporary 
Debate on the Meaning of Natural Laws,” Acta Philosophica 6 (1997): 237-264. 
3 The Aristotelian account of motion improves not only our understanding of nature but also our 
understanding of agency and finality in human action. Aquinas says that the most unqualified sense of 
the term “action” is attributed to voluntary agents or rational substances, which are not merely 
operated, as the other substances are, but operate on their own: “[Substantiae rationales] non solum 
aguntur, sicut alia, sed per se agunt” (STh, I, 29, 1). Cf. STh, I, 60, 1 obj. 2 and ad 2; CG, II, 47, 
n. 1238. There is a difference between se agere of non-rational beings (which have their own nature as 
the inner principium motus) and agere per se of rational agents. The difference between rational and 
non-rational substances lies in the ability of grasping distinctly the purpose and the possible resources, 
a grasping which is proper to reason and intellect “cuius est cognoscere proportionem finis et eius quod 
est ad finem, et unum ordinare in alterum” (STh, I, 18, 3). Cf. STh, I-II, 6, 2. Yet, a consideration of 
action only in its primary signification runs the risk of treating it as though it were unique or 
incommensurable with other instances. St. Thomas uses the term “action” analogically, and for him the 
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First, and somehow in advance, because of our historical context, we should 
know that for St. Thomas it is false that no event can consist in something that entails 
a relation.4 For him the alternative that statements are either expressions of a matter of 
fact or expressions of a relation of ideas is insufficient. This is the case because some 
events or matters of fact are relations. That a relation could be called “real,” 
i.e. numbered among real beings, three conditions must be met: the terms of this relation 
must be 1) beings, 2) really existing entities, and 3) able to be ordered one to another. 
By fulfilling these three conditions, a relation may be a really existing characteristic of 
the extramental realm. The dependence of an effect upon its cause, understood as an 
effect’s existing due to the cause, is a real relation. A description of such realities as 
family relations or social relations or relations to God asks for a category that grasps 
these real features of our world and ordinary experience. Obviously, talking about 
relations and things that are able to be ordered one to another, we should remember that 
it is only the intellect that can grasp relations and orders. My relation to my sister is not 
grasped in the same way as the colour of her eyes or the temperature of her hand, 
although these data are not irrelevant in the actual constitution of this relation. Yet this 
relation is something more than sense experience and I rightly recognize it as something 
real, belonging to this real world, a matter of fact, not a relation of ideas.5  
                                                                                                                                               
general notion of action is broader than that of human or ethical action. Even if ‘action’ primarily 
signifies free action, it is obvious that there is much more to the signification of ‘action’ than only its 
freedom. Besides freedom, there are some essential elements that should be considered in the analysis 
of action. Especially notions of agency and finality seem to be logically primary and independent from 
the notion of free agency. Due to the complexity and difficulty of the problem of free agency it is 
advantageous to analyze first less complex examples of agency found in non-rational agents. The fact 
that the general notion of action is broader than that of human action, should thus influence our 
analysis of action because some features that are more obvious in secondary instances of the 
signification of ‘action’ may illuminate what is less visible but nonetheless essential in its primary 
instance. And this is Aquinas’s way of dealing with action, which is clearly seen already in his 
Commentary to Physics as well as in his other writings. His procedure may nonetheless escape the 
awareness of the reader who is prone to separate disciplines too much without bothering about the 
order of learning. I will not develop the aspect of the dependency of our understanding of moral action 
upon the understanding of physical action because this part of Aquinas’s teaching is already splendidly 
presented by Stephen Brock in his Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998). He explains at length in this book why we should resist the tendency to 
treat the human domain of action as a separate world, conceptually self-enclosed and incommensurable 
with the rest. 
4 In advance, because it is proper to metaphysics to refute such claims as this. This claim is, of course, 
true for Hume because of his sharp division into statements that express either a relation of ideas or 
express a matter of fact or existence: since no impression has a relation for its subject, therefore no 
matter of fact or existence can consist in a relation. 
5 As we remember this solution is precluded in Hume’s semantics and epistemology especially because 
of the second of his nominalist dogmas: “there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; 
nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. That all our distinct perceptions are distinct 
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Moreover, the division of statements into expressions of “matter of fact” (that 
could be also relations) or expressions of a relation of ideas would be, nevertheless, 
even now insufficient for St. Thomas. He says that there is still something in between. 
Namely, there are relations that are not real beings but which are not mere relations of 
ideas. These relations, however, reason can apprehend. When logical relations were 
considered (section 2.2, esp. footnote 79) it was said that logical relations are these non-
real relations (beings of reason) which follow from our mode of understanding of real 
things but are founded on things as known. These non-real relations, based remotely 
upon our understanding of this real world, were called “second intentions.” Yet, there 
are still such non-real relations (beings of reason) that follow from our mode of 
understanding and are founded on things as they really exist. Relations like this between 
an actually existent and a future thing (or between two future things), or a relation of 
identity, or a relation between a relation and the subject of that relation, or a relation of 
a natural thing, which happens to be known, to the human knowledge of this thing – 
such relations do not constitute the subject of logic, they belong to first intentions, they 
belong to what is apprehended from the real world and help to explain our experience of 
this world. Such relations ask for their due place in the world in the philosophical 
discourse about analogically existent things.  
Why am I writing about relations, and specifically about these relations that are 
not real beings, if I am supposed to write about motion? Because according to Aquinas, 
a proper account of motion should include precisely this kind of relation. For example, 
imagine an object O in motion. How do you see it right now? What is seen is O in 
a certain place. To say that it is in motion it must be added that this motion is from some 
point A to some point B (this works not only for local motion but also for a qualitative 
and quantitative change). But what you see actually is O, A, and B. How do you join 
them in order to see a real motion? O may be stopped still in this place between A and B 
and my actual experience of O in a certain place will no longer be an experience of O in 
motion. How to account for O’s motion? Aristotle’s solution, in Aquinas’s 
interpretation, consists in pointing at three characteristics we should include in the 
description of O, in order to account for our experience of its motion. When O was in 
the point A and not yet moved toward B, it was or it was not evident that O could move 
from A toward B. The possibility of being moved from A to B belongs, therefore, to the 
                                                                                                                                               
existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences” (Treatise, 
Appendix, p. 636). Cf. section 0.1. 
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description of O. In scholastic language this possibility is called potentia. It is, in other 
words, a receptivity in O of the new feature of being-in-point-B. O’s potency to be 
moved is the first characteristic that should be included in order to account for O’s 
motion.  
Potentia is necessarily correlated with actus, that is, the term of this possibility 
to be moved. In this case it is identified with O’s achievement of point B. For O’s 
potency is correlated with B as O’s act. The act is the second characteristic that should 
be included in the description of O in order to account for its motion.  
Moreover, O’s potency and act that belong to O’s description are inconceivable 
without A and B. It is impossible to talk about O’s potency and act without mentioning 
any point of reference for O’s motion. A and B, therefore, must also enter into the 
description of O as some points of reference to the actual state of O as moving. The 
description of O in motion gains in this way the third needed characteristic: O is in 
some relation to A and B. O is able to receive this new state without ceasing to be O but 
ceasing to be O-in-point-A. O loses its state of being-in-point-A when it realizes the 
possibility of becoming O-in-point-B. O is removed from A and moved toward B. 
Being-in-point-A and being-in-point-B are thus for O contraries. 
Now, what is the ontological status of O’s achievement of point B when O is 
still in the point A or somewhere in between A and B? Is it a being? Actually, it is not. 
Perhaps it will be when O achieves B but now it is not. Say, it is a future being. But 
a future being is not a real being. In Aristotelian philosophy future beings are only 
beings of reason. 
Here already it should be plain why I am insisting on Aquinas’s teaching about 
non-real relations that are not logical relations. The relation between O-in-point-A and 
O-in-point-B is a non-real relation. However, it is not a relation of ideas and it does not 
constitute the subject of logic. This relation belongs rather to our experience of this real, 
changing world. When you see O somewhere between A and B, try to remove the 
relation of O to B – it suffices only to imagine that O has the potency to move only to 
this point between A and B. What you have is O having accomplished its potency to 
move to this point. You have O’s act and no longer its motion. You see O’s completed 
or perfected motion. To perceive its motion toward B a relation or order toward B is 
needed. This relation or order indicates (or is indicated by) O’s potency.  
Describing motion as O’s being somewhere between A and B with the order to 
B, it should be said that its potency is already to some extent realized which means that 
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O is to some extent in act although this act is not yet fully attained. This state in 
scholastic language is called actus imperfectus. The imperfect act belongs to O but in 
order to account for it we must include A and B. In other words, O in motion exists both 
in act and in potency: in act insofar as the potency to move from A to B is realized, and 
it exists in potency by comparison to point B, which is not yet achieved. This is why the 
definition of motion is simply: actus existentis in potentia inquantum huiusmodi.6 
Motion as the act of something existing in potency “is neither potentia existentis in 
potentia or actus existentis in actu: the word actus designates an order of it to an 
anterior potency, and the expression existentis in potentia designates an order of it to 
a further act.”7 Motion is an event but an event that is intrinsically relational. It is the 
actuality of what is still in potency to that very actuality.  
From this Aquinas concludes that: 
the definition of motion is completed not only through what there is of motion in 
things existing outside of the human mind, but also through that which reason 
apprehends. For in things existing outside of the human mind there is only an 
incomplete act, which is a certain beginning of a complete act in that which is moved 
(as in that which is being whitened, something of whiteness already begins to exist). 
But in order that this something incomplete be understood as motion, it is further 
necessary that we understand it to be a sort of middle between two terms, of which 
the preceding is compared to it as potency to act (whence motion is said to be an act), 
and the subsequent is compared to it as perfect to imperfect or as act to potency (this 
is why it is called ‘the act of something in potency’, as was said above). Thus if 
something imperfect is taken as not tending toward something else which is perfect, it 
is called the term of a motion, and it will not be a motion according to which 
something is moved (as for example when something only begins to be whitened and 
the alteration is instantly interrupted).8 
                                                 
6 In Phys., III, 2, n. 1-8 (“omnino impossibile est aliter definire motum per priora et notiora, nisi sicut 
philosophus hic definit” n. 3). Cf. ibid., 3, n. 2; 4, n. 1. As is well known, Descartes rejected this 
definition as unintelligible and proposed his own which reduces motion only to the local motion, 
because – as he confessed – only with this kind of motion was he acquainted. On this see Sarah Byers 
“Life as ‘Self-Motion’: Descartes and ‘The Aristotelians’ on the Soul as the Life of the Body,” 
The Review of Metaphysics 59 (2006): 723-755. The author remarks that Descartes, reducing motion in 
this way, mistakenly interpreted the Aristotelian definition of life as self-motion (Aristotle meant the 
capacity for self-induced alteration, i.e. qualitative motion) and dispelled any need for a vegetative soul 
indicating that the living body can be considered as a self-propelled machine. Byers shows that this 
misunderstanding was common also to Gassendi, who attacked the Aristotelian view as well, and to 
the others who desired to defend this traditional view. This is, obviously, only one of consequences of 
this reductive account of motion in the whole of natural science but the influence it makes upon the 
understanding of the nature of living beings is radical. 
7 “Sic igitur actus imperfectus habet rationem motus, et secundum quod comparatur ad uletriorem actum 
ut potentia, et secundum quod comparatur ad aliquid imperfectius ut actus. Unde neque est potentia 
existentis in potentia, neque est actus existentis in actu, sed est actus existentis in potentia: ut per id 
quod dicitur actus, designetur ordo eius ad anteriorem potentiam, et per id quod dicitur in potentia 
existentis, designetur ordo eius ad ulteriorem actum” (In Phys., III, 2, n. 3). 
8 “Ratio motus completur non solum per id quod est de motu in rerum natura, sed etiam per id quod ratio 
apprehendit. De motu enim in rerum natura nihil aliud est quam actus imperfectus, qui est inchoatio 
quaedam actus perfecti in eo quod movetur: sicut in eo quod dealbatur, iam incipit esse aliquid 
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From what is apprehended from extramental things, if we precluded the existence of 
non-real relations, we would perceive things that are incomplete or imperfect, but not 
things in motion. Moreover, without non-real relations we might even have some 
difficulties in ascribing the feature of incompleteness or imperfection to these singular 
things. Relations are intrinsic to the event we call “motion,” but these relations, to 
repeat, are relations of reason, so we cannot say that O has such relations to A and B. 
These relations are included in the description of O’s moving because they make O’s 
motion intelligible. Motion itself is a characteristic of O moving from A to B. Therefore, 
the subject of motion is indispensable for motion’s intelligibility. Furthermore, A and B 
give species to O’s movement.9 Yet the fact that A and B never co-exist in motion either 
with each other or with the movement makes the relation that they set up non-real. The 
terms of this relation never co-exist because by definition they are contraries: one term 
is being in potency and another being in act – both with reference to the same form or 
disposition.10  
 Grasping motion as existing between two terms, as it was sketched above, 
implies already the notion of cause and effect, because the reduction of something from 
potency to act occurs only by some efficient cause. For the very intelligibility of 
efficacy also finality, as acting in a definite direction, must be included. Finality, in 
other words, is carrying an order toward one term and at the same time away from what 
is opposed to it. Now, looking at motion from this aspect, from the side of the subject of 
motion, motion is a real accident. The efficient cause and effect set the scope of two 
                                                                                                                                               
albedinis. Sed ad hoc quod illud imperfectum habeat rationem motus, requiritur ulterius quod 
intelligamus ipsum quasi medium inter duo; quorum praecedens comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad 
actum, unde motus dicitur actus; consequens vero comparatur ad ipsum sicut perfectum ad 
imperfectum vel actus ad potentiam, propter quod dicitur actus existentis in potentia, ut supra dictum 
est. Unde quodcumque imperfectum accipiatur ut non in aliud perfectum tendens, dicitur terminus 
motus et non erit motus secundum quem aliquid moveatur; utpote si aliquid incipiat dealbari, et statim 
alteratio interrumpatur. Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per 
reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum, ut supra 
dictum est. Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam 
inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia in 
actum, non est nisi ab aliqua causa agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum 
actionis et passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et 
effectus, ut dictum est” (In Phys., III, 5, n. 17). 
9 “Manifestum est enim quod … motus localis, est motus unde et quo, id est a termino et ad terminum. Et 
sic oportet, quod specie diversificetur secundum diversitatem terminorum” (In Eth., X, 5 [Leon. 47/2, 
p. 566, lin. 90-94]). 
10 Cf. Brock, p. 77. 
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genera of real being enumerated in section 2.2, namely action and passion.11 The origin 
of a removal from one disposition toward another is called actio. “Action, according to 
the first imposition of the name, implies an origin of motion … motion, insofar as it 
begins from another and terminates in that which is moved, is called action.” Whereas 
“motion, insofar as it is in the mobile from something, is called passio.”12 These two 
kinds of accidents are in the realm of real being and they involve a real relation which is 
the relation of dependence of an effect upon its cause. For Aquinas to predicate a causal 
relation between two real things is to predicate some characteristics as inhering in these 
things, characteristics that give rise to the causal relation. This relation belongs to these 
things and not to the operations of the mind or to the fruits of these operations. Hence, 
a description of motion involves a relation of reason but a description of causality which 
is intrinsic to the notion of motion (that is, motion considered from the aspect of action 
or passion) involves a real relation.  
Why is causality a real relation? Because causality is a dependence in existence 
of one thing on another. Insofar as a real thing is actually dependent upon another, the 
relation is real. This actuality belongs to the actuality of being constituted by causal 
dependency. Things composed of matter and form, that is, changeable things that we 
experience in this world, are at the same time in potency and in act. Causality consists 
in reducing something from potency to act. A form of such composite, although it is an 
actualizing principle of matter, nonetheless, requires matter for its being as such form. 
Hence, the existence of form in the composite depends on matter without which such 
form does not exist.13 Also, the existence of matter of the composite depends on form 
because matter cannot exist by itself. Thus a composite is already internally correlated 
in dependencies of its principles. Perceiving a form which constitutes a composite of 
                                                 
11 “Quantum ad it quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam inter duos 
terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia in actum, non est 
nisi ab aliqua causa agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis: 
haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus” (In Phys., III, 
5, n. 17). 
12 “Primo coniicere potuimus originem alicuius ab alio, ex motu, quod enim aliqua res a sua dispositione 
removeretur per motum, manifestum fuit hoc ab aliqua causa accidere. Et ideo actio, secundum 
primam nominis impositionem, importat originem motus, sicut enim motus, prout est in mobili ab 
aliquo, dicitur passio; ita origo ipsius motus, secundum quod incipit ab alio et terminatur in id quod 
movetur, vocatur actio” (STh, I, 41, 1 ad 2). “Motus est actus existentis in potentia inquantum 
huiusmodi; existens autem in potentia inquantum huiusmodi, est mobile, non autem movens, quia 
movens inquantum huiusmodi est ens in actu” (In Phys., III, 4, n. 1). 
13 “Et licet materia non pertingat ad esse nisi per formam, forma tamen, in quantum est forma, non 
indiget materia ad suum esse, cum ipsam formam consequatur esse, set indiget materia cum sit talis 
forma que per se non subsistat” (De anima, 6 c.). 
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matter and form, the intellect is led by the impossibility of the self-actualization of form 
(form does not act but only a composite, thus form does not act before being in 
a composite, form is an actualizing principle but already in the composite, and before 
being a composite such form simply does not exist by itself) to search for an agent 
which actualizes the composite. It is even less possible for matter to be an agent 
introducing form into the composite since it is a potentiality that receives form as the act 
of the composite. We may know a quiddity with or without its external dependencies, 
because we can talk about a thing either according to its real existence (in rerum natura) 
or according to its existence in our consideration. The first way of treating a thing 
should include all its dependencies, dispositions and operations – as it really is in the 
world. In the second way we may take a thing without its dispositions because a 
consideration of quiddity or substance does not depend on its dispositions.14 The real 
existence of things really depends upon other things. Thus, the quiddity of a composite 
thing does not explain fully its real existence. It calls for an agent able to give form for 
its real existence. A thing that becomes must have a cause of its becoming because its 
internal elements do not explain its becoming. The internal elements make a thing 
intelligible in itself as a distinct entity, but its existence depends upon another, upon an 
agent which is able to give form. Moreover, an action of an agent is always correlated 
with final cause, which is the direction of its action, if only the agent is a cause per se. 
Since the action of an agent depends on a final cause, final causality is also a real 
relation and enters into the description of real being.  
It is true that being an effect of another does not constitute a quiddity of any 
material thing but only an accident. This looking for an agent which is the source of a 
composite and the end toward which the action of the agent tends is thus, in a sense, 
accidental for our knowing the quiddity of the composite. Yet, to know a thing only in 
its mental existence (i.e., as existing in our consideration) is a very imperfect form of 
knowledge. To know a thing as it exists in rerum natura, we should include also the 
order of its origin and the order of its finality, along with other dispositions that – 
                                                 
14 “De re aliqua dupliciter loqui possumus: uno modo secundum quod est in rerum natura, alio modo 
secundum quod est in consideratione nostra; primo modo accipitur substancia rei cum omnibus suis 
dispositionibus et operationibus, quia sine hiis substancia non inuenitur in rerum natura; set secundo 
modo potest accipi substancia absque suis dispositionibus, quia consideratio substancie non dependet 
a consideratione suarum dispositionum” (Quodl., 10, 2 c.). On this basis we can see that the error of 
those who accepted the nominalist principle “what is distinguishable, is separable” consisted in taking 
what is abstracted and exists only in consideration as if it was a thing existing in rerum natura. The 
irony is that this error happened to philosophers who fought against abstraction as something only 
postulated by the passion of systems. 
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although accidentally – nonetheless really constitute this thing. Quiddity of a natural 
thing simply does not exist without its accidental equipment. It may happen also that 
our knowledge of the quiddity may be imperfect to a lesser degree: we may know the 
quiddity and know that this quiddity in a really existing thing depends on another thing 
yet at the same time we may not know what this other thing is (this refers either to the 
source of nature or to its finality). The intellect can, however, perceive the quiddity of 
a really existing thing in its causal dependency, which is indispensable for its very 
being.  
Applying what is said so far to the notion of nature, we see that its signification 
is astonishingly rich if considered most generally in natural, really existing things. 
Nature, as an inner principle of motion and rest in things in which it is per se and not 
per accidens, implies, for example, that natural beings are composed. They contain 
something in potency and something in act. Hence, the notion of cause is included even 
with a reference to an anterior agent able to introduce form and constitute the 
composite. The signification of “nature” implies, therefore, the order of the origin of 
natural things. Since nature is a principle of motion and rest, the direction of passing 
from potency to act is determined. This determination of natural motion indicates 
natural finality of natural things. Thus, “nature” implies also the order of finality. In 
natural motion something acts and something is acted upon, the natural action “bridges” 
the agent and the patient in the same subject of action. Moreover, the act of an agent is 
in the patient.15 This application of analysis of motion to the notion of nature admits or 
even calls for a causal explanation of nature. Such an explanation underlines even more 
intrinsically the relational character of natural being and becoming. These elements are 
disclosed in the analysis of motion and remain valid in the consideration of nature or 
works of nature.  
In the sequence of considerations contained in the first three books of the 
Physics Aquinas underlines a wise procedure of going from what is more evident to us, 
that is, from what contains our sensory experience, (and by the same time general 
enough to include what is the most common in our experience) to what is less evident, 
that is, to a deeper structure of things and events. This way of thinking arms our account 
of these deeper structures with an assurance that nothing is gratuitously postulated but 
                                                 
15 “To assert that an action exists wholly in the agent is not only to deny that there is any event that 
consists in an action; it is also to deny the existence of any genuinely causal relation according to 
which an event may be truly called an action” (Brock, p. 81).  
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rather brought out from simple, down-to-earth experience. By discovering these deeper 
structures through a general consideration, we can proceed to the more specific. Yet we 
should remember this initial procedure when considering more specific things, since 
they are based on these deeper structures. We should also remember that these 
structures are revealed in our simple experience of changing bodies in order to retain the 
elements of basic analysis that reveal what something is. These elements include four 
causes in their necessarily relational character. Being mindful of this procedure 
preserves also an openness to a new input of information coming from experience that 
may modify our understanding of these structures. This is especially important because 
the main difficulty of determining the deep structure of a specific thing or event consists 
in distinguishing what is per se and what is per accidens. A mistake made on this 
general level of determining the nature of a thing or event may falsify more specific 
considerations.  
“Nature” cut off from this initial analysis tends to become an ossified concept 
that is only slightly intelligible because, in the absence of this analysis, it begins to refer 
to a vague intuition of what something is. In this vague intuition a finality of things is 
hardly perceived and seems rather to be a religious pretension that is proposed in order 
to insert God and thereby manipulate societies in constructing inherently religious 
ethics. To avoid something that might appear as a religious pretense, some have built 
a secular ethics upon the autonomous character of the first practical principle and built 
upon it a secular and autonomous ethics. Yet, if one wants to present St. Thomas’s 
teaching, it is preferable rather to recover the initial analysis of what motion is and, 
consequently, what nature is. This reveals plainly that the finality of things is not as 
mysterious as it is presented by some authors; it is not a secret tie, not a secret energy, 
but a simple correlate of agency, without which agency itself is unintelligible. 
God’s presence in Aquinas’s ethical discourse is considerable. In the next 
section I will emphasize some points which further explain why St. Thomas is not 
hesitant to refer to God in his philosophical discourse on human action. 
 
 
7.2. The source of nature 
 
Now we look into the question of the Author of nature. In this dissertation the 
main intention in explaining how Aquinas deals with the existence of a universal 
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efficient cause of mobile being is to show that, for a proper understanding of his 
philosophical notion of human nature (proper to natural science but used in ethics), we 
must also presuppose the Author of this nature. In the Aristotelian approach the very 
first application of the general considerations of motion is directed to the source of the 
whole and of every nature. Before even starting to consider specific topics of the 
subjective parts of natural science (including the science of man or anthropology), the 
analysis of what motion is in the foundational treatise on natural science serves to settle 
the question whether there is or is not the first universal cause of motion, called “God.” 
Again, it is regarded as a more universal consideration that is presupposed as manifest 
and not repeated later in more specific domains (see section 5.4). If God is to be 
included or presupposed in the philosophical anthropology (that is, in what constitutes 
the human “is”), we could now conjecture that this fact might in a way influence our 
knowledge of what man ought to do. It is thus good to see what kind of the knowledge 
of God students of natural science might have before entering into the study of human 
nature and the study of ethics. We remember that, in the order of learning, Aquinas – 
otherwise than some of his contemporaries – postpones the study of metaphysics until 
after ethics (see section 1.2).  
Aquinas relates that in Book VII of the Physics Aristotle established the 
necessity of a first mobile thing, a first motion, and a first mover.16 This is the famous 
argument ex motu. Aristotle came to this conclusion after a long analysis of several 
topics. Finally he manifested that among movers essentially subordinated to each other 
there is no infinite series and evidenced the validity of the principle omne quod movetur 
ab alio movetur.17 St. Thomas opposes Averroes’s interpretation that the manifestation 
                                                 
16  Cf. In Phys., VIII, 1, n. 6. 
17 This principle has been very often misunderstood, resulting either in the complete rejection of 
Aristotelian natural science or in some substantial modifications on this basic level in the way of 
scientific explanation in natural science as well as in metaphysics (as it was, for example, in the case of 
Duns Scotus). Cf. James A. Weisheipl, “The Principle Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur in 
Medieval Physics,” in ature and Motion in the Middle Ages, p. 75-97. He remarks that even “modern 
scholastics, while conceding the significance of the axiom, interpret it in a variety of ways, often 
diametrically opposed to one another” (p. 75). Having indicated that this principle is considered by 
Aquinas as per se notum sapientibus, i.e. by those who understand properly the terms used here and 
who are able to reduce them to simpler and commonly better-known terms, Weisheipl criticizes the 
attempt to read this principle as “whatever moves or whatever is in motion is moved by another.” He 
says: “A proposition such as this is neither self-evident nor true. It is not true to say that whatever 
moves (omne movens) is also moved, for clearly the primum movens is not moved … Nor can one say 
that everything that is now in motion (omne in motu) is being moved here and now by something else. 
In the first place, this is contrary to the grammar of the text. In the second place, this proposition is not 
at all evident to the senses or to reason. St. Thomas never said, Omne movens ab alio movetur; nor did 
Aristotle. … Nor did St. Thomas – or Aristotle, for that matter – ever maintain that everything that is 
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of this latter disputed premise is only a quia demonstration and openly considers it to be 
a demonstration propter quid.18 However, the argument ex motu remains still 
a posteriori.  
In the beginning of Book VIII of the Physics, Aristotle refers to two opposed 
positions on the eternity of motion. For him this question was crucial not only in natural 
science but also in metaphysics, because, as Aquinas notes, both in Book VIII of the 
Physics and Book XII of the Metaphysics, the eternity of motion is used to prove a first 
principle.19 This is why to answer the question whether motion is eternal is so 
                                                                                                                                               
in motion must be here and now moved by something, as some imagine. This interpretation is 
grammatically impossible and philosophically absurd” (p. 78). “In fact, the principle Omne quod 
movetur ab alio movetur is so fundamental and universal in Aristotelian natural philosophy that it must 
be recognized as one of the first principles of the entire science of nature. In the eyes of modern 
historians of science this was the most basic and most erroneous principle in Aristotelian physics. … 
Modern historians are surprisingly at one in their interpretation and evaluation of Aristotelian physics. 
… [they] interpret the Aristotelian principle to mean that everything that is moving must be moved by 
something here and now conjoined to the moving body” (p. 80). Yet the principle in this interpretation 
is simply not Aristotelian! Hence, it is not an Aristotelian principle that is rejected but a misreading of 
this principle. Further Weisheipl traces this erroneous understanding to Avicenna and Averroes with 
this conclusion: “Clearly the position attributed by modern historians to Aristotle is, in fact, the 
position of Averroes” (p. 88). Nonetheless “many schoolmen accepted the interpretation of Averroes. 
In particular it was accepted by Peter of Auvergne, Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter Olivi, Duns Scotus, 
and by the bulk of beginners’ manuals popular in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. However, 
Averroes’ interpretation was explicitly rejected on all essential points by St. Thomas Aquinas and to 
a lesser degree by Albertus Magnus and even by Siger of Brabant, the eminent founder of Latin 
Averroism” (p. 88-89). Finally Weisheipl explains that “for St. Thomas movetur refers exclusively to 
nature as a passive and material principle of motion and rest. It does not refer to nature as an active and 
formal principle of motion and rest, except in the sense that it too had ‘to be moved,’ generated, 
produced in the first place” (p. 95). And in the conclusion he suggests that “the principle Omne quod 
movetur ab alio movetur, understood as Aquinas understood it, is still philosophically correct today. Its 
philosophical validity in no way undermines modern laws of dynamics; on the other hand, its validity 
in no way validates those laws. But the Averroist interpretation, presented by modern historians of 
science as the ‘Aristotelian view,’ did not have to wait until the seventeenth century to be discredited; 
it was already discredited in the thirteenth on strictly Aristotelian grounds” (p. 97). Cf. also idem, “The 
Specter of motor coniunctus in Medieval Physics,” ibid., p. 99-120 and Thomas J. McLaughlin, 
“Aristotelian Mover-Causality and the Principle of Inertia,” International Philosophical Quarterly 38 
(1998): 137-151. 
18  Cf. section 5.3. William Wallace in his “The Cosmological Argument: A Reappraisal” (as Essay XV 
in From a Realist Point of View, p. 309-323) establishes that Aquinas is correct in his assessment and 
that this demonstration propter quid is made not through efficient causality but rather through material 
causality. See also his “A Second Look at the ‘First Way’” (ibid., p. 325-332). Although in CG, I, 13, 
n. 84-89 St. Thomas says that this proposition must be proved (probanda – see also In Phys., VIII, 7, 
n. 4), Weisheipl suggests that it is rather an explanation of terms in their technical signification 
(especially that motion should be taken here as primo et per se motus), which renders this principle a 
self-evident proposition to the wise (cf. In De ebd., 1 [Leon. 50, p. 269, lin. 119-185]; In Poster., I, 5 
[Leon. 1*/2, p. 25, lin. 116-152]) – cf. Weisheipl, “The Principle Omne quod movetur,” p. 78.  
19 “Deinde cum dicit: considerandum igitur etc., ostendit utilitatem huius considerationis. Et dicit quod 
considerandum est quomodo se habeat veritas circa hanc quaestionem: quia scire veritatem huius 
quaestionis est praeopere, idest pernecessarium, non solum ad considerationem scientiae naturalis, sed 
etiam ad scientiam de primo principio: quia et hic in octavo et in Metaphys., ad probandum primum 
principium, utitur aeternitate motus (In Phys., VIII, 1, n. 6). 
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necessary. Yet a further remark of St. Thomas, where evidently he is not commenting 
on Aristotle’s text but is adding his own position, might appear slightly startling: 
This way of proving that a first principle exists is most effective and cannot be 
resisted. For if it is necessary to posit one first principle on the assumption that the 
world and motion are eternal, this is much more necessary if the eternity of these 
things is denied. For it is clear that every new thing needs some innovating principle. 
Therefore, only if things exist from eternity can it seem to be unnecessary to posit 
a first principle. And if it follows even from this assumption that a first principle 
exists, it is shown that it is absolutely necessary for a first principle to exist.20 
 
Aquinas’s way of interpreting Aristotle’s intention is to point out that the Philosopher 
took a more difficult way of proving the existence of a first principle of the world and 
motion. St. Thomas states that to prove a first mover with a supposition that the world 
had a temporal beginning is much easier because everything new requires an innovating 
principle. But another possibility (i.e. that the world had no temporal beginning), 
presents a more serious challenge to our reasoning and needs a more complex argument 
to show the necessity of a first mover. Aristotle took the more difficult hypothesis and 
achieved his proof successfully. If the more difficult hypothesis gives us the evidence 
that there is the necessity of a first mover, therefore, we have even greater assurance 
that the solution of the easier hypothesis is correct. Thus, this way of proving that a first 
principle exists “cannot be resisted.” 
Obviously, for Christians the temporal beginning of the world is an article of 
faith. In the time of Aquinas there were two parties in the academic world. On the one 
hand there were heterodox Aristotelians-Averroists who claimed that it is possible to 
demonstrate philosophically that the world had no temporal beginning. On the other 
hand there were hyperorthodox Augustinians who claimed that it is possible to 
demonstrate philosophically that the world had such a beginning. Aquinas distanced 
himself from both parties, saying that we can demonstrate philosophically the necessity 
of a first mover, but to establish whether the world began in time or from eternity does 
not belong to natural reason because there is no sufficient reason to claim in one way or 
another. We can believe on the grounds of faith that it was in time but cannot 
demonstrate it in philosophy.21 Philosophical demonstration remains open and 
                                                 
20 “Haec enim via probandi primum principium esse, est efficacissima, cui resisti non potest. Si enim 
mundo et motu existente sempiterno, necesse est ponere unum primum principium; multo magis 
sempiternitate eorum sublata; quia manifestum est quod omne novum indiget aliquo principio 
innovante. Hoc ergo solo modo poterat videri quod non est necessarium ponere primum principium, si 
res sunt ab aeterno. Unde si etiam hoc posito sequitur primum principium esse, ostenditur omnino 
necessarium primum principium esse” (In Phys., VIII, 1, n. 7). 
21 Cf. De pot., 3, 17. 
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indifferent to both solutions. In the same way, this proof does not require that the world 
be finite in duration.22  
There was an interpretation in the time of St. Thomas according to which 
Aristotle, undertaking this way of proving the first cause, namely, from eternity of the 
world, revealed his conviction that God is not the cause of the world in its being but is 
only the first mover, only the cause of motion of the world. Yet Aquinas excludes this 
interpretation on the basis of Aristotle’s text, saying that it is clear that although he 
“held that the world is eternal, he did not believe that God is the cause only of the 
motion of the world and not its being.”23 
Aquinas acknowledges that Book VIII of Physics is distinct from preceding 
books because Aristotle starts to apply his general analysis of motion to things.24 In 
doing so Aristotle presupposes what was said before in order to answer the question 
about the general source of this changeable world; that is, whether there is a universal 
efficient cause of motion. One of the things that was established before and now is 
treated as a principle is one of the definitions of motion. The argument of Book III 
produced this definition: “motion is the act of a mobile insofar as it is mobile.”25 From 
this principle there appears an inevitable consequence, which also seems obvious for 
everybody, namely, that for the very existence of motion, things which can be moved 
are necessary. “For there cannot be act without a subject of the act.”26 
Interestingly, St. Thomas notes that Averroes took from this the opportunity of 
speaking contrary to what we hold in faith about creation. And he goes on to present 
                                                 
22 Cf. In Phys., VIII, 1-6; De aeternitate., passim; De pot., 3, 14 ad 8; CG, II, 33-38; STh, I, 46, 1. 
23 “Est autem valde notandum quod hic dicitur; quia ut in II Metaphys. habetur, eadem est dispositio 
rerum in esse et in veritate. Sicut igitur aliqua sunt semper vera et tamen habent causam suae veritatis, 
ita Aristoteles intellexit quod essent aliqua semper entia, scilicet corpora caelestia et substantiae 
separatae, et tamen haberent causam sui esse. Ex quo patet quod quamvis Aristoteles poneret mundum 
aeternum, non tamen credidit quod Deus non sit causa essendi ipsi mundo, sed causa motus eius 
tantum, ut quidam dixerunt” (In Phys., VIII, 3, n. 6). 
24 Cf. In Phys., VIII, 2, n. 2; 7, n. 1. 
25 “Motus est entelechia, idest actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi” (In Phys., III, 2, 
n. 3). “Postquam philosophus definivit motum, hic ostendit cuius actus sit motus, utrum scilicet 
mobilis vel moventis. Et potest dici quod hic ponit aliam definitionem motus, quae se habet ad 
praemissam ut materialis ad formalem, et conclusio ad principium. Et haec est definitio: motus est 
actus mobilis inquantum est mobile. Haec enim definitio concluditur ex praemissa. Quia enim motus 
est actus existentis in potentia inquantum huiusmodi; existens autem in potentia inquantum huiusmodi, 
est mobile, non autem movens, quia movens inquantum huiusmodi est ens in actu; sequitur quod motus 
sit actus mobilis inquantum huiusmodi” (ibid., 4, n. 1). 
26 “Ad hoc quod sit motus, necesse est existere res quae possint moveri quocumque motu: quia non 
potest esse actus sine eo cuius est actus … necesse est esse subiectum mobile, ad hoc quod sit motus” 
(ibid., 2, n. 2). 
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Averroes’s arguments and refutes them vigorously. Generally the main argument of 
Averroes goes like this: if to become is to be changed in some way, and every mutation 
requires a subject, it is necessary that everything which comes to be, comes to be from 
some subject. In this case an obvious conclusion imposes itself: it is impossible that 
something come to be from nothing. Thus, the venerable doctrine of the Church about 
the creatio ex nihilo does not seem to resist the contradicting force of reason. But 
Aquinas suggests a more precise reading of Aristotle’s text: 
But if one thinks correctly, he would realize that Averroes has been deceived by … 
[his] consideration of particular beings. For it is clear that the active potency of 
a particular agent presupposes a matter which a more universal agent makes, for 
example, an artist uses the matter which nature provides. Therefore, from the fact 
that every particular agent presupposes a matter which it does not make, it is not 
necessary to think that the first universal agent, which is the active power of the 
whole of being, presupposes something which, as it were, is not caused by it.27  
 
Initially St. Thomas says that Averroes’s interpretation forces Aristotle’s text by an 
unjustified extrapolation. While the Philosopher’s principle concerns particular 
changeable things of this world, Averroes applied the same principle to the most 
universal agent. He should not do so for several reasons.  
First, Aquinas refers to the intention of the author, saying that it is impossible 
that Aristotle would allow for this extrapolation because he himself proved in his 
Metaphysics that “that which is most true and most being is the cause of being for all 
existing things.”28 Hence, even the very being of potency that belongs to primary matter 
takes its source from the first principle of all being. Therefore, it is not necessary to 
presuppose for its action something that has not been produced by it. Thus, from the fact 
that every motion requires a subject, “as Aristotle proves here, and is indeed true,” it 
does not follow that the most universal agent should require such a subject. St. Thomas 
affirms that “the universal production of being by God is neither motion nor mutation, 
but a certain simple emanation” and so terms “to become” (fieri) and “to make” (facere) 
cannot refer univocally to particular productions of things and to the universal 
                                                 
27 “Sed si quis recte consideret … ipse deceptus fuit ex … consideratione particularium entium. 
Manifestum est enim quod potentia activa particularis praesupponit materiam, quam agens universalius 
operatur; sicut artifex utitur materia quam natura facit. Ex hoc ergo quod omne particulare agens 
praesupponit materiam quam non agit, non oportet opinari quod primum agens universale, quod est 
activum totius entis, aliquid praesupponat, quasi non causatum ab ipso” (In Phys., VIII, 2, n. 4). 
28 “Nec hoc etiam est secundum intentionem Aristotelis. Probat enim in II Metaphys., quod id quod est 
maxime verum et maxime ens, est causa essendi omnibus existentibus” (ibid.). 
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production.29 This is a simple consequence of the fact that the first principle of being is 
really first (this is a second reason why Averroes is wrong). It is also a simple 
consequence of Aristotle’s general analysis of becoming contained in Book I of the 
Physics (this is a third reason why Averroes is wrong).30 It makes no difference whether 
God produced things from eternity or after they were not – in both cases it is not 
necessary, even impossible (immo impossibile), to presuppose some subject of this 
universal production.  
According to Aquinas, Averroes in his interpretation, which contradicts the 
doctrine of Catholic faith, regressed in this point to the level of the first philosophers 
who were unable to arrive at the first cause of the whole being but considered only the 
causes of particular mutations. At the beginning they considered only accidental 
mutations; later on some of them understood also substantial changes. Yet Plato and 
Aristotle “came to a knowledge of the principle of the whole of being.”31 When we take 
into consideration the consequences of the fact that we are talking about the principle of 
the whole of being, the principle that every motion requires a subject does not apply. 
Thus Aquinas may say that aforementioned Aristotelian demonstration is not contrary to 
the judgment of our faith.  
Further in the same lesson there is another passage where St. Thomas compares 
Aristotle’s teaching with the doctrine of Christian faith. This time the eternity of motion 
is concerned. Aristotle intended to prove that motion always was and never ceases. 
Aquinas says that this position partly conflicts with our faith, because for us only God 
has always existed, who is altogether immobile. For we can call God’s understanding 
motion but only equivocally, whereas Aristotle considers here motion in its proper 
sense. The other part of Aristotle’s position is in conformance with our faith because 
according to our faith the substance of the world began to be but will never cease. Our 
faith also posits that some kind of motion of man will last forever as incorruptible life, 
either miserable or blessed.32 Thus, the claim that motion will never cease is in 
accordance with Christian doctrine. St. Thomas takes seriously Aristotle’s arguments 
                                                 
29 “Et quia omnis motus indiget subiecto, ut hic Aristoteles probat et rei veritas habet, sequitur quod 
productio universalis entis a Deo non sit motus nec mutatio, sed sit quaedam simplex emanatio. Et sic 
fieri et facere aequivoce dicuntur in hac universali rerum productione, et in aliis productionibus” 
(In Phys., VIII, 2, n. 4). 
30 Cf. ibid., VIII, 2, n. 5 and I, 14, n. 6. 
31 “Plato et Aristoteles, pervenerunt ad cognoscendum principium totius esse” (ibid., VIII, 2, n. 5). 
32 Cf. ibid., VIII, 2, n. 16. 
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and treats them as proofs, yet a careful consideration reveals that his reasons cannot 
repudiate efficaciously the truth of faith. Aristotle’s reasons prove that motion had no 
beginning per viam naturae, but are unable to prove that things were not produced anew 
by the first universal principle of things.33 This is still, for Aquinas, a consequence of 
what was established about the universal cause of the whole of being, namely, that the 
production of the whole of being is not a motion but an emanation. No motion is 
required before the beginning of the existence of mobile thing or before motion itself if 
we consider the first principle of things.  
However, St. Thomas notes that even considering the first principle of things 
there could appear a problem. If the first principle, “which is God” – as Aquinas 
pinpoints – is indifferently related to now and before, how is it that He decides in one 
moment things are to be produced? It seems obvious that the moment of God’s decision 
to produce things in time is in this way already a motion before the production of the 
whole of being. St. Thomas answers that it could be a necessary conclusion if we agreed 
that there is no other possibility to act as only through nature. Yet Aristotle himself 
earlier discussed the difference between action through nature and action through 
intellect and will.34 What he said there perfectly applies here also. If God acts through 
His will,  
He is able through His eternal will to produce an effect which is not eternal, just as 
through His eternal intellect He can understand a thing which is not eternal. For 
a known thing is in a certain way the principle of action in agents who act through the 
will, just as a natural form is the principle of action in agents who act through 
nature.35 
                                                 
33 Cf. In Phys., VIII, 2, n. 17. The method of harmonizing Aristotelian doctrine with the doctrine of the 
Church was suggested to Aquinas by Maimonides. In the interpretation of the VIII Book of Aristotle’s 
Physics they both deny that Aristotle’s argument from motion is a demonstration and proof of an 
eternal world. Whereas Maimonides’s conclusion is that all Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of 
the world are not valid, and arguments for creation are not valid either, Aquinas deviates from 
Maimonides in insisting that creation can be demonstrated: “Respondeo quod creationem esse non 
tantum fides tenet, sed etiam ratio demonstrat” (Super II Sent., 1, 1, 2 sol.). Cf. STh, I, 45, 2; De pot., 3, 
5. More specifically, for Aquinas creation as the origin of being can be demonstrated, but creation 
which implies limited duration must remain an article of faith: cf. Quodl., 3, 31; Super II Sent., 1, 1, 5; 
In De caelo, I, 29, n. 12; Quodl., 12, 7; STh, I, 46, 2. See Lottie H. Kendzierski, “Maimonides’ 
Interpretation of the 8th Book of Aristotle’s Physics,” The ew Scholasticism 30 (1956): 37-48.  
34 Cf. In Phys., VIII, 2, n. 7-8. “Omnis potentia quae non est in magnitudine, movet per intellectum …  
Nulla autem potentia quae est in magnitudine, movet quasi intelligens … Haec autem est differentia 
inter agens per intellectum et agens materiale, quia actio agentis materialis proportionatur naturae 
agentis; tanta enim procedit calefactio quantus est calor: sed actio agentis per intellectum, non 
proportionatur naturae ipsius, sed formae apprehensae” (ibid., 21, n. 10). 
35 “Remanet quaestio de prima rerum productione. Si enim primum principium, quod est Deus, non aliter 
se habet nunc quam prius, non magis nunc res producit quam prius: si vero aliter se habet, saltem 
mutatio quae est ex parte eius, erit prior mutatione quae ponitur prima. Et quidem si esset agens per 
naturam tantum, et non per voluntatem et intellectum, ex necessitate concluderet ratio: sed quia agit 
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We should exclude here a rather habitual presupposition that every agent acts in time, 
because the universal agent produces not only mobile things and motion but also time 
which is, for Aristotle and Aquinas, a measure of motion. If there is no motion, there 
could be no measure of motion. Thus, the denial of the position that God produced all 
things eternally does not mean that there was an infinite time during which God did 
nothing and after that He began to produce things, but rather it means that God 
produced both things and time after they were not. And so the “before” of this 
production does not function as affirmation (like in the phrase “the beginning of youth 
is that before which there is no youth”), but as negation, since time is not measured by 
time and it is impossible that time had existed before its beginning.  
It is not difficult to see that Aquinas exposes here what he personally thinks 
about Aristotle’s reasoning. He clearly shows that Aristotle went a bit further than his 
arguments allow and thus concluded something that is at best not necessary, if not 
wrong.36 Aquinas corrected the conclusions of the Philosopher by limiting them 
slightly. He did it by using Aristotle’s own words, analysis and principles, bringing 
forth a position which is more coherent not only with what is said within the scope of 
natural science, but also coherent with metaphysics (not to mention Christian theology). 
St. Thomas’s following remark might seem somehow out of place here, in his 
commentary to Physics:  
If, however, one asks why He willed this, without doubt it must be said that He did 
this for His own sake. For just as He made things for His own sake so that a likeness 
of His goodness would be manifested in them, so He wills them not always to be so 
that His sufficiency would be manifested in this, that when all other things do not 
exist, He has within Himself every sufficiency of beatitude and of power for the 
production of things. This indeed may be said insofar as human reason can understand 
divine things. Nevertheless, the secrets of divine wisdom, which cannot be 
comprehended by us, are preserved.37 
 
                                                                                                                                               
per voluntatem, potest per voluntatem aeternam producere effectum non aeternum, sicut intellectu 
aeterno potest intelligere rem non aeternam: res enim intellecta est quodammodo principium actionis in 
agentibus per voluntatem, sicut forma naturalis in agentibus per naturam” (In Phys., VIII, 2, n. 18). 
36 “Est autem sciendum quod hae rationes, quibus Aristoteles probare nititur primum motum esse 
perpetuum, non ex necessitate concludunt: potest enim contingere absque omni mutatione primi 
motoris, quod non semper moveat, sicut supra ostensum est in principio huius octavi” (ibid., 13, n. 8). 
37 “Si autem quaeratur quare hoc voluit, sine dubio dicendum est quod propter seipsum. Sicut enim 
propter seipsum res fecit, ut in eis suae bonitatis similitudo manifestaretur; ita voluit eas non semper 
esse, ut sua sufficientia manifestaretur, in hoc quod omnibus aliis non existentibus, ipse in seipso 
omnem sufficientiam beatitudinis habuit, et virtutis ad rerum productionem. Et hoc quidem dici potest 
quantum humana ratio capere potest de divinis: salvo tamen secreto divinae sapientiae, quod a nobis 
comprehendi non potest” (ibid., 2, n. 18). 
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This quotation might remind us what was said in Book I of the Physics about form: that 
it is something divine, and best, and perfect (see section 6.1). To this we could add as 
well the passage from Aquinas’s commentary to Book II of the Physics where he 
explains that “nature is nothing but a ratio of a certain art (i.e., the divine art) implanted 
in things, by which these things are moved to a determinate end.”38 Here also this kind 
of wording and reference usually astonishes the contemporary reader. St. Thomas is 
talking about the goodness of the first cause of mobile being, which is God – as we are 
reminded again and again – about what God wanted, and about His beatitude. Are we 
still within the scope of natural science? Is it not a sheer metaphysics or, even worse, 
a theology under the guise of natural science? No, we are still in natural science, 
debating over the best way of answering the climactic questions of this science, namely, 
whether there is a source of all mobile being, and, if so, how to understand it. From 
what was said so far in natural science we know already that these subjects, that are 
principled by some natures, do not establish what belongs to their natures; they do not 
establish the direction of their natures. This direction is simply experienced as regularly 
occurring; therefore, it cannot be the domain of chance. This fact calls for a cause which 
establishes this direction. Finally, we attain the necessity of the first cause. This first 
cause, however, cannot itself from its nature establish the directions of other natures, 
because the nature of the first cause would call also for a cause that establishes its 
nature. That the first cause be really first, it must act not from the necessity of its own 
nature but freely, through the intellect.39 
                                                 
38 “Natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur 
ad finem determinatum” (In Phys., II, 14, n. 8). Cf. CG, III, 100, n. 2761; STh, I, 91, 3; I-II, 13, 2 ad 3; 
III, 1, 1 ad 3. 
39 In section 6.2 footnote 47 we saw why the principle “natura nihil facit frustra” is treated as evident by 
Aquinas on the basis of the understanding of terms. Here it might be added that this principle holds 
because otherwise there would appear a serious inconvenience. God is the source of nature, “institutor 
naturae” (according to the demonstration in In Phys., VIII, 1-6), and he makes the nature through his 
intellect (cf. ibid., 2, n. 7-8 and 21, n. 10). In this way St. Thomas explaines the principle many times, 
e.g.: “Omne quod est in natura, vel est a Deo, sicut primae res naturales; vel est a natura sicut 
a secunda causa, puta inferiores effectus. Sed Deus nihil facit frustra, quia, cum sit agens per 
intellectum, agit propter finem. Similiter etiam natura nihil facit frustra, quia agit sicut mota a Deo 
velut a primo movente; sicut sagitta non movetur frustra, inquantum emittitur a sagittante ad aliquid 
certum. Relinquitur ergo quod nihil in natura sit frustra” (In De caelo, I, 8 ; n. 14). “Naturalis autem 
inclinatio non potest esse frustra, quia Deus et natura nihil frustra faciunt” (In De caelo, I, 12, 
n. 4). “Natura autem nihil facit irrationabiliter neque frustra, quia tota naturae operatio est ordinata ab 
aliquo intellectu propter finem operante” (In De caelo, II, 16, n. 2). “In operibus Dei non est aliquid 
frustra, sicut nec in operibus naturae” (CG, III, 156, n. 3295). “Quod autem sit impossibile in finibus 
procedere in infinitum, probat tertia ratione quae est etiam ducens ad impossibile, hoc modo: si 
procedatur in infinitum in desiderio finium, ut scilicet semper unus finis desideretur propter alium in 
infinitum, nunquam erit devenire ad hoc quod homo consequatur fines desideratos; sed frustra et vane 
aliquis desiderat id quod non potest assequi; ergo desiderium finis esset frustra et vanum; sed hoc 
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Obviously, this discussion is assumed, restated again and better argued from 
several aspects in the science of metaphysics. Nonetheless, natural science lawfully 
discusses this topic, not as its own subject, however, but rather as its principle and goal. 
Note what is at stake: if there were no first mover (that is, if we decided that we could 
make an infinite regress), we would not have a sufficient explanation of the 
foundational question of the natural science and so we would not have a sufficient basis 
for the science itself which treats the most obvious feature of the world that we 
experience: motion. This is thus the very basis of the entire field of natural science. 
Also, we must recall what is said about causes in the initial consideration of natural 
science: it is final cause that causes an efficient cause to be efficient (see section 6.2). 
The question, therefore, why the most universal efficient cause causes the changeable 
world, is perfectly in place here.  
It is good to read the text quoted above from the perspective of a student who is 
taught by a master, by a wise man, by an accomplished scientist-philosopher, who went 
through every discipline and acquired an excellence in these disciplines and a true 
wisdom that enables him to put everything in order. A student who knows for sure only 
what he learned so far, would have to utter such a statement with some hesitation, and 
he would treat it as more or less a probable opinion that is not yet sufficiently grounded 
to become a science. Aquinas, as a master, teaches us having in mind demonstrations 
that are proper to the science of metaphysics, and has this assurance as to say “sine 
dubio dicendum est quod…” If we would like to apply strict methodological rules, 
within the limits of natural science, as it is presented in his commentary to the Physics, 
we might treat it as an opinion which helps to appease the wonder excited by what is 
proper to natural science. Strictly speaking it does belong to metaphysics to treat why 
God created the world, but if somebody now asks, this light from a higher science is 
now given. Yet it is worth stressing that from what has been established so far in natural 
science we are allowed to achieve the conclusions summarized shortly by Aquinas in 
the quotation above. Thanks to the analysis of this science we are enabled to proceed 
further in our consideration so as to gain this knowledge about divine things.  
                                                                                                                                               
desiderium est naturale, dictum enim est supra quod bonum est quod naturaliter omnia desiderant; ergo 
sequetur quod naturale desiderium sit inane et vacuum; sed hoc est impossibile, quia naturale 
desiderium nihil aliud est quam inclinatio inhaerens rebus ex ordinatione primi moventis, quae non 
potest esse supervacua; ergo impossibile est quod in finibus procedatur in infinitum” (In Eth., I, 2 
[Leon. 47/1, p. 8, lin. 33-48]). 
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We are still on the first stage of our formation in natural science and we are 
taught already that there is a first cause of the universe, that it is a universal cause of the 
whole of being and, by consequence, of every change, motion, mutation or action. In the 
scope of scientia naturalis we can manifest that the first mover is eternal,40 immobile,41 
one and unique,42 and simple or indivisible.43 From this we know also that this first 
cause of the universe produces the whole of being ex nihilo. This production is neither 
motion nor mutation but “a certain simple emanation.” What is even more important, 
this first cause does not act through nature but rather through its intellect and will, and 
that it has an infinite power.44 For us it is especially important to see this first cause as 
the cause of nature. Since we can see that nature is determined to some end which 
nature itself does not establish, we are led to acknowledge this intelligent cause of 
nature which establishes orders proper to every nature. Moreover, we are taught by St. 
Thomas in such a manner that we are encouraged to think about this first cause as the 
God of our Christian faith. Our teacher strives to explain that even in Aristotle’s texts 
there is no serious obstacle to this identification.  
In the last sentence of his commentary to Physics Aquinas in this way expresses 
his conviction that what was said about the first cause of changeable being is applicable 
to the God in whom he believes: 
And thus the Philosopher ends his general discussion of natural things with the first 
principle of the whole of nature, who is over all things, God, blessed forever, Amen. 
 
One could object that in this way violence is done to the God of the Bible, that the God 
of Revelation is absolutely other than the God of Physics and cannot be compared. Yet 
such indignation might indicate at least two things. On the one hand, it is possible that 
the indignation comes from a deficiency of a solid reflection on mechanisms of our 
cognition, namely, how we come to understand the words of the Bible and the content 
of Revelation. On the other hand, it is highly probable that this indignation is one of the 
fruits of a methodological disorder. In the case of Aquinas we can observe his ease in 
relating different sciences, methods and discourses with each other, respecting however 
their due autonomy. He has no fear of treating the achievements of natural science as 
                                                 
40 Cf. In Phys., VIII, 12. 
41 Cf. ibid., 13. 
42 Cf. ibid., 23. 
43 Cf. ibid., 21. 
44 Cf. ibid., 21, n. 2-10; 23, n. 9. 
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reasons that have an ordering force in our life with the God of Revelation, or ordering 
force even within theological science.45 He does this thanks to his extraordinary clarity 
in distinguishing dimensions and planes, and thanks to his excellence in using the 
instruments of logic. 
Therefore, the explanation that God is so much present in St. Thomas’s 
commentary on the Ethics by pointing at his religious profession (which made him 
partial), has a better alternative.46 This alternative solution respects the order of learning 
and conforms with Aquinas’s methodological presuppositions. If we would like to 
follow St. Thomas in his taking natural science as a necessary basis for moral science as 
a discipline, we may freely eschew the Enlightened superstition that there is no place for 
God in philosophy. In this perspective it is not God in St. Thomas’s philosophical ethics 
that is problematic, but rather the malaise about God in ethics on the part of his 
interpreters. This malaise, however, is explicable by the study of the subsequent history 
of philosophy. It was later in time that God was unjustly banished from the realm of 
philosophy and science.47 Interpreting Aquinas, nobody is forced to repeat this unjust 
banishment. If one wants to do so, it is not because of Aquinas’s texts.  
From St. Thomas’s texts we conclude rather that every human being is 
inherently a religious being. This means that everybody, by the fact of simply being 
                                                 
45 For example, to explain why the inhabitants of Sodom were by nature held responsible for their sin 
even if they did not have an explicit revelation as we now do: “Sicut ordo rationis rectae est ab homine, 
ita ordo naturae est ab ipso Deo. Et ideo in peccatis contra naturam, in quibus ipse ordo naturae 
violatur, fit iniuria ipsi Deo, ordinatori naturae” (STh, II-II, 154, 12 ad 1). 
46 Ralph McInerny in his Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America, 1992) gives a plausible argument against a too tendentious, as it 
seems, interpretation of St. Thomas’s commentary on the Ethics proposed by a great Thomist scholar, 
René Antoine Gauthier (see Chapter 7: “Aristotle and Thomas: Père Gauthier”, p. 161-177). McInerny 
shows that it is difficult to agree with Gauthier who says that the responsibility for a longstanding 
misreading of Aristotle’s Ethics lies on “les théologiens, notamment un Thomas d’Aquin, précisément 
parce que, théologiens, ils ont dû faire violence à la sagesse grecque pour la faire tenir dans le lit de 
Procruste de leur système” and that Thomas’s moral thought is “la négation de l’enseignement exprès 
de l’Aristote historique” (Aristote, L’Ethique à icomaque, introduction, traduction et commentaire, 
par René Antoine Gauthier et Jean Yves Jolif, deuxième edition avec une introduction nouvelle. Vol. 
1, Introduction par René Antoine Gauthier [Louvain-Paris, 1970], p. 274-275). McInerny remarks that 
Gauthier simply “calls into question either the honesty or intelligence of St. Thomas. Knowingly to 
distort a text is a serious matter, and it will not do to say this was the literary custom of the time, surely 
a question-begging explanation. The truth seems rather to be that Thomas meant to say what Aristotle 
meant when he attributes a position to Aristotle. If he is systematically wrong about this, there is a 
word to describe such a deficiency. … I think it is nonsense to state universally that these 
commentaries do not achieve what they clearly set out to achieve, but that somehow this does not 
matter” (McInerny, p. 163). 
47 Cf. Benedict Ashley, Theologies of the Body, p. 58-61 and especially Cornelio Fabro, God in Exile: 
A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern Atheism from its Roots in the Cartesian Cogito 
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968). 
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human, is already oriented towards God, who is the adequate source of human nature in 
general, the adequate source of the human soul in every instantiation of human nature, 
and the adequate goal of man. Everybody is constituted in one’s being also by the order 
towards God.48 How a singular man responds to this fact – accepting, denying, or 
neglecting it – does not change the fact itself.49  
Accepting what should be presupposed in ethics as a discipline, according to the 
teaching of Aquinas, we might compare the endeavor of constructing a purely secular 
ethics to the endeavor of constructing optics without the notion of proportion. One may 
try to construct such an optics because some others might deny the existence of 
proportion or simply might not like this idea, but such an optics would lack its essential 
principle. We cannot act in ethics as if the truth about the existence of God as the first 
cause of the universe was not a truth. It does not belong to ethics to dispute this issue 
and Aquinas simply assumes this from a more basic science, namely, from natural 
science.  
It is naïve to think that St. Thomas was so narrow-minded that it was 
inconceivable for him that God’s existence or His relevance to ethics might be denied. 
In this naïve look, Enlightenment philosophers appear as saviours because they had this 
open-mindedness and courage to deny the relevance of God in ethical reflection, thus 
freeing ethics from religious oppression. For Aquinas, however, the claim that God does 
                                                 
48 “In omnibus naturis ordinatis invenitur quod ad perfectionem naturae inferioris duo concurrunt, unum 
quidem quod est secundum proprium motum; aliud autem quod est secundum motum superioris 
naturae. … Sola autem natura rationalis creata habet immediatum ordinem ad Deum. Quia ceterae 
creaturae non attingunt ad aliquid universale, sed solum ad aliquid particulare, participantes divinam 
bonitatem vel in essendo tantum, sicut inanimata, vel etiam in vivendo et cognoscendo singularia, sicut 
plantae et animalia, natura autem rationalis, inquantum cognoscit universalem boni et entis rationem, 
habet immediatum ordinem ad universale essendi principium. Perfectio ergo rationalis creaturae non 
solum consistit in eo quod ei competit secundum suam naturam, sed etiam in eo quod ei attribuitur ex 
quadam supernaturali participatione divinae bonitatis. Unde et supra dictum est quod ultima beatitudo 
hominis consistit in quadam supernaturali Dei visione. Ad quam quidem visionem homo pertingere 
non potest nisi per modum addiscentis a Deo doctore … Huius autem disciplinae fit homo particeps 
non statim, sed successive, secundum modum suae naturae. Omnis autem talis addiscens oportet quod 
credat, ad hoc quod ad perfectam scientiam perveniat, sicut etiam philosophus dicit quod oportet 
addiscentem credere” (STh, II-II, 2, 3 c.).  
49 Thus ‘religious’ here does not necessarily mean ‘religious in a Christian way’, but rather more broadly, 
in the sense of Eliade’s homo religiosus (cf. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The ature of 
Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask [New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961]). Today’s sociologists of 
religion and specialists in comparative religion often define religion in terms of function. Especially 
useful for some of them is the definition proposed by a theologian, Paul Tillich, who says that “religion 
is ultimate concern.” This broad formula implies no particular metaphysical position but only indicates 
somebody’s concern which is religious in the sense that it is more important than anything else for this 
person. Thus it includes anyone’s world-view and value-system, whether these are theistic or atheistic, 
dogmatic or relativistic, wordly or mystical, sacral or secular in content (cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic 
Theology [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], vol. 1, p. 8-15). Cf. also Ashley, Theologies of 
the Body, p. 11-18. 
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not exist or that this fact has no consequences for ethics is simply the expression of 
erroneous reasoning. He writes that the existence of God is accessible to natural reason 
not because the Scripture says so or because such is the anti-fideist dogma of the 
Catholic Church (St. Thomas lived six centuries before the proclamation of this dogma) 
but because it is a truth of which he himself as a philosopher was certain on the basis of 
solid arguments. He also makes it plain that it belongs to justice to thank and revere 
God – religion is for him the most noble of moral virtues.50  
Aquinas’s philosophical theism, assumed in ethics from natural science, is 
necessary for a non-reductivist description of the human “is.” An honest description of 
human being leaves room for an inherently dramatic form of our existence. Man calls 
from within of his being and activity for more than can be supplied by everything 
observable around him. Philosophically we cannot say much about this “more” for 
which our human nature strives. We can say, however, enough to open a horizon for 
a profoundly human answer to what surpasses the limits of purely philosophical 
thinking. What we say philosophically about this “more” is sufficient as well to 
discover what constitutes the most rational goal for every singular and personal 
instantiation of human nature. On this discovery, according to St. Thomas, the whole of 
ethics hinges as on its first indemonstrable principle.51  
                                                 
50 Cf. In Eth., IV, 7 (Leon. 47/2, p. 222, lin. 16-32 and 116-122); 8 (p. 227, lin. 115-120); V, 1 (p. 266, 
lin. 163-178); STh, II-II, 81, 6. Elisabeth Anscombe pointed out that Hume’s “objection to passing 
from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ would apply equally to passing from ‘is’ to ‘owes’ or from ‘is’ to ‘needs’” 
(“Modern Moral Philosophy,” p. 27). She gives an example: “Suppose that I say to my grocer ‘Truth 
consists in either relations of ideas, as that 20s.= £1, or matters of fact, as that I ordered potatoes, you 
supplied them, and you sent me a bill. So it doesn’t apply to such a proposition as that I owe you such-
and-such a sum’” (p. 28). She adds that owing money to somebody is a brute fact that contains a kind 
of “ought.” Hence, what we owe to God comes from our recognition of Him and our factual relation to 
Him. This recognition is of an utmost importance for our moral life.  
51 “Subiectum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finem, vel etiam homo prout est 
voluntarie agens propter finem” (In Eth., I, 1 [Leon. 47/1, p. 4, lin. 51-54]). “Et sic necesse est esse 
aliquem ultimum finem propter quem omnia alia desiderantur et ipse non desideratur propter alia. Et 
ita necesse est esse aliquem optimum finem rerum humanarum” (ibid., 2 [p. 8, lin. 48-52]). “Tota 
humana vita oportet quod ordinetur in ultimum et optimum finem humanae vitae; ergo ad rectitudinem 
humanae vitae necesse est habere cognitionem de ultimo et optimo fine humanae vitae. Et huius ratio 
est, quia semper ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumenda est ab ipso fine, ut etiam in II Physicorum 
probatur” (ibid. [lin. 67-73]). “Deinde … ostendit quid circa istum finem sit cognoscendum. Et dicit 
quod ex quo sic est, quod cognitio optimi finis necessaria est ad vitam humanam: oportet accipere quis 
sit iste optimus finis … Dicit autem quod tentandum est de his determinare ad insinuandum 
difficultatem quae est in accipiendo ultimum finem in humana vita sicut et in considerando omnes 
causas altissimas. Dicit autem quod oportet illud accipere figuraliter, id est verisimiliter, quia talis 
modus accipiendi convenit rebus humanis, ut infra dicetur. Horum autem duorum, primum quidem 
pertinet ad tractatum huius scientiae [i.e. moralis], quia talis consideratio est circa rem de qua haec 
scientia considerat” (ibid. [lin. 74-91]). “Ultimus enim finis est ultimus terminus motus desiderii 
naturalis” (ibid., 9 [p. 31, lin. 60-61]). “Unde rationabile est quod ultimus finis, scilicet felicitas, 
proveniat homini ex suprema omnium virtute, scilicet Dei summi” (ibid., 14 [p. 50, lin. 47-50]). 
7. Some Lessons from Natural Science 
 228
 
7.3. Cogitative power (vis cogitativa) 
 
We should take one more lesson from natural science in order to explain how 
St. Thomas justifies the transition from “is” to “ought.” This lesson concerns one aspect 
of our sensory cognition that influences considerably the understanding of practical 
rationality. This is not the place to present the whole teaching of Aquinas on 
philosophical psychology. Only one topic, often underestimated, needs to be especially 
underlined here to point at the originality of his solution. This will indicate the direction 
of solving the main difficulty with the transition from the universality of theoretical 
conclusions and the singularity of human actions. Actiones in singularibus sunt – 
Aquinas often repeats, hence we should know how it occurs that universal conclusions 
about human nature or about the nature of certain acts (conclusions that we have from 
natural science or from moral science) may influence singular human actions. The goal 
of this section, therefore, is to provide an answer to the third layer of the “Is/Ought 
Thesis,” namely to the “internalist assumption.” 
As was said already, for St. Thomas all our knowledge has its source in sense 
cognition. The five external senses, however, do not explain sufficiently our sensory 
experience. Some interior senses were already mentioned in this dissertation. When in 
section 4.3 we were talking about the first principles of sciences and arts (that they are 
taken from the sensory experience), memory was mentioned. Earlier, in section 3.1, 
when the first act of intellect was discussed, imagination was also mentioned. Apart 
from that there are two other interior senses, namely common sense (sensus communis) 
and estimative power (vis aestimativa; in human being it is called “discursive power” – 
vis cogitativa). Here, I will shortly present Aristotelian arguments for perception 
through interior senses as distinct from sensation of external senses and focus especially 
                                                                                                                                               
“Videtur felicitas esse aliquid divinissimum, quia, cum sit praemium et finis virtutis, sequitur quod sit 
optimum et divinum aliquid et beatum. Non enim dicitur aliquid divinum propter hoc solum quia est 
a Deo, sed etiam quia nos Deo assimulat propter excellentiam bonitatis” (ibid. [p. 50-51, lin. 71-76]). 
“Principium autem totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus, qui ita se habet in operativis, sicut 
principium indemonstrabile in speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.” (STh, I, 72, 5c). “Primum autem 
principium in operativis, quorum est ratio practica, est finis ultimus” (STh, I-II, 90, 2 c.). “Sicut nihil 
constat firmiter secundum rationem speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad prima principia 
indemonstrabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat per rationem practicam nisi per ordinationem ad ultimum 
finem (STh, I-II, 90, 2 ad 3). 
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on the discursive power.52 According to Aquinas, the teaching on the interior senses 
belongs to natural science, and is treated properly for the first time in the order of 
learning in the fifth part of natural science, which considers animated beings (in 
Aristotle’s works commented by St. Thomas, first, in a general treatment in De anima, 
then in the more specific treatment, De memoria et reminescentia).53  
Why are our external senses insufficient to give an account of our sensory 
experience? As Aquinas relates, Aristotle gives two principal reasons. First, reason is 
taken from the fact that we perceive ourselves sensing, or, in other words, that we are 
conscious of our sensation. For example, I am conscious that I hear something. It is not 
through my hearing that I perceive myself hearing because I would not be able to 
perceive myself not hearing if my hearing were impeded. Second, reason is taken from 
the fact that we discern sensations of exterior senses. For example, we can discern 
through our sight white from black and through our taste sweet from bitter. But through 
what power do we discern white from sweet? It cannot be sight or taste because through 
sight it is impossible to sense tastes and through taste it is impossible to sense colours. 
There must be a power that is able to perceive both sensations and is able to compare 
them in one moment.54 Obviously, we think about the intellect as a possible candidate 
for this task. Aquinas, however, commenting on Aristotle, says that it is proper to the 
intellect to grasp a conceptual difference, but to know the sensible as sensible according 
to diverse immutation of sense pertains of necessity to some sensory power.55  
                                                 
52 George P. Klubertanz, in his study The Discursive Power Sources and Doctrine of the “Vis 
Cogitativa” According to St. Thomas Aquinas (St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1952), shows that 
Aristotle does not have a clear theory of interior sensation. A significant development along the lines 
of Aristotle’s thought brought Avicenna, and Aquinas, although taking some elements from other 
interpretations, for the most part follows him. 
53 See especially In De an., II, 27-30 and III, 6-7 [Leon. 45/1, p. 182-200 and 229-237]; In De sensu, 
tr. 2, passim; CG, II, 60; 73; STh, I, 78, 4; De ver., 10, 5. 
54 “Postquam Philosophus ostendit quod non sit alius sensus proprius preter quinque, procedit ad 
inquirendum utrum sit aliqua potencia sensitiua communis hiis quinque sensibus et hoc quidem 
inuestigat ex quibusdam actionibus que non uidentur alicuius sensus proprie esse, set uidentur exigere 
aliquam potenciam sensitiuam communem; huiusmodi autem actiones sunt due: una est secundum 
quod nos percipimus actiones sensuum propriorum, puta quod sentimus nos uidere et audire; alia est 
secundum quod discernimus inter sensibilia propria diuersorum sensuum, puta quod aliud sit dulce et 
aliud album” (In De an., II, 26 [Leon. 45/1, p. 178, lin. 1-14]). 
55 “Quia discernimus aliqua uirtute non solum album a nigro uel dulce ab amaro, set etiam album a dulci 
et unumquodque sensibile discernimus ab unoquoque, et sentimus quod differunt, oportet quod hoc sit 
per sensum, quia cognoscere sensibilia inquantum sunt sensibilia est sensus. Cognoscimus autem 
differenciam albi et dulcis non solum quantum ad quod quid est utriusque, quod pertinet ad 
intellectum, set etiam quantum ad diuersam immutationem sensus, et hoc non potest fieri nisi per 
sensum” (ibid., II, 27 [p. 183, lin. 41-51]). 
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The insufficiency of the external sensation is confirmed as well by a simple 
observation of animals that seem to be unable to think in an abstract manner (that is, 
they seem to not have an intellect like humans do), but nonetheless are in a way 
conscious. Moreover, they experience time and so have memory, and even have 
a capacity to act with a kind of hope or prudence. This is the basis for looking for 
a distinct cognitive power still belonging to the sensory cognition, which could explain 
the existence of phantasms and animal patterns of behaviour that are similar to human.  
Thus, from this operation of our cognition through which we sense ourselves 
seeing or hearing, Aquinas follows Aristotle in looking for such a sensory power which 
would integrate information from the various exterior senses into one sensory 
perception.56 Since powers of cognition are distinguished by their objects, another 
cognitive power should be distinguished in order to account for this aspect of our 
ordinary experience. This power, which integrates data coming from our sensation, that 
is, the power at which end immutations of all exterior senses, is called “common 
sense.”57 
Yet, we may experience also a kind of sensation even when the objects sensed 
by exterior senses are absent, as well as employ these sensations in creating some 
conscious appearances of the wholes or things that were never an object of our 
experience. Thus imagination or phantasia (which are the same) is distinguished as 
another interior sense.  
Moreover, a simple observation of animals shows that there is also a sensory 
power through which they somehow know what is beneficial for them and what is 
harmful, what is useful for them and what is hurtful, what is to be followed and what is 
to be avoided. For example a lamb follows its mother, it “knows” how to feed itself, and 
that mother’s milk is something good for it. On the other hand, the same lamb flees 
when it sees a wolf – as it seems, without taking some special lessons on this topic – 
                                                 
56 Cf. In De an., II, 26 (Leon. 45/1, p. 182, lin. 1-17).  
57 “Sensus enim communis est quedam potencia ad quam terminantur immutationes omnium sensuum” 
(ibid., II, 13 [p. 119, lin. 94-96]). Eleonore Stump, discussing the difference between sensation and 
perception in Aquinas, gives an example from the field of today’s neurobiology the much-discussed 
phenomenon of blindsight: “A patient with blindsight has no defects in his eyes and no neurological 
defects in the lower-level processing of visual data; but he will still be unable to have conscious access 
to the processed visual data. He will therefore claim, sincerely, to be blind. On the other hand, when 
asked just to guess whether a yardstick in his field of vision is vertical or horizontal, he has a very high 
percentage of correct ‘guesses’. Shall we say that the blindight patient perceives the yardstick? Here, 
although much of the patient’s visual system is functioning properly, most of us would be inclined to 
answer ‘no’” (Eleonore Stump, Aquinas [London-New York: Routledge, 2003], p. 246). 
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“knowing” by itself that its presence brings a danger. The lamb does not flee wolf 
because its colour or shape are ugly but because wolf is its natural enemy. Or a sparrow 
does not gather together straws because they are pleasant to its exterior senses but 
because they are useful for building its specific nest, specific to its species. Or else, 
a wild mother bear does not hurl herself ferociously at an approaching stranger whom 
she perceives as a danger to her cubs because she likes to do so or it is her hobby, but 
because protecting the offspring is for her a natural consequence of being a mother bear. 
There is, therefore, a sensory cognitive power which enables animals to act according to 
their natural instinct, that is, to refer the content of sensation to the sensing subject and 
to judge this content of sensation under the aspect of being beneficial or nocive. This 
power is called the “estimative power.” Since this power seems to be more developed in 
man and since it functions in the mood of a discourse in man, there are another names 
for this more developed form, namely “discoursive power,” “cogitative power,” or even 
“particular reason.” 
Note that through the activity of the estimative power something is perceived 
that is contained in sensation but is not sensed by exterior senses or any other interior 
sense. These are some intentiones, as Aquinas says, which may be translated as 
“individual” or “sensory intentions” or else as “instinctive references” because these are 
some references of what is sensed to the sensing subject under the aspect of usefulness 
or harmfulness. This element of sensory cognition is of great importance in the process 
of gaining experience – it was no mystery for Aristotle or Aquinas that animals may 
gain an extensive experience and learn many things on the sensory level. Because of 
this, another interior sense is distinguished, which stores such sensory intentions and is 
necessary for the experience of the past. This sensory power is called “memory”. Since 
these powers of cognition are sensory, they use a corporeal organ, namely, some parts 
of the brain.  
Commenting upon Aristotle’s Ethics Aquinas compares prudence to the intellect 
understood as the habit of first principles.58 Prudence is said to be receptive or in 
continuity or else coherent with the habit of first indemonstrable principles. This habit 
concerns some terms or ultimates from which principles are immediately grasped. 
These principles cannot be rationally demonstrated but are evident once one 
                                                 
58 Cf. In Eth., VI, 7 (Leon. 47/2, p. 359, lin. 234-255). 
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understands terms.59 Prudence concerns also some ultimates but these ultimate terms in 
the case of prudence are some singular perceptions which play the role of principles in 
action. These perceptions must be singular because actiones in singularibus sunt. Since 
science concerns universals, there cannot be a science of these perceptions but only 
a sensory cognition.60 We are talking about perception and not about sensation, thus to 
grasp these ultimate terms as indemonstrable principles in action belongs to one of the 
interior senses. The conclusion that follows may be surprising if we remember that 
prudence was enumerated as one of the intellectual virtues (section 1.2), because 
Aquinas says that “prudence pertains more to this interior sense which perfects 
particular reason to estimate properly about singular practicable intentions.”61 And right 
after this statement he adds that “also some brute animals, which have a good estimative 
natural power are said to participate in prudence.”62  
Above we singled out the estimative power as this power through which animals 
perceive some sensory intentions as usefulness and harmfulness, friendliness and 
unfriendliness, amity and enmity – intentions that are not perceived in exterior senses 
but sensorily experienced by humans and observable in the behaviour of some other 
animals. On the other hand, earlier we described prudence as an intellectual virtue of 
cognition that concerns such contingent things as our immanent actions (this makes it 
a practical virtue). Prudence enables us to judge these actions always according to the 
truth (this makes it a virtue of cognition) and thus morality is possible. How, therefore, 
prudence might pertain more to the estimative power? Aquinas seems to reconcile the 
intellectual virtue with the interior sense by underlining the importance of the latter: 
prudence is more in the domain of the estimative power. Should we thus conclude that 
our cognition of moral matters belongs to this interior sense which – as all interior 
                                                 
59 “Intellectus est quorumdam terminorum sive extremorum, id est principiorum indemonstrabilium, 
quorum non est ratio, quia non possunt per rationem probari, sed statim per se innotescunt” (ibid. 
[lin. 238-242]). 
60 “Prudentia est extremi, scilicet singularis operabilis, quod oportet accipere ut principium in agendis: 
cuius quidem extremi non est scientia, quia non probatur ratione, sed est eius sensus, quia aliquo sensu 
percipitur” (ibid. [lin. 243-247]). 
61 “Et ad istum sensum, id est interiorem, magis pertinet prudentia, per quam perficitur ratio particularis 
ad recte aestimandum de singularibus intentionibus operabilium” (ibid. [lin. 255-258]). 
62 “Unde et animalia bruta, quae habent bonam aestimativam naturalem dicuntur participare prudentia” 
(ibid. [lin. 258-260]). 
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senses – resides in one part of an animal (including human) brain? Was St. Thomas 
a proponent of a “moral organ”?63  
In another place Aquinas explains that it is common to the apprehensive and the 
appetitive part of the sensitive soul that there is in it something characteristic to the 
proper nature but there is also something through which this sensitive soul “has some 
small participation in rationality.” This participation is achieved in the highest level of 
the sensory life. According to St. Thomas this highest level of animal soul embodies the 
estimative power: “it inheres in the sensitive soul insofar as it participates something of 
rationality. Hence because of this estimative power some animals are said to have 
prudence.”64 
From several texts of Aquinas it must be concluded that it is through this interior 
sense that the intellect becomes properly practical.65 The intellect in its function of 
                                                 
63 Marc Hauser, who is professor of psychology, organismic and evolutionary biology, and biological 
anthropology, influenced by Chomsky’s theories of linguistics, suggests “that something about the 
human brain allows us to acquire a system of moral norms” (Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds: How 
ature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong [New York: Ecco/Harper Collins, 2006], 
165). He uses many contemporary findings from different disciplines showing that there is one special 
part of our brain that is responsible for the linking of our general moral knowledge with guiding of our 
singular actions. He finds especially useful the discoveries of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio 
(cf. his Descartes’ Error [Boston: Norton, 1994], and The Feeling of What Happens [New York: Basic 
Books, 2000]) who analyzed some brain-damaged cases and remarked that some patients appear to 
have intact moral knowledge but have damaged the circuitry that allows emotion to collide with such 
knowledge and guide action. As Hauser puts it, “it appears that these patients have normal moral 
competence, but abnormal moral performance” (Hauser, p. 229). Hauser characterizes such a “moral 
organ” at length and compares it with animal’s cooperative behaviour. He gives many examples 
showing that animal societies have unwritten rules that function in the regulation of dominance 
relationships, plays, sexual behaviour, the defense of space, etc. and argues that “parts of our moral 
faculty are shared with other animals, and parts appear to be uniquely human” (ibid., p. 414), although 
he shuns from giving an answer to the question whether animals are moral. Obviously, as befits 
a contemporary scientist, he does not seem to be aware that the ancient and medieval authors made 
similar observations of human and animal behaviour and even of brain damaged cases. Instead of 
calling this part of brain “moral organ,” they gave to it the name vis cogitativa for humans and vis 
estimativa for other animals to mark the difference.  
Cf. Adina Roskies, “Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from ‘Acquired 
Sociopathy,’” Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 51-66, who also uses Damasio’s research in order 
to provide evidence for the falsity of substantive belief-internalism (i.e. that our moral knowledge is 
inextricably linked to our motivational system). 
64 “Sciendum est … quod tam ex parte apprehensivarum virium quam ex parte appetitivarum sensitivae 
partis, aliquid est quod competit sensibili animae secundum propriam naturam; aliquid vero, secundum 
quod habet aliquam participationem modicam rationis, attingens ad ultimum eius in sui supremo; … 
vis aestimativa, per quam animal apprehendit intentiones non acceptas per sensum, ut amicitiam vel 
inimicitiam, inest animae sensitivae secundum quod participat aliquid rationis: unde ratione huius 
aestimationis dicuntur animalia quamdam prudentiam habere” (De Veritate, 25, 2).  
65 “Intellectus speculativus fit practicus per extensionem ad opus. … quia intellectus speculativus et 
practicus non sunt diversae potentiae, sed differunt fine, ut dicitur in II Meta. Et in III De anima, 
inquantum practicus ordinatur ad opus, speculativus autem ad veritatis inspectionem tantum” (Super 
III Sent., 23, 2, 3, qc. 2 sol.). “Intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae potentiae. Cuius 
ratio est quia, ut supra dictum est, id quod accidentaliter se habet ad obiecti rationem quam respicit 
aliqua potentia, non diversificat potentiam … Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod 
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considering something true or false on a general level is called “speculative intellect,” 
but in its function of applying this general knowledge or general rules to particular 
operables is called the “practical intellect.” This application is more on the side of the 
interior sense than on the side of the intellect because the interior sense is concerned 
with singular intentions and the intellect with universal ones. Thus, the interior sense is 
directly concerned with actions which of necessity are in singulars. The interior sense is 
a bodily organ which has already its nature, a nature established not by human creative 
power of the intellect but by God. To be sure, there is a considerable flexibility and 
receptivity of this sense, yet through its proper object it is possible to recognize its 
relatively unchanging deep structure, which is its nature. The nature of this interior 
sense consists in comparing what is experienced with the specific nature of the sensing 
subject. There is a difference between lamb’s reaction to an approaching wolf and the 
reaction to the same approaching wolf of this wolf’s cub: the lamb flees from the wolf 
but the cub follows its mother-wolf. There is the same colour, shape, odour, sound, or 
movement, but different reactions depending on the nature of the sensing subject. 
Hence, there must be a sensory faculty that enables this sensing subject to refer the 
content of sensation to its own specific nature and judge it whether it is beneficial or 
nocive, whether something should be followed (prosequendum) or avoided (vitandum), 
whether something should be done or not. This interior sense enables the sensing 
subject to estimate what is good or bad for it, for this singular instantiation of this 
particular nature. There must be also some sense of identity, some consciousness of 
itself in a non-human animal in order that it might react according to its nature and 
according to its experience.66  
                                                                                                                                               
ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et 
practicus. Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam 
veritatis considerationem, practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. 
Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III De anima, quod speculativus differt a practico, fine.” (STh, I, 
79, 11 c.). “Non ergo intendit comparare uerum et falsum bono et malo secundum conuenienciam 
generis, set uerum et falsum quod est in actione uero et falso quod est sine actione. Et hoc patet ex 
differencia quam subdit, dicens, quod differt, scilicet quod est in actione et quod est sine actione, in eo 
quod est simpliciter et quodam: nam intellectus speculatiuus considerat aliquod uerum esse vel falsum 
in uniuersali, quod est considerare simpliciter, intellectus autem practicus applicando ad particulare 
operabile, quia operatio in particularibus est” (In De an., III, 6 [Leon. 45/1, p. 233, lin. 239-250]). 
66 Note, that the belief that animals are machines with no conscious life is relatively late. Before 
Descartes it belonged to a common opinion that non-human animals have some consciousness and 
some share in rationality. It might seem that whoever has seen two cubs playing together should easily 
reject the mechanistic explanation of all human behaviour. Indeed, the flexibility of animal reactions is 
one of the greatest difficulties for mechanistic theories. Cf. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Psychologia 
racjonalna (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1996), p. 67-103. 
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According to St. Thomas, man also makes this comparison of what is sensed 
with himself as the sensing subject, and makes it through the same interior sense. We 
instinctively react to water differently than dolphins do and the human child 
instinctively does not follow a mare to feed itself as does a foal. Animals have their 
instinctive behaviour, but human beings are not totally free from it either. Human 
beings are also animals. We live in our bodily condition and thus we have much in 
common with other animals. Like other animals, we also have a distinctive feature that 
makes of us an instantiation of this particular species. Is this interior sense therefore 
capable of referring the content of sensation to the specificity of our rational nature? 
How might an interior sense be able to grasp the specificity of rational nature in order to 
produce an adequate instinctive reaction?  
Aquinas says that the highest embodiment of sensory life links animal life with 
properly human rational life. Thus animal estimative power functions slightly 
differently in human being because it is intertwined or in continuity with the activity of 
the intellect. Human estimative power is considerably influenced by the activity of the 
intellect since the intellect is this distinctive feature that constitutes (along with 
animality) human nature. For this reason the estimative power in human being gains a 
different name: it is no longer called vis aestimativa but vis cogitativa or ratio 
particularis or else passivus intellectus.67 Through the cogitative power we are able to 
know a man as this concrete man or a sheep as this sheep. It enables us to know the 
object of cognition under its common nature and existent as distinct and concrete 
substance with all its actual accidents.68 The content of our consciousness is thereby 
marked by both our animality and our rationality in their concretization.69  
                                                 
67 “Illa potentia quae a Philosophis dicitur cogitativa, est in confinio sensitivae et intellectivae partis, ubi 
pars sensitiva intellectivam attingit. Habet enim aliquid a parte sensitiva, scilicet quod considerat 
formas particulares; et habet aliquid ab intellectiva, scilicet quod confert. Unde et in solis hominibus 
est” (Super III Sent., 23, 2, 2, qc. 1 ad 3). “Passivus intellectus, de quo Philosophus loquitur, non est 
intellectus possibilis, sed ratio particularis, quae dicitur vis cogitativa, habens determinatum organum 
in corpore, scilicet mediam cellulam capitis, ut Commentator ibidem dicit; et sine hoc anima nihil 
modo intelligit” (In IV Sent., 50, 1, 1 ad 3). “Intellectus passivus dicitur virtus cogitativa, quae 
nominatur ratio particularis” (STh, I, 79, 2 ad 2). Cf. STh, I, 81, 3 c. 
68 “Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid uniuersale, apprehenditur intellectu. … Si 
uero apprehendatur in singulari, ut puta si, cum uideo coloratum, percipio hunc hominem uel hoc 
animal, huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per uim cogitatiuam, que dicitur et ratio 
particularis eo quod est collatiua intentionum indiuidualium sicut ratio uniuersalis est collatiua 
rationum uniuersalium, nichilominus tamen hec uis est in parte sensitiua, quia uis sensitiua in sui 
supremo participat aliquid de ui intellectiua in homine, in quo sensus intellectui coniungitur. … 
cogitatiua apprehendit indiuiduum ut existentem sub natura communi, quod contingit ei in quantum 
unitur intellectui in eodem subiecto, unde cognoscitur hunc hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc 
lignum prout est hoc lignum; estimatiua autem non apprehenditur aliquid indiuiduum secundum quod 
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The content of our consciousness is not necessarily conceptual or speculative. 
Our sensory consciousness, which is prelinguistic and which we share with some non-
human animals, cannot be conceptual because it is sensory, although it can be 
influenced by conceptual or speculative knowledge. However, our intellectual 
consciousness does not suppress our sensory consciousness nor it can be freed from 
sensory consciousness while existing in a bodily condition. Thus, even if we do not find 
explicit, named ideas in our mind or explicit, named inclinations, it does not mean that 
some sensory content of our consciousness does not direct our actions according to 
these singular sensory intentions through which the content of sensation is estimated 
under the aspect of something’s being beneficial or nocive. 
To the cogitative power Aquinas also ascribes some function in gathering the 
experimentum
70
 from which the intellect is able to draw the universal intelligible or 
the first indemonstrable principles.71 This function is so essential that to some extent the 
cogitative power and experimentum are treated as synonyms.72 Moreover, the 
experimentum enhances the efficacy of operation. This clarifies the difference between 
only universal moral or artisanal rules learned by the way of conceptual instruction (per 
modum scientiae) without application to a concrete action and the rules learned from 
personal action or rules applied already to a concrete action.73 This interior sense plays 
some role as well in preparing the phantasms for intellection.74 
                                                                                                                                               
est sub natura communi, set solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis uel 
passionis; sicut ouis cogniscit agnus non in quantum est hic agnus, set in quantum est ab eo lactabilis, 
et hanc herbam in quantum est eius cibus; unde alia indiuidua ad que se non extendit eius actio uel 
passio, nullo modo apprehendit sua estimatiua naturali: naturalis enim estimatiua datur animalibus ut 
per eam ordinentur in actiones proprias uel passiones prosequendas uel fugiendas” (In De an., II, 13 
[Leon. 45/1, p. 121-122, lin. 182-183 and 191-222]). 
69 Cf. STh, I, 84, 7 c.  
70 Cf. In Meta., I, 1, n. 15; In Poster., II, 20 (Leon. 1*/2, p. 244-245, lin. 141-195).  
71 “Quia igitur uniuersalium cognitionem accipimus ex singularibus, concludit manifestum esse quod 
necesse est prima uniuersalia prinicipia cognoscere per inductionem: sic enim, scilicet per uiam 
inductionis, sensus facit uniuersale intus in anima, in quantum considerantur omnia singularia” (In 
Poster., II, 20 [Leon. 1*/2, p. 246, lin. 282-288]).  
72 For a discussion of diverse texts see John Deely, “Animal Intelligence and Concept-Formation,” The 
Thomist 35 (1971): 43-93. 
73 “Quantum ad actum pertinet, experientia nihil videtur differre ab arte. Cum enim ad actionem venitur, 
tollitur differentia, quae inter experimentum et artem erat per universale et singulare: quia sicut 
experimentum circa singularia operatur, ita et ars; unde praedicta differentia erat in cognoscendo 
tantum. Sed quamvis in modo operandi ars et experimentum non differant, quia utraque circa 
singularia operatur, differunt tamen in efficacia operandi. Nam experti magis proficiunt in operando 
illis qui habent rationem universalem artis sine experimento” (In Meta., I, 1, n. 20). 
74 Cf. CG, II, 60; 73. Cf. also Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” Proceedings of the Catholic 
Philosophical Association 72 (1998): 213-227. 
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What influences the cogitative power comes exclusively from other exterior or 
interior senses and from the speculative function of our intellect. Aquinas’s conception 
of the nature of the intellect and his specific claim that the intellect becomes practical in 
the application of the intellective cognition to singular operables leads to this 
conclusion.75 According to St. Thomas, our intellectual cognition is abstractive – man 
abstracts the forms of things from sensory cognition and this is the only basis for our 
intellective cognition. Through the abstractive process the intellect is concerned only 
with universals and there is nothing in the intellect in Aquinas’s account which would 
enable it to consider singulars.76 Singulars are the domain of sensory cognition. Thus 
the application of our intellective cognition to singular operables is possible only 
through our sensory cognition. The best candidate for this task is the cogitative power.77 
If the intellect is practical only through the connection with the cogitative power, it 
follows that the cogitative power cannot be influenced, except by the fruits of the 
activity of the speculative intellect.  
Through the sensory cognition, which we share to a great extent with some non-
human animals, we are able to recognize something as useful or harmful for us, hence, 
what is good and evil on sensory level. This suffices to put us into some kind of action – 
action which is not properly humana but only hominis. For a properly human act it is 
necessary that we recognize rationally and choose voluntarily. Yet rational recognition 
of what something is is the work of the intellect in its speculative function because its 
practical function appears only when what is recognized is applied to action. The 
application, in turn, happens only through the cogitative power as particular reason 
since the intellect is concerned with universals. The intellect, therefore, is properly 
practical only through its connection or continuity with the cogitative power. It may be, 
however, in a less proper sense called practical also when on a general level it considers 
issues that may be ordered to practice. In this sense the operation of the intellect itself is 
none other than speculative but the order of finality of its consideration, that is, an 
                                                 
75 Cf. above, footnote 64. 
76 This conclusion would not be necessary in the Scotistic framework thanks to the distinction into 
intuitive and abstractive cognition. Cf. section 5.3, footnote 51.  
77 “Intellectus practicus ad hoc quod de singularibus disponat, ut dicitur in 3 de Anima (text 47), indiget 
ratione particulari, qua mediante, opinio quae est universalis (quae est in intellectu) ad particulare opus 
applicetur: ut sic quidem fiat syllogismus, cujus major est universalis, quae est opinio intellectus 
practici; minor vero singularis, quae est aestimatio rationis particularis, quae alio nomine dicitur 
cogitativa: conclusio vero consistit in electione operis” (Super IV Sent., 50, 1, 3 ad 3). 
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application to practice (either achieved in future or not and either planified to be applied 
to action or not), entitles us to call it practical.  
To be sure, human instincts, correlated with the activity of the cogitative power, 
are not the matter of ethics. It is rather the domain of natural science. Yet note what 
happens when it is not presupposed in ethics. If ethics is so autonomous that it takes 
nothing from natural science (because considering human nature as the basis for ethics 
there would pop up the “naturalistic fallacy”), then we are obliged to search for such an 
element in moral theory that could bind everybody, everywhere and always. Ethics, for 
the sake of guarding its autonomy, becomes a science of “oughts.” We are obliged then 
to search for a source of this “ought” that is autonomous as regards the “is.”  
I argue that this is not necessary in Aquinas’s account because of his explanation 
of our cognitive faculties. The first principle of practical reason is only a conceptual 
expression of our sensory consciousness which we share to a considerable extent with 
other animals. The principle: bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum 
vitandum
78 is only a conceptualization of the principle that every animal has inscribed in 
its nature and every animal follows it according to its particular capacity to grasp what 
is good for it and what is evil. Man has the capacity to grasp the good universally and 
thus the content of this principle differs significantly, but the principle itself remains the 
same. Therefore, we are not obliged to search any other distinctive “ought” than the 
“ought” of natural finality discovered, and not established, in the consideration of what 
constitutes human being; that is in the consideration of what there “is.”79  
                                                 
78 “Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit 
in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus, omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui 
habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem 
boni, quae est, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum 
est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis 
naturae, ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio 
practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana. Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum 
autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio 
naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et 
vitanda” (STh, I-II, 94, 2 c.). 
79 This section on the cogitative power is in a way a modest complement to Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
analysis contained in his book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). He does not mention the 
cogitative power but discusses a similar problematic from the aspect of soul-body relationship. He 
remarks that “the relationship of soul to body, indeed the existence of body, had been something of an 
embarrassment to later Augustinians, even if not to Augustine. And on this specific point Aquinas’s 
integration of Augustinian and Aristotelian views had seemed to his Franciscan Augustinian 
contemporaries offensive. More particularly, they were concerned with the implications of soul-body 
relationships for the knowledge of singulars” (p. 153). MacIntyre notes that “The Franciscan William 
de la Mare in 1279 denounced 117 theses in Aquinas’s writings in his Correctorium fratris Thomae, 
among them those which give expression to this view of the relationship of soul to body and thus 
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Thus the question “why be moral?” in Aquinas’s framework is identical with the 
question “why be human?” or “why maintain my own identity as a human being?” or 
“why be conscious of who I am and act accordingly?” The main guarantor of the 
universality of certain moral rules or certain moral order is, on the one hand, the nature 
itself shared by all people, and on the other hand, the sense of identity which everybody 
naturally would like to preserve and deepen. To search a distinctive force of moral 
discourse which could motivate man is to disregard the fact that man is already found as 
motivated, as tending, as inclined towards his good according to his recognition of this 
good.  
 
*   *   * 
 
In Chapter 5 we stated that for Aquinas natural science is proper to construct the 
human “is” for ethics. Chapter 6 provided some basics of natural science with an initial 
analysis of its principles and specific method. In Chapter 7 we discussed some aspects 
of three vital issues from the field of natural science in order to reveal the essential 
                                                                                                                                               
impugn the competence of the soul to know singulars immediately and independently of bodily 
experience. In 1282 the Franciscan order prohibited the copying of the Summa except as accompanied 
by the Correctorium, a book thereafter referred by some younger Dominicans as the Corruptorium” 
(p. 153). In this context Scotus’s insistence on the possibility of the intuitive intellective knowledge of 
singulars is not that surprising (cf. section 5.3, footnote 51). Further MacIntyre offers an analysis of 
two models of the understanding of the relationship between the intellect and will. One of them says 
that the intellect has the primacy over the will and the other says the opposite. Aquinas works within 
the first, intellectualist model, to which it is proper to see reason as an active goal-setting, goal-
achieving power. Within this Aristotelian understanding of the primacy of the intellect over the will 
one “can find no room for any question as to why, given that one recognizes that something is one’s 
true good, one should act so as to achieve it” (p. 154). MacIntyre juxtaposes this framework with an 
Augustinian understanding of the primacy of the will and suggests that for Scotus, who is one of the 
proponents of this view, “the primacy of the will entails that the intellect is inert, the will is free, and 
the will’s being moved by its good is something distinct from the will’s being obedient to the 
command of another. Part of the freedom of the will to defy God would, on Scotus’s view, be taken 
away if merely by pursuing its own good the will was obedient to God. The will therefore can only 
exhibit its obedience to God by not only obeying the natural law qua directive of our good but also qua 
divine commandment. Hence alongside of the ‘ought’ of practical reasoning, which in any case qua 
reasoning cannot move us to action (since the intellect is practically inert), there appears another 
‘ought,’ one unknown to Aristotle and to the ancient world generally, the distinctive ‘ought’ of moral 
obligation. But in generating this new, distinctive concept Scotus makes it possible for his successors 
to generate a new set of problems, problems which were to become in time central to the about to 
emerge academic discipline of moral philosophy. For once one has identified a moral obligation as an 
obligation not because of what it enjoins in the doing or achieving of something good, but in virtue of 
the command of another, questions arise as to why we should obey this command. … Scotus thus not 
only made possible but provoked a good deal of later moral philosophy, directly and indirectly, from 
Occam all the way to Kant” (p. 155). Cf. also MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human 
Beings eed the Virtues (Chicago-La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1999) where he praises Aquinas who 
underlines so much the role of our animality for the understanding of our practical rationality, but there 
also MacIntyre only briefly mentions the cogitative power (p. 55). 
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elements that allow us to infer in ethics an “ought” from an “is” shaped in the 
consideration of natural science.  
In order to make the image of Aquinas’s thought integral, many other themes 
would have to be discussed but these three seem to be the most important for the topic 
of this dissertation.  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. The Analyzability of Goodness 
 
 
In sections 0.2 and 6.2 it was mentioned that the Aristotelian definition of 
goodness caused some problems in the history of philosophy. One of the main and best 
known opponents of naturalism in ethics, G. E. Moore, based his argument on the 
conviction that good is simple, sui generis, irreducible, unanalyzable – and thus 
indefinable. According to him, every endeavor to define good is doomed to the 
identification of good with some observable and natural property (which will lead to the 
denial of the plurality of goods; therefore an ethics built upon such a definition would 
be dangerous to society), whereas good is a non-natural property, because it is unique 
and peculiar and nonreducible to anything other. Anyone who inferes that something is 
good from any proposition about something’s natural properties commits the 
“naturalistic fallacy.” And so, every effort that endeavors to found ethics on some 
definition of the good must fail due to the fact that we cannot describe precisely – 
without an arbitrary decision – what the good is. We can, seemingly, judge about the 
goodness of things, but not about good itself. If only we think rigorously, it is claimed, 
we should see that there still remains an “Open Question” why good is desirable or 
appetible. Descriptions in this account cannot be evaluative; purely factual premises 
about the naturalistic characteristics cannot entail evaluative conclusions. Indeed, any 
attempt to reduce moral property to anything else is doomed to fail.  
We should now examine how this issue ceases to be problematic whithin the 
framework of Aquinas’s developed analysis of good. Since we encounter some authors 
who negate the definition of goodness, a definition that functions as a principle in 
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natural science and ethics, we should take the role of the metaphysician in order to 
defend this principle, because to dispute with such opposition is the proper task of 
a metaphysician. Thus, first, I will briefly explain in what consists the transcendentality 
of the term “good.” Next, mode, species, and order will be discussed as the elements 
according to which goodness is analyzable. Further, it will be necessary to ask what is 
the relationship of these three elements of the analyzability of goodness in general to 
moral goodness. Finally, I will offer some remarks about St. Thomas’s understanding of 
the practicality of moral science. 
 
 
8.1. “Good” as a transcendental term 
 
To understand how the term “good” functions in St. Thomas’s writings we 
should first realize that, like the term “being,” “good” is an analogous term.1 It seems 
obvious from our everyday usage of this word. The term “good” is also a transcendental 
term, just like the term “being.” When in section 2.2 we looked into his manner of 
considering being, we saw that some terms predicated about being are grouped into the 
categories that divide being, making some genera of being and some specific modes of 
being (analogically understood). Yet there are also some terms, like “being,” “thing,” 
“one,” “something,” “true,” and “good,” that do not divide being into special modes of 
being but are predicated about being in general. This kind of terms St. Thomas calls 
transcendentia, known now as transcendentals. That a term is transcendental means that 
it serves to express general modes of being belonging to every being. Transcendental 
terms other than “being” serve the same purpose but they express also what is not 
expressed in the term “being” itself.2 As such, transcendental terms are opposed to the 
expression of special modes of being which constitute genera of being. Transcendental 
terms “transcend” genera. So, in a way, what transcendental terms express is added to 
what is signified by the term “being.”  
                                                 
 
1 “Bonum non univoce dicitur de bonis” (De ver., 21, 4 c.). “Bonum dicitur de multis non secundum 
rationes penitus differentes sicut accidit in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, sed in quantum omnia bona 
dependent ab uno primo bonitatis principio, vel inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. … Vel etiam 
dicuntur omnia bona magis secundum analogiam, id est proportionem eandem” (In Eth., I, 7 
[Leon. 47/1, p. 27, lin. 199-207]). 
2 “Aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non 
exprimitur. … modus generalis consequens omne ens” (De Ver, 1, 1 c.). 
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This addition takes place when something is expressed about being absolutely 
(in se) through affirmation or negation, or when something is expressed about being in 
relation to something else (in ordine ad aliud). The term “good” adds to being in the 
second way and expresses being in reference to a desire.3 It might be said that “good” 
expresses the significatum of the term “being” along with the consideration of it as an 
end, goal or fulfilment. Note that it is not the kind of addition that could be compared 
with a specific difference constituting a species, nor could it be compared to an accident 
that adds a specific mode of being to another specific mode of being. This is not an 
addition of something in the existence of a being because nothing can be added to being 
in universal consideration (as it is the case in “being” in its transcendental signification) 
since outside of such being there is nothing.4 That addition to being that occurs in 
transcendentals could be counted only among conceptual distinctions (secundum 
rationem) not real attributes or properties.5 In other transcendentals than “being,” there 
is contained an expression of what is not contained in the term “being,” which means 
that it is a consideration about or an aspect of being itself not expressly signified by the 
term “being.” It is therefore an addition according to our understanding or consideration 
which follows being in general or a being in question.  
In the case of goodness it is the addition of relation which does not make the 
being to be what it is. It is this kind of relation as the relation of a real thing which 
happens to be known to the knowledge about this thing. The relation of the knowledge 
of a thing to the thing known is a real one, but the relation of a thing known to the 
knowledge of this thing is only a relation of reason, although this is not a logical 
relation. Aquinas notes that the same kind of relation is between measure and what is 
measured or between perfective and perfectible. Good is one of the instances of the 
relationship between perfective and perfectible. “Inasmuch as one being by reason of its 
act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that perfected as 
an end.”6 Here, again, we can observe how crucial it was for St. Thomas to include real 
                                                 
 
3  “Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum” (De ver., 1, 1 c.). 
4  Cf. ibid, 21, 1 c. 
5  Cf. ibid. 
6  “In quantum autem unum ens secundum esse suum est perfectivum alterius et consummativum, habet 
rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur” (De ver., 21, 1 c.). 
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and non-real (although non-logical) relations into his set of descriptive and analytical 
tools.  
It is important to note that, in the case of good, being is perfective by reason of 
its act of existing. In this it differs from truth: in the case of truth, being is perfective by 
its ratio or by ratio speciei. Whereas in good, being is perfective by reason of the act of 
existing of this ratio entis or ratio speciei.7 Being is what it is, and is known as good 
only considering its relation to a desire. This relation to desire does not constitute the 
thing nor is it its real attribute.8  
On the one hand, therefore, the term “good” transcends every category, that is, it 
is not confined to any of them. Yet, on the other hand, because particular modes of 
being are also called “beings” analogically, such a transcendental term as “good” is 
applied analogically to every category as well.9 Thus, since “good” enjoys the status of 
a transcendental term, as such it cannot be identified with any particular mode of being 
that constitutes a certain genus, although it is possible to predicate analogically the good 
about any of the categories of being.10  
The similarity of the good to being is so considerable that St. Thomas says that 
secundum rem good does not differ from being. Good is somehow coextensive with 
being yet “good” and “being” are not synonymous.11 Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s 
definition of goodness that it is what is desired by all or that at which all things aim 
(bonum est quod omnia appetunt). It was already explained that a definition of such 
a basic term cannot have the proper form of a strict definition, it cannot contain a cause 
                                                 
 
7  Cf. ibid. 
8  Today the kind of addition that “good” adds to “being” is sometimes explained in terms of 
supervenience. In the case of transcendentals, a term is supervenient when it follows being in general 
or a certain kind of being without adding any real attribute or property yet expressing something more, 
a certain consideration or respect of that being. “According to St. Thomas’s category/transcendental 
distinction good is a term that follows or is tied to (‘supervenes’ upon) the being of a thing (with its 
properties) and yet expresses the something more of a reference to desire. So the predication of good is 
not a tautology nor is it the predication of some special property of its own. It is the predication of 
a certain consideration of the being of the thing, not a further addition of being to it” (Peter Simpson, 
“St. Thomas on the Naturalistic Fallacy,” The Thomist 51 [1987], p. 62). Cf. also Eleonore Stump, 
Aquinas (London-New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 71-72. 
9  This position, however, is all but common opinion among philosophers, perhaps due to the often 
remarked crisis of analogical thinking (cf. John Deely, “The Absence of Analogy,” The Review of 
Metaphysics, 55 [2002]: 521-550). See Georg Henrik von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (New 
York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963) for a contrary opinion, namely that various instances of 
goodness cannot be unifed by analogy.  
10 Cf. In Eth., I, 6 (Leon. 47/1, p. 21-23); STh, I, 5, 6 ad 3; STh, I-II, 18, 3 ad 3; De ver., 21, 1. 
11 Cf. De ver., 21, 1 c. 
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or causes prior or more simple to definiendum, but rather contains a proper effect that 
indicates what is basic and most primary and what in this case is the cause of the 
effect.12 The essence of goodness is therefore what is desirable or what is the goal.13 
Good is thus identified with what is perfect because what is perfect is desirable. In the 
analysis of good, St. Thomas takes for granted the fruit of his previous analysis of what 
is more evident to us, although less universal, namely, from the analysis of changeable 
being. He now presupposes as already manifest that everything desires its own 
perfection. Everything desires its own perfection because it belongs to the deepest 
structure of every changing being, it belongs simply to the very hylomorphic 
composition or to the structure of being, regardless of having or not having psychic 
powers of feeling a desire (see sections 2.1 and 2.2).14  
It is visible already now how the explanation of goodness by perfection has its 
profound consequences for solving the main argument against the Aristotelian 
definition of goodness as the basis for ethics. By now (perhaps still indistinctly but 
nonetheless) we can see the door which closes the “Open Question Argument”. If 
somebody asks why something good is desirable, instead of answering tautologically: 
“because it is good,” we can pertinently and informatively say: “because it is perfect” or 
“because it is perfective.” It remains to clarify what being perfect or perfective means. 
So far we have the door but we still need to find the key that will close the question for 
good (at least on a general level).  
 
                                                 
 
12 “Bonum numeratur inter prima … . Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed 
notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum 
appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum” 
(In Eth., I, 1 [Leon. 47/1, p. 5, lin. 150-158]). Thus the sometimes discussed question whether the 
agent desires the end because it is good or whether the end is good because the agent desires it, has not 
the slightest sense in St. Thomas’s approach. (Note that it was one of the problems against which 
G. E. Moore stumbled.) Denis J. M. Bradley, nonetheless, seems to perceive some ambiguous 
formulations in Aquinas and even that some of his texts suggest a contradiction (Aquinas on the 
Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science [Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1997], p. 273-274). But finally he states that “Aquinas 
undoubtedly maintains, despite some ambiguous formulations, that desire essentially follows upon the 
apprehended goodness of the end. Desire, in other words, does not constitute the good” (ibid., p. 274). 
13 “Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile” (STh, I, 5, 1 c.). 
14 Cf. STh, I, 59, 1 c. While writing STh, I, 5, 1, it suffices to him to mention this analysis in only one 
sentence, as he can have the confidence that his readers have already studied natural science, where all 
this was explained. Reading this statement (that everything desires its own perfection) without this 
context of previous analysis in natural science, we could scratch our heads, wondering where he takes 
it from and even denouncing him as a dogmatic thinker – to have thrown out such a disputable claim 
seemingly without any discussion. 
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8.2. Perfect and good according to mode, species, and order 
 
Etymologically, “perfect” means something reduced from potency to act and is 
synonymous to “complete,” “consummate,” or “accomplished.” In this signification it 
is applicable to things that become (that is, to things that are the subject of natural 
science). From this meaning the term “perfect” is also used by Aquinas to signify 
everything that lacks nothing in actuality according to its proper mode, whether it refers 
to something becoming or not (which means that the signification of this term is 
extended to the subject of metaphysics).15 Hence, generally speaking, perfect 
is identified with what is in act or actual. Accordingly, this sense of perfection requires 
that something be constituted in its essence and that it lack nothing its essence should 
contain. St. Thomas calls this perfectio prima.16 This sense of perfection explains the 
affirmation that good and being are one and the same thing. Perfectio prima is 
paralelled with primum esse, that is, with esse substantiale. The claim about the identity 
of being and goodness is pronounced according to this existence of something, even if 
this something may not be fully actualized. The notion of act is crucial here because it 
links the notion of being with “perfect”: what is perfect always implies actuality and 
actuality is always of something existing (that is, of being).17 Thus, what is actual, when 
seen under the aspect of existence, is known as being, whereas what is actual, when 
seen under the aspect of perfection, is known as good.18 Yet, strictly speaking, this is 
not the first sense of the term “good”: 
goodness signifies the ratio of what is perfect, which is desirable; and consequently it 
signifies the ratio of what is ultimate. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said 
to be good simply. Whereas that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have 
(although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be 
perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in 
its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively 
                                                 
15 “In his quae fiunt, tunc dicitur esse aliquid perfectum, cum de potentia educitur in actum; transumitur 
hoc nomen perfectum ad significandum omne illud cui non deest esse in actu, sive hoc habeat per 
modum factionis, sive non” (STh, I, 4, 1 ad 1). Cf. STh, I, 5, 5 c.; CG, I, 28, n. 268; Super III Sent., 27, 
3, 4 c.; In De div. nom., 12. 
16 Cf. Super II Sent., 15, 3, 1 c.; 34, 1, 4 c.; CG, II, 73, n. 1498; III, 64, n. 2394; STh, I, 73, 1 c.; III, 29, 
2 c.; In Eth., I, 10 (Leon. 47/1, p. 35, lin. 29-31). 
17 “Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu: unde manifestum est quod intantum 
est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens” (STh, I, 5, 1 c.). Cf. De pot., 7, 2 ad 9; STh, I, 3, 4 c.; 4, 1 ad 3. 
18 “Unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum” (STh, I, 5, 5 c.). “Ratio autem boni in 
perfectione consistit” (CG, I, 39, n. 320).  
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(i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be 
relatively, and to be good simply.19 
 
Here, it is crucial to remark that the first instance of perfection or goodness is predicated 
in relation to the realization or actualization of a thing’s essence or nature.20 A thing’s 
fulfillment in its proper nature is the measure of its goodness. This understanding 
relativizes goodness to each particular thing and thereby intensifies the role of knowing 
the thing’s nature in judging its actual goodness. St. Thomas states clearly: “for each 
thing, that is good which suits it according to its form; and evil, that which departs from 
the order of its form.”21 In things that are changing, a thing’s goodness has its degrees 
along the process of its becoming. In section 6.1 we quoted Aquinas who explains that 
forms of things are of two kinds: perfect – that which completes the species of a thing; 
and incomplete – that which constitutes a thing on the way of generation to the perfect 
form according to its species or a thing in the process of corruption. Hence, in 
St. Thomas’s understanding of natural form, we face the whole range of intermediate 
forms that is limited by the primary matter and perfect form of some species. For that 
reason, the perfection and goodness of a child is to be judged according to the 
intermediate form which is proper to the child at this stage of development and the 
perfection and goodness of an old man, similarly, according to what is proper to this 
stage of human life.  
The full perfection of things, however, does not consist only in substantial form: 
In natural things the whole fullness of perfection due to a thing is not from the mere 
substantial form which gives species; but much is added from supervening accidents, 
                                                 
19 “Bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id 
quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem 
quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur 
perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum esse, 
quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens, 
secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter” (STh, I, 5, 1 
ad 1). “Si quidem aliquid defuerit de debita essendi plenitudine, non dicetur simpliciter bonum, sed 
secundum quid” (STh, I-II, 18, 1 c.). 
20 “In hoc enim consistit uniuscuiusque rei bonitas, quod convenienter se habeat secundum suae naturae” 
(STh, I, 71, 1 c.). “Perfectum dicitur quasi complete factum, sicut perambulasse nos dicimus, quando 
ambulationem complevimus; unde, quod non est factum, non potest secundum hanc rationem dici 
perfectum. Sed quia res, quae fiunt, tunc ad finem suae perfectionis perveniunt, quando consequuntur 
naturam et virtutem propriae speciei, inde est, quod hoc nomen perfectum assumptum est ad 
significandum omnem rem, quae attingit propriam virtutem et naturam” (In De div. nom., 2, 1).  
21 “Unicuique enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei 
praeter ordinem suae formae” (STh, I-II, 18, 5 c.). Cf. STh, I, 49, 1; I-II, 71, 2. 
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as man does from shape, colour, and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out 
of due proportion, its consequence is evil.22  
 
Action or operation is one of the accidents caused by substance. These can often be very 
important accidents, which may be essential attributes by which we recognize what is 
the essence or what is the nature of some thing. When this is the case, we can say that 
the action of something is a fulfillment of its natural potency, because such an action 
expresses the intrinsic teleology of the substance. In natural beings which do not have 
the capacity of intellectual judgment such intrinsic teleology is determined in realization 
to only one way. Nonetheless, as many individuals instantiate particular natures (in 
different times and places, in different conditions of matter and agent), we can find as 
many variations in singular realizations of this natural telos. In the case of human 
beings, the range of variations extends significantly due to the faculty of intellectual 
judgment.23 Obviously, a human being is a natural being as well; therefore, there is also 
a determination to one telos proper to human nature. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that 
it can be said that all men seek the same pleasure according to natural desire but not 
according to their own judgment. Indeed not all think in their heart or say with their 
lips that the same pleasure is the best. Nevertheless everyone is inclined by nature to 
the same pleasure as the highest, namely, the contemplation of intelligible truth 
inasmuch as all men naturally desire to know. This happens because all things have in 
themselves something divine, i.e., an inclination of nature, which comes from the 
First Principle, or even their form itself which is the principle of the inclination.24 
 
Yet intellectual judgment can be used in order to establish one’s own telos, which 
objectively might be in harmony or at variance with the natural one. According to 
Aquinas, the natural determination of the intrinsic human goal (which is universal for 
every particular instantiation of human species) does not belong to the range of human 
decision. We may decide to embrace one way of its realization or another but not 
                                                 
22 “Respondeo dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus non invenitur tota plenitudo perfectionis quae debetur 
rei, ex forma substantiali, quae dat speciem; sed multum superadditur ex supervenientibus 
accidentibus, sicut in homine ex figura, ex colore, et huiusmodi; quorum si aliquod desit ad decentem 
habitudinem, consequitur malum” (STh, I-II, 18, 3 c.). 
23 “Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatis mediis perducuntur ad finem, unde semper eodem modo 
contingunt: natura enim determinata est ad unum. Electiones autem humanae diversis viis tendunt in 
finem, tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus. Non igitur electiones humanae sunt naturaliter” 
(CG, III, 85, n. 2601). 
24 “Omnes homines appetunt eamdem delectationem secundum naturalem appetitum, non tamen 
secundum proprium iudicium; non enim omnes existimant corde, neque dicunt ore eandem 
delectationem esse optimam, natura tamen omnes inclinat in eandem delectationem sicut in optimam, 
puta in contemplationem intelligibilis veritatis, secundum quod omnes homines natura scire desiderant. 
Et hoc contingit, quia omnia habent naturaliter in se ipsis quiddam divinum, scilicet inclinationem 
naturae, quae dependet ex principio primo; vel etiam ipsam formam, quae est huius inclinationis 
principium” (In Eth., VII, 13 [Leon. 47/2, p. 433, lin. 156-168]). 
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change it with our decision. Indeed, our particular choices may really contradict what 
we are universally determined to by nature, but subjectively it will be always a choice 
of what is judged better for me for here and now, what is more fulfilling for me – that is, 
it will always be subject to the same universal dynamism of tending toward happiness.25 
“Happiness” is a term for ultimate human fulfillment. It is our ultimate good toward 
which we aim by nature by the structure of our being. When this happiness is 
misunderstood, misidentified, or misplaced, such a general misleading of all human 
choices may objectively take some apparent good, some falsely judged ultimate end, yet 
subjectively such a human being would still be under the same natural dynamism of 
striving toward happiness.  
Thus, it is insufficient for St. Thomas to say that perfection consists in the 
actualization of substantial form. He says that apart from perfectio prima we need to 
talk about perfectio secunda, which is the goal. Although it is true that it seems 
impossible to be in the state perfectio prima in its fullness and not to have perfectio 
secunda,26 there is an obvious reason for insisting on this distinction, namely, it happens 
that some individuals may attain the second perfection without having the first one. For 
example a blind person does not have the perfection which is due to human nature, but 
such a person may be perfect in the second way, may attain an excellency in operation. 
The goal could be either the operation itself or something which is attained through 
operation.27 Hence, St. Thomas can generally say that “the perfection of something 
                                                 
25 “Non enim ad liberum arbitrium pertinet quod volumus esse felices” (STh, I, 19, 10 c.). “Ultimus enim 
finis est ultimus terminus motus desiderii naturalis” (In Eth., I, 9 [Leon. 47/1, p. 31, lin. 60-61]). 
“Unde rationabile est quod ultimus finis, scilicet felicitas, proveniat homini ex suprema omnium 
virtute, scilicet Dei summi” (ibid., I, 14 [p. 50, lin. 47-50). “Omnes actus voluntatis reducuntur, sicut in 
primam radicem, in id quod homo naturaliter vult” (De virtutibus, 2, 1 c.). “Voluntas libere appetit 
felicitatem, licet necessario appetat illam” (De pot., 10, 2 ad 5). “Quia vero bonum habet rationem 
finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem 
inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et 
contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda” (STh, I-II, 94, 2 c.). Cf. Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas, Our 
Natural Lights, and the Moral Order,” Angelicum 67 (1990): 285-307; Stephen L. Brock, “Natural 
Inclination and the Intelligibility of the Good in Thomistic Natural Law,” Vera Lex 6 (2005): 57-78; 
John C. Cahalan, “Natural Obligation: How Rationally Known Truth Determines Ethical Good and 
Evil,” The Thomist 66 (2002): 101-132. 
26 Nonetheless there is one non-negligable casus in Christian belief of such an instance, viz. Lucifer. 
27 “Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta, quae quidem perfectio 
est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem secunda est finis, finis autem 
vel est operatio, sicut finis citharistae est citharizare, vel est aliquid, ad quod per operationem 
pervenitur, sicut finis aedificatoris est domus, quam aedificando facit” (STh, I, 73, 1 c.). “Ad 
perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid pertinet. Uno modo ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut 
anima requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad perfectionem rei, quod pertinet ad 
bene esse eius, sicut pulchritudo corporis et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis” 
(STh, I-II, 4, 5 c.). “Est autem duplex formalis perfectio: una quidem intrinseca, quae constituit 
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consists in that that it attain the end.”28 However, the twofold signification of this end 
should be specified: one is determined by thing’s essence or nature and another is the 
goal of the thing. In these two kinds of perfection, the attainment of full actualization of 
form and the attainment of the goal in/through operation, we can see the consequence of 
Aquinas’s distinction into finis cuius (cause of generation, i.e., when final cause 
coincides with formal cause) and finis quo (final cause of thing generated), referred to in 
section 6.2. Both kinds of a thing’s perfection are identified with its goodness.29 And 
both kinds of perfections are deeply related one with another.  
This consideration of goodness can be further specified so as to acquire a general 
method of how to analyze it. St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, says that we may 
analyze the goodness of any substance or accident according to three elements: modus, 
species, and ordo. Both kinds of perfection mentioned above are analyzable according 
to mode, species, and order. The form of something is a measure of this thing’s 
perfection. However, we know already that good expresses the perfective character of 
being by reason of its act of existing. This is, therefore, not an abstract form that is 
taken into consideration but a form that really exists with all conditions associated with 
its real existence. Hence, we should not forget that such a form, on the one hand, 
presupposes something, and on the other hand, something necessarily follows from it. 
There lurks here a danger of considering form in a too abstract (that is, a falsely 
metaphysical) way, form as species existing in mind, so that such a form may nothing 
presuppose and nothing necessarily could follow from it.  
                                                                                                                                               
essentiam rei, alia autem, quae supervenit rei in specie sua constitutae” (In Eth., X, 6 [Leon. 47/2, 
p. 569, lin. 104-107]). “Sicut perfectio domus, secundum quod iam habet speciem, est id, ad quod 
species domus ordinatur, scilicet habitatio; non enim domus fieret, nisi propter hoc, unde et in 
definitione domus oportet hoc poni, si debeat definitio esse perfecta. Perfectio vero ad speciem domus 
est tam id, quod ordinatur ad speciem constituendam, sicut principia substantialia ipsius, quam id, 
quod ordinatur ad speciei conservationem, sicut appodiacula, quae fiunt ad sustentationem domus, 
quam etiam illa, quae faciunt ad hoc, quod usus domus sit convenientior, sicut pulchritudo domus” 
(CG, III, 26, n. 2089). “Dupliciter potest dici aliquis perfectus. Uno modo simpliciter; quae quidem 
perfectio attenditur secundum id, quod pertinet ad ipsam rei naturam, puta si dicatur animal perfectum, 
quando nihil ei deficit ex dispositione membrorum et aliis huiusmodi, quae requiruntur ad vitam 
animalis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid perfectum secundum quid; quae quidem perfectio attenditur 
secundum aliquid exterius adiacens, puta in albedine vel nigredine vel aliquo huiusmodi” (STh, II-II, 
184, 1 ad 2).  
28 “Perfectio enim rei consistit in hoc quod pertingat ad finem” (In De div. nom., 1, 2).  
29 “Perfectio uniuscuiusque est bonitas eius” (CG, I, 38, n. 311). “Unumquodque dicitur bonum in 
quantum est perfectum in esse et in operari” (In De ebd., 4 [Leon. 50, p. 280, lin. 152-153]).  
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The form of a really existing being presupposes a determination or 
commensuration of principles that could be material or efficient. And this is called by 
Aquinas “mode.”  
What necessarily follows from every form is an inclination to the end or to an 
action or operation, because what is in act also acts and tends towards what is in 
accordance with its form. Thus, an order is established by the simple fact of the 
existence of a form and what necessarily follows from it.30 In this way it is clear that we 
should take these three elements (modus, species, and ordo) into account whenever we 
consider goodness of something both under the aspect of perfectio prima and perfectio 
secunda.31  
 
 
8.3. Moral goodness and the practical character of moral science 
 
One could object that in what I have written so far about the good we can find an 
inclination to conflate two distinct kinds of good, namely transcendental/ontological 
goodness with moral goodness because I should not refer to the former while discussing 
the foundation of ethics. Also bad actions exist, hence they have some ontological 
goodness insofar as they exist – this fact should caution us not to use the 
transcendental/ontological notion of good in this context. It is true that for Aquinas 
transcendental/ontological goodness is something different than moral goodness, yet in 
St. Thomas’s texts it is evident that moral goodness is to ontological goodness as 
species to genus. Ontological goodness is found in a more universal consideration; 
                                                 
30 “Unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, sic enim est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. 
Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem 
unumquodque sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam, et quaedam ad 
ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod 
formam habeat, et ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. Praeexigitur 
autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium 
ipsam, et hoc significatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. Ipsa autem forma 
significatur per speciem, quia per formam unumquodque in specie constituitur. … Ad formam autem 
consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid huiusmodi, quia unumquodque, 
inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad 
pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in perfectione, consistit etiam in modo, 
specie et ordine” (STh, I, 5, 5 c.). 
31 “Cum bonum convertatur cum ente, sicut ens dicitur secundum substantiam et secundum accidens, ita 
et bonum attribuitur alicui et secundum esse suum essentiale, et secundum esse accidentale, tam in 
rebus naturalibus, quam in actionibus moralibus” (STh, I-II, 18, 3 ad 3). Cf. STh, I, 5, 6 c.; I-II, 52, 1 c.; 
CG, III, 20, n. 2012-2014; De ver., 21, 6 c.; De virtutibus, 1, 8 ad 12; De malo, 1, 4 ad 6; 2, 3 c.; 16, 2 
ad 4. 
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moral goodness is more specific, related only to rational beings capable of free choice. 
Bad actions are good insofar as they exist, not insofar they are lacking in perfection. 
Without their ontological goodness there would be nothing that could be lacking. 
Aquinas makes it plain in the following fragment: 
The disposition of things in goodness is the same as their disposition in being. There 
are namely some things of which being does not depend on another – in these it 
suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are also things the being of 
which depends on something else – hence, in their regard we must consider their 
being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Just as the being of a thing 
depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end. 
Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the 
measure of goodness is not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other 
things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of 
goodness from the end on which they depend, besides the unconditional goodness 
which exists in them.32 
 
Thus, it is necessary that the goodness of human action be analyzed – as every goodness 
– according to the species, mode, and order. Yet apart from that the fact that human 
action is an accidental being should also be taken into account. 
Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that 
which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and 
being so much has it of goodness, as stated above. Secondly, it has goodness 
according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has 
goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it 
has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.33 
 
Moral goodness or evil are characteristics inhering in a human being through 
human acts. The human act is an act that is per se caused by human being. This means 
that a human act proceeds from a deliberated will, called also “free choice.”34 Other acts 
                                                 
32 “Respondeo dicendum quod eadem est dispositio rerum in bonitate, et in esse. Sunt enim quaedam 
quorum esse ex alio non dependet, et in his sufficit considerare ipsum eorum esse absolute. Quaedam 
vero sunt quorum esse dependet ab alio, unde oportet quod consideretur per considerationem ad 
causam a qua dependet. Sicut autem esse rei dependet ab agente et forma, ita bonitas rei dependet 
a fine. Unde in personis divinis, quae non habent bonitatem dependentem ab alio, non consideratur 
aliqua ratio bonitatis ex fine. Actiones autem humanae, et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio, habent 
rationem bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent, praeter bonitatem absolutam quae in eis existit” (STh, I-II, 
18, 4 c.). 
33 “Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex considerari potest. Una quidem secundum genus, 
prout scilicet est actio, quia quantum habet de actione et entitate, tantum habet de bonitate, ut dictum 
est. Alia vero secundum speciem, quae accipitur secundum obiectum conveniens. Tertia secundum 
circumstantias, quasi secundum accidentia quaedam. Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi secundum 
habitudinem ad causam bonitatis” (ibid.). For an excellent study of the place of final cause in the 
analysis of moral goodness see Steven A. Long, The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act (Naples, 
FL: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2007). 
34 “Respondeo dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie dicuntur humanae, 
quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo. Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in 
hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quarum 
homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et 
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that occur in human being are called acts of human being rather than human acts. 
Aquinas equates human act with moral act. “Moral” is therefore a characteristic of an 
act which is caused by a rational free agent.35 As such “moral” in the human realm is an 
accident (quality) of an accident (action) of a human being, which is the subject for 
them. An accident of an accident (a quality of action) therefore should be analyzed 
accordingly in relation to the immediate (action) and ultimate subject (person). 
To the general description of what a human being is, belongs thus not only what 
it is from the aspect of its substance, but also from the aspect of its accidents, among 
which the most important in this case are action and quality. Operation and dispositions 
to the operation constitute the human person, in a way, because they testify to its 
fulfillment. Hence, in our assessment of the goodness of a human being we should also 
take into account the kinds of operations undertaken by man or its capabilities to 
operate in a certain way. In the order of discovery, operation is first and through the 
operation we are able to recognize that there is an appropriate cause of it. The 
requirement of the appropriateness of the cause in the case of human intelligent and free 
action asks for something other than a merely bodily cause.36 This is the way of 
discovering immaterial faculties of the intellect and will as well as their subject, which 
is the soul.  
Moreover, this manner of describing a human being as the source of certain 
kinds of action enables us to discover – because of the regularity or constancy of some 
actions – also some capabilities or dispositions of these faculties. Among these 
capabilities or dispositions, habits are included as something distinct from faculties and 
                                                                                                                                               
liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae 
dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, 
possunt dici quidem hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis inquantum est 
homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea 
secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet quod 
omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint” (STh, I-II, 1, 1 c.). 
35 “Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani, vel morales, secundum quod sunt a ratione” (STh, I-II, 18, 5 c.). 
“Actus dicuntur humani, inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata … actus morales proprie speciem 
sortiuntur ex fine, nam idem sunt actus morales et actus humani” (STh, I-II, 1, 3 c.). “Dicuntur enim 
proprie illi actus humani quorum ipse homo est dominus; est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per 
voluntatem sive per liberum arbitrium” (De ver., 5, 10 c.). Cf. STh, I-II, 17, 4 c.; De virtutibus, 1, 4 c.; 
Super II Sent., 25, 1, 3 ad 3. 
36 “Nulla virtus activa se extendit ad ea quae sunt supra speciem et naturam agentis: quia omne agens agit 
per suam formam. Sed ipsum velle transcendit omnem speciem corporalem, sicut et ipsum intelligere: 
sicut enim intelligimus universalia, ita et voluntas nostra in aliquod universale fertur, puta quod 
odimus omne latronum genus, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica” (CG, III, 85, n. 2611). “Sicut 
dicitur in XVI De animalibus, quorum principiorum actiones sunt sine corpore, oportet principia 
incorporea esse; unde non potest esse quod actiones intellectus et voluntatis, per se loquendo, in aliqua 
principia corporalia reducantur” (De ver., 5, 10 c.). 
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from singular actions. These habits are considered by Aquinas as qualities of the agent. 
Because these habits cause diverse kinds of actions suitable or not to the agent, they are 
analyzable according to their goodness or evil.37 Thus, virtues and vices as good and 
bad habits belong to our ordinary descriptive equipment of what there is.  
Ethics assumes the existence of habits and the analysis of their nature from 
natural science. Already in his commentary to the Physics St. Thomas explains that 
habits or dispositions of the body and habits or dispositions of the soul belong to the 
first species of quality and they are some virtues and vices:  
For in general the virtue of a thing is what makes it good and renders its work good. 
Hence, a virtue of the body is that according to which it is well constituted and acts 
well, for example, health. And the contrary is true of vice, for example, sickness.38  
 
The general definition of virtue is applicable not only to the rational soul but also to 
good dispositions of the body – health is given as an example. Aquinas explains that 
every virtue and vice is predicated in relation to something else.39 He develops the 
example of health showing that relation or order to something should be necessarily 
included in any description of such dispositions. These dispositions, however, are not to 
be considered as relations but as qualities understandable only together with relations.40 
Aquinas points at two kinds of these relations or orders: one is set among the parts or 
elements that constitute something in itself according to its nature, the other compares 
something to its operation. These two kinds of relations are distinguished as 
a consequence of two parts of the general definition of the virtue of a thing: 1) what 
                                                 
37 “Quales sunt habitus, tales actus reddunt ut dicitur in II Eth.” (Super III Sent., 34, 2, 2, qc. 2 sol.). 
“Habitus, secundum proprietatem sui nominis, significat qualitatem quandam, quae est principium 
actus, informantem et perficientem potentiam; unde oportet, si proprie accipiatur, quod sit 
superveniens potentiae sicut perfectio perfectibili” (Super II Sent., 24, 1, 1 c.). “Habitus potentiae 
alicuius perfectivus est” (CG, I, 92, n. 771). “Habitus autem a potentia in hoc differt, quod per 
potentiam sumus potentes aliquid facere, per habitum autem non reddimur potentes ad aliquid 
faciendum, sed habiles vel inhabiles ad id, quod possumus, bene vel male agendum. Per habitum igitur 
non datur neque tollitur nobis aliquid posse, sed hoc per habitum adquirimus, ut bene vel male aliquid 
agamus” (CG, IV, 77, n. 4114). 
38 “Habitus qui sunt in prima specie qualitatis, etiam corporei, sunt quaedam virtutes et malitiae. Virtus 
enim universaliter cuiuslibet rei est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit: unde virtus 
corporis dicitur, secundum quam bene se habet et bene operatur, ut sanitas; e contrario autem est de 
malitia, ut de aegritudine” (In Phys., VII, 5, n. 6). 
39 “Omnis autem virtus et malitia dicuntur ad aliquid” (ibid.). 
40 “Non autem est hic intelligendum quod huiusmodi habitus et dispositiones hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad 
aliquid sint; quia sic non essent in genere qualitatis, sed relationis: sed quia eorum ratio ex aliqua 
relatione dependet” (ibid.).  
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makes it good, and 2) renders its work good.41 Thanks to the latter kind of relations we 
are able to see such qualities of a thing that excede in a way our understanding of the 
thing’s nature, because we see  
some dispositions of something that is perfect in its nature in comparison to the best, 
i.e., to the end, which is operation. … these dispositions are described in reference to 
the due work, which is the best of a thing.42 
 
 Thus a thing perfect in its nature (perfectio prima) might have some dispositions to an 
operation that can be recognized as what is the best of the thing (perfectio secunda). 
This “what is the best of the thing,” which is its operation, is identified as the final cause 
of the thing.  
What is this “due work” that supplies the basis for assessing dispositions? Note 
that St. Thomas undertakes here, in his commentary to the Physics, a description of all 
dispositions common to everything that operates in any way. Earlier he compared the 
first kind of relations, according to which something is well kept in itself, to the health 
of a lion. Such a net of relations that enables us to recognize that a lion is healthy is 
specific to a lion and cannot be applied succesfully in judging the health of a horse. 
Similarly, the net of relations according to which we recognize an excellency in lion’s 
operation is far different from the net of relations according to which we judge an 
excellency in horse’s operation. These relations must have their foundation in the 
natural identity of a thing. A “due work” or an excellency in operation cannot be judged 
otherwise than referring to the particular nature of the agent.43 Remember that this is the 
most general consideration, which is presupposed and treated as manifest in more 
specific disciplines. When St. Thomas writes about human excellency, when he 
describes intellectual and moral virtues, he applies the same schema. 
                                                 
41 “Nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum … alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se 
habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud” (STh, I-II, 49, 1 c.). “Si autem sumatur habere, prout res aliqua 
dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum 
aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est: de quo Philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit 
quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum 
se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est” (ibid.). “Habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis” (STh, 
I-II, 49, 2 c.). “Habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei et ad operationem vel 
finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc disponitur” (ibid., 4 c.). “Habitus est 
quaedam dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam vel ad operationem” (ibid., 
50, 1 c.). 
42 “Huiusmodi enim sunt quaedam dispositiones eius quod est perfectum in sua natura per 
comparationem ad optimum, idest ad finem, qui est operatio. … Dicuntur ergo huiusmodi dispositiones 
per relationem ad debitum opus, quod est optimum rei” (ibid.). 
43 “Dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, 
nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod 
attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis” (STh, I-II, 49, 2 ad 1). 
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Yet, in this view moral science might appear as only a specification of natural 
science that seems inapropriate because of the practical character of the former and only 
the theoretical character of the latter. There is certainly something of the specification in 
ethics as regards natural science, but it is similar to the way medicine is in relation to 
natural science. In medicine, natural science is presupposed and a special quality or 
perfection (health) of the human being is studied more closely in order to guide sanative 
activities of the doctor; similarly in ethics natural science is presupposed and a special 
quality or perfection (moral goodness) of the human being is studied more closely in 
order to guide human activities towards happiness.  
The amount of theory does not decide whether a science is theoretical or 
practical. Practical sciences differ from theoretical in their goals or ends. The goal 
or end of theoretical sciences is only the attainment of truth whereas practical sciences 
seek the truth so as to order it to practice or operation. The unique essential difference 
between theoretical and practical sciences consists, therefore, in the existence or non-
existence of the ordering to practice. Obviously, there are some additional reasons that 
may be brought forth, as for example that the subject considered in practical sciences 
(factibilia or operabilia) is by itself inextricably practical whereas the subject of 
theoretical sciences (for example the subject of mathematics) is not by itself practical. 
Yet, properly speaking, what is studied in practical sciences is something that is first 
recognized to exist or that it should exist; it is recognized as such and such or 
recognized that it should be such and such; it is recognized as doable or operable, and 
only finally it is considered under the aspect of how it may be made or done. The 
practicality of science comes last in the process of forming such a science but it comes 
without eliminating previous intrinsically theoretical steps of this process.  
The knowledge that an artist has about something that can be made is of two kinds: 
speculative and practical. He has speculative or theoretical knowledge when he knows 
the intimate nature of a work but does not have the intention of applying the 
principles to the production of the work. His knowledge is practical, properly 
speaking, when by his intention he ordains the principles of the work to operation as 
an end. In this way, as Avicenna says, medicine is divided into theoretical and 
practical. It is clear that the practical knowledge of an artist follows his speculative 
knowledge, since it is made practical by applying the speculative to a work. But when 
the practical is absent, the speculative remains.44 
                                                 
44 “Artifex de operabili habet duplicem cognitionem, scilicet speculativam et practicam: speculativam 
quidem sive theoricam cognitionem habet cum rationes operis cognoscit sine hoc quod ad operandum 
per intentionem applicet, sed tunc proprie habet practicam cognitionem quando extendit per 
intentionem rationes operis ad operationis finem, et secundum hoc medicina dividitur in theoricam et 
practicam, ut Avicenna dicit. Ex quo patet quod cognitio artificis practica sequitur cognitionem eius 
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Hence, moral science does not lose its practical character when it is considered as 
dependent upon a theoretical or speculative science. Moreover, to be a science at all it 
must be so dependent, as it was already argued in section 4.3. Now more will be said 
about the specificity of this dependence. 
The beginning of Saint Thomas’s commentary on the Ethics revolves around the 
term ordo. He states that it is characteristic of the intellect or reason to recognize 
ordinem: “even if the sensitive powers know some things absolutely, nevertheless to 
know the order of one thing to another is exclusively the work of intellect or reason.”45 
Between the two orders we can find in things, things among themselves and things to an 
end, the latter is called principalior. Yet in relation to reason there is a fourfold 
diversification of orders. 
Because the operation of reason is perfected by the habit of science, according to 
these different modes of order that reason properly considers, there are different 
sciences. To natural philosophy pertains to consider the order of things that human 
reason considers but does not make – in this way under natural philosophy we also 
include mathematics and metaphysics. The order that reason considering makes in its 
own act, pertains to rational philosophy, which considers the order of the parts of 
speech among them and the order of principles to conclusions. But the order 
of voluntary actions pertains to the consideration of moral philosophy. The order that 
reason considering makes in external things established by human reason, pertains to 
the mechanical arts.46  
 
Aquinas says that reason in its own consideration is able to establish different orders. 
We saw already how this establishing of order is achieved in the case of logic: this is 
not an arbitrary establishing of anything, but a complete dependence of our cognitive 
faculties and its activities on things of this world. This dependence is the measure of the 
veracity of every logical reasoning and of every statement. Logic is built upon 
intellectual perceptions of relations that ensue in the human mind from intellectual 
perceptions of things. Logical principles and rules of thinking come from the 
                                                                                                                                               
speculativam, cum practica efficiatur per extensionem speculativae ad opus; remoto autem posteriori 
remanet prius” (De ver., 2, 8 c.). 
45 “Nam, etsi vires sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam 
cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis” (In Eth., I, 1 [Leon. 47/1, p. 3, lin. 4-7]). 
46 “Quia consideratio rationis per habitum scientiae perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordines quos 
proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae: nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare 
ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit, ita quod sub naturali philosophia 
comprehendamus et mathematicam et metaphysicam; ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in 
proprio actu pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis 
adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones; ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad 
considerationem moralis philosophiae; ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus 
constitutis per rationem humanam pertinet ad artes mechanicas” (ibid. [p. 4, lin. 25-39]). 
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observation of this world, because, according to St. Thomas, there is no understanding 
without phantasms: our cognition begins in senses and phantasms are necessary in every 
act of understanding. All first principles in their functioning are based on the 
undestanding of the terms of these principles. Understanding of any concept, again, is 
impossible without our previous possession of phantasms, which could provide a basis 
for the intellect to abstract a concept. This is valid for all sciences. Thus, the order that 
is only discovered and not made by human reason, the order proper to natural science 
along with mathematics and metaphysics, is presupposed even in the consideration of 
logic. Otherwise, in Aquinas’s account, it would be impossible to conceive any logical 
principle, it would be impossible to judge the truth of predications and the validity of 
inferences.  
According to St. Thomas, in mechanical arts similarly, reasoned considering 
establishes an order in exterior things, but it depends in this activity upon the order of 
nature. Mechanical arts also presuppose the order which is not made but only 
discovered in human experience of the world. A doctor cannot take the first principle of 
medical science and arbitrarily establish what health is nor is it possible to construct 
a ship without knowledge of the nature of materials and the force of waves. Ars imitatur 
naturam – St. Thomas repeats again and again. He explains why this principle is true in 
this way:  
The reason for saying that art imitates nature is as follows. Knowledge is the principle 
of operation in art. But all of our knowledge is through the senses and taken from 
sensible, natural things. Hence in artificial things we work to a likeness of natural 
things. And so natural things are imitable through art, because all nature is ordered to 
its end by some intellective principle, so that the work of nature thus seems to be the 
work of intelligence as it proceeds to certain ends through determinate means. And 
this order is imitated by art in its operation.47 
 
Finally, is ethics so significantly different from logic and mechanical arts that it 
should not presuppose the order only discovered and not made? Is ethics so exceptional 
that it does not or even cannot repose on the order considered in speculative sciences? Is 
it possible to have such first principles of ethics that they be independent from our 
                                                 
47 “Eius autem quod ars imitatur naturam, ratio est, quia principium operationis artificialis cognitio est; 
omnis autem nostra cognitio est per sensus a rebus sensibilibus et naturalibus accepta: unde ad 
similitudinem rerum naturalium in artificialibus operamur. Ideo autem res naturales imitabiles sunt per 
artem, quia ab aliquo principio intellectivo tota natura ordinatur ad finem suum, ut sic opus naturae 
videatur esse opus intelligentiae, dum per determinata media ad certos fines procedit: quod etiam in 
operando ars imitatur” (In Phys., II, 4, n. 6). Cf. ibid., 13, n. 4; STh, I, 117, 1 c.; CG, II, 75, n. 1558; 
Super IV Sent., 42, 2, 1 sol.; In De sensu, I, 1 (Leon. 45/2, p. 8-9, lin. 277-321); In Polit., prooem. 
(Leon. 48 A, p. 69, lin. 1-23). 
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knowledge of the order of nature? No, it is impossible in the Aristotelian account. And 
this for the same reason as this quoted above in the case of mechanical arts. First 
principles of every science depend upon our knowledge of the order of nature. Apart 
from what Aquinas says on this in his last lesson of the Commentary on the Posterior 
Analytics (see section 4.3), in his introduction to the Commentary on the Politics he 
gives an even more explicit statement confirming this general rule in application to both 
groups of practical sciences: to mechanical arts and to moral science.48 St. Thomas 
begins this commentary with his personal reflection on how art imitates nature. He takes 
“art” in the large sense as a cause of things opposed to “nature” and “chance.” In the 
course of this reflection he says that:  
human reason, in reference to the things that exist according to nature, is only 
a cognoscitive power, whereas in reference to things that exist according to art, it is 
both a cognitive and operative power. Hence, the human sciences that deal with 
natural things are necessarily speculative, while those that deal with things made by 
man are practical or operative according to the imitation of nature.49 
 
Practical or operative sciences are both cognitive and operative because they are 
practical or operative “according to the imitation of nature.” If so, they are necessarily 
first cognitive and then practical – otherwise they would not be “according to the 
imitation of nature.” Further Aquinas touches the same question when he remarks that 
politics is a part of practical philosophy because human reason in reference to civitas is 
not only a cognitive power but also operative.50 This “not only … but also…” reveals 
certain dependence of the practical character of reason upon what is known from the 
order of nature as given and not made by man. In particular, politics,  
considering the principles and the parts of the city, gives a knowledge of it by 
manifesting its parts and its properties and its operations. And because it is a practical 
science, it manifests in addition how each thing may be realized, as is necessary in 
every practical science.51 
                                                 
48 Cf. In Polit., prooem. (Leon. 48, p. 69-70).  
49 “Ratio humana eorum que sunt secundum naturam est cognoscitiva tantum, eorum uero que sunt 
secundum artem est et cognoscitiua et factiua. Vnde oportet quod scientie humane que sunt de rebus 
naturalibus sint speculatiue, que uero sunt de rebus ab homine factis sint practice siue operatiue 
secundum imitationem nature” (ibid. [p. 69, lin. 29-36]). Cf. STh, I, 60, 5; II-II, 31, 3; 50, 4; 130, 1. 
50 “Cum enim scientie practice a speculatiuis distinguantur in hoc quod speculatiue ordinantur solum ad 
scientiam ueritatis, practice uero ad opus, necesse est hanc scientiam sub practica philosophia 
contineri, cum ciuitas sit quiddam totum, cuius humana ratio non solum est cognoscitiua, set etiam 
operatiua” (In Polit., prooem. [Leon. 48, p. 69-70, lin. 75-81]). 
51 “Sicut enim scientie speculatiue que de aliquo toto considerant, ex consideratione partium et 
principiorum notitiam de toto perficiunt passiones et operationes totius manifestando, sic et hec 
scientia principia et partes ciuitatis considerans de ipsa notitiam tradit partes et passiones et operationes 
eius manifestans. Et quia practica est, manifestat insuper quo modo singula perfici possunt: quod est 
necessarium in omni practica scientia” (ibid. [p. 70, lin. 110-119]). 
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Here again, the basic function of this science is a description and explanation in general 
and its practicality consists only in manifesting how singulars may be brought to 
perfection. The ordo that reason establishes should be thus understood primarily as a net 
of relations that occur between an acting person and this person’s acts in the perspective 
of personal and universal final cause as well as between this acting person and other 
personal beings. This is the ordo that human being makes in its own acts according to 
the recognized truth of the agent’s identity, of the character of acts, and of the identity 
of other persons. This recognition of our own identity in the natural order and the 
identity of other persons Aquinas extends also to God as the One who makes the natural 
order of things:  
just as the order of right reason is from man, so also the order of nature is from God 
Himself. And therefore in sins against nature, in which the very order of nature is 
violated, injustice is done to God Himself, the one who orders nature.52 
 
The fact that personal acts are carried out by an order of practical reason, is only 
secondary, because it concerns the knowledge of “how to do,” that is, it pertains more to 
prudence than to moral science.53  
It is proper to moral philosophy … to consider human operations, insofar as they are 
ordered to one another and to an end. I am talking about human operations, those 
springing from man’s will following the order of reason. But if some operations are 
found in man that are not subject to the will and reason, they are not properly called 
human but natural, as clearly appears in operations of the vegetative soul, which in no 
way fall under the consideration of moral philosophy. As the subject of natural 
philosophy is motion, or mobile thing, so the subject of moral philosophy is human 
action ordered to an end, or even man, insofar as he is an agent voluntarily acting for 
an end.54  
 
St. Thomas juxtaposes the subject of natural philosophy with that of moral philosophy 
in order to explain the specificity of the latter. In this quotation human operation 
                                                 
52 “Sicut ordo rationis rectae est ab homine, ita ordo naturae est ab ipso Deo. Et ideo in peccatis contra 
naturam, in quibus ipse ordo naturae violatur, fit iniuria ipsi Deo, ordinatori naturae” (STh, II-II, 154, 
12 ad 1). 
53 For a longer discussion of the distinction of speculative and practical sciences see Jacques Maritain, 
Distinguish to Unite: or, The Degrees of Knowledge, Transl. under the supervision of G. B. Phelan 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), Appendix VII; William A. Wallace, “Being Scientific in 
a Practice Discipline” as Essay XIII in From a Realist Point of View, p. 273-293.  
54 “Sic igitur moralis philosophiae … proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod 
sunt ordinatae adinvicem et ad finem. Dico autem operationes humanas quae procedunt a voluntate 
hominis secundum ordinem rationis; nam, si quae operationes in homine inveniuntur quae non 
subiacent voluntati et rationi, non dicuntur proprie humanae sed naturales, sicut patet de operationibus 
animae vegetabilis, quae nullo modo cadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae. Sicut igitur 
subiectum philosophiae naturalis est motus, vel res mobilis, ita etiam subiectum moralis philosophiae 
est operatio humana ordinata in finem, vel etiam homo prout est voluntarie agens propter finem” 
(In Eth., I, 1 [Leon. 47/1, p. 4, lin. 39-54]). 
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appears as a species of operation understood as something universal and common to 
every activity. If we would like to put human operations into one of the Aristotelian 
categories, we should put it into the category of action and passion. It is thus one of the 
nine accidents. In general, action along with passion is considered as a characteristic of 
every material being. The proper science for this consideration is natural science which 
has for its subject mobile being. The heading “mobile being” comprises human being 
insofar as it is material and changing. In this way what we call today biology, and 
philosophical anthropology, and epistemology, and psychology, all of them used to be 
integral parts of natural science. All of them treat something of human being and its 
activity.  
To natural science pertains somehow even the treatment of human soul as the 
substantial form of the body and as manifesting itself through bodily action and 
experience tied up to phantasms. Intellect and will as faculties of this substantial form, 
although they themselves are immaterial and act per se without matter, nonetheless they 
belong to a changing being in this present bodily condition and are known only through 
material manifestations. We do not know what it is like to be without a body or to think 
without a body or to be conscious without a body. Our consciousness is now necessarily 
bound up with our bodily condition. Thus, human action in general remains in the scope 
of natural science.  
Among diverse operations of human being there are some ordered to an end 
through rational appetite. The subject of moral philosophy, human action ordered to an 
end, is therefore an aspect of human action: ordinatio ad finem is its distinctive feature. 
What is this distinctive feature? How could we put this into one of the Aristotelian 
categories? We can find a fitting place for ordinatio ad finem within the category or 
relation, often called ad aliquid. Again, it is an accident. It appears that in this case 
ordinatio ad finem is an accident of human action, which also is an accident. For 
St. Thomas it is obvious that every accident is caused by that in which it remains, 
generally its substance, and thus every accident is definable and explainable by its 
substance. As a result of this approach to science and to accidents, natural science is 
necessary to begin the study of moral philosophy. The necessity of natural science 
before studying moral philosophy is even more visible when we take the second 
phrasing of the subject of moral philosophy: “a man insofar as he is an agent voluntarily 
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acting for an end.” This is why Aquinas wisely postpones the course of moral 
philosophy until students have learned natural science.55  
On the other hand, moral philosophy seems to be a part of wisdom to which 
pertains ordinare. We could thus imagine that ethics should be taught within or even 
after the course of metaphysics, to which the name of wisdom applies most of all. Why 
should it be taught before metaphysics? The ordo docendi is conditioned by our 
cognitive capacities: more known to us are singular things and events, and we find their 
causes more easily than universal causes of all things. The discovery and demonstration 
of universal cause which takes place in the last stage of the general study of nature 
prepares for the study of metaphysics and it seems that metaphysics could be taught just 
after natural science, and moral philosophy after metaphysics. Yet metaphysics is more 
difficult to learn than ethics, and so should be taught after that what is easier, if 
possible.56  
Apart from that, since in human action there is a special and very important kind 
of motion not treated in particular in natural science, there is a need just after natural 
science to devote a special science to explain this kind of motion according to causes 
that are more known to us. This special kind of motion is the action of the will as 
ordered by reason57: the human being is a changing being not only in the order the 
human being does not make but also on the level of the order which is made in actions 
                                                 
55 Obviously, there is also another argument for this postponement, namely the one concerning a good 
disposition of students: to learn ethics they need to have more experience than it is required for liberal 
arts and natural philosophy, and also have their spirits liberated from too much passion. 
56 Ethics is not necessary for learning metaphysics but it is for the greater good of metaphysics: “alie 
uero scientie sunt ad bene esse ipsius [i.e. metaphisice], ut musica et morales et alie huiusmodi” 
(In Boet. De Trin., 5, 1 ad 9). Interestingly, John Wippel juxtaposes the text of this answer with the text 
of Avicenna, Metaphysica I, 3, where he more explicitly states that: “Musica vero et particulares 
disciplinalium et morales et civiles utiles sunt, non necessariae, ad hanc scientiam [i.e. ad 
metaphisicam].” (John F. Wippel, “Aquinas and Avicenna on the Relationship Between First 
Philosophy and the Other Theoretical Sciences (In De Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 9)” in: Metaphysical Themes 
in Thomas Aquinas [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984], p. 44). 
57 In his Commentary to Ethics St. Thomas presents the intellect or reason and will as principles of 
movement, according to the treatment of them from De anima: “Duo sunt principia humanorum 
actuum, scilicet intellectus seu ratio et appetitus, quae sunt principia moventia, ut dicitur in III De 
anima” (In Eth., I, 1 [Leon. 47/1, p. 5, lin. 128-131]). Although the specificity of the motion proper to 
spiritual substances should be underlined in order to avoid some misunderstandings: “Platonici, qui 
posuerunt aliqua movere seipsa, dixerunt quod nullum corporeum aut divisibile movet seipsum; sed 
movere seipsum est tantummodo substantiae spiritualis, quae intelligit seipsam et amat seipsam: 
universaliter omnes operationes motus appellando; quia et huiusmodi operationes, scilicet sentire et 
intelligere, etiam Aristoteles in III De anima nominat motum, secundum quod motus est actus perfecti. 
Sed hic loquitur de motu secundum quod est actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia, secundum 
quem motum indivisibile non movetur, ut in sexto probatum est, et hic assumitur. Et sic patet quod 
Aristoteles, ponens omne quod movetur ab alio moveri, a Platone, qui posuit aliqua movere seipsa, non 
dissentit in sententia, sed solum in verbis” (In Phys., VII, 1, n. 7). 
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of the will. We are talking about actions of will that are natural, but are not actions of 
nature understood as our bodily condition. If we take “natural” as signifying rather our 
animal condition, actions of the will as ordered by reason exceed the determination of 
nature. If we, however, take “natural” as signifying both our animality and rationality, 
then actions of the will as ordered by reason are plainly natural.  
However, it is true that the study of metaphysics helps significantly in ordering 
our acts towards the end because this end is more clearly seen. The study of 
metaphysics provides also the possibility of judging better about the moral matter in the 
light of higher causes. St. Thomas, as a commentator of Aristotle’s Ethics, is already an 
accomplished professor and when it is advantageous to his readers, he freely elucidates 
the ethical matters adducing quotations, definitions, divisions and distinctions from 
Metaphysics, not as something that the students should already know but that he is 
a teacher to whom students owe a confidence about matters which will be fully 
explained later.58  
 
*   *   * 
 
In this chapter we examined the possibility of an analysis of goodness. In 
St. Thomas’s approach, such an analysis is possible thanks to his teaching on analogy, 
thanks to his semantics, and thanks to the hylomorphic structure of his thought. Apart 
from that metaphysics helps significantly in ordering and strenghtening this analysis. 
Good is analyzable according to mode, order, and species – and this analysis implies 
that we can know and can predicate of the natures of things as they are instantiated in 
these things.  
The notion of perfection was underlined as this which closes the “Open 
Question Argument.” The distinction between first and second perfection proved useful 
also in the analysis of the specificity of moral goodness and its relationship to 
ontological goodness.  
 
                                                 
58 Cf. e.g.: “Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod duplex est operatio, ut dicitur in IX 
Metaphysicae” (In Eth., I, 1 [Leon. 47/1, p. 6, lin. 193-194]). 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to show whether St. Thomas Aquinas justified 
the transition from “is” to “ought,” that is, the transition from factual descriptions to 
moral claims. The need for such a study was dictated by a controversy that originated 
with an interpretation of Aquinas’s writings that takes for granted the negative answer, 
namely that generally there is no justification for such a transition and Aquinas did not 
even try to justify it or to make it. For it is believed that to make such a transition is to 
commit a basic logical fallacy: you simply cannot infer prescriptive conclusions from 
purely descriptive premises. This claim is presented as an obvious philosophical 
principle. Some texts from the Summa Theologiae are quoted as well in order to prove 
that practical principles are not deduced from theoretical principles. This should 
confirm the opinion that St. Thomas was so a great thinker that already in the thirteenth 
century in his ethical theory he avoided a common mistake which was named and 
stigmatized only in the eighteenth century by David Hume. Moreover, since the first 
practical principles are not deduced from metaphysics or natural science, it follows that 
Aquinas’s ethics is not and cannot be naturalistic. By the same token St. Thomas 
avoided in his ethics the “naturalistic fallacy” identified by George Edward Moore in 
the twentieth century.  
But this interpretation of St. Thomas proved controversial for several Thomists 
and many critiques appeared that show inconsistencies in this approach. This study, 
however, was not undertaken as another polemic with those distinguished authors who 
advanced the aforementioned interpretation. It intended only to present positively some 
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aspects of Aquinas’s teaching that help to understand why it is possible to say that he 
did justify the transition from “is” to “ought.”  
Since the question of this transition is now diversely understood by different 
authors, after the introduction a brief history of the problem was offered. The goal of 
this historical sketch was to identify the roots of the problem that was to guide our 
analysis of St. Thomas’s texts. David Hume and G. E. Moore were presented as two 
main figures who shaped the contemporary belief that no “ought” can be derived from 
an “is,” turning this belief into a general principle. Although the principle seems to be 
basically the same in the writings of both authors, Hume proposed a naturalistic version 
of ethics, whereas Moore proposed a deeply non-naturalistic one. This is commonly 
attributed to the fact that Moore had a more elaborate version of the principle. The 
above mentioned interpretation of Aquinas that accepts the “Is/Ought Thesis” rejects 
naturalism in ethics as well, absolving St. Thomas from the charge of baneful 
naturalism.  
A brief analysis of the “Is/Ought Thesis” as it is commonly understood revealed 
that this meta-ethical principle has its roots in semantics, logic, epistemology and 
metaphysics. Three layers of the thesis, namely a semantical sub-thesis, logical sub-
thesis and internalist assumption, were distinguished so as to proceed in an orderly 
manner toward answering the problem of this dissertation. 
St. Thomas lived in the thirteenth century, a century that belongs to the epoch 
called the Middle Ages or the Dark Ages – still too often characterized as the age of 
irrationality, dogmatism and superstition. Since in this study Aquinas was asked to 
respond to the problem identified in the Enlightenment era, in the Age of Reason, it was 
appropriate in Chapter 1 to sketch briefly Aquinas’s general approach to cognition in 
order to, on the one hand, underline some attractive points of his philosophical project, 
and on the other hand, find an interpretative key for reading what he said in his diverse 
writings. These two aspects are deeply connected because the general approach to 
cognition includes the Aristotelian technique of research and explanation. Knowing the 
art of asking questions and the need for dialectical method we could easily avoid an 
often repeated error of interpreting St. Thomas in a deductivist manner. An emphasis on 
the virtues of cognition protected our interpretation from the similarly widespread error 
of neglecting the order of learning in reading Aquinas’s writings.  
This order of learning was established by St. Thomas himself. One of his 
reasons for establishing the order of learning was to avoid useless repetition of things 
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common to diverse disciplines. He could, therefore, confidently presuppose in ethics, 
things treated in disciplines that should have been taught earlier. For our topic, it turned 
out to be crucial because, although the problem of the possibility of inferring an “ought” 
from “is” belongs to ethics or its foundations, the roots of the problem are not ethical 
and thus the problem seems to be insoluble within ethics as a discipline. Hence, we 
concluded that in order to find an answer to the problem of this dissertation we cannot 
read only the texts which we judge to belong to ethics or moral theology. Doing so 
might easily lead us to interpret them anachronistically. Two distinct disciplines come 
before ethics in the order of learning, namely logic and natural science. We decided to 
explore them in order to find some indications of how to respond to the question posed 
by this study.   
Since Aquinas said that there are important things taught in logic that are valid 
for all disciplines, and knowing from the history of philosophy that logic was not the 
same for all ages, in Chapter 2 we turned our eyes to see what logic he used. This step 
was taken not only because of the order of learning but also because of the logical sub-
thesis contained in the “Is/Ought Thesis.” First, we followed Aquinas’s divisions of 
logic so as to, on the one hand, realize that his understanding of logic is different from 
today’s mainstream logics, and on the other hand, to set an order for our subsequent 
inquiry. Next, it was necessary to distinguish logic as an art (logica utens) and logic as 
a science (logica docens). The first is a part of the art of living, the second is one of the 
quasi-speculative disciplines (“quasi” because of its subordination to other speculative 
disciplines). It became obvious that the thesis on the logically illicit character of the 
inference of an “ought” from an “is” might be easily defended if we take logic in the 
sense of a discipline, that is, when we take the premises in their logical formality. Such 
a logic does not consider human being as a changing being, a being that has nature and 
is naturally inclined and directing his actions to an end, because this logic is not applied 
to really existing things. To be sure, taking descriptive phrases in their logical formality, 
no prescriptive or imperative phrase follows from them. Yet it is not so obvious for 
logic as an art, in applied logic, in logic which serves in other disciplines and shapes 
real human choices and their lives.  
To grasp better the nature of St. Thomas’s logic and how such a logic can be 
applied to other disciplines we inquired what is the subject of logic. It was necessary to 
understand exactly what logical relations are as opposite to real relations and non-
logical relations of reason because Aquinas’s solution of this question helps to 
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recognize the possibility of a realistic discourse about things that are not immediately 
sensorily experienced. In this account, logic, even though remotely, is perforce based 
upon the reality of things. Logic is supposed to lead us to know things as they really are, 
protecting against errors in our acts of reason. Through logic one makes an order in 
one’s acts of reason, yet this order is not a fruit of an arbitrary creativity of reason. For 
St. Thomas the logical order would never exist without our cognition of really existing 
things. Logic only serves to know what there is so as to make an order in what we think.  
Since we learned in Chapter 2 that there are three kinds of logical relations or 
logical intentions (namely, the intention of universality, the intention of attribution, and 
the intention of consequence), we went deeper in our analysis of the topics that 
generally pertain to Aquinas’s logic and explored in Chapter 3 the first and the second 
kind of logical intentions, leaving the third for Chapter 4. Hence, in Chapter 3 the 
intention of universality was studied under the aspect of St. Thomas’s theory of 
signification. This served to prepare us to give an answer to the semantical sub-thesis of 
the “Is/Ought Thesis.”  
At the beginning we asked where the intention of universality comes from and 
we made plain how Aquinas undermines the main skeptical premise in his analysis of a 
simple cognitive act. The representing function of understanding, as the activity of mind 
which gives rise to the intention of universality, St. Thomas explained within the 
framework of formal causality. This protected his approach from diverse pitfalls of 
representationalisms known from the later history of philosophy and allowed him to 
remain realist and steady in reflecting upon the possibility of the scientific knowledge 
of the natures of things as they really are in things. Accordingly, the essentials of 
Aquinas’s theory of signification were sketched, and the immediate or primary 
signification of words was clearly distinguished from their proper signification. This 
element is foundational for both the theory of predication and theory of science. 
The subject of the theory of predication is the second logical intention, the 
intention of attribution. The inherence theory of predication was briefly explained along 
with the verificational factor of sentences. We learned that for Aquinas the only 
properly speaking true sentences are indicative sentences because only these signify the 
relation of adequacy between the act of the intellect and the actual state of things 
signified by the subject and predicate of such sentences. Imperative sentences express 
the tendency of will, hence the character of truth may be ascribed to them only insofar 
as the will conforms with the judgment of the intellect that concerns things as they 
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really are. Imperative or prescriptive sentences would be therefore reduced to indicative 
sentences in order to find whether they are true or not. As a logical tool the inherence 
theory of predication serves to perfect our analysis of what there is in the world and 
opens the possibility of diverse ways of describing and expressing what there is. 
Issues treated in Chapter 3 constitute a necessary background for St. Thomas’s 
theory of learning and his general scientific methodology, which is partly discussed in 
Chapter 4. In this chapter the third logical intention, the intention of consequence, plays 
the main role and determines the possibility of inferring conclusions. Hence, looking for 
the justification of the inference of an “ought” from an “is” we had to explore also this 
field of Aquinas’s logic. Moreover, looking for the possibility of grounding ethics as 
a science on some descriptive science or sciences we had to determine how exactly the 
word “science” functions in St. Thomas’s writings and what kind of knowledge has 
scientific status in his works. We learned that his scientific method provides not only 
a description of phenomena, but also a causal explanation according to formal, material, 
efficient, and final cause. We remarked as well that Aquinas’s theory of science would 
be impossible without his semantical presuppositions.  
Further, some aspects of material logic were considered. In this context we saw 
how important it is to distinguish science in the sense of an epistemic virtue and science 
in the sense of a discipline to dispel erroneous interpretations of Aquinas’s general 
scientific method. We also analyzed the conditions for premises to construct 
a demonstration through which science may be obtained. From this we concluded that 
sometimes it is impossible to demonstrate otherwise than only through the final cause. 
Thus the demonstration ex suppositione finis is sometimes the only adequate means to 
fulfill the conditions to acquire science. The role of final cause was especially 
emphasized as the logical instrument that helps significantly and is even necessary in 
sciences that explain changing things, things characterized by a dynamism of aiming to 
their end, namely, in natural science and ethics.  
To this part of logic belongs also the discussion about definitions and first 
indemonstrable principles. We followed St. Thomas’s explanation of the origin of all 
first indemonstrable principles. He teaches that all of them are derived from our sensory 
experience and all of them presuppose our understanding of terms that constitute these 
principles. In this topic the distinction between science as a discipline and science as an 
epistemic virtue was also clarifying for there are principles treated as first and 
indemonstrable within the scope of some disciplines (especially in disciplines that treat 
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some accidents inhering in and caused by substance) but they are demonstrable in more 
basic disciplines (namely in disciplines that treat these substances which cause the 
accidents in question). Moreover, the lack of such a more basic demonstration, even if it 
belongs to another discipline, may result in the absence of science as an epistemic 
virtue. Instead, there would be only dialectical knowledge or opinion. This point 
underlines the sapiential character of Aquinas’s theory of learning and is at odds with 
our contemporary way of doing philosophy or science.  
From this logical analysis we concluded that since moral science treats properly 
human action as ordered to the end, it treats an aspect (or quality understood only with 
a relation: “being ordered to”) of an accident (action). This aspect is thus an accident of 
an accident. In the framework of Aquinas’s logic (i.e. his theory of science or his way 
of explanation) this situation calls for a knowledge of the subject (human being) as the 
cause of the accident (action). Without this basis we, admittedly, could coherently 
construct a discipline with its first indemonstrable principles that would have all formal 
requirements for a discipline, but we would not have science as a virtue. Several texts 
were adduced in order to show that this is indeed so for St. Thomas in the case of moral 
science. 
Chapter 4 closed the first part of this dissertation and left us with the need to 
looking for a science that could construct such a human “is,” which would provide 
a possibility for inferring an “ought.” We embarked on the consideration of this 
problem in Chapter 5, where we studied how many and what kinds of theoretical or 
speculative sciences we have, so as to choose from among them the most proper to 
describe what a human being is. It was necessary to see why these sciences differ, what 
the factor divides them, and how it influences the mode of their procedure. Especially 
important was to see how St. Thomas avoids the danger of “mathematization” in natural 
science and metaphysics and how he avoids the danger of “metaphysicization” in 
natural science. These clear distinctions of functions and competences of the sciences 
allowed us to point at natural science as the most proper to carry out the scientific 
description and explanation of a human being so as to provide a basis for moral science. 
Indeed, also in the order of learning Aquinas puts ethics only after the study of natural 
science and before the study of metaphysics. In addition, we learned that within the 
scope of natural science St. Thomas also establishes an order according to which we 
should study diverse parts of this science.  
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In Chapter 6 we explored the particular manner of explanation in natural 
science. The first basic principles of Aristotelian hylomorphism were analyzed as a way 
of understanding change or changing being. We saw how the precision of Aquinas’s 
analysis enabled him to avoid some errors of Platonism and gave him some excellent 
tools which he used in all his writings. If we did not know this analysis we would be 
prone to diverse misreadings of Aquinas because the hylomorphic structure of his 
thought is omnipresent. We learned about form as something divine, the best, and 
desirable, as well as about the necessarily dynamic character of matter as tending 
towards form.   
From this we moved to consider the principles of natural science. Natural 
motion was distinguished from other kinds of motion and briefly nature itself was 
identified. The question of the knowability of nature was only touched since it develops 
the issue of the rise of the logical intention of universality discussed in Chapter 3. We 
stressed also the difference in the signification of the word “nature” in metaphysics, 
logic, and natural science. Further, we observed how causes as principles of natural 
science emerge from a simple analysis of natural motion. Especially the necessity of 
final causality for the very intelligibility of efficient causality was explained and 
highlighted since, on the one hand, the notion of final causality is so crucial for solving 
the problem of this dissertation and, on the other hand, it is so misunderstood today. The 
correlation of formal and final causality was also stressed in a provisional analysis of 
the goodness of natural things. Finally, we saw why the subject of natural science often 
requires that demonstrations be carried out according to the final cause. Because this 
kind of demonstration involves a supposition, it was also explained what certainty of the 
conclusions results from it and what errors may be easily made in this context.  
This dissertation did not offer an elaborated Thomistic anthropology. In Chapter 
6 only some general elements were displayed from the foundational treatise of natural 
science because these things are said to be presupposed in the whole natural science (so 
they may be inadvertently omitted by authors who study Aquinas’s anthropology and 
even more so by those who study Aquinas’s ethics or moral theology). Nonetheless, 
from these elements it became clear that St. Thomas’s understanding of natural science 
and his manner of analyzing what there is in natural things gives a possibility of 
revealing not only what there is but also what there should be according to the inherent 
nature of this particular thing.  
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In Chapter 7 we took three specific lessons from the vast domain of natural 
science so as to grasp better the originality and attractiveness of Aquinas’s approach. 
First, we looked closer at his analysis of motion because he himself expressly said that 
by not knowing what motion is, one does not know what nature is. Since nature is 
defined as an inner principle of motion and rest in things, the analysis of motion is one 
of the privileged ways of recovering the signification of the word “nature” from 
misunderstandings caused by a selective reading of Aquinas’s texts and by 
anachronistic distortions. This analysis indicated how important the notion of real and 
non-real (but non-logical) relation is in St. Thomas’s account of motion. We remarked 
also that this simple analysis of motion must include the notion of efficiency and 
finality. Thus, efficiency and finality turned out to be indispensable for our 
understanding of motion. It became plain that an erroneous “metaphysicization” of 
natural beings, their natures, essences, or quiddities might obstruct to grasp their deeply 
relational character in all their dependencies. We saw how the complete understanding 
of natural things in their real existence implies our knowledge of their origin and end. 
To the constitution of really existing thing belongs an order or a relation to its origin 
and an order or a relation to its end. These orders or relations do not enter into the 
essence of the thing but they make up the thing in its real existence as a changing being 
or being-in-motion. We were able thus to appreciate the wise procedure dictated by 
St. Thomas in his order of learning. According to his intention, everybody had to go 
through the initial analysis of motion so as to be able to understand nature as it exists in 
extra-mental things in relation to diverse dependencies of things that instantiate this 
nature. Among these dependencies the most important are those of origin and finality. 
Without this initial analysis, the finality of nature might appear as a religious pretension 
of those who are unable to free their reason from this teleological “superstition.”  
The second lesson from natural science continued the thread of 
religious/irreligious thinking about nature and about ethics. We looked for reasons why 
Aquinas is not hesitant to refer to God in his philosophical discourse on human action. 
We saw that the question of the Author of nature belongs still to the foundational 
treatise of natural science and as such it is presupposed in every specific part of this 
science. Thus, also in the science of man or anthropology, that is, in the science which 
constitutes human “is,” God too should somehow be included. It was, therefore, 
advantageous for us to see what knowledge of God the students of natural science 
gained before they started to learn ethics.  
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We offered only some remarks concerning the physical proof of the existence of 
the first mover and St. Thomas’s discussions with those who disagreed with his 
approach, so as to show Aquinas’s deep conviction that with our natural cognitive 
capacities it is possible to discover that the first mover of this world exists. He said, 
namely, that this proof from the foundational treatise of natural science is the most 
perfect, such that it could not be resisted. We noted as well that already on this stage of 
philosophical formation there was much more that students learned about God, 
especially that he produces the world by his intellect and will. We saw how Aquinas 
explains that there is no serious obstacle to identify this God discovered in natural 
science with the God of the Bible.  
These remarks enabled us to find a better solution to the problem of how to 
interpret the “religious” character of St. Thomas’s thought in his commentary 
to Aristotle’s Ethics than pointing at his religious profession. This better solution 
respects the order of learning and methodological presuppositions clearly articulated 
elsewhere by Aquinas. We concluded rather that for him every human person is 
inherently a religious being, which means that everybody by the fact of being human, is 
already related to God as to the adequate source of human nature in general and the 
human soul in every instantiation of this nature. Everybody is constituted in one’s being 
also by the order towards God as the unique adequate final cause of man. This fact 
changes significantly our understanding of natural justice and what we, as beings of 
nature, owe to God.  
The third lesson from natural science concerned more specific and often 
underestimated topic of sensory cognition in relation to practical rationality. This lesson 
helped to deal with the “internalist assumption.” We explored some aspects of the 
nature and functioning of the discursive or cogitative power (vis cogitativa). This is the 
highest of the four interior senses, essentially the same as in other animals (vis 
aestimativa). This sense is responsible for the perception of some singular intentions 
from sensory data, just as the intellect is responsible for the universal ones. These 
intentions in the interior sense are the fruit of the comparison of what is experienced 
with the identity of the agent, which means that the content of experience is taken under 
the aspect of being beneficial or nocive to the agent. This function allows animals to act 
instinctively: to protect themselves, feed, play, and reproduce according to their own 
nature. For Aquinas, animals in their sensory cognition possess a kind of consciousness 
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and recognize what they experience as something good or bad for them, what should be 
followed (prosequendum) or avoided (vitandum).  
We learned that according to St. Thomas, on the one hand, all speculative 
cognition comes through the functioning of the cogitative power because the cogitative 
power makes experience possible and, on the other hand, that every application of the 
universality of intellectual operations to singular actions occurs also through the 
functioning of the cogitative power. Moreover, although prudence is one of the 
intellectual virtues, Aquinas claims that prudence pertains more to this interior sense 
than to the intellect because actions are in singulars and intellect concerns only 
universals.  
From our analysis we concluded that the intellect becomes practical through the 
cogitative power. We also outlined briefly the mutual dependency of the intellect and 
this interior sense. From this it became clear that the first principle of practical reason is 
only a conceptual expression of our sensory consciousness which we share to 
a considerable extent with other animals. The principle that good should be followed 
and evil avoided appears thus as a conceptualization of the rule which every animal has 
inscribed in its nature and which every animal follows according to its particular 
capacity to grasp what is good for it or what is evil. Man has the capacity to grasp the 
good universally and thus the content of this principle differs significantly, but the 
principle itself remains the same. This solution allows us to reject the need of searching 
for any other distinctive “ought” than the “ought” of natural finality discovered, and not 
established, in the consideration of what constitutes a human being. Thus, St. Thomas’s 
consideration of what man is contains already in some sense what he ought to do.  
In Chapter 8 we examined how Aquinas analyzes the good. Obviously, this topic 
directly opposes G. E. Moore’s claim that good is unanalyzable. The impossibility of 
this analysis, according to Moore, sentenced every ethics based upon any definition of 
good to a lethal fallacy. Therefore, firstly, the analogical character of good was 
underlined. Then, the transcendentality of the term “good” was explained and the rules 
of defining according to Aquinas’s semantic presuppositions were applied to goodness. 
From this analysis perfection as a correlate to good proved useful (once understood in 
relation with what is presupposed from the initial analysis of hylomorphic structure of 
material being, which we learned in natural science). Next the Augustinian way of 
analyzing the good according to mode, order, and species was presented as it was used 
by St. Thomas. This revealed how goodness is relativized to particular natures of what 
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is claimed to be good and how such an analysis implies the possibility of knowing the 
natures of things as well as the “natures” of some accidents. Also an error of the 
“metaphysicization” of nature was indicated as something precluding the possibility of 
an integral analysis of the goodness of changeable beings.  
Further, some remarks about moral goodness were offered. Moral goodness was 
presented as a species of ontological goodness, which means that for St. Thomas an 
“ought” is a species of an “is.” This is possible only if the “is” is depicted and explained 
with philosophical tools which he so masterly used. Especially the notion of habit was 
examined as one more element from natural science that perfects the description of what 
there is and what there should be according to nature. What was said in Chapter 4 was 
applied to the analysis of moral goodness to emphasize the necessarily naturalist 
character of Aquinas’s ethics.  
Finally, some notes about the practical character of moral science were given so 
as to forestall the objection that allowing ethics to be naturalistic one devoids its 
content. There is a danger, it is believed, that such an ethics may be reduced to natural 
science and lose the reason for its existence. Presupposing what was said in previous 
chapters, moral science and its proper order was compared with the order of natural 
science, logic, and mechanical arts. Especially the comparison with logic, as it is 
understood by Aquinas, proved useful. The possibility of reducing ethics, in the same 
way as logic, to natural science or metaphysics, comes only from methodological 
confusion. The possibility of confusion, however, cannot undermine true natures and 
the functions of these sciences. This chapter ends with some notes on the role of 
metaphysics in learning ethics and on the place of both in one sapientially oriented 
organism of philosophy.  
 
*   *   * 
 
Trying to give a brief answer to the question whether St. Thomas Aquinas 
justified the transition from “is” to “ought,” we should say: yes, he did. The logical sub-
thesis of the “Is/Ought Thesis” in Aquinas’s framework is simply wrong. It is true that 
not from every descriptive sentence or synthetic statement which uses no term in its 
moral sense there follows a moral statement. Yet there are descriptive sentences that 
point at the final cause of a human being and thus entail moral statements. And there are 
specific rules in material logic discussed by St. Thomas that help to discern what 
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conditions of descriptive sentences should be fulfilled so as to justify such an inference. 
The semantic sub-thesis of the “Is/Ought Thesis” does not apply to Aquinas’s 
framework because of the extensive differences in semantic presuppositions. It could be 
granted that if aforementioned descriptive sentences be understood not in their proper 
signification (which means: in their too abstract sense), the possibility of inferring moral 
claims might be precluded. Yet if they are understood as signifying the final cause of 
this instantiated nature in a singular man, a moral conclusion follows. A detailed 
analysis of human cognitive faculties, coupled with an elaborated semantics, allowed 
Aquinas to avoid also the problems with the “internalist assumption.” Finally, it should 
be said that in St. Thomas’s approach ethics not only might presuppose natural science 
but it necessarily presupposes natural science. In this sense Thomistic ethics is 
necessarily naturalistic. 
To be sure, we might have developed significantly the topic of moral 
psychology in this dissertation in order to show the genuineness of St. Thomas’s 
approach. We might have examined closer his theory of relation as it is used in his 
moral teaching. We might have shown in detail Aquinas’s virtue ethics and his 
conception of moral fault or sin in order to reveal more clearly the dependency of moral 
science upon natural science. We might have studied as well how to understand natural 
law within this framework. Each of the topics, however, deserves that it be undertaken 
in a separate study.  
After this voyage of exploration into logic and natural science (with some 
metaphysical excursions) which had to prepare our study of St. Thomas’s ethics, we 
need most of all a separate study which could examine what import all of this has for 
Aquinas’s moral theology. We may rightly conjecture already now that this import is 
extensive. This preparation will certainly protect us, at least partly, from being 
anachronistically creative in the interpretation of his texts. On the other hand, it will 
give us some useful interpretative tools so as to explain some rather cryptic principles 
that appear without explanation in a theological context. Yet most importantly this 
preparation will give us the courage to seek harmony between what we know naturally 
and what we know from divine revelation. This is what the Catholic Church seems to 
expect from moral theologians. 
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